THE

RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE.

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THE

[redacted]

RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE

WITH A

COMMENTARY

BY THE LATE

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REVISED AND EDITED FOR
THE SYNDICS OF THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

BY

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EDITOR'S PREFACE.

IT is just ten years since the lamented Author of this Commentary gave to the world of scholars an *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, containing, amongst other valuable matter, a general outline of the contents of the treatise and paraphrases of the more difficult portions. In the preface to that book, which is an almost indispensable companion to the present edition and renders any special prolegomena to these volumes unnecessary, the Author describes the *Introduction* as preparatory to the detailed explanation of the work itself in an edition of the Greek text which had been long in preparation and was to appear as soon as it could be got ready. This promise is now at last fulfilled, under circumstances however in which the pathetic interest naturally attending the publication of any posthumous work like the present, is in this particular instance, if I may judge of the feelings of others by my own, intensified into a sense of more than usually deep regret that the labours of a large portion of an eminent scholar's life-time must now see the light without the advantage of his own editorial care.

Mr Cope died in the year 1873, but during the last four years of his life his work on the Rhetoric, though it had nearly approached completion, unhappily but unavoidably remained untouched. He was actively engaged upon it during the two years that succeeded the publication of the *Introduction* in 1867;—a year that was also marked by the appearance of a long-expected edition of the Rhetoric by Spengel, which,

by the critical acumen and maturity of judgment generally displayed in its pages, and in particular by its wealth of illustration from the remains of Greek Oratory and the technical treatises of the later Greek rhetoricians, proved the most important aid to the study of the subject that had been published since the time of Victorius. With Spengel's earlier contributions to the criticism of his author, as also with those of Brandis and Bonitz and Vahlen and other eminent Aristotelian scholars on the continent, Mr Cope was of course familiar, as the pages of these volumes abundantly testify; but while preparing his own Commentary, he appears during the last two years of his active work to have only occasionally consulted and quoted Spengel's edition, refraining purposely from incurring any such indebtedness as would prevent his own edition remaining a perfectly independent work.

In June, 1874, the year after Mr Cope's death, his brothers took into consideration the desirability of publishing his Commentary; and, acting under the advice of two distinguished members of his own College, Mr Munro and Mr Jebb, did me the honour to invite me to undertake its completion and revision. The manuscript, so far as it was finished, consisted of nearly seven hundred closely written pages requiring a certain amount of general revision before they could be sent to press; and, owing to other engagements, I found it impracticable to arrange for the printing of the work to commence till June, 1875. During the progress of the work through the press in the last two years, my duties as reviser have proved more laborious than I had anticipated; as even apart from the necessity of reading several times over at various stages of progress not far from a thousand pages of printed matter, I have found it requisite to consult the reader's convenience by rearranging many of the paragraphs, by recasting many of the more complicated sentences, and by endeavouring to prevent the sense from being obscured by the partiality for parenthesis, which, in this case, happens to be characteristic of the commentator and his author alike. In a work of this compass, accidental repetitions of nearly identical notes in various parts of the Commentary are almost unavoidable, and though I have succeeded in detecting and

striking out some of these repetitions, others still remain unremoved.

It will probably occur to some of those who use this book that, in the way of retrenchment of matter and condensation of style, something might without disadvantage have been done by the original writer; but such correction, I may remark, was the very thing from which he consciously shrank; and as a mere reviser I felt that I had no right to assume the responsibility of abridging, still less of rejecting, what the writer himself clearly intended to leave standing. In the case of verbal alterations, however, which I was morally certain would not have been disapproved by the original writer, I have used such slight discretion as appeared to fall within my province; this kind of revision cannot of course generally appear on the surface, but wherever it is practicable any additional matter for which I am alone responsible is indicated by the use of square brackets with or (as the work proceeded) without my initial. Such insertions are generally very brief, and often take the form of simple reference to important works that have appeared since the Commentary was prepared; as it seemed only due to the readers of this edition and to the writers of the works in question, that I should endeavour to bring it up to date by referring as occasion served to books such as Dr Thompson's edition of the *Gorgias* of Plato (1871); Grote's *Aristotle* (1872); Volkmann, *die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer*, ed. 2, 1874; Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, 1868, '74; and Professor Jebb's *Attic Orators*, 1876. In testing the references to other parts of Aristotle, I have made frequent use of the great *Index Aristotelicus* of Bonitz, which appeared in 1870, and was therefore not available when Mr Cope's notes were written;—a fact that only increases one's admiration at the wide and minute acquaintance with all the Aristotelian writings which he had acquired by his own independent reading.

In any trifling additions of my own, I have seldom gone beyond the briefest annotations, but in the case of the third book, which was left in a less finished state, and on which I had happened to have lectured on several occasions during the last ten years, I felt myself somewhat less restricted; and indeed, as Mr Cope's manuscript unfortunately comes to an

b 2

abrupt conclusion in the course of Chapter XVII of that book, I was compelled, for the convenience of those who use this edition and in accordance with the wishes of Mr Cope's representatives and the Syndics of the University Press, to endeavour to supply the deficiency in the three concluding Chapters by writing the notes that occupy the last twenty pages of the Commentary.

In so doing, I have tried to follow the general plan of Mr Cope's own work, and in particular have paid attention to such slight indications of his intended treatment of that portion as I could glean from the memoranda in the margin of his own copy of Bekker's Oxford text of 1837. This volume and an interleaved copy of earlier date, and of somewhat less value for this purpose, were kindly placed at my disposal by the authorities of Trinity College, and, as they contain part of the first rough material for the Commentary, they have proved of some use in verifying doubtful references and also in ascertaining Mr Cope's intentions with regard to the text on points of detail such as punctuation and various readings. But, holding as he did that an editor's main duty was explanation in its widest sense and accordingly devoting himself mainly to questions of exegesis, to elucidation of subject matter, to illustration of verbal expression, and to matters of grammatical and lexicographical interest, he was content on the whole to accept the text as he found it in the earlier editions with which he was familiar. Under these circumstances, in the absence of any intention on his part to make an independent recension of the text, I have thought it best to adopt as the text of the present Commentary the last reprint (1873) of Bekker's third edition (octavo, 1859); and instead of impairing the integrity of that text by altering it here and there to suit what I gathered to be Mr Cope's intentions, I have briefly indicated the instances in which the evidence of his translation or notes, or again the memoranda in his own copy of the Rhetoric already mentioned, pointed clearly to some other reading as the one which he deliberately preferred to that of Bekker's third edition, or in which he was at any rate content to acquiesce. In the margin, beside the references to Book, Chapter and Section at the top of each page, is marked the beginning of each page of Bekker's last

octavo edition, and also of that published in quarto in 1831: the former will, it is trusted, make this work easy to refer to side by side with the plain text in ordinary use; the latter, though it involves a cumbersome method of notation, is worth recording, as it is the mode of reference adopted in the *Index Aristotelicus*, in Spengel's edition, and often elsewhere.

In an Appendix to the third volume, I have added Mr Shilleto's *Adversaria* on the Rhetoric, which I have transcribed almost exclusively from one of his two copies of the book, lately acquired (with a selection of his other books) by the Syndicate of the University Library. I have also constructed what I hope may be found to be a fairly comprehensive Greek index to the text and notes; and to this I have subjoined a supplementary index to the notes and subject matter, including amongst other miscellaneous items, almost all the passages in the rhetorical writings of Cicero and Quintilian referred to in the Commentary; the passages of Homer and other authors quoted in the text, and the illustrations from Shakespeare in the notes, and also (under the head of 'lexicographical notes') a series of references to Mr Cope's incidental contributions to Greek lexicography. In the transcription of both these indexes for the press, I have had much assistance from my brother, James Stuart Sandys, one of the undergraduates of St John's College.

I cannot close these few prefatory explanations of what I have attempted to do in discharging however imperfectly the editorial duty with which it has been my privilege to be entrusted, without recording the fact that Mr Cope (as I am assured by his surviving brother) fully intended, had he lived to see his work through the press, to dedicate it to one of his most intimate friends, Mr Munro. The latter, however, has kindly supplied a short biographical notice by which I am glad to feel that he will be as inseparably associated with the crowning work of his friend's career as if it had appeared inscribed by that friend himself with the honoured name of the Editor of Lucretius.

J. E. S.

CAMBRIDGE,
2 *July*, 1877.

CORRIGENDA.

(In the notes.)

Vol. I.

p. 40, line 14, *for* 'this ἀρετή, this special excellence', and on p. 49, last line, *read* 'the' *for* 'this' in all three cases.

p. 56, line 10, *read* ἐπανόρθωμα.

p. 76, line 29, *read* νενεμημένων.

p. 93, line 1, *for* 'in' *read* 'is.'

p. 105, line 28, *read* ἀγχίνοια.

p. 153, line 30, *read* ὀλιγαρχίας.

p. 161, line 23, *read* 'fortitude.'

p. 173, line 31, *for* 'be' *read* 'the.'

p. 190, below text, *read* ῥᾴθυμα.

p. 239, line 32, insert (3) before διὰ λόγων.

Vol. II.

p. 56, note 1, l. 3, *read* 'Gorg. 522 D.'

Vol. III.

p. 12, line 21, *read* 'II 4. 9.'

p. 30, line 1, *for* 'by' *read* 'at.'

p. 62, line 19, *read* 'writings.

EDWARD MEREDITH COPE.

MANY of Cope's friends having expressed an opinion that it would be well if a short memoir of him were prefixed to this posthumous work, and his sole surviving brother having written to me that he and his nieces would rather leave it in my hands than in those of anybody else, I could not hesitate to undertake the task.

Edward Meredith Cope was born in Birmingham on the 28th of July 1818. He was for some time at the Grammar School of Ludlow under Mr Hinde, and then for about five years at Shrewsbury, where he remained until October 1837, when he commenced residence at Trinity College Cambridge.

During the first years of his Shrewsbury life Dr Butler, late Bishop of Lichfield, was Headmaster; for the last year and quarter Dr Kennedy. Cope throughout his school career was always first or among the first of boys of his own age and standing. For to a great natural aptitude for study and scholarship he joined a strong will and a determination to use his best efforts to excel in whatever was given him to do. Not that he was a bookworm by any means: for he enjoyed extremely the society of his friends and loved innocent recreation in almost any form. Thus though he was not made, and never sought, to distinguish himself in any of them, he thoroughly enjoyed nearly all the usual games and amusements of the place. This taste he retained for years after he took his degree at the University, and Mr Essington, Vicar of Shenstone, and many other friends will bear me witness that he was a consistent votary of Hockey up to the time when the Great Western Railway extinguished this pleasant game first at Eton and then at Cambridge.

The last year and quarter of his residence at Shrewsbury was of vital importance for Cope's future career. Greek was the main and favourite study of his life; and in the summer of 1836 Greek scholarship at Shrewsbury was, if not in comparison with other schools of the day, yet absolutely at a very low ebb. Boys were left in great measure to their own natural lights. Now the light of nature seems capable in favourable circumstances of doing a good

deal for Latin; but in the case of Greek it fosters often the conceit of knowledge, but rarely indeed can impart the knowledge itself.

When Dr Kennedy came to Shrewsbury in the autumn of 1836, he proved himself equal to the task that was before him. Knowledge and method, united with kindness and enthusiasm, effected at once a marvellous change; and all who were able and willing to learn felt in a few months that they had gotten such an insight into the language and such a hold of its true principles and idiom, as to render further progress both easy and agreeable. I would appeal to those who were high in the school at the time when the change in question took place, and ask them whether I have at all overstated the facts of the case; I would refer to Henry Thring and John Bather who came next to Cope in the Classical Tripos; to Francis Morse and others of the same year with myself, and to many others.

But none was more conscious of what he owed to Dr Kennedy, or was more ready to acknowledge it, than Cope himself. The judicious training and the well-directed reading of that year and quarter had an incalculable effect on his future career as a scholar; and, when he went to Cambridge in the October of 1837, he was prepared, as few are, to profit by the advantages the place afforded for classical study. There during his undergraduate days he led a blameless, industrious, and, I believe from what I observed myself and what he often told me, a thoroughly contented and happy life, enjoying the esteem and friendship of many of his worthiest contemporaries, some of them his old schoolfellows, others new acquaintances both in Trinity and in other Colleges, whose names are too numerous to mention. All the while his studies were pursued with a constant and uniform diligence; for none knew better than he to make a good and judicious disposition of his time. He became Scholar of his College as soon as the statutes permitted him to be a candidate, and, after taking his degree in the Mathematical Tripos of January 1841, he gained, as was generally expected, the first place in the Classical. For a year or two after this success he read with a few private pupils, though this employment was never very greatly to his taste. He was elected Fellow of Trinity in 1842: this Fellowship he retained till the day of his death. During the summer of 1843 he resided for some months in Jersey with a few pupils; and in the autumn of that year he made a short tour in Normandy, where he first imbibed, or first tried to satisfy, that intense love for Continental travel which exercised so marked an influence on his future tastes and development.

The moment he had been created Master of Arts at the beginning of July 1844, he threw off for a time the trammels of

Academical life and on the 4th of that month started for a continuous tour of more than fourteen months, never setting foot again in England before the 11th of September 1845. At the commencement of this tour he had for companions two friends, both of them now dead, James Hemery, Dean of Jersey, and Richard Pike Mate, Fellow of Trinity. He always dearly loved and would sacrifice much for the companionship of intimate friends in his travels. But for the greater part of the time he was moving about by himself. In these fourteen months he traversed Switzerland almost from end to end, being a good and indefatigable walker; saw Italy thoroughly, with its thousand objects of interest, as far South as Naples; made a short excursion to Greece in November 1844, seeing Athens well and visiting a part of the Peloponnese and landing in Malta and in Sicily on his return to Italy. I have before me now a full and precise Journal which he kept of the occurrences of every day during this 14 months' peregrination. The whole would make a good-sized printed volume. Here we find minutely recorded where he slept on each succeeding night; what he ate and drank; how many miles he walked each day and the number of hours spent in walking them. He was passionately fond of mountain scenery, and of mediaeval and Italian architecture and art. In this Journal all the varying phases of Swiss scenery are described; the buildings, the pictures and other works of art of every Italian town, great or small.

Cope possessed in a high degree the happy faculty, which does not by any means always accompany general power of mind, of readily picking up a foreign language by ear and conversation; and in the course of this journey he made himself an excellent Italian scholar, acquiring such a mastery over the idiom, as is seldom possessed by Englishmen who have not resided many years in the country. On this and his many subsequent tours he attained to no less facility in colloquial French. German seemed to give him more trouble, although by continued exertion he gained a sufficient acquaintance with it too. He never appeared to me to care very much for Italian literature, with however the very important exception of Dante; nor did the great French classics seem to have any very absorbing interest for him. German he made large use of for purposes of study and critical research, while at the same time Goethe and the other classics of the language were enjoyed for their own sakes.

This first comprehensive tour imbued him with a passion for foreign travel, which he indulged without stint until permanent ill-health brought it to a close. External circumstances compelled him however to confine and modify it in future years. While he was

on his travels in 1845, he was offered and accepted an Assistant-Tutorship at Trinity, the duties of which formed the main occupation of his subsequent life. These duties compelled him to be in residence for most of the year between October and June, and left only the summer months for travel, a time not the most suitable for some of the countries which he would have most liked to see. Palestine for instance and Egypt he never set his foot in; Greece he saw only for a few weeks in 1844; nor did he ever get again to Rome or Naples after his first visit. Between June and October however he continued to be a most indefatigable traveller, confining himself almost entirely to a few favoured lands, first and foremost his first loves, Switzerland and North Italy, next France, then Belgium, Germany, Austria, and the Tirol. I should calculate that, in the twenty-four years between 1844 and 1868 when he was compelled to give up travelling, he must have spent at least six years in the countries just enumerated. With the exception of 1848, an ominous time for continental travel, during the summer of which he visited the North of England and Scotland; of 1865 when he was again in Scotland, and of one other summer when he travelled in Ireland, he was on the Continent every one of these years.

Thus in 1846 he was abroad from June the 12th to October the 5th, traversing assiduously the South West and South East of France, the Pyrenees from end to end, the Tirol and South Germany, and finally crossing through France to Paris. In 1847 he was on the Continent from June the 25th to October the 6th, passing by the Rhine and Switzerland into North Italy and to Florence, in which place he found me to my delight and profit, and accompanied me home by Bologna, Milan, Como, Switzerland, the Rhine and Belgium. I have now in my hands twenty manuscript volumes of various sizes, filled with the most minute writing, in which he describes at length the proceedings of every day and almost every hour during all these years' travel, with the exception of the six years from 1854 to 1859. That he was abroad all or most of these years I know, and that he kept equally minute journals of them I have no doubt; but whether they are lost or where they now are, I cannot ascertain. In 1855 I well remember I was with him for some time in Germany and France and in Paris, seeing the great Exhibition of that year. The moment he quits the Continent, his Journals come to an end. So far as I know or can learn, he never kept any diary of his life at home. Had he done so on any thing like the scale which he has adopted in his Journals of travel, he would have accounted for almost every hour of his life.

His social disposition greatly enjoyed the companionship of intimate friends in these travels; and this he was sometimes able to have during his earlier journeyings. In the first of them he had for a time the society of the friends who have been already spoken of. In 1847 I can remember how thoroughly happy he was in Florence together with W. G. Clark and myself. He writes in his Journal of September the 10th, the evening before he left that city: 'Altogether I dont think I ever enjoyed a visit to any foreign town more than this last three weeks at Florence. First I had very pleasant society of intimate friends which has rarely been my lot before—men that take an interest in the same things that please me; the weather has been delightful,' and so on. Again in 1851 he had a long tour, from July 2 to October 16, in Switzerland and North Italy with two intimate friends and brother Fellows, H. R. Luard, now Registrary of the University, and C. B. Scott, the present Headmaster of Westminster. I joined them for a time in Venice and found him thoroughly happy.

But as time went on and he continued year after year to pursue his travels with unabated energy, it was not so easy for him to get his old friends for companions. They did not care to walk for twenty or thirty miles over an Alpine pass under pouring rain, or to defy the summer heats of the Pyrenees, or of the sweltering cities and dust-tormented plains of North Italy. For he hated to pass a single day in inaction, looking upon this as a dereliction of duty and an ignoble concession to laziness. His Journals, as years go on, become more and more instructive, as his taste grew more refined and his discrimination keener; and the ordinary guidebooks of the countries he so often visited might gain greatly by a judicious study of these volumes. At the same time I feel convinced that these later journeys overtaxed his strength and energies, created in him an unnatural excitement and irritation, and fostered the seeds of that malady by which he was subsequently struck down.

In October 1845 Cope commenced the work of what might be called his future profession as Lecturer at Trinity, and continued to perform the duties attached to this office, with energy and success and without the intermission of a single term, for twenty-four years, until the failure of his health put a final stop to all intellectual effort in the summer of 1869.

For some years his favourite subjects of lecture were the Greek Tragedians, the two elder of whom he very decidedly preferred to Euripides. In fact until the very end of his career one or other of their plays was almost invariably the subject of his lecture for the Michaelmas term. And thus by constant repetition and careful pre-

paration he gained a thorough insight into the texts themselves and a very extensive acquaintance with the voluminous literature connected with the Greek drama. But often one or other of the two great historians, Herodotus or Thucydides, or else Demosthenes or another of the orators supplied the text on which he discoursed.

If the best scholars in any of the twenty-four generations of Freshmen who listened to his teaching were consulted, I believe they would one and all avow that their knowledge of the language and of its literature was very greatly furthered by his learned and elaborate lectures.

He gradually established his reputation in the College and the University as one of the very best and soundest Greek scholars of his time: I could cite, if it were necessary, many distinguished names to bear me out in this assertion. In his efforts to be thorough, he would collect a great mass of materials, which he did not always take sufficient pains to mould into shape and symmetry. Indeed he often avowed to me that, when he had once put on paper his thoughts and collections on any question—and this he was in the habit of doing with very great rapidity—, he found it quite impossible to rearrange and rewrite what he had prepared. Hence no doubt there was often a great diffuseness and some want of clearness in his work,—defects with which I have most frequently heard him charged by his auditors. He was by nature too very mistrustful of his own powers, and consequently a great stickler for authority. He seemed to think there was something sacred in the printed text, as it presented itself to him, and was sometimes determined to explain the inexplicable and see a meaning in that which had none. But with all this he was an admirable Greek scholar and a most valuable and highly valued lecturer.

Sometimes, though rarely, he lectured on a Latin writer; but for Latin literature, especially poetry, he did not greatly care; though he quite felt and freely admitted the surpassing merits of style in the great prose authors. After a time however he almost entirely dropped the Classical Latin writers, except for purposes not connected with the study of the language, and took up a position of benevolent neutrality with regard to the whole literature. He treated the Latin in much the same way as he treated their compeers, the great French Classics.

When he had been Assistant Tutor about ten years, he undertook the College lecture on Plato, and afterwards on Aristotle as well; and these two philosophers he resolved to make the main object of his study henceforth. For a long time his great natural diffidence seemed to give him a disinclination to commit anything to the press. One of his earliest essays in print were his criticisms, in the Journal

of Classical and Sacred Philology, of Grote's famous dissertation on the Sophists. There is a good deal to be learnt from what he has written; but, if I am not mistaken, he has hardly caught Grote's point of view, which in this country at all events has I believe now gained very general acceptance among the best judges. In 1864 he published a translation of Plato's Gorgias. His translation is strikingly literal and very excellent in its kind; but this kind is peculiar. Mr Henry Jackson in his introductory remarks to Cope's translation of the Phaedo, a posthumous work which Mr Jackson has edited with great skill and diligence, has given a short and trenchant exposition of the principle which Cope has followed out in both these translations. A more elaborate effort is the Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, published in 1867 and designed to serve as a preliminary study to the present edition of that work. We find in this dissertation a very full exposition of Aristotle's principles, set forth with learning and research; but one feels perhaps here too that want of concentration and careful revision, which, as I have said, Cope used himself to acknowledge with regret as a peculiar feature of his style which he was quite unable to remedy. Anyhow I fancy a reader would have liked to have seen it incorporated in the present edition as an essential portion of it, neither of the two being a complete whole without the other. This edition it is not for me to offer an opinion upon: suffice it here to say that it was the main occupation of the latest and most mature years of his working life, and bears witness in every page to unsparing labour and genuine scholarship.

Cope was ordained Deacon in November 1848 and Priest in September 1850 by Dr Turton, late Bishop of Ely. A short experience with his friend Mate, then Vicar of Wymeswold, convinced him that, as he had already for some years devoted himself to a life of study, Parish work was not the sphere for which his tastes and habits were best adapted; and he contented himself afterwards with occasionally assisting one or other of his clerical friends, when he would make them a visit during a vacation.

Perhaps the most important crisis in the even tenour of his laborious College life was occasioned by the Greek Professorship becoming vacant in 1866, when he came forward as one of three candidates for that office. The votes of the electors, the Council of the Senate, having been equally divided between him and Dr Kennedy, the appointment finally devolved by statute on the Chancellor of the University who gave it to Dr Kennedy. There is no doubt that this result was a poignant disappointment to Cope at the time; it is no less certain that his strength and the tone of his mind

were already a good deal affected by ill-health. This I could illustrate from my own knowledge, if many considerations did not counsel silence on matters which neither his friends nor the public would care to know, or see paraded before them.

Every one, they say, has the defects of his virtues; and it cannot be denied that in his later years, when health became uncertain, Cope was too prompt to take offence and conceive causeless suspicions against his most intimate friends. But they could understand that this arose from excess of susceptibility and perversion of tender feeling; and the offence was forgotten as readily as it was conceived.

In August 1869 he was seized with that malady from which he never rallied during the four remaining years of his life. He died on the 5th of August 1873, and on the 14th of that month he was followed to his grave in the Church of England Cemetery at Birmingham by his two brothers, his nephew and a few of his oldest and dearest friends.

I never knew a kinder-hearted or more charitable man than Cope. Suffering of any sort excited in him an uncontrollable longing to relieve it, whether the relief were to be afforded by sympathy and personal attention, or by money. Many indeed are the acts of charity on his part which fell under my own observation; and I am sure that I never learnt but a small portion of them, for he loved to do good by stealth. Whenever a friend needed care and sympathy, none so prompt as he to offer them. When Robert Leslie Ellis, for whom he felt an unbounded admiration, was seized with fever at San Remo in 1849, off hurried Cope at once to render him all the assistance it was in his power to give. So when his poor friend Mate was struck down by crushing disease, Cope hastened at once to lavish on him his affectionate care. It was always among the chief pleasures of his existence to make a round of visits to his old friends who lived away from Cambridge. One of the oldest of them, R. W. Essington, Vicar of Shenstone, writes to me as follows: 'Of all my old friends of King's and Trinity he alone from 1848 to the year of his sad seizure visited me regularly at Shenstone. He preached in my Church, he taught in my schools, and rarely left me without contributing liberally to some Parochial charity, never without wishing to do so'. 'No one living', he adds with good reason, 'is more capable than I am of testifying to the warmth, the steadiness and depth of his friendship'.

H. A. J. M.

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ

Α.

Ὁ βίος βραχύς, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρή·
ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὀξύς· ἡ δὲ πεῖρα σφαλερή· ἡ δὲ κρίσις χαλεπή.

HIPPOCRATES.

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α.

1 Ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ· ἀμ- Bekker P. 1354 quarto edition 1831. p. 1 octavo edition 1873.

§ 1. Ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ is translated by Cicero, *ex altera parte respondere dialecticae*, Orat. XXXII 114. 'Vox a scena ducta videtur. Chori antistrophe strophae ad assem respondet, eiusque motus ita fit, ut posterior in prioris locum succedat...Significat ex altera parte respondere et quasi ex adverso oppositum esse; id quod etiam in antistrophen cadit.' Trendel. *El. Log. Arist.* § 14 p. 74: and to the same effect, *Comment. ad Arist. de Anima*, II 11 5 p. 408. 'ἀντίστροφον dicitur quod alius rei quasi partes agit eamque repraesentat;' Waitz, *Comm. ad Anal. Pr.* I 2, 25*a* 6.

The term is borrowed from the manoeuvres of the chorus in the recitation of the choral odes. Στροφή denotes its movement in one direction, to which the ἀντιστροφή, the counter-movement, the wheeling in the opposite direction, exactly corresponds, the same movements being repeated. Müller, *Diss. Eumen.* p. 41. *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. XIV § 4. Mure, *Hist. Gk. Lit.* Bk. III. c. I § 15. Hence it is extended to the words sung by the chorus during the latter of these evolutions, and signifies a set of verses precisely parallel or answering in all their details to the verses of the στροφή. And thus, when applied in its strict and proper sense, it denotes an exact correspondence in detail, as a fac-simile or counterpart. Hence in Logic ἀντιστρέφειν is used to express terms and propositions which are *convertible*, and therefore identical in meaning, precisely similar in all respects. On the various senses of ἀντιστρέφειν and its derivatives in Logic, see Waitz, u. s. In this signification, however, ἀντίστροφος does not properly represent the relation actually subsisting between the two arts, the differences between them being too numerous to admit of its being described as an exact correspondence in detail; as I have already pointed out in the paraphrase (Introd. p. 134).

It also represents Rhetoric as an art, independent of, though analogous to, Dialectics, but not growing out of it, nor included under it. The word is of very frequent occurrence in Plato (Gorgias, Republic, Philebus, Timaeus, Theaetetus, Leges), who joins it indifferently with the genitive and dative; and he employs it in this latter sense; as likewise Isocrates, περὶ ἀντιδ. § 182; and Aristotle himself in several places; Polit. VI (IV) 5, 1292 *b* 7, καὶ ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος (corresponding)

φότεραι γὰρ περὶ τοιούτων τινῶν εἰσιν, ἃ κοινὰ

αὕτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις. c. 6 ult. 1293 *a* 33. c. 10, 1295 *a* 18. de part. anim. II 17 ult. ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτοις τοῖς ζῴοις ἡ γλῶττα τοιαύτη τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἀντιστρόφως ἔχουσα τῷ μυκτῆρι τῶν ἐλεφάντων.

Lastly, Waitz, u. s., points out a peculiar signification of it, 'res contraria alteri quam potestate aequiparat,' in de Gen. Anim. II 6, 743 *b* 28. τὸ ψυχρὸν συνίστησιν ἀντίστροφον (as a balance) τῇ θερμότητι τῇ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τὸν ἐγκέφαλον. Trendelenburg, *Comm. ad de Anima* u. s., after defining ἀντιστρέφειν as above, adds, ἀντίστροφος ex eadem chori similitudine significat *ex altera parte respondere* (this is from Cicero, u. s.) Arist. Rhet. I 1; quod non significat, rhetoricam in dialecticae locum succedere (*i.e.* can be substituted for it, step into its place, as *a convertible term*), sed quasi ex adverso esse oppositam (stands over against it, as a corresponding opposite in a συστοιχία, two parallel rows of coordinate opposites, like the partners in a country dance). Quintilian, Inst. Orat. II 17, 42, *specie magis quam genere differunt.*

The term ἀντίστροφος therefore applied to the two arts, seems to represent them as two coordinate opposites, or opposites in the same row (see Spengel on the study of Rhetoric, Munich 1842, p. 21). They are sister arts, with general resemblances and specific differences; two species under one genus, proof: both modes of proof, both dealing with probable materials, but distinguished by the difference of the two instruments of proof employed: the one *concluding* by the formal syllogism, and by the regular induction, assumed complete; the other drawing its *inferences* by the abbreviated, imperfect, conversational enthymeme, never complete in *form*, and by the single example in the place of the general induction.

Rhetoric is afterwards described as παραφυές, μόριον and ὁμοίωμα (*infra* c. II § 7). παραφυές and μόριον both express in different ways the relation that Rhetoric bears to Dialectics as the off-shoot, *branch*, or part; a species or variety of the *general* art of probable reasoning: παραφυές as a subordinate shoot, growing out of the same root with the larger plant or tree,—a term so far corresponding with ἀντίστροφος, but differing from it in making Rhetoric *subordinate*. μόριον reduces it to a still lower level in comparison with the other. ὁμοίωμα implies no more than a mere general resemblance.

In Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII 6, occurs an explanation of ἀντίστροφος, quite in character with the ordinary Greek etymologies, ῥητορικήν, ἥς ἀντίστροφον εἶναι τὴν διαλεκτικήν, (not referring apparently to this passage, but most probably to the συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν) τουτέστιν ἰσόστροφον, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὕλην στρέφεσθαι (*versari circa*), as Homer called Ulysses ἀντίθεον instead of ἰσόθεον. Alexander (infr.) gives the same explanation.

Bacon *Adv. of learning* Bk. II IX 3, has *antistrophe* for 'correspondence', "and it hath the same relation or *antistrophe* that the former hath."

The points of correspondence and difference between the two arts have been already fully explained in the Introduction, p. 90 foll.: I will here give a summary of them from Alexander's *Commentary on the*

τρόπον τινὰ ἁπάντων ἐστὶ γνωρίζειν, καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης. διὸ καὶ πάντες τρόπον

Topics, p. 4. They are 1. that both of them are μὴ περὶ ἕν τι γένος ἀφωρισμένων; that is, that neither of them has any special subject-matter, like the sciences, but argues or perorates upon any thesis or subject whatsoever that can be presented to it. 2. τὸ δι' ἐνδόξων καὶ πιθανῶν, no proof or conclusion, or principle, that they employ is more than probable; exact demonstration and necessary conclusions are excluded from both alike; πίστις, belief, the result of mere persuasion, and not ἐπιστήμη, the infallible result of scientific demonstration, being the object aimed at. 3. μὴ δι' οἰκείων ἀρχῶν, they have no 'special, appropriate' first principles, such as those from which the special sciences are deduced; though they likewise appeal to the τὰ κοινά, the κοιναὶ ἀρχαί, the ultimate axioms and principles common to all reasoning, which are above those of the special sciences, and from which the latter must be deduced. And, 4. they are ὁμοίως περὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις; they argue indifferently the opposite sides of the same question, and conclude the positive or negative of any proposition or problem; unlike science and demonstration, which can only arrive at one conclusion. Where the materials and the method are alike only probable, every question has, or may be made to appear to have, two sides, either of which may be maintained on probable principles; in Dialectics and Rhetoric no certainty is either attained or attainable. The chief points of difference between them are, that Dialectics deals practically as well as theoretically with every kind of problem or question that can be submitted to it; proceeds by question and answer, in the way of debate, and its discussions are of a more general or universal character; whereas the subjects of Rhetoric are practically, though not theoretically, almost absolutely limited to Politics; it follows a method of continuous narration or explanation (διεξοδικῶς), and deals in its conclusions rather with individual cases than with general principles or universal rules, maxims and axioms.

Alexander, in a preceding passage, gives the following very extraordinary account of the derivation and original meaning of ἀντίστροφος: τὸ γὰρ ἀντ. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἰσόστροφόν τε καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ στρεφομένην καὶ καταγινομένην λέγει.

κοινὰ ἁπάντων] See Introd., p. 87, and the Paraphrase, pp. 134—5.

ἀφωρισμένης] 'marked off, separated by a limit', from every thing else about it; and so 'definite, special' (§ 7). 1, 2, 1 περί τι γένος ἴδιον ἀφωρισμένον, opposed to περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος. Polit. I 13, 1260 *b* 1 ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ δουλείαν (a definite, limited, kind of slavery). Ib. IV (VI) 4, 1290 *b* 25 ἀποδιορίζειν. ἀφορίζεται (ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις) πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις τῷ ἔργῳ τούτῳ, "this capacity of the soul is marked off, separated, distinguished, from all the rest by this function," de Anima II 4, 9, 416 *a* 20. The preposition is similarly used in the compound ἀποβλέπειν, which is 'to look away, or off', from all surrounding objects, so as to fix the attention on one particular thing, or turn it in one particular direction. Comp. Lat. definire, determinare.

Parallel passages, in which this same characteristic of Rhetoric and

τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῖν· πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ
ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον, καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ
2 κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οἱ
μὲν εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ
ἕξεως. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον ὅτι εἴη
ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁδοποιεῖν· δι' ὃ γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἵ

Dialectics is noticed, are cited in the Introd. p. 75. See also Quintilian, II 21, 16—19, on the province of the orator.

ἐξετάζειν...λόγον] Note 1, Introd. p. 135. *ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἐξεταστική*, Top. A 2, 101 *b* 3.

§ 2. *συνήθειαν*] 'habituation, familiarity, practice', acquired by *association* (prop. that of living or herding together). Top. A 14, 105 *b* 27 *τῇ διὰ τῆς ἀπαγωγῆς συνηθείᾳ πειρατέον γνωρίζειν ἑκάστην αὐτῶν (τῶν προτάσεων)*. See also on I 10, 18. This *συνήθεια* is derived from the constant operation or activity, the *ἐνέργειαι*, of the developed and acquired and settled *ἕξις*, or mental state (*ἕξις* from *ἔχειν*, 'to be in such and such a state or condition', *τὸ πῶς ἔχειν*): by the constant exercise of the *ἕξις*, or established confirmed habit, and its *ἐνέργειαι*, is produced by association that familiarity, or habituation, or practice, which secures success even to the empirical unartistic use of Dialectics or Rhetoric.

εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρᾶν is the use of them antecedent to practice, and without previously acquired familiarity: *ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου*, by a mere spontaneous impulse, and therefore 'at random.'

'Est autem dialectica,' says John of Salisbury, *Metalogicus*, II 4, 'ut Augustino placet, bene disputandi scientia: quod quidem ita accipiendum est ut vis habeatur in verbis; ne scilicet dialectici credantur, quos casus iuvat artis beneficio destitutos.'

αὐτά] Rhetoric and its processes.

ὁδοποιεῖν] 'to make a way'; to trace a path to be followed, which will lead you without unnecessary deviations to the place at which you wish to arrive. *ὁδός* therefore, in this metaphorical usage, is not merely *a* way, but *the* way, the *best* way; the way which will lead you most surely and expeditiously to the end proposed. Hence it denotes a regular, systematic, or scientific method; the best and easiest way of attaining the end desired in any intellectual pursuit or branch of study. And thus it is that the simple *ὁδός*, as well as the compound *μέθοδος*, come to denote a scientific or systematic procedure in the pursuit of truth as a philosophical 'method', or in any art or study. Hence we find *ὁδῷ διῃρῆσθαι*, Plat. Phaedr. 263 B, of a systematic methodical scientific division; and Rep. VII 533 D: *καθ' ὁδόν*, in the same sense, Rep. IV 435 A, and Crat. 425 B. In Aristotle, de gen. et corr. I 8, 2 *ὁδῷ δὲ μάλιστα περὶ πάντων...διωρίκασι Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος*. de part. Anim. I 4, 9 *πῶς μὲν οὖν ἀποδέχεσθαι δεῖ τὴν περὶ φύσεως μέθοδον, καὶ τίνα τρόπον γένοιτ' ἂν ἡ θεωρία περὶ αὐτῶν ὁδῷ καὶ ῥᾷστα...* Anal. Pr. I 30 init., *ἡ μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὁποιανοῦν καὶ μάθημα.* Top. B 2, 109 *b* 14 *ὁδῷ γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐν ἐλάττοσιν ἡ σκέψις.* Eth. Nic. I, 2 *ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ*

τε διὰ συνήθειαν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, τὴν αἰτίαν θεωρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἤδη πάντες ἂν
3 ὁμολογήσαιεν τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι. νῦν μὲν οὖν οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες ὀλίγον πεπορίκασιν αὐτῆς μόριον· αἱ γὰρ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθῆκαι, οἳ δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων οὐδὲν λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ δὲ

τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ ὁδός. Dionysius, de Comp. Verb. c. 25, has ἡ ῥητορικὴ ὁδός for the more usual μέθοδος: and again ὁδῷ, de Comp. Verb. c. 4 sub fin. From this usage of the Greek word the Latins seem to have borrowed their *via* or *via et ratione*, which frequently occurs in precisely the same sense. See Cicero de Fin. III 5, 18, IV 4, 10; Orat. III 10, XXXIII 116; de Orat. I 25, 113. Quint. II 17, 41 *esse certe viam atque ordinem in bene dicendo nemo dubitaverit;* and X 7, 6 *via dicere.*

The verb ὁδοποιεῖν is found in the same sense, Met. A 3, 984 *a* 18. προϊόντων δ' οὕτως, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὡδοποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάγκασε ζητεῖν, and Rhet. III 12, 3 (according to MS A[c] and some others); and the substantive ὁδοποίησις, III 14, 1.

προοδοποιεῖν, which occurs several times in Aristotle (as Rhet. II 2, 10, II 13, 7, III 12, 3, Prob. XXX 1, 954 *b* 12, de part. Anim. II 4, §§ 4, 5, 6, III 9, 8, de gen. anim. IV 4, 9, περὶ Μαντικῆς, I 11. Polit. II 9, 1270 *a* 4, IV (VII) 17, 1336 *a* 32, and V (VIII) 3, 1338 *a* 35 πρὸ ὁδοῦ), has a meaning slightly differing from the preceding. The metaphor is now taken from the office of pioneers, who precede an advancing army, and prepare, clear, or 'pave the way' for them.

δι' ὅ...τὴν αἰτίαν] τὴν αἰτίαν is here grammatically the antecedent to ὅ, the cause, *αἰτία*, being in the relative pronoun expressed as an abstract notion ('the cause, which *thing*') in the *neuter*. A similar change from feminine to neuter, in antecedent and relative, occurs in de Anima I 3, 407 *a* 4 τὴν γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς (ψυχὴν) τοιαύτην εἶναι βούλεται οἷόν ποτ' ἐστὶν ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς, Pol. II 2 init. καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετῆσθαι... οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων, and in Eur. Iph. T. 900 (Herm.) ἡ δ' αἰτία τίς ἀνθ' ὅτου κτείνει πόσιν; where ὅτου must be understood as neuter: see Hermann on v. 1038.

§ 3 seq. To the same effect III 14, 8 δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα· πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούοντα, ἐπεὶ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος ᾖ, οὐθὲν δεῖ προοιμίου—as the vehicle for appeals to the feelings and other indirect proofs addressed to the judges personally, which were usually introduced into the προοίμιον.

πίστεις] *rhetorical*, not demonstrative, proofs; modes of *belief*, of things *probable;* all the materials and arguments of Rhetoric being probable merely, none of them certain. See Introd. p. 136 note.

προσθῆκαι...σῶμα τῆς πίστεως] All kinds of *indirect* proof are secondary, subordinate, non-essential, mere 'adjuncts' or 'appendages', like dress or ornaments to the body: 'the body' being the actual, logical, direct and substantial proof of the case. What is here called 'the body', meaning

τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύ-
4 ονται· διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ

the substance as opposed to accidents, we usually represent by 'the soul' in this same relation; the body in its turn now standing for the accidents and non-essentials of a thing. So the Scholiast on Hermogenes, Proleg. (quoted by Ernesti, *Lexicon Technologiae Graecae* p. 110, Art. ἐνθύμημα) οἱ παλαιοὶ ὥσπερ τι ζῷον τὸν λόγον ὑπέθεντο ἐκ σώματός τε συνεστηκότα καὶ ψυχῆς· ψυχὴν μὲν καλοῦντες τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν διὰ τῶν κεφαλαίων συνισταμένην· σῶμα δὲ τὴν φράσιν καὶ τὸ ἔξωθεν κάλλος, ὃ ποιεῖν εἰώθασιν αἱ ἰδέαι. And Cicero, Orat. XIV 44 *nam et invenire et iudicare quid dicas magna illa quidem sunt et tamquam animi instar in corpore.*

Quintilian describes the views of some of those who thus rigorously limit the province of Rhetoric as an *art*—αἱ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον—to the employment of the 'enthymeme', the rhetorical representative of the logical and demonstrative 'syllogism'; with the exclusion of all that is, strictly speaking, 'beside the subject or real issue', all that is beside the facts of the case and the direct proof of them; all indirect proof, namely, from the assumed character of the speaker himself, or appeals to the feelings of the judges or audience, and also all ornaments and graces of style and delivery. Aristotle here assumes this to be theoretically the only true and proper method, though he by no means consistently adheres to it in his actual treatment of the subject. Quintilian's description is as follows, though, as the reasons for the exclusion of these indirect proofs are somewhat different from those assigned by Aristotle, he probably does not refer immediately to him: *Fuerunt et clari quidem oratores quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere. Namque et affectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant: primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio; deinde quia iudicem a veritate depelli misericordia vel ira similibusque non oporteret: et voluptatem audientium petere, quum vincendi tantum gratia diceretur, non modo agenti supervacuum sed vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur.* Inst. Orat. V. Prooem. 1.

On the general question of appeals to the feelings, Quint. II 17, 26 seq.: and on the prevailing practice, Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδ. § 321.

πραγματεύεσθαι is well explained by Bonitz on Metaph. A 6, 987 *a* 30. 'πραγματεύεσθαι περί τι, vel περί τινος is dicitur ab Aristotele, qui in investiganda et cognoscenda aliqua re via ac ratione procedit; itaque coniunctum legitur cum verbis διαλέγεσθαι, ζητεῖν, θεωρεῖν'. The primary sense of doing business, or occupying oneself about anything, passes into the more limited or special signification of an *intellectual* pursuit, and thence of 'a special study', 'a systematic treatment of a particular subject of investigation, or practice' (as in this present case, of Rhetoric, comp. § 10). πραγματεία, like μέθοδος, τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φιλοσοφία, and many other words, is used to express not only the intellectual process of investigation, but also the resulting science, art, treatise, or written work, or part of such work. See on this point, Introd. p. 17, note 2. Also, on the general meaning of the term, Waitz on Anal. Post. II 13, 96 *b* 15. Trendel. *de Anima* p. 199. *Elem. Log. Arist.* § 58, p. 135.

§ 4. διαβολή from διαβάλλειν 'to sunder or set at variance', and so

τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν. ὥστ' εἰ περὶ πάσας ἦν τὰς κρίσεις καθάπερ ἐν ἐνίαις γε νῦν ἐστὶ τῶν πόλεων καὶ μάλιστα ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις, οὐδὲν ἂν εἶχον ὅ τι λέγωσιν· ἅπαντες γὰρ οἱ μὲν οἴονται δεῖν οὕτω τοὺς νόμους ἀγορεύειν, οἱ δὲ καὶ χρῶνται καὶ κωλύουσιν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ, ὀρθῶς τοῦτο νομίζοντες· οὐ

'to make hostile, to engender a mutual dislike between two parties', in its technical application to Rhetoric, of which it is a potent instrument; and with its opposite *ἀπολύεσθαι* 'to absolve oneself, clear away from oneself ill-feeling and suspicion', forms one of the principal topics of the *προοίμιον* (see Introd. pp. 343, 4). It denotes the exciting of suspicion and ill-will in the minds of the judges or audience, in order to prejudice them against the opponent with whom you are in controversy: and is therefore improperly classed with the *πάθη* or emotions such as *ἔλεος* and *ὀργή*. This has been already noticed by Victorius and Muretus: the latter says, '*διαβολὴ* non est *πάθος*, sed pertinet ad judicem ponendum *ἐν πάθει*.'

Top. Δ 5, 126 *a* 31. [*διάβολον*] *τὸν δυνάμενον διαβάλλειν καὶ ἐχθροὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς φίλους*. These words, which seem to be a mere gloss upon *διάβολον* in the text of the Topics, occur apparently in one MS only, marked u by Waitz, and inserted by him in the critical notes of his edition, Vol. II p. 144. Bekker altogether omits to notice them. Though of no authority they will equally well answer the purpose for which they are here employed, of helping, namely, to define the meaning of *διαβολή*.

On *πάθος* and *πάθη*, see Introd. pp. 113—118.

οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος δικαστήν] Appeals to the feelings are *ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος*: they are 'beside the proper subject, the real question, the direct issue', which is the fact and the proof of it; and 'directed to the judge', intended to bias and pervert his judgment, to incline him to our side in the contest, and so to have the effect of a secondary or indirect kind of proof of the justice of our case.

ὥστ' εἰ περὶ πάσας—λέγωσιν] Similarly in Rhet. III 1, 4, it is said of the ornaments of style, and declamation in general, as of appeals to the feelings here, that they are only allowed to be employed *διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν πολιτειῶν*; in *well-governed* states they would not be permitted at all.

§ 5. *οἱ μέν...οἱ δέ*] 'either...or'. The one only *think* that the laws ought to be so framed, hold the opinion as a theory; the others, as the Court of Areopagus, actually (*καί*, also, besides the mere theory) carry it into practice, *καὶ χρῶνται*.

ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ] Heindorf ad Theaet. § 76. Lycurgus c. Leocr. §§ 12, 13, quoted by Gaisford, *καὶ ταῦτα κάλλιστον ἔχοντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων παράδειγμα τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ συνέδριον, ὃ τοσοῦτον διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, ὥστε*

γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργὴν προά-

καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὁμολογεῖσθαι τοῖς ἁλισκομένοις δικαίαν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κρίσιν. πρὸς ὃ δεῖ καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀποβλέποντας μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν' κ.τ.λ.

Lucian, *Hermotimus*, c. 64, has something similar about the practice of this court, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς 'Αρεοπαγίτας αὐτὸ ποιοῦντα· οἳ ἐν νυκτὶ καὶ σκότῳ δικάζουσιν, ὡς μὴ εἰς τοὺς λέγοντας ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ λεγόμενα ἀποβλέποιεν. (Lucian ed. Hemsterh. I p. 805), and again, *Anacharsis s. de Gymn.* c. 10, (Vol. II p. 898) οἱ δὲ (δικαζόμενοι) ἕς τ' ἂν μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος λέγωσιν ἀνέχεται ἡ βουλὴ καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἀκούουσα· ἢν δέ τις ἢ φροίμιον εἴπῃ πρὸ τοῦ λόγου, ὡς εὐνουστέρους ἀπεργάσαιτο αὐτούς, ἢ οἶκτον ἢ δείνωσιν ἔξωθεν ἐπάγοι τῷ πράγματι, οἷα πολλὰ ῥητόρων παῖδες ἐπὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς μηχανῶνται, παρελθὼν ὁ κῆρυξ κατεσιώπησεν εὐθύς, οὐκ ἐῶν ληρεῖν πρὸς τὴν βουλήν κ.τ.λ. There are several allusions to the same in Quintilian, II 16, 4, VI 1, 7, X 1, 107, XII 10, 26. Spalding in his note on the first of these passages calls attention to—what indeed is sufficiently apparent on the face of the statements—Quintilian's carelessness in extending to all the law-courts of Athens, a practice actually prevailing at the most only in one of them; in spite of the direct evidence to the contrary in the extant orations of the Athenian orators, and the story of Hyperides and Phryne which he himself tells in II 15, 9.

διαστρέφειν] to warp, or distort, to wrest out of the straight ('right') line or proper direction, to pervert or 'deprave' the judgment. The same metaphor is repeated in στρεβλόν. The metaphor which compares wrong, the deviation from the 'right' line or path, to the crooked or twisted, the divergence from the straight, and represents wrong judgment as the warping of the moral rule, occurs in various languages; σκολιός, and ὀρθός, εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς, Solon ap. Dem. de F. L. p. 423, σκολιαῖς ὁδοῖς πατῶν, Pind. Pyth. II 156, Pl. Theaet. 173 A &c. &c. So ἑλικτός, Eur. Androm. 448 ἑλικτὰ κοὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ἀλλὰ πᾶν πέριξ φρονοῦντες. So Plato of the good and bad horse in the human chariot, Phaedr. 253 D, ὁ μὲν...τό τε εἶδος ὀρθός...ὁ δ' αὖ σκολιός κ.τ.λ.

So also *rectum* and *pravum* or *varum* or *curvum*, right and wrong (wrung or twisted out of shape, distorted, similarly *intortus*) *tort*, Fr. (*tortum*), *torto*, Ital. Compare Lucretius, IV 516, *denique ut in fabrica, si* prava *est fabrica prima* Norma*que si fallax rectis regionibus exit,—Omnia mendose fieri, &c.* Cic. Acad. Pr. II 11, 33, *interesse oportet, ut inter* rectum *et* pravum, *sic inter verum et falsum.* Hor. Ep. II 2, 44, curvo *dignoscere* rectum, ('virtutem distinguere a vitio'. Orelli). Pers. Sat. III 52, *haud tibi inexpertum* curvos *deprendere mores.* IV 11, rectum *discernis ubi inter* curva *subit, vel cum fallit pede* regula varo. V 38, *apposita* intortos extendit regula *mores.*

'Crooked' for perverse, immoral, wrong, is very common in the earlier writers of our own language. Deut. xxxii 5, a perverse and crooked generation. Ps. cxxv 5, Prov. ii 15, whose ways are crooked, and they froward in their paths. Ep. ad Phil. ii 15, and in many other places and authors. For examples of the latter, see Richardson's Dict. Art. 'crooked'.

Very different to this are the principles laid down by the author of

γοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον· ὅμοιον γὰρ κἂν εἴ τις, ὢ p. 2.

the 'Ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον as a guide to the practice of the rhetorician, c. 36 (37) § 4. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς ἐπαίνῳ θεραπεῦσαι, ὡς δικασταὶ δίκαιοι καὶ δεινοί εἰσιν. συμπαραληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐλαττώσεις, εἴ που τῶν ἀντιδίκων καταδεεστέρως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τὸν ἀγῶνα. The judges are to be flattered, and the opponent represented in the darkest colours, whether his alleged defects have or have not any bearing upon the matter at issue. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐμβλητέον τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἀκόλουθα; which is the exact contradictory of the course prescribed by Aristotle in § 6 as alike fair and in accordance with the true principles of the art.

προάγοντας εἰς] Comp. III 14, 7, and note.

κἂν εἴ τις...ποιήσειε] The process by which ἂν in this and similar forms of expression—ὡς ἂν εἰ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ, καθάπερ ἂν εἰ, οἱόνπερ ἂν εἰ, and the like—has lost its force, become inactive, (*consopitum*, 'gone to sleep', Buttm.,) in the sentence, is explained by Buttmann in his note on Dem. Mid. § 15, p. 530. The conditional ἂν belongs to some verb in the apodosis, originally expressed, afterwards left to be understood, as in the clause before us. The expression at full length would be, κἂν, εἴ τις ποιήσειε, ποιήσειε, 'as one would do, if he were to do'. Still, though the particle has lost its direct and active force in this sentence, some latent notion of conditionality always remains, even when the verb which ἂν supposes cannot actually be supplied. This is the case in such phrases as φοβούμενος ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ παῖς, Pl. Gorg. 479 A 'fearing as a child would': Ar. parva naturalia περὶ μαντικῆς I 2, 2 ὅσων ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ λάλος ἡ φύσις ἐστιν, 'whose natural habit is, as it might be (ἂν), talkative'; de Anima I 5, 5, 409 *b* 27, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ πράγματα τιθέντες. In such cases the ἂν is retained by habit and association, when the sense no longer requires it. The phrase accordingly is not found in the earlier forms of the language, and does not become common till the time of Plato and Aristotle, with whom, the latter especially, it is very frequent. The association required time before it was established as a fixed habit. I believe that it does not occur in Thucydides, and that it makes its first appearance in Xenophon; that is, in the forms above given; for as an unnecessary appendage to a participle, or in cases *analogous*, ἂν is thus used by earlier writers. See Hermann on Soph. Phil. 491, and Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 430, 1, for some instances [Kühner's *Ausführliche Grammatik* § 398 p. 209 sq. S.].

Aristotle seems to be the earliest writer who assumed the license of joining κἂν εἰ with the subjunctive mood, as in Pol. II 1 init. κἂν εἰ τυγχάνωσιν, c. 2, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμῆς πλεῖον ἑλκύσῃ, and III 8 κἂν εἰ συμβαίνῃ, also Poet. I 5, κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνωσιν. Κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκῇ is the MSS reading in Plat. Rep. IX 579 D, and defended by Schneider (not. ad loc.); but rejected by Ast, Bek., Stallb. and the Zurich Editors who substitute δοκεῖ. I subjoin a few examples of the usage in its various forms. Soph. Aj. 1078 δοκεῖν πεσεῖν ἂν κἂν (it might be even) ἀπὸ σμικροῦ κακοῦ. Xenophon, Symp. II 20, IX 4, Cyrop. I 3, 1, Memor. III 6, 4 and 10, 12. Plato, Apol. 23 B, Phaed. 72 C, 109 C, and elsewhere, Men. 97 B, Gorg. 479 A, Rep. VI 493 A, Isocr. Paneg. §§ 69, 148, Aristotle in addition to

μέλλει χρῆσθαι κανόνι, τοῦτον ποιήσειε στρεβλόν.
6 ἔτι δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν ἀμφισβητοῦντος οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔξω τοῦ δεῖξαι τὸ πρᾶγμα ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ γέγονεν ἢ οὐ γέγονεν· εἰ δὲ μέγα ἢ μικρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὅσα μὴ ὁ νομοθέτης διώρικεν, αὐτὸν δή που τὸν δικαστὴν δεῖ γινώσκειν καὶ οὐ
7 μανθάνειν παρὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν προσήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται, πάντα διορίζειν αὐτούς, καὶ ὅτι ἐλάχιστα καταλείπειν ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἕνα

those already quoted, Rhet. II 20, 4, *ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις*, Eth. N. V 7, 1132, 11. Ib. V 12, 1137, 2; VI 13 sub. fin., 1145, 2 and 10; VII 8, 1150, 16, *κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι*, Pol. III 6 (sub init.) *κἂν εἰ πλείους*, and several more: Hist. Anim. IV 2, 16, IV 11, 11, VIII 2, 10, de part. Anim. IV 5, 26, de Gen. Anim. III 9, 7. In Aristotle it has become habitual. The analogous use of *ἂν* with the participle is exemplified by Pol. II 2, 1261 *b* 4 *ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι*; and Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. I 5, 1, *ὡς ἂν καθόλου λέγοντας*, and I 6, 6, *ὡς ἂν κατὰ λόγον*, where *ἂν* may be considered as redundant. [Vahlen, *Beiträge zu Ar. Poet.* I p. 35—37; Eucken, *de Ar. dicendi ratione* I p. 61—64. S.]

§ 6. On the 'legal issues', *στάσεις, ἀμφισβητήσεις*, which, as Victorius remarks, are here tacitly referred to, see Introd. p. 397, Appendix E to Bk. III.

§ 7. *κειμένους νόμους*] *κεῖσθαι* and some of its compounds are often convertible with the passive of *τιθέναι*. *κεῖσθαι* itself 'to be placed, fixed, established' = *τίθεσθαι*; *συγκεῖσθαι* 'to be put together or composed' = *συντίθεσθαι*; *διακεῖσθαι* 'to be disposed' = *διατίθεσθαι*; *ποκεῖσθαι* (as I 2 13) 'to be assumed' = *ὑποτίθεσθαι* or *ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι*.

[*κεῖμαι* is constantly borrowed as a perfect passive to *τίθημι*, while *τέθειμαι* is almost invariably used as a deponent perfect. Thus the usage of the perfect in the best writers would be: *ὁ νομοθέτης τέθεικε τὸν νόμον. ἡ πόλις τέθειται τὸν νόμον· ὁ νόμος κεῖται* (Dem. Or. 46 § 12 note). *infra* chap. 15 § 23 *τοῖς νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὦσιν ἀλλ' ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι*, Plato Leg. p. 793 B (*νόμων*) *τῶν ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντων τε καὶ κειμένων καὶ τῶν ἔτι τεθησομένων*. See also Cobet's *variae lectiones* p. 311. S.]

τοῖς κρίνουσι, κρίσεις, τοὺς κρίνοντας] On the different senses of *κρίνειν* and *κριτής* as applied to the different branches of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 137 note 1: and on the necessary imperfections of laws in their application to particular cases, the consequent introduction of *ἐπιείκεια* to modify them and adapt them to the circumstances of the case, and Plato's opinion, on the authority of laws, see p. 138 note 1.

ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι] *ἐπί* *resting*, and so depending, upon; hence *penes*, in the power of, at the discretion of. § 8 *ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς καταλείπειν*.

This primary, literal, and physical sense of *ἐπί*, (in this application of it,

λαβεῖν καὶ ὀλίγους ῥᾷον ἢ πολλοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας P. 1354 *b*. καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν· ἔπειθ' αἱ μὲν νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκεψαμένων γίνονται, αἱ δὲ κρίσεις ἐξ ὑπογυίου, ὥστε χαλεπὸν ἀποδιδόναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καλῶς τοὺς κρίνον-

which represents the object of the preposition as the *basis* on which something stands or rests, and therefore depends upon), of the half dozen Grammars and Lexicons, which, after forming my own opinion, I have consulted on the point, is to be found distinctly stated only in that of Rost and Palm, where it lurks hardly discoverable, amidst the enormous mass of illustrations of the various usages of ἐπί accumulated in Vol. I pp. 1032—1045, in p. 1038, col. 2.

αἱ νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκεψαμένων γίνονται] 'legislation arises from (is the work of men after) long previous consideration'. Thuc. I 58, ἐκ πολλοῦ πράσσοντες οὐδὲν εὕροντο ἐπιτήδειον.

ἐξ ὑπογυίου] (retained by Bekker; Gaisford *not. var.* prefers ὑπογύου, and so L. Dindorf, on Xen. Cyr. VI 1, 43.) ὑπόγυιον· πρὸ μικροῦ γεγονός, Hesychius. ἐξ ὑπογύου· παρ' αὐτά, ἀπερισκέπτως, ἐκ τῶν σύνεγγυς, Suidas. By the Scholiast on Arist. Nub. 145, in Suidas v. ἀρτί (Gaisf.), ἐξ ὑπογυίου λέγειν is interpreted by αὐτοσχεδιάζειν; and in Eustath. (ap. eund.) it is said to be derived from γυῖον in the sense of χείρ, (compare Theocr. Idyl. XXII 81 and 121; the 'hand' is *the* member, *par excellence*), from which likewise he deduces ἐγγύη, ἐγγυᾷν, and ἐγγυαλίζειν; and ὑπόγυον, ὃ καὶ ἐξ ὑπογύου λέγεται, τὸ ἐγγύς φασι προσδόκιμον, ἢ παραυτίκα γεγονός, καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν πρόχειρον, ἢ μᾶλλον ὑποχείριον. Examples may be found, all bearing much the same sense, in Koch's note on Moeris Lex. p. 343, and a still larger list in Rost and Palm's Lex. s. v., to which add Rhet. II 22, 11; Pol. VII (VI) 8, 1321 *b* 17. ὑπογυιότατον (the readiest way or means) πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν. Isocr. Paneg. § 13. Menand. ap. Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III 391. In Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδ. § 4, and Epist. 6. 2, p. 418 B, it stands for 'close at hand', ἤδη ὑπογυίου μοι τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτῆς οὔσης, and similarly Ar. Eth. Nic. III 9 (Bekk.) sub fin., ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπογυῖα ὄντα.

It appears from all this that ὑπογυῖον means 'under the hand', as an unfinished or just finished work, fresh and recent, πρόσφατον (so Rhet. II 3, 12) as Moeris explains it: and ἐξ ὑπογυίου, 'from under the hand', corresponds to our 'off-hand', or 'out of hand', and is used to express anything 'sudden and unexpected' or 'unpremeditated', 'extemporaneous' a signification which appears in all the examples. Similarly ἐκ χειρός, ἀπὸ χειρός, 'off-hand'.

ἀποδιδόναι] a word of *very* frequent use in Aristotle, has for one of its elementary senses that of 'to give back', *reddere*; ἀπό as in ἀπονέμειν, ἀπολαμβάνειν, ἀπαιτεῖν, ἀπόπλους, ἀποπλεῖν (see Sturz. Lex. Xenoph.), from which all the other senses in which at least Aristotle employs it may be deduced. Another of the original senses of the word is 'to give forth', or 'produce', as the earth produces her fruits, and this also *might* be applied to the interpretation of it in several of its various uses. But as this signification is likewise deducible from the other—for production, as

τας. τὸ δὲ πάντων μέγιστον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τοῦ νομοθέτου κρίσις οὐ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλὰ περὶ μελλόντων

when the earth produces her fruits, may be regarded as a payment or restoration, or 'return' of something *as due*—it may perhaps be better to refer them all to the one original signification, *reddere*. So in Eth. N. II 1, 1103, *a* 27, *b* 22, τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδιδόναι is not simply 'to produce', but to produce energies that are *due to the system*, energies *corresponding* to the faculties from which they spring. So Trendelenburg, *El. Log. Arist.* § 55, p. 132, 'ἀποδιδόναι proprie est reddere, unde ex suum cuique tribuendi significatione facile orta est declarandi vis (*declarare* is the sense which the word bears in the passage specially referred to, Top. A 5, 102 *a* 3) nihil enim est aliud quam logice suam cuique naturam reddere.'

ἀποδιδόναι is therefore (1) to give back, restore, repay, render, always implying some kind of obligation, (2) to render *as a due*, 'assign', (which best represents it in the majority of cases in Aristotle); of *due* distribution, *suum cuique;* hence (3) of the due fulfilment of any office or duty, as ἀποδιδόναι λόγον, 'to *render* an account', to explain, or set forth, any statement or doctrine, ἀποφαίνεσθαι, *declarare*. To one or the other of these I believe all the multifarious uses of the word may be referred.

I will add a few examples in the way of illustration:—Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 638 § 56, τοὺς ἐχθρὰ ποιοῦντας ἐν ἐχθροῦ μέρει κολάζειν ἀπέδωκεν (assigns as a due) ὁ νόμος; and elsewhere. Plat. Phaed. 71 E (a good example), οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν (pay back in return), ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλὴ (mutilated, defective, lopsided, single where all the rest are pairs) ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι κ.τ.λ. de Anima I 1, 403 *b* 1, τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, 'assigns' or 'applies', that is, to the definition, which is the thing in question, to which it assigns matter as the sole element: comp. c. 4, 408 *a* 3; and ἀπονέμειν, in precisely the same sense, ib. V 1, and Pl. Tim. 34 A. ἀποδιδῶσι make to correspond, bring into comparison, Rhet. III 11, 13. ἀποδ. λειτουργίαν de part. An. III 14, 9, 'duly to fulfil certain functions (services)'. Ib. II 14, 5, (ἡ φύσις) πανταχοῦ ἀποδίδωσι (makes due compensation, duly assigns) λαβοῦσα ἑτέρωθεν πρὸς ἄλλο μόριον. Top. Δ 1, 121 *a* 15, et passim, τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος, ἀποδιδόναι γένος. Top. A 18, 108 *b* 9, τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τῶν ὁρισμῶν, the rendering, or due preparation, production, of definitions: and so elsewhere. de part. An. III 7, 18, ἀποδ. τὸ ἔργον of the due performance of the work. Ib. I 1, 43 ἀποδ. τὸ ὀστοῦν τί ἐστι, to state, give a sufficient account or explanation. Phys. I 6, 1, 189 *a* 16, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πάντα ἀποδιδόναι (to produce, effect everything) οἴεται ὅσαπερ Ἀναξ. ἐκ τῶν ἀπείρων. Eth. Nic. III 1, 110 *b* 8, ποῖα δὲ...οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι, to give an account, explain.

So here ἀποδιδόναι is 'duly to assign, distribute, or apportion' and again I 2, 5, ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις 'we render our judgments'. These same applications of the word occur likewise in Plato, as Rep. 379 A, (to represent), Ib. 472 D, VI 508 E, Phaedr. 237 C, Theaet. 175 D, Polit. 295 A. The precise opposite, ἀπολαμβάνειν, occurs with the same sense of ἀπό, I 11, 3. ἀπονέμειν is used in exactly the same sense, 'to assign as a due'; see for instance Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 *b* 18, ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, Ib. V 35, τιμὴ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, Ib. 1124 *a* 9.

τε καὶ καθόλου ἐστίν, ὁ δ' ἐκκλησιαστὴς καὶ δικαστὴς ἤδη περὶ παρόντων καὶ ἀφωρισμένων κρίνουσιν· πρὸς

ἤδη...κρίνουσιν] by this time, now that we have come to *them*, '*they actually* decide...' So in the next line, τὸ φιλεῖν ἤδη καὶ τὸ μισεῖν 'this time', in *their* case, *not* in the former, of something new, special, and *marked*. ἤδη therefore in these cases is often translatable by a mere emphasis. The word is repeated so soon after, applied to the same persons, and expressing almost identically the same thing, that it is not improbable that Spengel may be right in his conjecture that the one or the other should be erased. *Rhet. Gr.* Vol. I. Pref. p. v. 'paulo post alterutrum ἤδη abundat, puto prius.' However there are two still closer together, II 25, 14.

It may be worth while to say a few words on this very common usage of ἤδη and analogous particles of time, in the way of illustration and exemplification. Ἤδη and its analogues ἔτι, οὐκέτι, οὔπω, are used emphatically to mark a critical point, climax, degree attained, as deserving of special and particular attention, at the moment, and in reference to something else which is not equally remarkable. They are all particles of time, and derive this their secondary sense from the metaphorical application of this notion of 'already', a definite time which we have just reached: 'point', or 'stage', or 'degree' attained being substituted by the metaphor for 'time' in the original sense of the word.

This will be best illustrated by a few examples. Arist. περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως c. 2. 16, ὥσπερ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος, 'habit, already by this time, *now* that we have reached this point, has become a second nature'. Met. Δ 21, 1022 *b* 18, ἕνα δὲ [τρόπον πάθος λέγεται] τούτων ἐνέργειαι καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ἤδη, 'one sense of πάθος is, the *actual* energies and changes of these'. ἤδη, by the time that they have reached this stage or state, and have *actually* become what they are. Categ. c. 8, 9, *a* 4, ἣν ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξιν ἤδη προσαγορεύσαι, 'which may *now* (at this stage) be fairly called a ἕξις'. περὶ ἑρμηνείας c. 9, 19, *a* 39, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν ἑτέραν, οὐ μέντοι ἤδη (not *yet* actually, not *quite*, not yet arrived at the stage of,) ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ. Polit. II 8, 1268 *b* 20, ἐκεῖνος ἤδη ἐπιορκεῖ. III 7, 1279 *a* 40, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλεπὸν ἠκριβῶσθαι. VIII (V) 8, 1308 *a* 15, ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ δῆμος ἤδη οἱ ὅμοιοι, i.e. though this may not be strictly true of all oligarchies, when we come to the ὅμοιοι, at this stage, by this time, it is now *quite* true that *they* may be regarded as a δῆμος. Eth. Nic. V 3, 1132 *a* 2, πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων, 'when a man has come to be a ruler, he must *then*...' in the case of others this perhaps is not necessarily true, but the ruler *must*, *actually*, live or act in relation to others and in society'. Rhet. I 6, 24, πάντες ἤδη ὁμολογοῦσιν. I 10, 11, ἤδη διαφέρει 'it *does* make a difference'. c. 11 § 3, τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται. Ib. § 26, ἔργον ἤδη γίγνεται. II 6 § 12, and 25 § 14, bis. I have confined myself in these illustrations to examples from Aristotle; from the ordinary language, in which this usage is at least equally common, I will content myself with citing Herod. III 5, ἀπὸ ταύτης ἤδη Αἴγυπτος: and Eur. Hippol. 1195 (Monk) πρὸς πόντον ἤδη κειμένον Σαρωνικόν.

It is found also in French, Italian and German—*déjà*, *gia*, *schon*. *C'est*

οὓς καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ἤδη καὶ τὸ μισεῖν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον συνήρτηται πολλάκις, ὥστε μηκέτι δύνασθαι

déjà quelque chose, 'and *that's* something'. *das ist schon etwas*. The Italian *gia*, when used as an expression of assent, may be similarly explained.

The use of *demum* is precisely similar, and common in most Latin writers. Sallust, Cat. XX *idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum* (that and that alone) *firma amicitia est*. Quint. II 5, 1, *artemque de qua loquimur bonis demum* (to the good, and to them alone) *tribui volunt*. VII Praef. init. *neque enim ea demum quae ad docendum pertinent exsecuti sumus*. VII 2, 21, VIII Prooem. 3, IV 5, 7, XI 1 § 44, 3 § 68, et passim. Cic. Tusc. Disp. I 19, 43, *eaque ei demum naturalis est sedes*, et seq., de Orat. II 30, 131, *hi loci ei demum oratori prodesse possunt*. Rarer is the analogous use of *denique* and *tandem*: Cic. de Orat. II 30, 131, c. 34, 146, *tum denique scrutari locos*, c. 75, 304, *quantum est in eo tandem mali!* c. 77, 315, *hisce omnibus rebus consideratis, tum denique id*... Hor. Ep. I 17, 2, *quo tandem pacto*... On *iam* in this same usage, see Munro, on Lucr. I 600, 613, II 314, 426; add, II 974, and Virg. Aen. V 179, *iam senior*, VI 304, VII 46, 735.

Similarly in a negative sentence, οὔπω sometimes introduces the notion of time in estimating the amount or degree, Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 *a* 11, τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι οὔπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. Ib. 23, ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δ' οὔπω. Ib. *b* 24, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι—in the two former cases the unjust habit of mind is distinguished as 'not yet *amounting* to' the actual crime or unjust *act*; and in the third case this distinction is applied to the ἁμάρτημα, which, though a wrong in itself, has not yet reached the stage or degree of the *vice*, confirmed evil habit, of ἀδικία—also VI 10, 1142 *b* 14, αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις. Ib. 25, οὐδ' αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, and 28.

So also οὐκέτι, 'no longer; not as before; not, now that we have reached this point'. Pol. V (VIII) 3, 1338 *a* 6. Rhet. I 2, 21, ἂν γὰρ ἐντύχῃ ἀρχαῖς οὐκέτι διαλεκτικὴ οὐδὲ ῥητορική, II 24, 3, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη κ.τ.λ. Ib. II 9, 3. de gen. et corr. I 2, 3, 315 *b* 3, πῶς δὲ τοῦτο οὐκέτι, Hist. Anim. I 6, 3, 490 *b* 16, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ζῴων οὐκέτι τὰ γένη μεγάλα, Ib. V 1 7, 539 *a* 30, τὰ δὲ θηλέα μέν ἐστιν, ἄρρενα δ' οὐκέτι. Dem. de F. Leg. § 80, ὃν δ' ἂν αὐτοὶ λάβητε μηκέτ' ἐκείνοις περὶ τούτου προστάττετε. Plat. Gorg. 503 A, οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς. Protag. 312 E. Xen. Oecon. 3. 1. Buttm. ad Mid. 13 *a* p. 528, 'οὐκέτι proprie valet *non ut antea*, hinc *non ut alias, non item, non iam*.'

συνήρηται] (Bekker and Spengel. Alii συνήρτηται) 'with whom are connected...' In πρὸς οὕς, πρὸς expresses a mere general reference, 'with respect to whom', 'in whose case'; and συνήρηται 'are often taken into, embraced in, the account', σύν, together with their proper business, the mere facts of the case and the proof of them. I can find no sufficient authority for συναιρεῖν in this sense; the nearest approach to it is in Plat. Phaedr. 249 B, εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον, but even this is something different. Vater makes a similar observation. The interpretation also of πρός is certainly rather strained. Probably συνήρτηται is right.

θεωρεῖν ἱκανῶς τὸ ἀληθές, ἀλλ' ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει
8 *τὸ ἴδιον ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δεῖ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ποιεῖν κύριον τὸν κριτήν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι, ἢ ἔσεσθαι ἢ μὴ ἔσεσθαι, ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς καταλείπειν· οὐ γὰρ*
9 *δυνατὸν ταῦτα τὸν νομοθέτην προϊδεῖν. εἰ δὴ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν ὅσοι τἆλλα διορίζουσιν, οἷον τί δεῖ τὸ προοίμιον ἢ τὴν διήγησιν ἔχειν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον μορίων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πραγματεύονται πλὴν ὅπως τὸν κριτὴν ποιόν τινα*

τὸ ἀληθές] No one is a fair judge, where his own passions or interests are concerned. Gaisford quotes appositely, Pol. III 16, 1287 *a* ult. *ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονταί γ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς οἱ ἰατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ἰατρούς, καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυμναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες.*

ἐπισκοτεῖν] 'to bring darkness, throw a shadow over, overshadow'. Dem. c. Mid. 565, 25, *οἰκίαν ᾠκοδόμηκεν ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι τοσαύτην ὥστε πᾶσιν ἐπισκοτεῖν τοῖς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ.* Infr. III 3, 3. Plat. Euthyd. 274, *ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἐπεσκότει τῷ Κτησίππῳ τῆς θέας*: an odd and unexplained use of this word. It seems to mean that Euthydemus, by bending forward and getting in the way, obscured or darkened Ctesippus—not however in the ordinary sense of the word, but in that of intercepting the object, and *so* darkening by throwing a cloud over, and thereby depriving him of his view (*τῆς θέας* gen. of deprivation, implied in the verb).

In a metaphorical sense it occurs in Dem. Olynth. B 23, 26, Isocr. ad Dem. § 6, and in several fragments of the Comic Poets, (Ind. ad Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* Vol. V Pt. I p. 393,) for instance, Eubul. incert. Fr. II (Mein. III 267) *τὸν οἶνον τῷ φρονεῖν ἐπισκοτεῖν*; and in other authors. See also Victorius: and Gaisford in not. var. p. 18.

§ 9. *ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος*] *ἔξω* for *ἐκτός*. Lobeck, *Phryn.* p. 128.

τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν] infra § 11; comp. de Anima I 3, 406 *b* 26 *καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος* (Plato, in the Timaeus) *φυσιολογεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα.*

διορίζειν] to separate by a limit or boundary line. Herodot. IV 42 *διουρισάντων Ἀσίην τε καὶ Λιβύην.* Hence to separate a thing from others, to mark off as a special province or domain, and so of 'the definition', which includes all that is essential to, or characteristic of, the thing defined, and excludes everything else. The word here of course means something more than a bare definition; it expresses the limitation or 'determination' of the proper contents of the *προοίμιον*.

ποιήσωσιν. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντέχνων πίστεων οὐδὲν δεικνύουσιν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅθεν ἄν τις γένοιτο ἐνθυμηματικός. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς αὐτῆς οὔσης μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικανικά, καὶ καλλίονος καὶ πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγμα- p. 3.

ἔντεχνοι πίστεις] are the regular systematic proofs by enthymeme and example, the σῶμα τῆς πίστεως § 3, and opposed here, not merely to the ἄτεχνοι πίστεις of c. 15, the witnesses, documents, torture, oaths and such like, which we do not *invent*, but find ready to our hand to be employed in the support of our case; but also to the irregular appeals to the feelings (πάθος), and to evidence from character (ἦθος).

§ 10. πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας] πραγματείας, here applied to the study and practice of one of the departments of Rhetoric; see on § 3.—πολιτικωτέρας: There are three possible senses of this word, *firstly*, 'more worthy of, more becoming to, a citizen', more agreeable to the position and duties of a citizen, 'better and worthier'; *secondly*, 'more suitable to a public man, statesman, or politician', larger, more comprehensive, and liberal; as opposed to the comparatively trifling and petty occupations of private citizens: *thirdly*, more public and common, wider, more general; κοινόν, as opposed to ἴδιον and οἰκεῖον: the second seems to be the most appropriate here, and so I have rendered it in the paraphrase. [p. 141 of the Introduction: "nobler and larger and more liberal (or 'statesmanlike', or 'more worthy of a citizen',) *vid. not. ad loc.*"]

μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικανικά] The third kind of Rhetoric, τὸ ἐπιδεικτικόν, is here omitted, but afterwards supplied, c. 3 § 1.

τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας ἢ τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα] 'The most general expression which the Athenians have for a contract is συνάλλαγμα, συνθήκη, συμβόλαιον.' Meier und Schömann *der Attische Process* p. 494. The difference usually taken between συνθήκη and συνάλλαγμα appears in Rhet. I 15, 22 ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων (ordinary dealings, buying and selling and such like transactions), καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας (in the way of, by contracts): we are concerned here only with the first and third of these, συνάλλαγμα and συμβόλαιον.

The ordinary signification of both of these is a contract, or covenant, or mutual agreement, or interchange (συνάλλαγμα), between two or more parties. They are thence extended to any dealings, especially business transactions, or even any circumstances of ordinary intercourse between man and man, and more particularly any of those which may give rise to a suit at law. These are ἴδια συμβόλαια or συναλλάγματα: see Dem. de Cor. p. 298 § 210, τὰ τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίου συμβόλαια, with Dissen's note: Isocr. Paneg. §§ 11, 78. π. ἀντιδ. §§ 3, 38, 40, 42, 79 τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ συμβόλαια τὰ γιγνόμενα πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. § 309 ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τοῖς περὶ τῶν συμβολαίων. The former of these two seems to refer rather to dealings in general, the second to special contracts. Areop. §§ 33, 34. Arist. Eth. N. II 1, 1103 *b* 15 πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γιγνόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοί. Rhet. I 15, 22 ἔτι δὲ πράττεται πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια κατὰ τὰς συν-

τείας οὔσης ἢ τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα, περὶ μὲν ἐκείνης οὐδὲν λέγουσι, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρῶνται τεχνολογεῖν, ὅτι ἧττόν ἐστι πρὸ ἔργου τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν ἐν τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς καὶ ἧττόν ἐστι κακοῦργον ἡ δημηγορία δικο-

θήκας. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 (2 Oxf.) § 2 ταῖς περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια δικαιολογίαις.

That the meaning of the terms is not confined to contracts proper, is plain also from Eth. N. v 1131 *a* 2. (This passage is quoted at length on I 15, 22.) τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια τὰ δ' ἀκούσια (the 'voluntary' being illustrated by buying and selling, lending and borrowing, whereas 'involuntary' are all of them crimes, λαθραῖα or βίαια: all of them cases in which the breach of the supposed contract, private or public, entitles the aggrieved party to a legal remedy). Opposed to these ἴδια συμβόλαια or συναλλάγματα are the public (κοινά) international commercial treaties, σύμβολα. See further on σύμβολα, note on c. 4 § 11.

συμβόλαια is also employed in a wider and more general sense, as Rhet. ad Alex. c. 2 (3 Oxf.) § 2 περὶ τῶν πρὸς ἄλλας πόλεις συμμαχιῶν καὶ συμβολαίων. Other examples may be found in Plat. Gorg. 484 D ἄπειροι τῶν λόγων οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς ξυμβολαίοις. Rep. I 333 A τί δὲ δή; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρείαν ἢ κτῆσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι; Πρὸς τὰ ξυμβόλαια, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα, ἤ τι ἄλλο; κοινωνήματα δῆτα, and several others in Ast's Lexicon. Arist. Polit. IV (VI) 16, 1300 *b* 22, and 32 περὶ τῶν μικρῶν συναλλαγμάτων, ὅσα δραχμιαῖα καὶ πεντάδραχμα καὶ μικρῷ πλείονος. Ib. 15 ult. 1300 *b* 12, ἀρχὴ ἡ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν συμβολαίων (dealings) κυρία. Comp. c. 8 sub init. ἀρχὴ περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια. VI (VII) 2, 1317 *b* 27, III 13, 1283 *b* 30, and elsewhere.

πρὸ ἔργου] 'to the purpose'; anything 'for', or 'in favour of', and therefore 'likely to promote', any 'work' we may have in hand; and hence generally 'serviceable' or 'profitable' to any purposes. πρὸ ἔργου (which also occurs *infra* I 4 §§ 3, 7) is the Aristotelian mode of writing what in Xenophon, Plato, Demosthenes, and indeed ordinary Greek in general, appears as προύργου. Some examples in Fritsche ad Eth. Eud. A 3, 1215 *a* 8.

κακοῦργον] As a special variety of the general conception of dishonesty, fraud, knavery, this adjective is applied in a peculiar sense to sophistical reasoning. Rhet. III 2, 7 τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστῇ ὁμωνυμίαι χρήσιμοι, παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουργεῖ. Topic. Ι 11, 172 *b* 21. Plat. Gorg. 483 A. Dem. Lept. 491. Stallb. ad Rep. I 338 D. Similarly συκοφαντεῖν is used for cheating in argument, bringing fallacious objections, Top. Θ 2, 157 *a* 32. I (de Soph. El.) 15, 174 *b* 9. Both of them represent the knavish tricks and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and dialectical reasoning. Plat. Rep. 341 B πρὸς ταῦτα κακούργει καὶ συκοφάντει.

A debate in a political assembly, which turns upon questions of public and national concern (κοινότερον), in which accordingly the audience, who

λογίας, ὅτι κοινότερον. ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ὁ κριτὴς περὶ οἰκείων κρίνει, ὥστ' οὐδὲν ἄλλο δεῖ πλὴν ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς φησὶν ὁ συμβουλεύων· ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικανικοῖς οὐχ ἱκανὸν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀναλαβεῖν τὸν ἀκροατήν· περὶ ἀλλοτρίων γὰρ ἡ κρίσις, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν σκοπούμενοι καὶ πρὸς χάριν ἀκροώμενοι διδόασι τοῖς ἀμφισβη-

are all members of it, have a strong personal interest, and are therefore impatient of anything that would divert them from the direct proof of the expediency or inexpediency of the policy recommended or condemned, affords much less room for these deceptive arts *ad captandum*, τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος, than the practice of the law-courts, where the judges who decide the case are usually not personally interested in the issue, and the pleader has therefore to *create* an interest in them by these irregular methods: this is on the principle so pithily stated by the Corinthian envoys, Thuc. I 120, 3 κακοὺς κριτὰς ὡς μὴ προσηκόντων εἶναι. (This is a more correct mode of stating the argument than that adopted in the paraphrase, Introd. p. 141.)

This contrast of the two kinds of audiences, in respect of their several dispositions to keep the speakers to the point, does not hold of our own law-courts and parliaments. The Athenian dicasts, careless, ignorant, and unprofessional, selected at random from the population of the city, with their sense of responsibility diminished or destroyed by the large number of those who had to decide, might very likely be indifferent to the issue of the case before them, and require a stimulus to their attention from the parties immediately concerned: but this is not true of the *professional* judges of our courts, who regard the right decision of the case as a business and a duty.

ὁ κριτής] applied to the ἐκκλησιαστής in the *general* sense of 'judge' or 'critic' of the question or arguments employed; supr. § 7. Introd. p. 137, note 1.

ἀναλαβεῖν] is to 'bring back', 'recover'; hence to 'gain *over*', 'conciliate', as ἀνά in ἀναπείθειν, ἀναδιδάσκειν, ἀναδιδόναι, ἀναδέχεσθαι κ.τ.λ. 'Membranae Balliolenses, *captare*: Muretus, *accurare, excipere*: Portus, *reficere, recreare*, ἡ μεταφορά *ab aegrotis; vel conciliare*. Omnes hae notiones a primaria *resumendi*, *ad se recipiendi*, facile deducuntur.' Gaisford. The order is, (1) to 'get or bring back'; thence, (2) to 'bring back into the proper and normal state', as of 'recovery' from a disease—the notion of something as *due* being again implied as in ἀποδιδόναι, note on § 7—and thence again, (3) as here, to 'restore', as it were, the audience to their proper state of mind, conciliate them to your views and interests. Hence, lastly, the senses of *reparare, reficere, recreare*, and the like; abundantly illustrated in Steph. *Thes.* ed. Did. Vol. II pp. 431—2.

διδόασιν] (ἑαυτούς) *sese dant*, 'lend themselves', ὁ δ' ἡδονῇ δούς, Eur. Phoen. 21. Valck. *Diatr.* p. 233. And so, many of its compounds,

τοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ κρίνουσιν. διὸ καὶ πολλαχοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὁ νόμος κωλύει λέγειν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος. ἐκεῖ δ' αὐτοὶ οἱ κριταὶ τοῦτο τηροῦσιν
11 ἱκανῶς. ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔντεχνος μέθοδος περὶ τὰς πίστεις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις (τότε γὰρ πιστεύομεν μάλιστα ὅταν ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὑπολάβωμεν), ἔστι δ' ἀπόδειξις ῥητορικὴ ἐνθύμημα, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων, τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τις, περὶ δὲ συλλογισμοῦ ὁμοίως ἅπαντος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστὶν

ἐνδιδόναι, ἐκδιδόναι, ἐπιδιδόναι, ἀποδιδόναι, διαδιδόναι, ὑποδιδόναι, παραδιδόναι, (ἡδονῇ παραδούς, Pl. Phaedr. 250 D), προδιδόναι (Herod. *bis*), ἐκδιδόναι (Herod.). The process is the usual one by which transitive verbs become intransitive, viz. by the ellipse of the reflexive pronoun.

§ 11. *ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις*] *ἀπόδειξις*, in its strict, proper, and highest senses, is exact scientific demonstrative proof, by syllogism, leading from and to universal and necessary conclusions. And therefore, properly speaking, *παραπλήσιον φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν*, Eth. Nic. I 1. *ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμὸς ἐπιστημονικός*, Anal. Post. I 2, 71 *b* 18. *ἐξ ἀναγκαίων ἄρα συλλογισμός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις*, c. 4, 73 *a* 24. *ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμὸς δεικτικὸς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διά τι*, Ib. *c* 24, 85 *b* 23. *ἀπόδειξις ἐστίν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων ὁ συλλογισμὸς ᾖ, ἢ ἐκ τοιούτων ἃ διά τινων πρώτων καὶ ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνώσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφεν*, Topic. A 1, 100 *a* 27. Waitz, *Comm. ad Anal. Post.* Vol. II p. 293 seq. *πίστις* therefore, whose premisses and conclusions are never more than 'probable', cannot properly be said to be 'a kind of demonstration'. It resembles it however, and may be regarded as a 'sort of demonstration' in this; that probable proof often produces a belief or conviction as strong and certain as that which follows from demonstration. It is therefore to be understood here, as often elsewhere, as a general term including proof of every kind. A similar misapplication of *ἀπόδειξις* to rhetorical proof is found in Rhet. II 1, 2, and II 20, 9. So *συλλογίζεσθαι*, of reasoning, inference, conclusion in general; Rhet. I 6 § 17, 10 § 1, 11 § 23 and II 22 § 4, where *συλλογισμοί* stands for 'Enthymemes'; Poet. 4, 5, *συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον*. Phys. II 1, 193 *a* 7, *συλλογίσαιτο γὰρ ἄν τις ἐκ γενετῆς ὢν τυφλὸς περὶ χρωμάτων*. Similarly, *ἀποδεικτικός* of a *rhetorical* argument or speech, Rhet. II 1, 2, *πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁρᾶν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικός* (conclusive) *ᾖ καὶ πιστός*. A still more remarkable example of this looseness of expression occurs I 4, 5, where Dialectics is called *ἡ ἀναλυτικὴ ἐπιστήμη*. The rhetorical enthymeme, again, 'a kind of *ἀπόδειξις*', is subsequently and this time correctly, called *κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων*. See Introd. p. 92.

τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τις]. On the enthymeme, Introd. p. 101—105. On *περὶ δὲ συλλογισμοῦ ἰδεῖν*, and on *μέρους τινός*, Introd. p. 143, note.

ἰδεῖν, ἢ αὐτῆς ὅλης ἢ μέρους τινός, δῆλον[1] ὅτι ὁ μάλιστα τοῦτο δυνάμενος θεωρεῖν, ἐκ τίνων καὶ πῶς γίνεται συλλογισμός, οὗτος καὶ ἐνθυμηματικὸς ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, προσλαβὼν περὶ ποῖά τ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ τίνας ἔχει διαφορὰς πρὸς τοὺς λογικοὺς συλλογισμούς· τό τε γὰρ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ

[1] δῆλον δ' ὅτι

δῆλον δέ] δέ, omitted by one MS, and rejected by Buhle, Schrader, Bekker, and Spengel, is retained and defended by Victorius and Vater. It is justified not only by the common usage of the Greek language (see Buttm. Exc. XII on Dem. c. Mid. *de particula δέ in apodosi*, p. 150; the passages which he thus quotes might be multiplied indefinitely), but also by the special usage of Aristotle himself. Waitz, on Organ. 17 *b* 1, Vol. I p. 335, comp. Zell ad Eth. Nic. I 1 § 4, Vol. II p. 5, who quotes examples from Aristotle, to which add Rhet. I 4 § 2, I 10 § 4, I 11 §§ 6 and 11, II 25 § 10, an exact parallel, the protasis here also commencing with ἐπεί. Similarly Pol. VII (IV) 13 init. ἐπεὶ δὲ δυ' ἐστιν (a long parenthesis of several clauses intervenes, and the apodosis begins with) δεῖ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις κ.τ.λ. de Anima I 3, 406 *a* 4 and 10. Phys. VI 8, 2, εἰ τὸ μέν... ἵστασθαι δέ. See also Stallb. on Phædo 78 C. The particle is thus used in the apodosis generally, not always, as a repetition of a preceding δέ, and in these cases may be translated by "I say". It *repeats* in order to recal the attention to the connexion of the apodosis with the foregoing protasis, which might be overlooked after a long parenthesis: in cases where this would not be necessary, it may be accounted for by the influence of habit or association. Of the many illustrative passages I had collected from other writers as well as Aristotle, I will content myself with citing two or three apposite ones from Thucydides. I 11, sub init., ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν, (parenthesis) φαίνονται δέ κ.τ.λ. I 18 init., ἐπειδὴ δέ (ten lines) μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν κ.τ.λ. II 65, ἐπεί τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη, ὁ δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προγνοὺς τὴν δύναμιν. IV 132, ὁ δὲ Περδίκκας κ.τ.λ. and VIII 29 (three of these are referred to by Arnold, note 2 on I 11). Paley on Aesch. P. V. 952, 994, 2nd ed. gives some instances from Aeschylus. I may also add Plat. Phaedo 78 C, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ μήδεποτε κατὰ ταὐτά, ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι τὰ ξύνθετα. A good example may be found in Phaedo 87 A, B, δοὺς δέ—εἰ δὲ τοῦτο...

τοὺς λογικοὺς συλλογισμούς] Waitz on Anal. Post. I 21, 82 *b* 35, p. 353, 'opponitur τῷ λογικῶς τὸ ἀναλυτικῶς 84 *a* 8, 86 *a* 22, 88 *a* 19, accurata demonstratio, quae veris ipsius rei principiis nititur, ei quae probabili quadam ratione contenta est....Unde fit ut λογικόν idem fere sit quod διαλεκτικόν.' And this is its usual signification...'Quamquam' (he adds, referring to the present passage) '1355 *a* 13, quum λογικὸς συλλογισμός et hic et in iis quæ proxime sequuntur opponatur rhetorico syllogismo (ἐνθυμήματι), *veram demonstrationem* significare videatur.' To the same effect is what follows, where τὸ ἀληθές exact truth and knowledge, scientific certainty, is represented as the object of the λογικοὶ συλλογισμοί, and τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ (probability, τὰ ἔνδοξα, which has only a resemblance to truth),

ὅμοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ δυνάμεως ἰδεῖν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς πεφύκασιν ἱκανῶς καὶ τὰ πλείω τυγχάνουσι τῆς ἀληθείας· διὸ πρὸς τὰ ἔνδοξα στοχαστικῶς ἔχειν τοῦ ὁμοίως ἔχοντος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος οἱ ἄλλοι τεχνολογοῦσι, καὶ διότι μᾶλλον ἀπονενεύκασι πρὸς

as the object of the enthymeme. And as both are apprehended by the same faculty, this faculty will be cultivated by the study and exercise of both alike, and the processes that lead to them, syllogism and enthymeme: and therefore the knowledge of the materials and modes of constructing syllogisms, and the practical application of them, equally in all their varieties, demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical (enthymeme), are serviceable to the rhetorician as a training and preparation for the practice of his art.

πρὸς τὰ ἔνδοξα] 'things probable, matters of opinion, not certainty'; the materials, objects, and results of Rhetoric, as of Dialectics. Top. A 10, 104 *a* 8, ἔστι δὲ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἔνδοξος, κ.τ.λ. Ib. c. 1, 100 *b* 21, ἔνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις. Cic. de Orat. I 23, 108, *sunt enim varia et ad vulgarem popularemque sensum accommodata omnia genera huius forensis nostrae dictionis.*

διότι] 'that', = ὅτι. The earliest instance of this use of διότι appears to be in Herod. II 50. It occurs in Xenophon (add Symp. I 11, to the examples in Sturz's Lexicon), Plato, Ep. I 309 D, Dem. de Cor. §§ 155, 167, 184, but each time *in a document.* Isocr. Paneg. § 48, Phil. § 1, Archid. § 24, Plat. § 23, Antid. §§ 133, 263. π. τοῦ ζεύγους § 43, πρὸς Καλλίμαχον §§ 1, 31. (Some of these referring to Isocrates are derived from Benseler's note, Praef. p. V note 4, who has the following remark, from Baiter on Paneg. § 48, 'Isocrates ubicunque διότι usurpavit, id fecisse videtur hiatus evitandi causa' [see esp. Isocr. Lochit. § 7, where ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι is followed by καὶ διότι...S.]. It is found several times in the Rhet. ad Alex. as c. 17 p. 1432 *a* 16, c. 30 p. 1437 *a* 19, and elsewhere, but it is in Aristotle that it first becomes common; too common to need further illustration. See however Waitz on Anal. Pr. 58 *b* 7, *Comm.* I p. 495. For διότι = ὅτι, Steph. *Thes.* Vol. II 1544 cites Crito. Com. ap. Athen. 4, p. 173 C, πάντων ἀκούων διότι παρασίτῳ τόπος οὗτος τρία μόνον ἀγαθὰ κεκτῆσθαι δοκεῖ. Its ordinary sense is 'because'.

It has also a third signification, 'why'; the indirect interrogative, corresponding to the direct, διὰ τί, as ὅπως to πῶς, ὅποτε to πότε, ὅσος to πόσος, ὅπου to ποῦ, &c. In this sense it occurs in Plato, Phaedo 100 C, (four other examples in Ast's Lex.), Xen. Cyrop. VIII 4, 7, ἢ καὶ ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν διότι; Demosth. Phil. A 46, 10; Isocr. Archid. § 16, and in Aristotle, Rhet. II 23, 24, (where it is explained by the preceding τὴν αἰτίαν), Polit. IV (VI) 11, 1296 *a* 22. Met. A 1, 981 *a* 29, where again it is explained by τὴν αἰτίαν). περὶ ἀναπνεύσεως 14, ult. and elsewhere, e.g. Ar. de

12 τὸ δικολογεῖν, φανερόν· χρήσιμος δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ διά τε τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον αἱ p. 4
κρίσεις γίγνωνται, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι· τοῦτο

Anima II 8, 12, 421 *a* 4, *φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διότι οἱ ἰχθῦς ἄφωνοι, οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι φάρυγγα.* In Rhet. III 11, 14, it is explained by *τὸ αἴτιον*. Cf. Amphis Dith. Fragm. 1 ap. Meineke, *Comm. Fragm.* III 306; B. *διὰ τί δ' οὐκ ἄγεις εἰς τὸν ὄχλον αὐτό;* A. *διότι φυλὴν περιμένω.*

With *διότι* 'that', compare *οὕνεκα* and *ὁθούνεκα* in Sophocles, as Philoct. 634, the *reason*, the *what for*, passes into a mere statement of fact; *because*, into *that*. See Ellendt, Lex. Soph. *ὁθούνεκα*.

ἀπονεύειν, to bend the head away from something else and turn the attention to a particular object; hence, to incline to, fix the attention upon: *ἀπό* as in *ἀποβλέπειν*, (supr. § 1). Plat. Theaet. 165 A, *ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν.* In Plat. Legg. VII 815 A, *ἔκνευσις πληγῶν καὶ βολῶν*, is *declinatio*, the bending of the head aside to avoid a blow. (In Eur. Iph. T. 1186 v. 1155 Herm. *σὺ δ' ἐς τὸ τῆς θεοῦ γ' ἐξένευσας εἰκότως*, *ἐξένευσας* is of doubtful interpretation. Hermann, followed by Paley, derives it from *ἐκνεῖν evadere*, referring to Valckenaer on Hippol. 469, and 822. It seems however at least equally probable that the aorist belongs to *ἐκνεύειν abnuere*, opposed to *ἐπινεύειν annuere*, and that the meaning of the line is "It was natural, or reasonable, for thee to decline, reject, their offer, *εἰς τὸ τῆς θεοῦ γ'*, looking to, in respect of, in regard of, thy duty to the goddess". This sense of the word seems to be more in conformity with what precedes; and it occurs again in line 1330 Dind., with the same sense and derivation, *ἐξένευσ' ἀποστῆναι*, beckoned us *off*, "gave us a sign to stand aloof".)

§ 12. *χρήσιμος—ἐντεύξεως*] This passage is cited by Dionysius, Epist. ad Amm. 1 c. 6. He reads *διά γε* for *διά τε*, and *διδασκαλία* for *διδασκαλίας* (six lines below).

On the defence of Rhetoric, compare Quint. Inst. Orat. II 17, 26, seq. (in II 16 he sums up the arguments against the use of it), Isocr. *ἀντιδ.* § 251 seq. and Id. Nicocles, §§ 1—9, also Gorgias, in Plato's dialogue, c. XI 456 A—457 C. On the true office and functions of the orator, Cic. de Orat. I 46, 202—a striking passage. Id. de Invent. I 3 and 4.

διά τε] *τε* is *answered* by the (irregular) correlative *δέ* in *ἔτι δέ* at the beginning of the next sentence. de Anima II 4, 7, 416 *a* 2—6, *οὔτε* (parenth.)...*πρὸς δὲ τούτοις.*

ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι] The argument of this clause, *χρήσιμος δέ—ἐπιτιμήσεως*, is summed up in two lines of Euripides, Alex. Fragm. 55 (12) Dind. *ἀγλωσσίᾳ δὲ πολλάκις ληφθεὶς ἀνὴρ | δίκαια λέξας ἧσσον εὐγλώσσου φέρει.* It is to the effect, that truth and right having a natural superiority over falsehood and wrong, the proper use of Rhetoric is to enable them to assert and enforce that superiority; to bring truth to light, and detect and expose deceit and sophistry. If the opposites of truth and right *do* ever prevail over these, it must be the fault of the parties concerned themselves, *ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι*, who have failed to avail themselves

δ' ἐστὶν ἄξιον ἐπιτιμήσεως. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς ἐνίους οὐδ' εἰ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἔχομεν ἐπιστήμην, ῥᾴδιον ἀπ' ἐκείνης πεῖσαι λέγοντας· διδασκαλίας γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πίστεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς ἐλέγομεν περὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως. ἔτι δὲ

of this powerful instrument. Rhetoric is therefore 'corrective' or 'remedial' of the perversion of truth and right to which legal decisions are always more or less liable from misrepresentation of facts, fallacious arguments, or the blinding of the judgment by appeals to the feelings.

According to this translation of δι' αὐτῶν, it is correctly and logically said that it is *a consequence* (ὥστε) of the natural superiority of truth and right to their opposites, that if those who have truth and right on their side are defeated, their defeat must be due to themselves, to their own neglect of Rhetoric, which would have enabled them to *enforce* this their *natural* superiority. Whereas if we follow Victorius (and Spengel who assents to his view, *Arist. Ars Rhet.* Vol. II p. 26) in explaining δι' αὐτῶν by δι' ἐναντίων, ὥστε becomes incorrect or meaningless: for there is neither truth nor sense in saying that it *follows from* the natural superiority of truth and justice that these, in the case of a wrong judgment, are defeated by their opposites; and not only so, but with this interpretation ἀνάγκη is also wrong—the consequence, if there be one, is certainly not necessary—and δι' αὐτῶν should be ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

In the Introd. p. 144 note, I have referred to Waitz's note on Anal. Pr. 55 *a* 14, who gives examples of αὐτῶν &c. for the reflexive αὑτῶν &c. The usage is however so constant in Aristotle as hardly to need illustration. A good example is de Anima II 5, 6, 417 *b* 24, διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούληται, αἰσθάνεσθαι δ' οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. Rhet. I 4, 9, ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, 'in their own power'.

πρὸς ἐνίους] 'in dealing with some'.

διδασκαλίας] de Soph. El. c. 2, 161 *b* 1, quoted in Introd. p. 75. Genuine and complete 'instruction' by demonstrative proofs. Top. A c. 14, 105 *b* 30, πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν κατ' ἀλήθειαν (i. e. δι' ἀποδείξεως) περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτέον, διαλεκτικῶς (and therefore also ῥητορικῶς) πρὸς δόξαν.

ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος] ἐπιστήμη defined ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, Eth. Nic. VI 3. τὸ δ' ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δι' ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν,...ἡ δὲ δόξα ἀβέβαιον.

ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς] A 2 101 *a* 30.

τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως] Topic. u. s. Metaph. Γ 5, 1009 *a* 17, ἔστι δ' οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος πρὸς πάντας τῆς ἐντεύξεως· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πειθοῦς δέονται, οἱ δὲ βίας, where in line 20, ἀπάντησις is substituted for ἔντευξις. Isocr. πρὸς Δημόνικον § 20, τὰς ἐντεύξεις μὴ ποιοῦ (hold conversation, intercourse) πυκνὰς τοῖς αὐτοῖς. Alex. ad Top. l. c. ἐντεύξεις λέγει τὰς

τἀναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν (οὐ
γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν) ἀλλ' ἵνα μήτε λανθάνῃ
πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ
δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων
τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τἀναντία συλλογίζεται, ἡ δὲ δια-
λεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν· ὁμοίως
γάρ εἰσιν ἀμφότεραι τῶν ἐναντίων. τὰ μέντοι ὑπο-
κείμενα πράγματα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τἀληθῆ
καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῇ φύσει εὐσυλλογιστότερα καὶ
πιθανώτερα ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον
εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν
ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ' οὐκ αἰσχρόν· ὃ μᾶλλον ἴδιόν ἐστιν P. 1355 b.
13 ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας. εἰ δ' ὅτι μεγάλα

πρὸς πολλοὺς συνουσίας, οἷς δεῖ μὲν ἐντυγχάνειν κοινωνικοὺς ὄντας καὶ φιλανθρώπους καὶ ἐντυγχάνειν ὠφελίμως.

ἔντευξις is therefore a lighting upon, or, meeting; hence a meeting which leads to a 'conversation'; or, as arising casually out of that, a dialectical 'encounter'.

ἔτι δὲ τἀναντία—λύειν ἔχωμεν] de Soph. El. 1, 165 *a* 24, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἓν πρὸς ἓν εἰπεῖν ἔργον περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ εἰδότος ἀψευδεῖν μὲν αὐτὸν περὶ ὧν οἶδε, τὸν δὲ ψευδόμενον ἐμφανίζειν δύνασθαι, Rhet. ad Alex. c. 19 (20) 2, τὰ μὲν οὖν αἰτήματα ταῦτά ἐστι, διειλόμεθα δ' αὐτῶν τὰς διαφοράς, ἵν' εἰδότες τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον χρώμεθα κατὰ τὸν καιρόν, καὶ μὴ λανθάνωσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ ἐναντίοι ἄδικόν τι αἰτοῦντες τοὺς δικάζοντας.

πῶς ἔχει] 'the true state of the case' (how things really are).

λύειν] *solvere, diluere,* 'to loose, untie, the knot of a fallacy', or difficulty; and so to 'solve' as a problem. ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν προτέρων ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν Met. B 1, 995 *a* 28. λύσις opposed to δέσις, Poet. c. 18, §§ 1, 2. On λύσις and λύειν see Introd. on II 25, p. 267, note.

τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν—τῶν ἐναντίων] Introd. p. 78.

τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα] Comp. I 2, 1, *subiecta materies*, ἡ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 *b* 12. τὸ ὑποκείμενον, 'the logical subject', of which other things are 'predicated', κατηγορεῖται. See Waitz, *Comm. ad Organ.* 1 *a* 20, Vol. I p. 274. Trendel. *El. Log. Ar.* § 1, note p. 52. Id. *Categorienlehre* § 10, p. 53 seq. Bonitz ad Met. Z 3, 1028 *b* 36.

τῷ σώματι μέν...λόγῳ δέ] On this use of μέν and δέ, Buttm. *Gr. Gr.* (Engl. Transl.) § 149, p. 396. Id. not. on Mid. § 7 *a*, 49 *e*, 56 *d*.

§ 13. εἰ δ' ὅτι μέγαλα βλάψειεν ἂν (φήσει τις) κ.τ.λ.] On the abuse of arts and natural gifts, and the answers to the argument from the abuse to the use of them, see Quint. Inst. Orat. II 16, 5, Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως

βλάψειεν ἂν ὁ χρώμενος ἀδίκως τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, τοῦτό γε κοινόν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ἀρετῆς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων, οἷον ἰσχύος ὑγιείας πλούτου στρατηγίας· τούτοις γὰρ ἄν τις ὠφελήσειε τὰ μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως καὶ βλάψειεν ἀδίκως.

14 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ἑνός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένου ἡ ῥητορική, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἡ διαλεκτική, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ πεῖσαι

§ 252, Plato, Gorg. u. s., Bacon, *Nov. Org.* I 129. Comp. Eth. Nic. III 3 *τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τἀγαθά διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν. ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν.*

τοῦτό γε κοινόν] Ovid. Trist. II 266, *Nil prodest quod non laedere possit idem.* Schrader.

πλὴν ἀρετῆς] Gaisford refers in illustration to Archytas ap. Stob. I p. 15. Xen. Cyrop. IV 1, 15. Pl. Meno, 87 E and Isocr. Nicocles, init.

§ 14. *οὐκ ἔστιν ἑνός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένου ἡ ῥητ., ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἡ διαλεκτική*] See note and reff. on § 1 p. 3.

οὐ τὸ πεῖσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ.] on Aristotle's alteration and improvement of the original definition of Rhetoric by the Sophistical school of Rhetoricians, see Introd. p. 32 seq.

'Non dubium est quin verba illa dirigantur adversus id quod apud Platonem ait Gorgias, p. 453 A, *τὴν ῥητορικὴν πειθοῦς δημιοῦργον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾶν.*' Muretus. Cicero's definition follows that of Aristotle, de Orat. I 61, 260, *accommodate ad persuadendum posse dicere.*

The notion of art, or proceeding by rule of art, consists not in the *result*, or success of the process, which is often unattainable, but in the correctness of the method followed. Top. Z 12, 149 *b* 25. *τοιοῦτος δ' ὁ τοῦ ῥήτορος καὶ ὁ τοῦ κλέπτου ὅρος, εἴπερ ἐστὶ ῥήτωρ μὲν ὁ δυνάμενος τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ πιθανὸν θεωρεῖν καὶ μηδὲν παραλείπειν, κλέπτης δ' ὁ λάθρα λαμβάνων. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοιοῦτος ὢν ἑκάτερος ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ῥήτωρ ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς κλέπτης ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάθρα λαμβάνων ἀλλ' ὁ βουλόμενος λάθρα λαμβάνειν κλέπτης ἐστίν.* The *art* of doing anything is distinguished from the mere fact that the thing is done (as accidentally for instance), by the *intention* of the agent systematically carried out, but not necessarily realised in success. Comp. de Anima III 9, 8, *καὶ ὅλως δὲ ὁρῶμεν ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἰατρικὴν οὐκ ἰᾶται, ὡς ἑτέρου τινὸς κυρίου ὄντος τοῦ ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην* (of the *successful result* of the artistic process), *ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ἐπιστήμης.* Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 *b* 12.

Topic. A 3, *ἕξομεν δὲ τελέως τὴν μέθοδον, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχωμεν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ῥητορικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνάμεων. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖν ἃ προαιρούμεθα. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου πείσει, οὔθ' ὁ ἰατρικὸς ὑγιάσει. ἀλλ' ἐὰν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων μηδὲν παραλίπῃ, ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην φήσομεν.* Comp. Top. E c. 7, 136 *b* 57, and 137 *a* 5.

ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις πάσαις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιᾶ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μέχρι οὗ ἐνδέχεται, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ὑγιείας ὅμως θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι τῆς αὐτῆς τό τε πιθανὸν καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἰδεῖν πιθανόν, p. 5. *ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς συλλογισμόν τε καὶ φαινόμενον συλλογισμόν. ὁ γὰρ σοφιστικὸς οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· πλὴν ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἔσται ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ῥήτωρ, ἐκεῖ δὲ σοφιστὴς μὲν κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν. περὶ δὲ αὐτῆς ἤδη τῆς μεθόδου πειρώμεθα λέγειν, πῶς τε καὶ ἐκ τίνων δυνησόμεθα τυγχάνειν τῶν προκειμένων. πάλιν οὖν οἷον ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ὁρισάμενοι αὐτὴν τίς ἐστι, λέγωμεν τὰ λοιπά.*

Quint. II 17, 23 seq. Cic. de Inventione I 5, 6. Bacon, *Adv. of learning*, Bk. II X 2. 'For almost all other arts and sciences are judged by acts or masterpieces, as I may term them, and not by the successes and events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the cause. The master in the ship is judged by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage.'

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις (φανερὸν) ὅτι—κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν] The explanation and connexion are given in the Paraphrase, Introd. p. 148, and note 3.

Comp. Met. Γ 2, 1004 *b* 17, *οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταί...ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ προαιρέσει*, and Bonitz' note. Top. Δ 5, 126 *a* 35, *πάντες γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι κατὰ προαίρεσιν λέγονται.* Z 12, 149 *b* 29 u.s. *οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάθρα λαμβάνων ἀλλ' ὁ βουλόμενος λάθρα λαμβάνειν κλέπτης ἐστίν.* Eth. Nic. IV 13, 1127 *b* 15, *οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει.* Rhet. I 13, 10.

πλήν] 'except that,—only', a reservation. Soph. Oed. Col. 1639 (Herm.), Trach. 41, Arist. Equit. 1397, Dem. de Cor. p. 281 init., Arist. An. Pr. II 27, 70 *a* 29, Top. B 8, 114 *a* 8, Γ 4, 119 *b* 22, Θ 3, 158 *b* 37; I (de Soph. El.) c. 4, 166 *a* 4, Eth. N. IV 12, 1126 *b* 27, Polit. II 6, 1266 *a* 16, Rhet. I 12, 10.

μεθόδου] Note on *ὁδοποιεῖν*, § 2.

πάλιν οὖν—λέγωμεν τὰ λοιπά] 'Let us then take as it were a fresh start, and so first define it, and then proceed to the rest'.

1 ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶς ἑτέρας ἐστὶ τέχνης ἔργον· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων ἑκάστη περὶ τὸ αὑτῇ ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι διδασκαλικὴ καὶ πειστική, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ νοσερὸν καὶ γεωμετρία περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα πάθη τοῖς μεγέθεσι καὶ ἀριθμητικὴ περὶ ἀριθμόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν· ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος ὡς εἰπεῖν δοκεῖ δύνασθαι CHAP. II.

CHAP. II.

§ 1. On this definition of Rhetoric, see Introd. pp. 33—4; and note on paraphrase, p. 149: on the other current definitions of it, Ib. pp. 27—36. On Rhetoric as a *δύναμις*, Ib. p. 14 seq.

ὑποκείμενον] on I 1, 12 p. 24 *supra*.

ὑγιεινόν] Three different senses of this word are distinguished, Top. A 15, 106 *b* 35, *τὸ ὑγιεινὸν πλεοναχῶς, τὸ μὲν ὑγιείας ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ φυλακτικόν, τὸ δὲ σημαντικόν.*

τὰ συμβεβηκότα πάθη τοῖς μεγέθεσι] These are usually called *συμβεβηκότα καθ' αὑτά* in Aristotle's terminology, i. e. absolute, necessary consequences (rather than accidents) of the essence or definition of a thing. The ordinary *συμβεβηκότα* are *separable* accidents, qualities or properties, which do *not* form part of this essence of the subject, or consequently of its definition; with or without which the essence of the subject, (that which constitutes its being, or makes it to be what it is,) remains the same. The *συμβεβηκότα καθ' αὑτά* are distinguished from the ordinary *συμβεβηκότα* in this; that although they are not of the essence, and therefore do not enter into the definition, still they are immediately deducible from it, and *inseparable* from the subject, and are therefore the proper objects of study. They are in fact identifiable with the *ἴδια* or *propria* of the five predicables. The *συμβεβηκότα πάθη τοῖς μεγέθεσι* in the text are accordingly 'the inseparable properties of magnitudes'; as 'the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles' is a necessary property of the triangle, though not included in the definition, which is 'a plane figure bounded by three straight lines': still the property is deducible from the definition, and thus is inseparable from the notion of it: the triangle cannot exist without this property, though it is not of its essence, and therefore not part of the definition. This example is given in de Anima I 1 § 8, 402 *b* 19. See the whole section. And again de part. Anim. I 3, 10 *συμβεβηκὸς γάρ τι (καθ' αὑτὸ) τῷ τριγώνῳ τὸ δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχειν τὰς γωνίας.* See further in Trend. ad de Anima I 1, 1, *Comm.* p. 188 seq. Bonitz ad Metaph. Δ 30, 1025 *a* 30. Anal. Post. I 7, 75 *a* 42, *ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν...τρίτον τὸ γένος τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὗ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα δηλοῖ ἡ ἀπόδειξις...οὐκ ἔστι τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἐφαρμόσαι ἐπὶ τὰ τοῖς μεγέθεσι συμβεβηκότα.*

On *πάθη* see Introd. p. 114.

θεωρεῖν τὸ πιθανόν. διὸ καί φαμεν αὐτὴν οὐ περί
2 τι γένος ἴδιον ἀφωρισμένον ἔχειν τὸ τεχνικόν. τῶν
δὲ πίστεων αἱ μὲν ἄτεχνοί εἰσιν αἱ δ' ἔντεχνοι.
ἄτεχνα δὲ λέγω ὅσα μὴ δι' ἡμῶν πεπόρισται ἀλλὰ
προϋπῆρχεν, οἷον μάρτυρες βάσανοι συγγραφαὶ καὶ
ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἔντεχνα δὲ ὅσα διὰ τῆς μεθόδου καὶ
δι' ἡμῶν κατασκευασθῆναι δυνατόν, ὥστε δεῖ τούτων
3 τοῖς μὲν χρήσασθαι τὰ δὲ εὑρεῖν. τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ P. 1356
λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν

§ 2. On ἔντεχνοι and ἄτεχνοι πίστεις, see Introd. p. 150 (paraphrase), and on the general subject, analysis of I c. 15, pp. 193—207.

τοῖς μὲν χρήσασθαι τὰ δὲ εὑρεῖν] The former lie ready at hand, and require only to be employed; the latter, proofs of all kinds, direct and indirect, *πίστεις, ἦθος, πάθος*, must be 'discovered' or 'invented' for this occasion by the speaker himself. Hence the distinction of *inventio* from the other parts of Rhetoric by the Latin Rhetoricians. So Cicero, de Inventione (this title is adopted to represent the whole domain of Rhetoric, because 'invention' or proof of one kind or another is the *σῶμα τῆς πίστεως*, I 1 § 3, by far the most prominent and important part of the entire art) VII 9, *quare materia quidem nobis rhetoricae videtur ea, quam Aristoteli visam esse diximus; partes autem hae quas plerique dixerunt, inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronunciatio* (invention, order and arrangement of parts, style, memory, and delivery including action). *Inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum aut veri similium* quae causam probabilem reddant &c. Similarly Quintilian, Inst. Or. I 12, 4, *Quid? nos agendi subita necessitate deprehensi nonne alia dicimus alia providemus, quum pariter inventio* rerum, *electio* verborum (style in single words), *compositio* (combination of words in sentences), *gestus, pronunciatio, vultus, motusque desiderentur?* XII 1, 30, *bonos nunquam honestus* sermo (style) *deficiet, nunquam* rerum *optimarum inventio.*

§ 3. *πίστεων τρία εἴδη*] Compare Rhet. III 1, 1. This threefold division of rhetorical proofs, due to Aristotle, is recognized by Dionysius, de Lys. jud. c. 19, *ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν καλουμένων ἐντέχνων πίστεων, καὶ χωρὶς ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου μέρους διαλέξομαι. τριχῇ δὲ νενεμημένων τούτων, εἴς τε τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ ἦθος κ.τ.λ.*: and by Charmadas, in Cic. de Orat. I 19, 87, where only the *ἦθος* and *πάθος* are directly mentioned, but the other, which is absolutely indispensable, must of course be assumed as a third division: by Cicero himself, de Orat. II 27, 115, *ita omnis ratio dicendi tribus ad persuadendum rebus est nixa; ut probemus vera esse quae defendimus; ut conciliemus nobis eos qui audiunt; ut animos eorum ad quemcunque causa postulabit motum vocemus.* This is repeated in §§ 121 and 128 and the *ἦθος* and *πάθος* described at length in c. 43 and the following. These two latter are again referred to Orat. XXXVII 128; and again in Partitiones Oratoriae XIII 46 the three *πίστεις* are thus ingeniously distinguished in a twofold division. *Argumentandi duo*

γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, διὰ
4 τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι. διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ

sunt genera, quorum alterum ad fidem directe spectat, alterum se inflectit ad motum. (These are the 'direct' and 'indirect' proofs and arguments.) *Dirigitur cum proposuit aliquid quod probaret, sumpsitque ea quibus niteretur; atque his confirmatis ad propositum se retulit atque conclusit. Illa autem altera argumentatio, quasi retro et contra, prius sumit quae vult eaque confirmat, deinde id quod proponendum fuit permotis animis iacit ad extremum.*

Quintilian touches on this subject in many places of his work; the most detailed account of ἦθος and πάθος is given in the second chapter of his sixth book: the description and distinction of them occur in §§ 18, 19. They are both referred, as subordinate species, to the general head of '*affectus*', § 8, comp. § 12; and these are again distinguished from the direct and logical arguments, § 3. In this and the following section he compares these two classes of arguments together in respect of their rhetorical value and importance, and comes to a conclusion precisely opposite to that of Aristotle. For Aristotle holds that these indirect proofs, though necessary to the orator by reason of the deficiencies and infirmities of his audience, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν, III 1 § 5, and therefore not to be excluded from the theory or practice of Rhetoric, yet are to be regarded as merely auxiliary and subordinate, standing in the same relation to the direct proofs as dress and personal ornaments to the body, serviceable but not essential. Quintilian on the contrary pronounces that these in comparison with the overpowering force of the appeals to the feelings are only not contemptible in respect of their power of persuasion; *quos equidem non contemno, sed hactenus utiles credo ne quid per eos iudici sit ignotum; atque ut dicam quod sentio, dignos a quibus causas diserti docerentur* § 3: that those that use them therefore are only fit to lay before the judges the facts of the case, not to influence their decision, and to instruct the real advocate, who can sway their minds and feelings at his will, and force them to decide in favour of his client: *ubi vero animis iudicum vis afferenda est, et ab ipsa veri contemplatione abducenda mens, ibi proprium oratoris opus est* § 5.

It may be observed in concluding this note, that there is a somewhat important difference, which I have already pointed out in the Introduction, between Aristotle's view of the use to be made of ἦθος in the practice of Rhetoric, and that of the Latin Rhetoricians, as well as the author of the Rhet. ad Alex.; see c. 39 (38) 2. Quintilian's *auctoritas*—and compare Cicero in de Oratore, II 43—expresses the influence of character upon opinion, in general: but in Aristotle's system the ἦθος means something more; the effect must be produced immediately *by the speech* δεῖ δὲ καὶ τουτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τὸ προδεδόξασθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα, Rhet. I 2, 4; and hence it finds a place in Rhetoric *as in Art*: whereas in the other view the *auctoritas* exercised may have been previously acquired, and altogether ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος, acting independ-

ἤθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἁπλῶς, ἐν οἷς

ently of any artistic or systematic process, in the way of reasoning or proving.

§ 4. On ἦθος, as *auctoritas*, see Introd. p. 151 note.

τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι] 'worthy and respectable people'. Eth. Nic. v. 14 sub init. καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες. The primary sense of ἐπιεικής is therefore 'equitable', one who has a leaning to the merciful side and of an indulgent disposition, as opposed to one who takes a strict and rigorous view of an offence, puts a harsh construction on men's motives and actions, is inclined to enforce on all occasions the letter of the law. From this, and because we think this the *better* disposition of the two, ἐπιεικής is 'transferred' by metaphor (i.e. the μεταφορὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος, the second of the four species of metaphors, Poet. XXI 7) to the general (or generic) signification of 'good'.

ἁπλῶς] has various usages. It may for instance mean (1) 'simply', opposed to συνθέσει or κατὰ συμπλοκήν: and this appears to be the primary sense of the word, in accordance with the derivation. Thus as the elements of nature are often called ἁπλᾶ σώματα in their simple, uncombined state, so we have ἁπλῶς, de Anima II 14, 8, to denote 'singly, or simply, by itself' (καθ' ἑαυτήν Themistius), without the admixture of any other element; δοκεῖ δέ τισιν ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις ἁπλῶς αἰτία τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως εἶναι. Similarly when applied in a moral sense to human character, it denotes 'simplicity' (of composition), 'singleness' of heart and purpose, as opposed to 'duplicity', (Plat. Rep. III 397 E, οὐ διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς. VIII 55, 4 D, Rhet. I 9, 29, Eur. Rhes. 395 φιλῶ λέγειν τἀληθὲς ἀεὶ κοὐ διπλοῦς πέφυκ' ἀνήρ. Ruhnk. Tim. p. 86).

The commonest signification however is that of (2) *simpliciter et sine exceptione* 'generally' or 'universally', as opposed to καθ' ἕκαστον, 'specially', 'particularly', 'individually', Eth. N. I 1, 1095 *a* 1, or to ἔστιν ὡς 'partially', or κατὰ μέρος, de Anima II 5, 4, νῦν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἐλέγομεν περὶ αὐτῶν, in *general* terms—we must now come to *particulars*. Hence it signifies 'altogether', 'absolutely', *omnino*, as οὐδὲν ἁπλῶς 'none at all', de Part. An. IV 13, 9, ἀδύνατον ὅλως 'absolutely impossible'. Plato will supply abundance of examples of this usage. See also Waitz, *Comm. on Organ.* Vol. I p. 354, who exemplifies it from Aristotle.

From this again may be distinguished a third sense (3), in which it is equivalent to καθ' αὑτόν, and opposed to πρός τι, 'the relative'. In this sense it is defined, Top. B 11, 115 *b* 33, ὃ ἂν μηδενὸς προστιθεμένου δοκῇ εἶναι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἁπλῶς ῥηθήσεται. de Soph. El. c. 5, 166 *b* 22 and *b* 37, where τὸ ἁπλῶς and μὴ ἁπλῶς are opposed as the absolute and relative in a paralogism of the substitution of the one for the other. Anal. Post. I 4, 83 *a* 15, κατηγορεῖν μὲν μὴ ἁπλῶς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ κατηγορεῖν. Eth. N. I 3, 1095 *b* 3, Polit. IV (VII) 1, 1323 *b* 17, καὶ ἁπλῶς (absolutely, in itself) καὶ ἡμῖν (relatively to us).

δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μή ἐστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ προδεδοξάσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἔνιοι τῶν τεχνολογούντων τιθέασιν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν τοῦ λέγοντος ὡς οὐδὲν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸ πιθανόν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος.
5 διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες· πρὸς ὃ καὶ μόνον πειρᾶσθαί φαμεν πραγματεύεσθαι τοὺς νῦν τεχνολογοῦντας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων δηλωθήσεται καθ' ἕκαστον, ὅταν περὶ τῶν παθῶν λέγω-

From these three may perhaps be distinguished a fourth sense (4) in which it occurs; for instance, in Met. A 6, 987 *a* 21, οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι... λίαν ἁπλῶς ἐπραγματεύθησαν "treated the subject too simply", i. e. too carelessly, without taking sufficient pains with it, with insufficient *elaboration*; '*negligenter*', Bonitz ad loc. q. v. On the various modes in which ἁπλῶς is opposed to the relative and particular see Schrader on I 9, 17.

κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος] 'is the most authoritative, effective, instrument of persuasion'. On the influence of character on the judgment add to the passages already quoted, Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (39), 2, and Isocr. ἀντίδοσις §§ 276—280.

The oratorical artifice here described is well illustrated by Marc Antony's speech in *Julius Caesar*, Act III Sc. 2, "I come not, friends, to steal away your hearts," &c.

κύριος in this and similar cases seems to derive its meaning from the 'authority' or 'influence' exercised by any one or any thing that has the power of doing so, of which general notion it is a special application. It corresponds to our 'sovereign', as when we speak of a sovereign remedy. Trendelenburg, on de Anima II 5, 7, *Comm.* p. 368, would connect this signification with the κύριος νόμος, 'ratio e iudiciis et foro tracta videtur. κύριος νόμος, qui ἀκύρῳ oppositus est, lex est quae rata viget &c.—ita hic κύρια ὀνόματα, quatenus eorum auctoritas valet.' This is perhaps unnecessarily narrowing the signification. Other persons and things, besides laws, exercise authority. A good instance of κύριος in this general sense, implying superiority, authority, mastery, occurs in de Anima II 8, 3, 419 *b* 19, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ψόφου κύριος ὁ ἀὴρ οὐδὲ τὸ ὕδωρ, where κύριος may be interpreted 'absolute master', the air and water are not *absolute masters* of sound: some other conditions are required to produce it. Ib. 419 *b* 33, τὸ δὲ κενὸν ὀρθῶς λέγεται κύριον τοῦ ἀκούειν.

§ 5. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν κ.τ.λ.] Comp. II 1, 4.

6 μεν· διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων [πιστεύουσιν], ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἢ φαινόμενον (ἀληθὲς) δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα
7 πιθανῶν. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσί, φανερὸν

§ 6. *διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων*] In § 3 we are told that there are three kinds of *πίστεις* or rhetorical proofs, which are conveyed through the channel or *medium* (*διά* with the *genitive*) of the speech. These three are then described *seriatim*. The first, § 4, is *διὰ τοῦ ἤθους*; the second (§ 5), *διὰ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν*; and the third, § 6, *διὰ τῶν λόγων*, plainly in the sense of the direct *πίστεις* or arguments proper, *ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἢ φαινόμενον δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα πιθανῶν*. *διὰ τῶν λόγων* is the reading of all the MSS except A^c, which has *τὸν λόγον*: but this, as an unnecessary and unaccountable departure from the construction of the parallel expressions, *διὰ τοῦ λόγου, τοῦ ἤθους, τῶν ἀκροατῶν*, and afterwards *διὰ τούτων*, seems to be self-condemned.

By these *λόγοι* we may understand either the actual words which are the instruments or *medium* of the reasonings, or better the reasonings or arguments themselves which the words convey. This explanation appears to be sufficiently rational and consistent, and in accordance with the ordinary usages of the language. Spengel, however, in his paper *über die Rhet. des Arist.* (Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851) p. 26, and again in his edition of the Rhetoric, Vol. II p. 46, thinks that the text requires alteration, and would read *δι' αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ λόγου*, or *διὰ δ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου*, which seems to be totally unnecessary. The explanation above given is confirmed by the rendering of the *Vetus Translatio* 'per orationes autem credimus', where '*orationes*' plainly stands for the 'words of the speeches in which these arguments are expressed'.

ἀληθὲς ἢ φαινόμενον] The second of these terms denotes the fallacious branch of Rhetoric, 'the apparent, unreal, sham' arguments, exemplified in II 24, and corresponding to the spurious branch of Dialectics treated in the *Σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι*, and appended to the Topics. The illustration of these is allowed to enter into a scientific treatise only for the purpose of detecting and exposing these fallacies, and enabling the pleader or dialectician to confute them when employed by an adversary. *ἔστι γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη σοφία οὖσα δ' οὔ*, de Soph. El. I, 165 *a* 21.

§ 7. *ἐπεὶ δὲ αἱ πίστεις—καὶ πῶς*] "seeing then that these are the channels, or modes of communication of rhetorical proofs, it is plain that to grasp, or get possession, or make himself master of them (*λαβεῖν*) is a task for one who has a capacity for logical reasoning, and for the contemplation or study of characters, and thirdly [for the discernment] of the emotions;—and of the latter, what each is in itself, and what are its qualities and properties (*ποῖόν τι*), and from what sources (what motives and impulses, *ἐκ τίνων*,) it may be excited, and in what modes (*πῶς*)."—*ταῦτα...ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου*, lit. '*it belongs to the* student of logic *to get hold of them*'.

Of these the logical branch belongs to Dialectics, which teaches the habit of reasoning and discussion, the other two to the study of Ethics,

ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ τρία ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τρίτον τοῦ περὶ τὰ πάθη, τί τε ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποῖόν τι, καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἐγγίνεται καὶ πῶς. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφυές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη

which deals with human beings as individuals, and investigates the fixed habits, virtuous or vicious (ἕξεις), which constitute their characters (ἤθη), and the moral πάθη or 'emotions', which when developed by exercise, according to the direction which they take, become virtues and vices. The consequence is, ὥστε συμβαίνει, that Rhetoric may be considered a scion or offshoot of the study of Dialectics and Ethics, the latter 'which may fairly be called Politics' (because it treats of men in society and therefore includes the science of the individual, ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος (Ethics) τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα. Eth. Nic. I 1, 1074 *b* 11), standing to them in the relation of the offshoot to the parent plant. *Sed idem* (Aristoteles) *et de arte rhetorica tres libros scripsit, et in eorum primo non artem solum eam fatetur, sed ei particulam civilitatis sicut dialectices assignat.* Quint. Inst. Orat. II 17, 4.

συλλογίσασθαι] improperly applied here, as ἀπόδειξις above, I § 11 p. 19, to *rhetorical* reasoning. But as there the rhetorical πίστεις are called a kind of demonstration, 'a sort of', or subordinate variety of, demonstration in a general sense, so here the syllogistic process is allowed to stand for reasoning in general, to which even rhetorical reasoning, though not syllogistic in the strict sense, but enthymematic, of course belongs.

παραφυές] which usually appears under the form παραφυάς in Aristotle and Theophrastus, properly denotes either a branch or a separate plant 'growing alongside' of the parent plant, and proceeding either from the stem or the root, as a scion or offshoot. In the latter of these two senses it certainly occurs in Theophr. Hist. Plant. II 2, 4, ἐὰν ἀπὸ ῥίζης ᾖ παραφυὰς ᾖ, though here also the hypothetical ἐάν admits the other possibility. Also παραφύεσθαι, Hist. Plant. III 17, 3, ἀποκοπὲν δὲ καὶ ἐπικαυθὲν παραφύεται (grows from the root) καὶ ἀναβλαστάνει. This word and its cognates, παραφύεσθαι, παράφυσις, ἀποφυάς (Hist. An. II 1, 53, de part. An. III 5 § 1, 10 § 5, 14 § 14, Theophr. Hist. Plant. I 6, 6, VII 2, 5 and 8, &c.), παραβλαστάνειν, -βλαστή, -βλάστημα, are applied by Aristotle and his pupil Theophrastus primarily to plants, and by analogy to the corresponding parts of animals.

It occurs again as a metaphor in Eth. Nic. I 4, 1096 *a* 21, παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος; that is, τὸ καθ' αὑτό and ἡ οὐσία stand to 'the relative', τὸ πρός τι, in the same relation as parent plant to offshoot. 'Similitudo, explicante Giphanio, a pullis arborum desumta, qui Graecis dicuntur παραφυάδες'. Zell, ad loc. So that Rhetoric is represented by this metaphor as a scion derived from two stocks or plants, Dialectics and Ethics, not identical with either, but with a general or inherited family resemblance to both. (The analogy will not bear

πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν. διὸ καὶ ὑποδύεται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ ῥητορικὴ καὶ οἱ ἀντιποιούμενοι ταύτης τὰ μὲν δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τὰ δὲ δι' ἀλαζονείαν τὰ δὲ καὶ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικάς· ἔστι γὰρ μόριόν τι τῆς δια-

pressing: one does not see, for example, how a young plant can be the scion or offspring of *two* others, but this general meaning is clear, that it bears a likeness to both, though differing from each of them.)

ὑποδύεται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα] 'creeps under, insinuates itself into, the form or figure'; 'assumes the mask or disguise of (for the purpose of acting a part)', 'personates', Plat. Gorg. 464 C, ἡ κολακευτική...ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδυ...ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ ὑποδέδυκε... Sopater, ap. Stallb. not. ad loc. ὑποδύεται, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὑπεισέρχεται, ὑποκρίνεται, ὡς ἐκείνῃ ταὐτὸν δοκεῖν εἶναι. Metaph. Α 2, 1004 *b* 17, οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ταὐτὸν μὲν ὑποδύονται σχῆμα τῷ φιλοσόφῳ.

ἀλαζονεία implies both presumption and imposture; either a character between both and a mixture of *both* (as Theophrastus' ἀλαζών, 'the braggart', of which Pyrgopolinices in the *Miles Gloriosus*, Thraso in the *Eunuchus*, and Captain Bobadil in *Every Man in his Humour*, are the three types, ancient and modern; and probably also the Sophistical Rhetoricians here referred to): or again a character in which *either* presumption *or* imposture is characteristic and predominant. For example, the insolent assumption, arrogance, and swagger appear more prominently in this picture of the ἀλαζών drawn by Xenophon, Cyrop. II 2, 12, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀλαζὼν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς προσποιουμένοις καὶ πλουσιωτέροις εἶναι ἢ εἰσι, καὶ ἀνδρειοτέροις, καὶ ποιήσειν ἃ μὴ ἱκανοί εἰσιν ὑπισχνουμένοις· καὶ ταῦτα φανεροῖς γιγνομένοις ὅτι τοῦ λαβεῖν τι ἕνεκα καὶ κερδᾶναι ποιοῦσιν. This last mercenary element is not found elsewhere in the character of the ἀλαζών. In Aristotle, Eth. Nic. II 7, IV 13, empty pretension, ostentation and swagger are the leading characteristics of the ἀλαζών. The vice is one of the extremes of which ἀλήθεια, the social virtue of frankness, sincerity, and plain dealing is the mean, the opposite extreme being εἰρωνεία, 'mock' in conversation, Socrates' habit. It is the extreme in προσποίησις, 'pretension', of which ἀλήθεια is the mean state. Whereas in Aristophanes it usually represents rather the other side of the character, its quackery and imposture; and ἀλαζών is 'a quack or a humbug'. Of course Socrates and his brother Sophists are the great representatives of the class. *Nubes* 102, 1494, *et passim*. And this is also the side of the character which is generally uppermost in Plato's view of it. See Rep. VI 486 B, 490 A, VIII 560 C, Phaedo 92 D, ἡδονὴ...ἁπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον, Phil. 65 C. The definition of it given in the Platonic ὅροι, p. 416, is that of undue pretension, assumption, imposture. ἕξις προσποιητικὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἀγαθῶν τῶν μὴ ὑπαρχόντων. Quackery and imposture are also predominant in the application of it, Rhet. II 6, 11.

δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικάς] 'incident to humanity', implying the infirmities, imperfections, frailties, miseries, and especially errors to which

λεκτικῆς καὶ ὁμοίωμα, καθάπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενοι εἴπομεν· περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὡρισμένου οὐδετέρα αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πῶς ἔχει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινὲς τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι
8 πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται σχεδὸν ἱκανῶς. τῶν δὲ διὰ
τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν
ἐπαγωγή ἐστι τὸ δὲ συλλο- P. 1356 b.



d, and from which the divine nature,
this conception, is exempt. 'The other
are any other defects or imperfections
ble. Thuc. III 40 ἀνθρωπίνως ἁμαρτάνειν,
τε ἅπαντες ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἁμαρτάνειν:
Soph. 229 A κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην δόξαν,
ıoxia est erroribus. Uti apud Latinos
ecillitatis humanae excusatio' (Heindorf
καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα et cet.). Demosth.
τῆς τύχης τι συμβέβηκεν ἐναντίωμα, ἢ
δὲ τἀνθρώπινα.—Id. c. Lept. p. 506, 15,
eot. de Nomine p. 998, πολλά γάρ ἐστι
7, καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγινώσκειν
31, ἀνθρωπικώτερον (more *humane*) γὰρ
ωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν

ων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, it has this
affairs, business and enjoyments': with
B καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τἀνθρώπινα (all
human society or affairs in general) ζητούντων διδασκάλους κ.τ.λ. So Virgil, Æn. I 462, *sunt lacrimae rerum; et mentem mortalia tangunt*: and in the second sense, Ecl. VIII 35, *nec curare deum credis mortalia quemquam*.

§ 8. The eighth and ninth and part of the tenth sections of this chapter are quoted by Dionysius, Ep. ad Amm. I c. 7, from τῶν δὲ διὰ to ἐν τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔχει. The variations are, δείκνυσθαι (*bis*) for δεικνύναι, ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς for ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, the omission of ἢ ὁντινοῦν, and of αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ; for ἕτερόν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν παρὰ ταῦτα τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι, we have ἕτερόν τε διὰ τ. σ. παρὰ τὸ ταῦτ' εἶναι, also φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι for ὅτι καί, further τὸ omitted before εἶδος, and γάρ after καθάπερ, and lastly ῥητορείας for ῥητορικῆς.

τῶν δὲ] πίστεων.

ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς] Dionysius has ἀναλυτικοῖς, which Spengel has introduced into the text, with the remark, *certe Aristoteles τῇ διαλεκτικῇ scripsisset* (Rhetores Graeci p. 5, Praef. p. 5); and again, *über die Rhet. des Arist.* Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 44, *Aristoteles sagt nur ἐν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ, nicht ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς*; in reply to which I will merely quote Rhet. II 22, 14, where ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς again occurs. Even without this evidence

γισμὸς τὸ δὲ φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοίως· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγή, τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός, τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα φαινόμενος συλλογισμός. καλῶ δ' ἐνθύμημα μὲν ῥητορικὸν συλλογισμόν, παράδειγμα δὲ ἐπαγωγὴν ῥητορικήν. πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ παραδείγματα λέγοντες ἢ ἐνθυμήματα, καὶ p. 7.
παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν[1]· ὥστ' εἴπερ καὶ ὅλως ἀνάγκη (ἢ)

[1] οὐδέν πως.

I can see no reason why an author who speaks habitually of others of his works in the plural, as τὰ ἀναλυτικά, ἠθικά, πολιτικά, μεθοδικά, should be denied that privilege in the special case of the Topics. Nor do I see why the single testimony of Dionysius should override the authority of all the Aristotelian MSS. I have therefore retained the old reading.

πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται—καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν πως] Anal. Pr. II 23, 68 *b* 9, ὅτι δ' οὐ μόνον οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ διὰ τῶν προειρημένων γίνονται σχημάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ καὶ ἁπλοῦς ἡτισοῦν πίστις καὶ καθ' ὁποιανοῦν μέθοδον, νῦν ἂν εἴη λεκτέον. ἅπαντα γὰρ πιστεύομεν ἢ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἢ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς. Anal. Post. I 18, 81 *a* 40, εἴπερ μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει. Eth. Nic. VI 1139 *b* 27, ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. The reference here is most unmistakeably to the opening words of the Anal. Post., an additional evidence, against Brandis (see the succeeding note), that the reference in ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν is either directly and exclusively to this passage of the Analytics or at any rate includes it with the others.

ἢ ὁντινοῦν] is rejected by Spengel on the authority of Dionysius, who omits it, and against that of the Aristotelian MSS, which, as appears from Bekker's revision, all agree in retaining it. It is not merely perfectly intelligible, and absolutely unexceptionable on all critical grounds, but when compared with the commencement of the Anal. Post., to which reference is immediately after made, it seems to tally so precisely with what is there stated, that it might almost be regarded as a necessary addition. In the passage of the Analytics we are told that every kind of instruction and learning, proof scientific and popular, mathematical or dialectical knowledge, is conveyed by way of syllogism or induction: and it is then added, ὡς δ' αὔτως καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συμπείθουσιν· ἢ γὰρ διὰ παραδειγμάτων, ὅ ἐστιν ἐπαγωγή, ἢ δι' ἐνθυμημάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συλλογισμός, a statement with which the ἢ ὁντινοῦν of the Rhetoric seems to correspond to a nicety. And for the same reason I hold that this passage is referred to in ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν, as well as Anal. Pr. II 23, 68 *b* 9, (quoted in the preceding note,) and the continuation of the subject there suggested in chapters 24 and 27, (which contain the logical description of induction and example, and the enthymeme), though Brandis, in his tract on the Rhetoric in Schneidewin's *Philologus* IV 1, p. 24, would confine the reference to the latter passage.

συλλογιζόμενον ἢ ἐπάγοντι δεικνύναι ὁτιοῦν[1] *(δῆλον δ' ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), ἀναγκαῖον ἑκάτερον*
9 *αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τούτων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. τίς δ' ἐστὶ διαφορὰ παραδείγματος καὶ ἐνθυμήματος, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν. ἐκεῖ γὰρ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἐπαγωγῆς εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὁμοίων δείκνυσθαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ἐκεῖ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα δὲ παράδειγμα, τὸ δὲ τινῶν ὄντων ἕτερόν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν παρὰ ταῦτα τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι, ἢ καθόλου ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἐκεῖ μὲν*
10 *συλλογισμὸς ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἐνθύμημα καλεῖται. φανερὸν δ' ὅτι καὶ ἑκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς· καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς εἴρηται,*

[1] *ὁτιοῦν ἢ ὁντινοῦν.*

§ 9. *ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν*] On this reference to the Topics see note in Introd. p. 154, and note on II 25, 3, in this Commentary. The reference to the Topics there made is precisely similar to this: that is, it is made to the work in general and its contents, and not to any particular passage: what is stated here may be *gathered* or *inferred* from the Topics.

§ 10. *φανερὸν δ' ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς*] 'It is plain that either kind of Rhetoric (the *παραδειγματῶδες* or the *ἐνθυμηματικὸν*) has good in it', that each of them has its own particular virtue and excellence, or advantage. Buhle construes the words *τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἔχει ἑκάτερον ἀγαθόν*, '*Rhetoricen utroque bono frui, et enthymemate et exemplo*'. (He takes *τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥ.* for a mere periphrasis. So in fact it does occur in Pol. I 4, 1253 *b* 28, *ἐν ὀργάνου εἴδει* "in the shape of an instrument", de gen. et corr. I 3, 10, *ἐν ὕλης εἴδει*—but *εἶδος* in this usage does not seem to admit the definite article.) We have a similar use of *ἀγαθὸν ἔχειν* in Rhet. II 20, 7, *εἰσὶ δ' οἱ λόγοι δημηγορικοί, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*

ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς] '*Scheint eine mittelstellung zwischen analytik und dialektik eingenommen zu haben*', Brandis, u. s. p. 13. The work is mentioned twice by Dionysius, Ep. ad Amm. I cc. 6 and 8, each time in company with Analytics and Topics. From this circumstance and from the reference here, it is natural to conclude that its subject was connected in some way with Logic. Diogenes Laert. V 1, 23, includes in his list of Aristotle's writings *μεθοδικὰ* in eight books, and § 25, *μεθοδικὸν* in one: the former comes amongst the logical, the latter amongst the rhetorical works. It appears also in the list of the 'Anonymous' author of the life of Aristotle (in Buhle, Vol. I p. 62), again in near connexion with works on Logic, *Ἀναλυτικῶν, Προβλημάτων, Μεθοδικά.* Hesychius Milesius in his life of Aristotle (Buhle, Vol. I p. 72), describes it thus; *πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὴν εὕρεσιν, τά τε τοπικὰ καὶ μεθοδικά, παρέδωκε*

καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔχει· εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ μὲν παραδειγματώδεις ῥητορεῖαι αἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικαί, καὶ ῥήτορες ὁμοίως οἱ μὲν παραδειγματώδεις οἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικοί. πιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἧττον οἱ λόγοι οἱ

προτάσεων πλῆθος, ἐξ ὧν πρὸς τὰ προβλήματα πιθανῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων οἷόν τε εὐπορεῖν: classing it, like Dionysius and Diogenes, with the Topics and Analytics, the latter of which is mentioned immediately after. Simplicius ad Categ. fol. 7 *a* (quoted by Buhle) speaks of it as one of Aristotle's ὑπομνήματα, *commentarii;* ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὑπομνήματι. Brandis, u.s., adds a reference to the Schol. in Arist. p. 47 b 40.

ῥητορεῖαι] 'rhetorical exhibitions or displays' Probl. XVIII 3. The word is a rare one, and as distinguished from ῥητορική denotes rather the practice and results of Rhetoric, speaking and speeches, than the system and theory of it as embodied in the 'art'. It is found in Plato, Polit. 304 A, where Stallbaum notes, 'vox ῥητορεία a Platone ficta videtur ut ars oratoria nobilior et generosior distingueretur a varia illa ῥητορικῇ cuius nomen profanaverant qui ad explendas suas cupiditates abusi erant.' The fact, that the word was a Platonic invention, and the ground assigned for the distinction, seem equally unauthenticated. It occurs also in Isocrates, κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν § 21, for 'the practice of rhetoric' in general, also Panath. § 2, Phil. § 26; and amongst the later writers, in Plutarch and Lucian: ῥητορεύειν, in Plato, Isocrates, and Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37), 35.

πιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν—οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοί] Anal. Pr. II 23, ult. φύσει μὲν οὖν πρότερος καὶ γνωριμώτερος ὁ διὰ τοῦ μέσου συλλογισμός, ἡμῖν δ' ἐναργέστερος ὁ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. The objects of sense and observation from which we derive our inductions and examples are 'nearer to us', more readily apprehensible by us, than the universals of the syllogism: and therefore, Top. A 12, 105 *a* 16, ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ πιθανώτερον καὶ σαφέστερον καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς βιαστικώτερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς ἐνεργέστερον, 'induction is a mode of reasoning which is clearer (to us) and more persuasive, because its materials are better known to us', the example must be familiar and well known or it will not produce its effect in the way of proof; also some kind of induction is constantly used by every one, τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν; the syllogism and enthymeme are more 'cogent' and 'effective' against an adversary in a debate, and are therefore 'more applauded', θορυβοῦνται δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοί.

There is no real contradiction between what is here said and in Probl. XVIII 3. In the Problem the question is *why* people in general are better pleased with examples than with enthymemes, the fact being assumed. The answer is, that they learn more from them, and are therefore more amused, and the facts which are adduced by way of examples are more familiar and interesting; the enthymeme (as the syllogism in the Topics) proceeds from universals, which we are less acquainted with than with particulars. Consequently, examples are more pleasing and therefore plausible (πιθανά), whilst the conclusive

διὰ τῶν παραδειγμάτων, θορυβοῦνται δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ
11 ἐνθυμηματικοί. τὴν δ' αἰτίαν αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἑκατέρῳ χρηστέον, ἐροῦμεν ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων μᾶλλον διορίσωμεν καθαρῶς.

ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ πιθανὸν τινὶ πιθανόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει δι' αὑτὸ πιθανὸν καὶ πιστὸν τὸ δὲ τῷ δείκνυσθαι δοκεῖν διὰ τοιούτων, οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ τί Σωκράτει τὸ ὑγιεινόν ἐστιν ἢ Καλλίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τί τῷ τοιῷδε ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἔντεχνον, τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητόν), οὐδὲ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔνδοξον θεωρήσει, οἷον Σωκράτει ἢ Ἱππίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῖσδε, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτική. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη συλλογίζεται οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν (φαίνεται

argument, the enthymeme which leaves the adversary without reply, is more striking, and therefore more applauded.

θορυβεῖσθαι, 'to be applauded', is a regular formation of the passive. For although the usual construction of *θορυβεῖν* is with *ἐπί* and the dative, many examples of the transitive use of it are found. See the examples of both, and of the passive, in Ast's Lex. Plat. Isocr. Panath. § 233, (*ὁ λόγος*) *ἐπῃνημένος ἦν καὶ τεθορυβημένος*: and Rhet. II 23, 30, *τῶν συλλογισμῶν θορυβεῖται μάλιστα τοιαῦτα ὅσα κ.τ.λ.* Cf. Rhet. I 9, 40, quoted in Introd. p. 155.

§ 11. *ἐροῦμεν ὕστερον*] II chapters 20—24.

πιθανόν] 'plausible', that which readily persuades; *πιστόν*, 'credible', that which is to be relied on; the latter represents the higher degree of trustworthiness. *διὰ τοιούτων, πιθανῶν καὶ πιστῶν.*

The connexion of the argument of this section is given in the paraphrase, Introduction p. 155.

Art and science deal with universals, art prescribes rules for classes, not individuals; practice, *ἐμπειρία*, follows the opposite method. Rhet. II 19, 27, *τὸ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτά τι ζητεῖν περὶ μεγέθους ἁπλῶς καὶ ὑπεροχῆς κενολογεῖν ἐστίν· κυριώτερα γάρ ἐστι πρὸς τὴν χρείαν* (for use or practice) *τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων.* Eth. Nic. VI 12, 1143 *a* 32, *ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων πάντα τὰ πρακτά κ.τ.λ.* Met. A 1, 981 *a* 12, *πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχόντων. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν.*

καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη συλλογίζεται οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν κ.τ.λ.] Compare Top. A 10, 104 *a* 4, 11, 105 *a* 3—9, *οὐ δεῖ δὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα οὐδὲ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἣν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις τῶν λόγου δεομένων, καὶ μὴ κολάσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορoῦντες πότερον δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς ἀγαπᾶν, ἢ οὔ,*

γὰρ ἄττα καὶ τοῖς παραληροῦσιν), ἀλλ' ἐκείνη μὲν ἐκ P. 1357.
τῶν λόγου δεομένων, ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ τῶν ἤδη βου-
12 *λεύεσθαι εἰωθότων. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς περί τε*
τοιούτων περὶ ὧν βουλευόμεθα καὶ τέχνας μὴ ἔχομεν,
καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀκροαταῖς οἳ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολ- p. 8.
λῶν συνορᾶν[1] *οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν. βουλευόμεθα*

[1] *συνορᾷν infra.*

κολάσεως δέονται, οἱ δὲ πότερον ἡ χιὼν λευκὴ αἰσθήσεως, κ.τ.λ., and Eth. Eud. I 3, quoted in Introd. p. 156, note.

ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν] sc. *ἐξ ἐκείνων ἃ ἔτυχεν*: 'any materials, or propositions taken at random, any chance propositions'. So Rhet. I 5, 11, *διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὧν τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται.* On the attraction of the relative from its proper case after the verb to that of its antecedent, see Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 473, and note on Rhet. I 5, 11.

§ 12. *τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς*] The proper office, the special function, business, 'work', *ἔργον*, of Rhetoric, is exercised in such things as we are obliged to take advice about, where there are no definite rules of art ready laid down to guide us.

The *ἔργον* of anything is that which it is specially appointed (by nature) *to do*, ~~its proper~~ special *work*. It is in the execution, the carrying out or fulfilment of this *ἔργον*, that this *ἀρετή*, this special excellence of everything, resides. Nature always works intelligently with a purpose in view, *πρὸς τέλος τι*, everything has its own special *ἔργον*. This is especially manifest in all 'instruments', *ὄργανα* (things in which the purpose is *apparent*); as of an axe or knife the office or purpose is to cut (large and small things), of a horse to run, of an eye to see, of the mind to think, and so on; and the purpose or office being the same in kind and differing only in degree, in doing a thing at all and in doing it well, the *ἀρετή* is shewn in and measured by the performance of this special work; sharpness in the knife to cut well, swiftness in the horse to run well, is the due fulfilment of its *ἔργον*. Eth. N. VI 2, 1139 *a* 16, *ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον.* This doctrine is first laid down by Plato, Rep. I 352 E seq. and borrowed by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. I 6, and II 5, where the theory of moral *virtue* is based upon it. Hence Pol. I 2, 1253 *a* 23, *πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει.* Eth. Eud. II 1, 1218 *b* 38, *περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη διάθεσις ἢ ἕξις ἢ δύναμις ἑκάστων, ὅσων ἐστί τις χρῆσις ἢ ἔργον*, which is there illustrated at length.

διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾷν] 'to take in at a glance through the *medium*, or along the line, of many steps of proof or syllogisms', 'to take in a long chain of arguments at one view'.

λογίζεσθαι πόῤῥωθεν] expresses much the same thing as *διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾷν*, to deduce or string together syllogisms in a chain from a long way off or back, 'to string together a long chain of connected syllogisms'. With *πόῤῥωθεν* here, compare the similar use of it in II 22, 3, and Top. A 11, 105 *a* 8 *οὐδὲ δὴ ὧν σύνεγγυς ἡ ἀπόδειξις, οὐδ' ὧν λίαν πόῤῥω.*

βουλευόμεθα δέ] On the proper objects of deliberation compare Eth.

δὲ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέρως ἔχειν· περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ ἔσεσθαι
13 ἢ ἔχειν οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον. ἐνδέχεται δὲ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ συνάγειν

Nic. III 5, VI 2 *λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων (τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων) τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν, τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐθεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν.* c. 5, 1140 *a* 32, *βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πρᾶξαι.* de Anima III 10, 4, 433 *a* 29, *πρακτὸν δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.* We deliberate and act only in cases where the event or issue is uncertain (may be in either of two ways, *ἀμφοτέρως*); where the event is necessarily this or that, i.e. certainly one way, and not the other, or where it is not in our own power, where we have no control over it, no one either deliberates whether or no anything is to be done or tries to do it. *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοτέρως ἔχειν* is usually expressed by *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν*, things contingent and uncertain in their issue; opposed to *τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν*, things certain and necessary, which can be only in one way, which have only one possible issue, and cannot be in one way *or* another, indifferently.

οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων] 'on that supposition', i.e. if he actually supposes them to be necessary and unalterable: because it is possible that he may have deliberated or even attempted in action things which he did not know were beyond his control, in mere ignorance.

οὐδὲν πλέον] 'there is nothing to be gained by it, no advantage in it'. Valckenaer, *Diatr. in Eur. Fragm.* p. 150 (156), supplies numerous examples. In three MSS (Bekker) the words *οὐδὲν γαρ πλεον* are followed immediately by *ἢ οὕτως ἐνδέχεται συμβουλεύειν.* They were first omitted by Bekker, though previously suspected by Muretus. The origin of this interpolation, for such it seems to be, may be thus accounted for. The words *συλλογίζεσθαι* and *συνάγειν* being very nearly synonymous, some one may have added in the margin *ἢ οὕτως· ἐνδέχεται δὲ συμβουλεύειν*— meaning that we might read *συμβουλεύειν* in place of *συλλογίζεσθαι* to avoid the tautology, *συμβουλεύειν* referring to the deliberative branch of Rhetoric, or public speaking: *ἢ οὕτως*, 'or thus', merely expressing the possibility of a *various reading*, *ἐνδέχεται δὲ συμβουλεύειν.* The essential stop after *οὕτως* was then omitted or overlooked, and the words finally introduced into the text as an appendage to *πλέον*, with the sense, as rendered by Gaisford, 'nihil enim amplius profici potest, quam quod sic deliberatur: i. e. incassum enim instituitur ista (altera) consultatio'.

§ 13. *συνάγειν*, (*ratione*) *colligere.* Rhet. II 22, 3 and 15. The *σύν* in words of this kind, which denote a process of reasoning or understanding, as *συνιέναι*, *συμβάλλειν*, (to comprehend, *comprehendere*,) and *συλλογίζεσθαι* itself, denotes the bringing of things together in the mind for the purpose of *comparison*, upon which either a judgment is founded and a conclusion drawn, or the understanding itself developed or enlightened. *συνάγειν* and *συλλογίζεσθαι* are found again together as synonyms, Met. H. init. 1042 *a* 3, *ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων συλλογίσασθαι δεῖ, καὶ συναγαγόντας τὸ κεφάλαιον τέλος ἐπιτιθέναι.*

τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλελογισμένων πρότερον, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀσυλλογίστων μὲν δεομένων δὲ συλλογισμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔνδοξα. ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν μὴ εἶναι εὐεπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ μῆκος (ὁ γὰρ κριτὴς ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἁπλοῦς), τὰ δὲ μὴ πιθανὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ὁμολογουμένων εἶναι μηδ' ἐνδόξων, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον τό τε ἐνθύμημα εἶναι καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν καὶ ἄλλως, τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγὴν τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός· ἐὰν γὰρ ᾖ τι τούτων γνώριμον, οὐδὲ δεῖ λέγειν· αὐτὸς γὰρ τοῦτο προστίθησιν ὁ ἀκροατής. οἷον ὅτι Δωριεὺς στεφανίτην ἀγῶνα νενί-

τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλελογισμένων πρότερον] 'the conclusions of previous syllogisms', which serve as major premisses to new syllogisms, and so on through the entire chain of demonstration.

ἁπλοῦς] 'a simple, uncultivated person', Germ. *einfach*. This use of the word belongs to the first of the three varieties above distinguished (note on *ἁπλῶς*, § 4 p. 30). It is opposed here rather to the 'complications' of an advanced stage of civilization and refinement, than to duplicity of character, and expresses 'an elementary state of cultivation'. Similarly Pol. II 8, 1268 *b* 39, *τοὺς γὰρ ἀρχαίους νόμους λίαν ἁπλοῦς εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικούς* 'rude and barbarous.

ἐνθύμημα—παράδειγμα] On enthymeme and example see Introd. pp. 99—108.

ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός] *πρῶτος* 'in its earliest, most elementary', or 'normal, typical, form'. *πλήρωμα τῆς πρώτης* (primary, in its original form) *πόλεως*, Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 *a* 17. *ἀριστοκρατίαν μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων παρὰ τὴν ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην*. Ib. c. 8, sub fin. Pol. VII (VI) c. 4, 1319 *a* 39, *τὴν βελτίστην καὶ πρώτην δημοκρατίαν*. On this passage, see note on II 21, 6.

οἷον (*πρὸς τὸ δηλοῦν, συλλογίζεσθαι ἀποδεῖξαι*) *ὅτι*. Infr. § 19, *οἷον ὅτι ἐπεβούλευε κ.τ.λ.* and c. 1 § 13.

Δωριεύς] the type of an Olympic victor; son of Diagoras of Rhodes, to whom Pindar's seventh Olympian ode is inscribed. See Introd. p. 158, note 1.

στεφανίτην ἀγῶνα] This is the title distinctive of the four great games, of which honour was in reality the prize, the garland being merely a symbol or external sign. They were hereby distinguished from *ἀγῶνες χρηματῖται* or *ἀργυρῖται* (Plut.) in which the prize was money, and in which therefore mercenary motives might possibly enter into the competition. Pausanias X 7, 3 tells us that it was not till the 2nd Pythiad that the Pythian games became an *ἀγὼν στεφανίτης*. Add to the instances

κηκεν, ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι Ὀλύμπια γὰρ νενίκηκεν· τὸ δ' ὅτι στεφανίτης τὰ Ὀλύμπια, οὐδὲ δεῖ προσθεῖ-
14 ναι· γιγνώσκουσι γὰρ πάντες. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὀλίγα μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξ ὧν οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συλλογισμοί εἰσι (τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ περὶ ὧν αἱ κρίσεις καὶ αἱ σκέψεις, ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν· περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πράττουσι βουλεύονται καὶ σκοποῦσι, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα πάντα τοιούτου γένους ἐστί, καὶ οὐδὲν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τούτων), τὰ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη ἑτέρων συλλογίζεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα ἐξ ἀναγκαίων (δῆλον δ' ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), φανερὸν ὅτι ἐξ

from Xen. Mem., Demosth., and Lycurg., Aesch. c. Ctes. § 179, and Isocr. Antid. § 301, *τοὺς ἀθλητὰς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς στεφανίταις ἀγῶσι νικῶντας.*

[*Anon. vita Euripidis*, init. *ἤσκησε δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς παγκράτιον ἢ πυγμήν, τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ χρησμὸν λαβόντος ὅτι στεφανηφόρους ἀγῶνας νικήσει.* S.]

Ὀλύμπια νενίκηκεν] The accusative in these phrases is an extension or 'equivalent' of a cognate accusative. Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 564.

§ 14. A summary repetition of the contents of the following sections, 14—19, is given in the chapter on *λύσις*, II 25, 8—9.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὀλίγα—ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ] Comp. II 22, 3, *καὶ μὴ μόνον συνάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλ' καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.*

ἐνδεχόμενα] 'things possible', as opposed to things *necessary*, not here to things *impossible*. On *ἐνδέχεσθαι* and *δύνασθαι, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον* and *τὸ δυνατόν* in Aristotle, see Waitz on Anal. Pr. I 3, 25 *a* 37, (Vol. I p. 375 seq.) and Bonitz on Metaph. Θ 3, 1047 *a* 26, p. 387. *δυνατόν* according to Waitz, where the two are distinguished, expresses *physical*, *ἐνδεχόμενον logical*, possibility: the latter implies the possible *truth* of an *assertion*, viz. that when we assert anything we do not contradict ourselves. *ἐνδεχόμενα* are therefore here 'possibilities' as opposed to certainties; things and events which are only conceived as possible, which may be in one way *or* in another. In the ordinary language *ἐνδέχεσθαι* and *ἐνδεχόμενον* have usually some other words, as *ἄλλως ἔχειν, γένεσθαι ἢ μὴ γίγνεσθαι*, or something similar, added to them in the way of a definition or limitation. With the *absolute* use of it in this passage (and the general sense in which it appears in Waitz's and Bonitz's *Commentaries*) comp. I 4, 3, *οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἁπάντων.* Eth. Nic. VI 2, 1139 *a* 8, *ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα.* Ib. c. 12, 1143 *b* 2, *τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου.*

ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.] Anal. Pr. I 8, 29 *b* 29, *ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν (πολλὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχει μέν, οὐ μέντοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τὰ δ' οὔτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔθ' ὑπάρχει ὅλως, ἐνδέχεται δ' ὑπάρχειν) δῆλον ὅτι καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἑκάστου τούτων ἕτερος ἔσται, καὶ οὐχ*

ὧν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται, τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἔσται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. λέγεται γὰρ ἐνθυμήματα ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων, ὥστε ἀνάγκη τούτων
15 ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρῳ ταὐτὸ εἶναι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον, οὐχ ἁπλῶς δέ, καθάπερ ὁρίζονταί τινες, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὕτως ἔχον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ εἰκός, ὡς P. 1357 b.
16 τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος· τῶν δὲ σημείων τὸ p. 9.
μὲν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθόλου, τὸ δὲ ὡς τῶν καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τεκμήριον, τὸ δὲ μὴ
17 ἀναγκαῖον ἀνώνυμόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν διαφοράν. ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὖν λέγω ἐξ ὧν γίνεται συλλογισμός. διὸ καὶ τεκμήριον τὸ τοιοῦτον τῶν σημείων ἐστίν· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι οἴωνται λῦσαι τὸ λεχθέν, τότε φέρειν οἴονται τεκμήριον ὡς δεδειγμένον καὶ πεπερασμένον· τὸ γὰρ τέκμαρ καὶ πέρας ταὐτόν ἐστι κατὰ·

ὁμοίως ἐχόντων τῶν ὅρων, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἐξ ἀναγκαίων, ὁ δ' ἐξ ὑπαρχόντων, ὁ δ' ἐξ ἐνδεχομένων. Anal. Pr. I 13, 32 *b* 4, where two kinds of possibility, *τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον*, are distinguished: one, the order of nature, which from its ordinary uniformity makes a near approach to the necessary, and the other, the indefinite, the purely accidental, *τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης*, in which there is no natural order at all.

τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἔσται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ] 'It is plain that the materials of enthymemes, the propositions or premisses of which they are constructed, though they *may* be necessary, are most of them no more than probabilities, or things that *usually* happen'. [On *μέν—δέ*, see the references above given in note on I § 12 p. 24.]

λέγεται ἐνθυμήματα ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων] Comp. I 3, 7, II 25, 8, where *παραδείγματα* are added. Anal. Pr. II 27, 70 *a* 10.

On *εἰκότα* and *σημεῖα*, Introd. p. 160—163. The meaning and connexion of the following sections on the rhetorical instruments of proof are explained in full detail in the paraphrase, to which the reader is referred (Introd. p. 163—168).

§ 17. *Λῦσαι τὸ λεχθέν*] On *λύειν, λύσις, λυτόν*, see Introd. on II 25 p. 267 and note 1.

τέκμαρ] Eustathius ad Il. H. p. 665, 45. *τεκμαίρεσθαι τὸ τελειοῦν, ἀπὸ τοῦ τέκμωρ, ὃ δηλοῖ τὸ τέλος. τὸ μέντοι τεκμαίρεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ σημειοῦσθαι, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τέκμαρ τὸ σημεῖον, οἱ μεθ' Ὅμηρον λέγουσι.* 'Antiqua lingua, quam mox commemorat Aristoteles, non erat ab Homeri dialecto diversa.

18 *τὴν ἀρχαίαν γλῶτταν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν σημείων τὸ μὲν ὡς τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον πρὸς τὸ καθόλου ὧδε, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν σημεῖον εἶναι ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ δίκαιοι, Σωκράτης γὰρ σοφὸς ἦν καὶ δίκαιος. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν σημεῖόν ἐστι, λυτὸν δέ, κἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ τὸ εἰρημένον· ἀσυλλόγιστον γάρ. τὸ δέ, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν σημεῖον ὅτι νοσεῖ, πυρέττει γάρ, ἢ τέτοκεν ὅτι γάλα ἔχει, ἀναγκαῖον. ὅπερ τῶν σημείων τεκμήριον μόνον ἐστίν· μόνον γάρ, ἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ, ἄλυτον ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἔχον, οἷον εἴ τις εἴπειεν, ὅτι πυρέττει, σημεῖον εἶναι, πυκνὸν γὰρ ἀναπνεῖ. λυτὸν δε καὶ τοῦτο, κἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ μὴ πυρέττοντα πνευστιᾶν[1]. τί μὲν*

[1] *πνευστιᾷν infra.*

Vide Il. N. 20. Od. δ'. 373, et alibi. Homeri carmina ea aetate qua vixit Aristoteles propter vetustatem apud vulgus obscuriora fuisse aliunde constat. Ex. gr. Vox *ἄποινα* invenitur in Iliadis locis minimum viginti et sex: Olympiade tamen CVII qua orationem c. Aristocratem habuit Demosthenes, ea Athenis prorsus obsoleverat. Dignus est Demosthenis locus qui hic proponatur. Vetarat scilicet antiqua lex *τοὺς ἀνδροφόνους —μὴ λυμαίνεσθαι μηδὲ ἀποινᾷν.* Quam sic explicare pergit orator summus p. 630, 25. *τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ λυμαίνεσθαι, γνώριμον οἶδ' ὅτι πᾶσιν—τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀποινᾷν, μὴ χρήματα πράττεσθαι· τὰ γὰρ χρήματα ἄποινα ὠνόμαζον οἱ παλαιοί.* Adeo universe verum est quod de Homeri tantum geographia scripsit Strabo VIII p. 484=513. *τὰ δ' Ὁμήρου σκέψεως δεῖται κριτικῆς, ποιητικῶς λέγοντος, καὶ οὐ τὰ νῦν, ἀλλὰ τἀρχαῖα, ὧν ὁ χρόνος ἠμαύρωκε τὰ πολλά.'* Gaisford.

§ 18. *τὸ δέ, οἷον εἴ τις...ἀναγκαῖον.*] The auctor ad Heren. II 25, 39, gives two 'signs' of an opposite, fallacious, or refutable character, derived from the same sources, *Necesse est quoniam pallet aegrotasse: aut, necesse est peperisse, quoniam sustinet puerum infantem.* These illustrations had doubtless become traditional, and commonplaces in the rhetorical books.

πνευστιᾷν] 'to have an affection or disease of the breath'. A large class of verbs in *αω* and *ιαω* are either desiderative (like those in *εαω* and in Latin in *urio*) or expressive of an affection, usually some form of disease; the latter can be extended to a 'mental' affection. Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 330, Obs. 3 *e* and Obs. 4, would separate these into two classes (1) desideratives in *αω* and *ιαω*, and (2) verbs in *ιαω*, which express a state of sickness [Kühner's *Ausführliche Grammatik* § 328. 8]. Buttmann also in his *Gr. Gr.* § 119 and p. 294 (Engl. Transl.) assumes a distinction between some varieties of them, which is not very clearly made out. They fall under three heads, first desideratives, second imitatives (as

οὖν εἰκός ἐστι καὶ τί σημεῖον καὶ τεκμήριον, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ νῦν· μᾶλλον δὲ φανερῶς

τυραννιᾶν, to play the tyrant); "but," he adds, "it is improper to rank verbs denoting *diseases* (the third), ὀφθαλμιᾶν, ὑδεριᾶν, ψωρᾶν, &c., in the same class (as the imitatives);" these belong rather to a preceding division, viz. verbs in αω formed from nouns, "and expressing, chiefly, the having a thing or quality, and performing an action; as κομᾶν, χολᾶν, βοᾶν, γοᾶν, τολμᾶν."

A much better and more exact account of these forms of verbs, in respect of the connexion and distinction of their senses, is to be found in Lobeck's learned note on Phrynichus, p. 79—83. "Verbs in ᾶν and ιᾶν," (this is not true of *all* these verbs and requires qualification; δαμᾶν, γειτνιᾶν, περᾶν, for instance, can hardly be said to denote either a bodily, or mental affection. It should be "*some* verbs" or "a large class of verbs in αω") "in *both* forms, are properly used of affections of mind and body. σπληνιᾶν, τὸν σπλῆνα ἀλγεῖν, λιθιᾶν, κριθιᾶν, μολυβδιᾶν express bodily ailments; δυσερωτιᾶν, νυμφιᾶν, πασχητιᾶν, and all *desideratives* (which have either of these terminations) express some affections of the mind, either as a malady, a longing, or in some other form." This is an amplification of what Lobeck actually says: and it is *also* I think implied that the bodily affection is the primary signification, which is extended by metaphor to the mental. A long list of examples is there given, chiefly of rarer words. I have collected some examples from various Greek writers, which, as most of them do not appear in Lobeck's list, or in the grammars, I will here add.

In Aristophanes, as was to be expected, they most abound. ὀφθαλμιᾶν Ran. 192, βουβωνιᾶν ib. 1280, ληματιᾶν 494, ὡρακιᾶν 481 and Pac. 702, δαιμονιᾶν, δαιμονᾶν Thesm. 1054 (and in Aeschylus, Eur., Xenoph.), στρατηγιᾶν (quoted by Schol. on Ran. 965, Xen. Anab. VII c. 33, Dem. de F. L. § 337 "to have an itch or mania for commanding an army"), εὐρωτιᾶν Nub. 44, λημᾶν 326, μαθητιᾶν 183, χεζητιᾶν 1387, σιβυλλιᾶν Eq. 81, κορυβαντιᾶν Vesp. 8, βουλιμιᾶν Plut. 870, φονᾶν Soph. Phil. 1209 (Hesych. τὸ ἐπὶ φόνον μαίνεσθαι), τομᾶν Aj. 589 (τομῆς ἐπιθυμεῖν, Schol.), θανατιᾶν Schol. ad Phil. l. c., θανατᾶν (to long for death) Plut. Phaed. 64 B, ναυτιᾶν Theaet. 191 A, Legg. I 639 B, κνησιᾶν Gorg. 494 E, ψωρᾶν καὶ κνησιᾶν ib. c. (Arist. Eccles. 919), ποδαγρᾶν Alcib. II 139 E, 140 A. In Aristotle we have σπουδαρχιᾶν (to be infected with the disease of office-hunting), Pol. VIII (V) 5 sub fin., ἀγωνιᾶν, of mental distress or anxiety, Rhet. I 9, 21. Many in the works on Nat. Hist., as ταυρᾶν, σκυζᾶν, ὀργᾶν, καπριᾶν (or καπρᾶν), all implying a sexual impulse, Hist. An. VI 18 §§ 12, 14, 17, VI 20, 4; ποδαγρᾶν VI 21, 5, σατυριᾶν de Gen. An. IV 3, 22, ὑδρωπιᾶν ib. V..8, 13, ἐξυδρωπιᾶν ib. V 20, 5, στραγγουριᾶν (also Arist. Thesm. 616, Plat. Legg. XI 2, 916 A, στραγγουριᾶν, λιθᾶν). Theophr. π. ἀλαζονείας, ὠνητιᾶν, "to have a mania, or itch, for buying", Diog. Laert. vit. Plat. III 18 "οἱ λόγοι σου, φησὶν (ὁ Διονυσιος), γεροντιῶσιν" (are infected with, smack of, old age), καὶ ὅς, (ὁ Πλάτων), "σοῦ δέ γε τυραννιῶσιν". (If this is the passage referred to by Buttm. in quoting the verb τυραννιᾶν in his Grammar, above cited—no reference is given—he is wrong both in attributing to it the sense of "imitation", and in assigning it to a separate class.)

καὶ περὶ τούτων, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν τὰ μὲν ἀσυλλόγιστά ἐστι τὰ δὲ συλλελογισμένα, ἐν τοῖς ἀνα-
19 λυτικοῖς διώρισται περὶ αὐτῶν. παράδειγμα δὲ ὅτι μέν ἐστιν ἐπαγωγὴ καὶ περὶ ποῖα ἐπαγωγή, εἴρηται· ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον οὔθ' ὡς ὅλον πρὸς μέρος οὔθ' ὡς ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον, ἀλλ' ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος, ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον, ὅταν ἄμφω μὲν ᾖ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος, γνωριμώτερον δὲ θάτερον ᾖ θατέρου, παράδειγμά ἐστιν. οἷον ὅτι ἐπιβουλεύει τυραννίδι Διονύσιος αἰτῶν τὴν φυλακήν· καὶ γὰρ Πεισίστρατος πρότερον ἐπιβουλεύων ᾔτει φυλακὴν καὶ λαβὼν ἐτυράννευσε, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις· καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσους p. 10.
ἴσασι, παράδειγμα πάντες γίγνονται τοῦ Διονυσίου,

ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς] Anal. Pr. II 27.

§ 19. ἄμφω ᾖ.] This union of neuter dual with verb singular, following the analogy of neuter plural in the same construction, is illustrated in Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 384, Obs. 1. [Kühner's *Ausf. Gram.* § 364.]

οἷον ὅτι ἐπιβουλεύει τυρραννίδι Διονύσιος κ.τ.λ.] The stratagem by which Dionysius actually succeeded in obtaining his body-guard (496 B.C.) contrary to the wishes of the majority of the Syracusan citizens is related by Diodorus, XIII 95. See Grote, *Hist. Gr.* Vol. X. p. 610—614. Aristotle again refers to the attempt, Pol. III 15 ult. On the similar, and equally successful attempt of Pisistratus, Grote, *H. G.* Vol. III p. 208, 209. This occurred at his *first* usurpation of government B.C. 560. (Grote, Clinton.) Theagenes of Megara (Grote, *H. G.* Vol. III p. 59, 60) is mentioned by Aristotle, Pol. VIII (V) 5 sub fin., together with Pisistratus and Dionysius, as one of those who had succeeded in making themselves tyrants of their native countries, by imposing upon the popular party; Aristotle notices the stratagem by which he effected his purpose (τῶν εὐπόρων τὰ κτήνη ἀποσφάξας, λαβὼν παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπινέμοντας). Thucydides also, I 126, mentions him as having assisted Cylon in the attempt which *he* also made on the tyranny at Athens; Herod. V. 71. Cylon was his son-in-law, Thuc. u.s. Cylon's attempt was made in 620 B.C. (Clint. *F. H.* sub anno), and Theagenes κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐτυραννεύει Μεγάρων (Thuc.). Cylon's attempt (and consequently the tyranny of Theagenes) took place, says Herodotus u.s., "before the age of Pisistratus." Theagenes was contemporary with Periander of Corinth, whose reign lasted from B.C. 625—585 (Grote u.s. p. 58).

αἰτῶν τὴν φυλακήν] Plat. Rep. VIII 16, 566 B, τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα τὸ πολυθρύλητον ἐπὶ τούτῳ πάντες οἱ εἰς τοῦτο προβεβηκότες ἐξευρίσκουσιν, αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς τινας τοῦ σώματος, ἵνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ᾖ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός. Herod. I 59, of Pisistratus. Infr. ad I 8, 4.

ὃν οὐκ ἴσασί πω εἰ διὰ τοῦτο αἰτεῖ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου, ὅτι ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι φυλακὴν αἰτεῖ.

ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν λέγονται αἱ δοκοῦσαι εἶναι πίστεις P. 1358.
ἀποδεικτικαί, εἴρηται. τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων μεγίστη διαφορὰ καὶ μάλιστα λεληθυῖα σχεδὸν πάντας ἐστὶν ἥπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ὥσπερ καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν [μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν], τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν οὔσας τὰς δ' οὔπω κατειλημμένας· διὸ καὶ λανθάνουσί τε [τοὺς ἀκροατάς], καὶ μᾶλλον ἁπτόμενοι

ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου] "under the same universal", i.e. genus or species; which stand to the species or individuals subordinate to each respectively, in the relation of universal to particular. *τὸ καθόλου* is that which is universally predicable, or predicable of every member of a class. Metaph. Δ 26, 1023 *b* 29, *τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου καὶ τὸ ὅλως λεγόμενον ὡς ὅλον τι ὂν οὕτως ἐστὶ καθόλου ὡς πολλὰ περιέχον τῷ κατηγορεῖσθαι καθ' ἑκάστου καὶ ἓν ἅπαντα εἶναι ὡς ἕκαστον, οἷον ἄνθρωπον, ἵππον, θεόν, ὅτι ἅπαντα ζῷα.* Ib. Z 13, 1038 *b* 11, *τὸ δὲ καθόλου κοινόν· τοῦτο γὰρ λέγεται καθόλου ὃ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν.* Anal. Post. I 4, 73 *b* 26, *καθόλου δὲ λέγω ὃ ἂν κατὰ παντός τε ὑπάρχῃ καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ᾗ αὐτό* (see Waitz, *Comm.* p. 315), of which the triangle is given as an exemplification, as the universal notion of all three-sided figures; applicable to any one of them, *τὸ τυχόν*, and *πρῶτον*, the highest or primary conception of triangles (the *ἰσοσκελές*, for example, a subordinate species, being only secondary): *τὸ καθόλου δὲ ὑπάρχει τότε, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ τυχόντος καὶ πρώτου δεικνύηται.* Thus the *καθόλου* is equivalent to the *γένος* under which all the species and individuals of the entire class are included, *ὃ κατὰ πάντων κατηγορεῖται*, and is opposed to *καθ' ἕκαστον* and *κατὰ μέρος*.

§ 20. *κατειλημμένας*] 'fixed, established, settled'. *καταλαμβάνειν* is 'to lay hold of, to get into one's possession', or 'to occupy', as an army occupies a conquered city or country. See the Lexicon for examples of this, the primary sense of the word. Thence it passes into the signification of 'binding' as by an oath, Herod. IX. 106, *πίστι τε καταλαβόντες καὶ ὁρκίοισι ἐμμένειν τε καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσεσθαι.* Thuc. V 21 (*σπονδὰς*) *εὗρον κατειλημμένας* (settled or concluded, 'confirmed', Schol. *ἰσχυράς*) VIII 63, 3, *τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι ἔτι βεβαιότερον κατέλαβον* (they secured, established or confirmed their interest in the army, Arnold). Plat. Legg. VII 23, 823 A, *τὰ ταῖς ζημίαις ὑπὸ νόμων κατειλημμένα* (*comprehensa et firmata*, Stallbaum). Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 2, 1324 *b* 21, *τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἔθεσιν*, (*fest gesetzt*, Stahr). Eth. Nic. X. 10, 1179 *b* 18, *τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἤθεσι κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι.*

κατὰ τρόπον μεταβαίνουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν. μᾶλλον δὲ
21 *σαφὲς ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον διὰ πλειόνων ῥηθέν. λέγω γὰρ διαλεκτικούς τε καὶ ῥητορικοὺς συλλογισμοὺς εἶναι περὶ ὧν τοὺς τόπους λέγομεν· οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ κοινῇ περὶ δικαίων καὶ φυσικῶν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν διαφερόντων εἴδει, οἷον ὁ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τόπος· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔσται ἐκ τούτου συλλογίσασθαι ἢ ἐνθύμημα εἰπεῖν περὶ δικαίων*

τοὺς ἀκροατάς] should be omitted, with Muretus, Vater, and Spengel. The 'oversight' in question applies only to the rhetoricians, not to the audience.

καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπτόμενοι κατὰ τρόπον μεταβαίνουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν] *μᾶλλον* belongs to *ἀπτόμενοι and μεταβαίνουσιν*, "the more they handle their subject according to the 'appropriate method', the more they pass out of, or stray beyond, transgress the limits of, the true province of Rhetoric". *κατὰ τρόπον* is equivalent or nearly so to *δεόντως*, 'duly', 'in the right and proper way'; and is often found in Plato opposed to *ἀπὸ τρόπου*. *πόῤῥω τοῦ καθήκοντος*, Schol. ad Theaet. 143 C. Gaisford from Steph. *Thesaurus* supplies examples from Plato and Isocrates, and others will be found in Stallbaum's note on Rep. V 16, 470 B. *δεόντως* itself appears in three MSS after *τρόπον*, being doubtless, as Gaisford supposes, a gloss on the preceding. I have followed Mr Poste, Introd. to Transl. of Post. Anal. p. 20, n. 3, in translating *κατὰ τρόπον*, 'the appropriate method', 'in the right way, or in due order', and it may very well bear that meaning. It will therefore be equivalent to *κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν μέθοδον*, the method which confines itself to the peculiar principles, the *ἴδιαι* or *οἰκεῖαι ἀρχαί*, of the special science which it investigates. *μᾶλλον ἀπτόμενοι κατὰ τρόπον* is equivalent to, and explained by, *ὅσῳ τις ἂν βέλτιον ἐκλέγηται τὰς προτάσεις*, near the end of the next section, § 21; and the *ἀρχαί*, which are spoken of immediately afterwards, *ἂν γὰρ ἐντύχῃ ἀρχαῖς*, are the *ἴδιαι ἀρχαί*, the special principles of each particular science above mentioned. Dialectics and Rhetoric have no such special principles, and their method is the 'inappropriate'. Gaisford follows Muretus in inserting *ἢ* before *κατὰ τρόπον* 'by handling them too properly'. The other interpretation seems preferable in itself, and requires no alteration. *μεταβαίνειν* is *μεταβαίνειν εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, technically used of passing from one science to another, and illicitly transferring its appropriate principles. Comp. I 4, 6. See Poste, u.s. p. 51, note 1, for examples from the Organon. Add Top. Θ 11, 161 *a* 33. Anal. Post. I 7 treats of this subject.

On *κοιναὶ* and *οἰκεῖαι ἀρχαί* see Introd. p. 73 note and the references there given.

§ 21. *περὶ ὧν τοὺς τόπους λέγομεν*] (*περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν*): to which we apply the term '*the τόποι*', *par excellence;* the *κοινοὶ τόποι*, namely. See below, § 22; and for this treatment of them, II 19.

ἢ φυσικῶν ἢ περὶ ὁτουοῦν. καίτοι ταῦτα εἴδει διαφέρει. ἴδια δέ, ὅσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ γένος προτάσεων ἐστίν, οἷον περὶ φυσικῶν εἰσὶ προτάσεις ἐξ ὧν οὔτε ἐνθύμημα οὔτε συλλογισμός ἐστι περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἄλλαι ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἔσται περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχει ἐπὶ πάντων. κἀκεῖνα μὲν οὐ ποιήσει περὶ οὐδὲν γένος ἔμφρονα· περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑποκείμενόν ἐστιν· ταῦτα δέ, ὅσῳ τις ἂν βέλτιον ἐκλέγηται τὰς προτάσεις, λήσει ποιήσας ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς· ἂν γὰρ ἐντύχῃ ἀρχαῖς, οὐκέτι διαλεκτικὴ οὐδὲ ῥητορικὴ ἀλλ' ἐκείνη ἔσται ἧς ἔχει τὰς ἀρχάς.
22 ἔστι δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἐκ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν λεγόμενα τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἰδίων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν

ἴδια δέ, ὅσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ γένος προτάσεων ἐστί] εἶδος καὶ γένος, species *or* genus, whichever you please. In any classification the same member may be either genus or species, according as it is regarded from above or below: Physics and Mathematics, for example, are either *species* in relation to the genus Philosophy, or again *genera* in relation to the subordinate *species*, Psychology (so all the ancient philosophers) and Natural History of the one, and Geometry and Arithmetic of the other. Only the *summum genus* and the *infima species* are not thus interchangeable.

κἀκεῖνα μὲν—ἔμφρονα] 'The former, the κοινοὶ τόποι, will make no one any the wiser, will convey no intelligence or instruction to any one, about any class of things'. This is the διδασκαλία or genuine instruction that belongs to science, διδασκαλίας γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος (I 1, 12; see note on p. 23); comp. I 4, 4, διὰ τὸ μήτε τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἶναι τέχνης, ἀλλ' ἐμφρονεστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς. Plato has employed the word in the same way, Legg. VII 14, 809 D τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους περὶ αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἔμφρονας ἀπεργάζωνται.—ἔμφρων belongs to the class of adjectives compounded with ἐν, in which the preposition expresses the indwelling or inherence of something in something else, ἔμψυχος (with soul in it, containing life, animated), ἔνθεος, ἔννους, ἔνθηρος, ἔμπνους, ἔμψοφος, ἔγχυμος, ἔντριχος, ἔνδικος, ἔντομα (insects), Ar. Hist. An. IV 1, 5, ἔστι δ' ἔντομα ὅσα κατὰ τοὔνομα ἐστὶν ἐντομὰς ἔχοντα κ.τ.λ.

ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς] ἄλλος, a comparative in *form* as well as in sense, naturally, like ἕτερος, διάφορος, διαφέρων, *et sim.*, takes the same construction, with the genitive. On the comparative form of ἄλλος see Donaldson, *New Crat.* §§ 165, 166.

οὐκέτι] See note on I 1, 7 on ἤδη &c. esp. p. 14.

κοινῶν ἐλάττω. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς, καὶ ἐνταῦθα διαιρετέον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τά τε εἴδη καὶ p. 11
τοὺς τόπους ἐξ ὧν ληπτέον. λέγω δ' εἴδη μὲν τὰς καθ' ἕκαστον γένος ἰδίας προτάσεις, τόπους δὲ τοὺς κοινοὺς ὁμοίως πάντων. πρότερον οὖν εἴπωμεν περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· πρῶτον δὲ λάβωμεν τὰ γένη τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὅπως διελόμενοι πόσα ἐστί, περὶ τούτων χωρὶς λαμβάνωμεν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς προτάσεις.

1 ἔστι δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς γένη τρία τὸν ἀριθμόν· CHAP. II
τοσοῦτοι γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν λόγων ὑπάρχουσιν ὄντες. σύγκειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ περὶ οὗ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὅν, καὶ τὸ

§ 22. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς—ληπτέον] 'Cum tanta formarum (i.e. τῶν εἰδῶν) locorumque differentia sit, quantam ipse supra demonstravit: ut scilicet illae fraudi dialectico et oratori, non recte usurpatae ab ipsis, esse possint, loci nullum tale periculum secum portent: aliaque etiam discrimina sint, affirmat oportere distinguere enthymematum species appellatas ab his qui loci vocantur, ex quibus illa ipsa promuntur: ut in Topicis factum est, ita etiam in his qui oratorem instruunt libris.' Victorius. 'We must *here* also, as well as in Dialectics, carefully distinguish the sources and materials (ἐξ ὧν ληπτέον) from which the special and the general topics are to be derived'.

πρότασις, a logical or rhetorical premiss or proposition, in syllogism or enthymeme: *propositio praemissa*; 'est enim προτείνειν (Top. Θ 1, 155 *b* 34, 38), vel προτείνεσθαι (ib. c. 14, 164 *b* 4 &c.) eas propositiones constituere unde conclusio efficiatur.' Trendel. *El. Log. Arist.* § 2, p. 53.

τὰ στοιχεῖα] On στοιχεῖα, 'the elements' of rhetorical reasoning, see Introd. p. 127. Add to the illustrations there given Rhet. ad Alex. c. 36 (37) 9, στοιχεῖα κοινὰ κατὰ πάντων, apparently in this sense.

CHAP. III.

The triple division of Rhetoric, συμβουλευτικόν, δικανικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν, is, as we learn from Quintilian, II 21, 23, III 4, 1, and 7, 1, due to Aristotle: Anaximenes, his predecessor, had admitted only two *genera*, with seven *species* subordinate to these, III 4, 9.

Almost all writers (*prope omnes*) on the subject, subsequent to Aristotle, had accepted his division, as proceeding from the 'highest authority' (*utique summae apud antiquos auctoritatis*) III 4, 1. Quintilian in this fourth chapter mentions, besides Aristotle's division, those which were adopted by Anaximenes, Protagoras, Plato (in the Sophist), and Isocrates. He decides in favour of Aristotle's, as the safest to follow, both because the preponderance of authority is on its side, and also because it is the most reasonable.

τέλος πρὸς τοῦτόν ἐστι, λέγω δὲ τὸν ἀκροατήν.
2 ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν εἶναι ἢ κριτήν, κριτὴν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ τῶν μελλόντων. ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων οἷον ἐκκλησιαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων οἷον ὁ δικαστής,
3 ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός· ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τρία γένη τῶν λόγων τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβου-

§ 2. *θεωρὸν ἢ κριτήν*] This classification of the different kinds of 'audience' is made for the purpose of determining the divisions of Rhetoric; because, the audience being the end and object of the speech, that to which every speech is ultimately referred, and everything being defined or determined by its end (*τέλος*, Eth. Nic. III 10, 1115 *b* 23), the number of the varieties of audiences must fix the number of the divisions or branches of Rhetoric. Audiences are of two kinds; either mere 'spectators', like the *θεαταί* in a theatre, at the games, or in any exhibition where amusement is the object, or at all events where there is no interest of a *practical* character or tendency[1]; or else 'judges', where some real interest is at stake, and they are called upon to pronounce a decision (*pars negotialis*, *πραγματική* Quint.). But these decisions, and those who pronounce them, again fall into two classes, according as they are referred to questions, (1) of political expediency and look to the *future*, or (2) of right or wrong in respect of *past* acts or facts.

So that we have three kinds of audiences, and consequently three branches of Rhetoric. The public or national assembly, to which the *deliberative* kind of rhetoric is addressed; the law-courts and their 'judges', properly so called, the object of the *forensic* or *judicial* branch of the art; and thirdly the 'spectators', those who go to be amused or interested by the show-speeches, or *ἐπιδείξεις*, the Panegyrics (in two senses), funeral orations, burlesques, or whatever other form may be taken by speeches composed merely to display skill in composition without practical interest (where the *δύναμις*, the faculty, or skill shewn, is only in question); or, if they please, to criticise them, and so become 'critics'.

The term *κριτής*, 'judge', which belongs properly only to the second of the three branches, may also be extended to the other two, since they all have to 'decide' in some sense, to choose between opposite views, either on questions of expediency in matters of state, or right and wrong in legal questions, or the merits of a composition as 'critics'. Comp. II 18, 1, III 12, 5, and also Rhet. ad Alex. c. 18 (19), 14, where (comp. § 10) *κριταί* seems to be used in this general sense for all kinds of *ἀκροαταί*.

[1] Thuc. III. 38 (Cleon to the Athenian assembly), *αἴτιοι δ' ὑμεῖς κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦντες, οἵτινες εἰώθατε θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων γίγνεσθαι, ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων, κ.τ.λ.* "You go to the public assembly as you go to the theatre, merely in quest of intellectual excitement. You go as *θεαταί* or *θεωροί*, that is, merely for your amusement; and not as *κριταί*, that is, carefully weighing the matter of what is said, in order to adopt it in your practice or reject it." Arnold.

λευτικόν, δικανικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν. συμβουλῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν προτροπὴ τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή· ἀεὶ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἰδίᾳ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ κοινῇ δημηγοροῦντες τούτων θάτερον ποιοῦσιν. δίκης δὲ τὸ μὲν κατηγορία τὸ δ' ἀπολογία· τούτων γὰρ ὁποτερονοῦν ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας. ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔπαινος
4 τὸ δὲ ψόγος. χρόνοι δὲ ἑκάστου τούτων εἰσὶ τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι ὁ μέλλων (περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐσομένων συμβουλεύει ἢ προτρέπων ἢ ἀποτρέπων), τῷ δὲ δικαζομένῳ ὁ γενόμενος (περὶ γὰρ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀεὶ ὃ μὲν κατηγορεῖ ὃ δὲ ἀπολογεῖται), τῷ δ' ἐπιδεικτικῷ κυριώτατος μὲν ὁ παρών, κατὰ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπαινοῦσιν ἢ ψέγουσι πάντες, προσχρῶνται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ γενόμενα ἀναμιμνήσκοντες καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα
5 προεικάζοντες. τέλος δὲ ἑκάστοις τούτων ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τρισὶν οὖσι τρία, τῷ μὲ συμβουλεύοντι τὸ συμφέ-

§ 3. ἐπιδεικτικόν] '*ea quae constat laude ac vituperatione. Quod genus videtur Aristoteles, atque eum secutus Theophrastus, a parte negotiali, hoc est* πραγματικῇ, *removisse, totamque ad solos auditores relegasse; et id eius nominis*, quod ab ostentatione ducitur, *proprium est*.' Quint. III 7, 1.

οἱ ἰδίᾳ συμβουλεύοντες] II 18, 1, ἄν τε πρὸς ἕνα τις τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος προτρέπῃ ἢ ἀποτρέπῃ, οἷον οἱ νουθετοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ἢ πείθοντες.

ὁποτερονοῦν] Append. [This Appendix was apparently never written. S.]

§ 4. χρόνοι—τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι ὁ μέλλων] I have already pointed out, Introd. p. 120, that Demosthenes adds τὸ παρόν, 'present time', to the 'future' of Aristotle, as characteristic of the deliberative branch of Rhetoric; and Aristotle himself, in two subsequent passages of this treatise, I 6 § 1, and 8 § 7.

κυριώτατος] On κύριος, in its secondary and metaphorical application, see note on I 11 § 4. The kind of 'authority' which this 'present time' is here said to carry with it in the epideictic branch is, that it has of all the three *the best right* to be there; that it is most 'proper' or appropriate in that place. It has here very much the same sense as in the phrases κυρία ἡμέρα, κυρία ἐκκλησία, a day or assembly which has a special authority, as 'fixed' and 'appointed' for a certain purpose; opposed to all ordinary days, and irregular assemblies, which are σύγκλητοι, called together at a moment's notice on special emergencies.

τὰ γενόμενα—τὰ μέλλοντα] The accusatives are here attracted by the participles, instead of following the principal verb in the dative.

προεικάζοντες] 'with, in the way of, an anticipatory guess or presentiment', of future honours and distinctions of the subject of the encomium.

ρον καὶ βλαβερόν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ προτρέπων ὡς βέλτιον συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χεῖρον ἀποτρέπει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμβάνει, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν· τοῖς δὲ δικαζομένοις τὸ p. 12. *δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι συμπαραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς ταῦτα· τοῖς δ' ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ψέγουσι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα καὶ*
6 *οὗτοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσιν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι τὸ εἰρημένον ἑκάστοις τέλος· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἂν ἀμφισβητήσαιεν, οἷον ὁ δικαζόμενος ὡς οὐ γέγονεν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔβλαψεν· ὅτι δ' ἀδικεῖ, οὐδέ ποτ' ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔδει δίκης. ὁμοίως δὲ*

§ 5. *ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χεῖρον ἀποτρέπει*] '*Fr. A. Wolf's einleuchtende verbesserung ὡς χείρονος findet einige bestätigung in den ungrammatischen worten der paraphrase: ἀποτρέπει δὲ τῷ χείρονι*' (Brandis, ap. Schneid. *Philol.* p. 45). This alteration seems to me to be totally unnecessary. It is true that the ordinary construction of the verb in the sense here intended is *ἀποτρέπειν τινά τινος*, or *ἀπό τινος*, as § 6, 'to divert or dissuade some one from something'. But it is plain it can equally well be adapted to the other form of expression adopted here, 'to divert the thing from the person—in the way of dissuasion—to turn *it* away from *him*, as (being) worse', i.e. 'to dissuade him from it (as the Greeks as well as ourselves *usually* say) as the less expedient course'. An author like Aristotle, always regardless of the ordinary usages of language, may very well be allowed such a liberty of expression. If, however, this be still objected to, we may, without alteration of the text—to be admitted I think, as a general rule, only as a last resource—understand *ὡς χεῖρον* as an absolute case, nomin. or accus., *ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χεῖρον* (*ὄν τι*), *ἀποτρέπει* (*τινὰ αὐτοῦ*). See similar examples in note on II 8, 10.

πρὸς τοῦτο] 'with a view to, with reference to, this'; all the rest (*τὰ ἄλλα*) as supplementary and subordinate to this.

συμπαραλαμβάνει] 'takes in as an adjunct, in *aid* of, as an auxiliary, subordinate and subsidiary, to his main purpose'; de Anima A 2, 1, *τὰς τῶν προτέρων δόξας συμπαραλαμβάνειν ὅσοι τι περὶ αὐτῆς ἀπεφήναντο.* Plat. Phaed. 65 A *ἐάν τις αὐτὸ* (*τὸ σῶμα*) *ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ.* Ib. 84 D, Lach. 179 E. Spengel ad Rhet. ad Alex. XXV 8, p. 192.

τοῖς δὲ δικαζομένοις] *τὸ τέλος ἐστί.*

ἐπαναφέρουσι] 're-fer' (*ἀναφέρειν*) 'to' (*ἐπί*).

§ 6. *περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κ.τ.λ*] On the 'legal issues' here intimated, the *ἀμφισβητήσεις* (Aristotle), or *στάσεις* (subsequent Rhetoricians and Lawyers), comp. I 13, 9; III 15, 2; 16, 6; 17, 1, and Introd. p. 397, Append. E to Bk. III.

καὶ οἱ συμβουλεύοντες τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολλάκις προΐενται, ὡς δὲ ἀσύμφορα συμβουλεύουσιν ἢ ἀπ' ὠφελίμων ἀποτρέπουσιν οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν· ὡς δ' οὐκ ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας καταδουλοῦσθαι καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας, πολλάκις οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οἱ ψέγοντες οὐ σκοποῦσιν P. 1359 *εἰ συμφέροντα ἔπραξεν ἢ βλαβερά, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπαίνῳ πολλάκις τιθέασιν ὅτι ὀλιγωρήσας τοῦ αὑτῷ λυσιτελοῦντος ἔπραξέ τι καλόν, οἷον Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε τῷ ἑταίρῳ Πατρόκλῳ εἰδὼς ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν, ἐξὸν ζῆν. τούτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν συμφέρον.*
7 *φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀνάγκη περὶ τούτων*

ὡς δ' οὐκ ἄδικον] (i.e. *τοῦ λέγειν ὡς*, or *τοῦ ὡς*, 'the fact that'), *οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν*. On the necessary limitation and qualification of this position of Aristotle, see Introd. p. 170.

ἐν ἐπαίνῳ πολλάκις τιθέασιν κ.τ.λ.] Isocrates gives credit to the Athenian people, *ἐν ἐπαίνῳ τίθησιν*, for this kind of disinterested policy, in a passage referred to by Victorius. Paneg. § 53 *Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε κ.τ.λ.* Plat. Symp. 179 E *πεπυσμένος παρὰ τῆς μητρὸς ὡς ἀποθανοῖτο ἀποκτείνας Ἕκτορα, μὴ ποιήσας δὲ τοῦτο οἴκαδ' ἐλθὼν γηραιὸς τελευτήσοι, ἐτόλμησεν ἑλέσθαι βοηθήσας τῷ ἐραστῇ Πατρόκλῳ καὶ τιμωρήσας οὐ μόνον ὑπεραποθανεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαποθανεῖν τετελευτηκότι.* Apol. 28 C *ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μητὴρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, Θεὸς οὖσα, οὑτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γαρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἕκτορα πότμος ἑτοῖμος* (Hom. Il. Σ 98 *et infra αὐτίκα τεθναίην κ.τ.λ.* v. 104) *ὁ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας κ.τ.λ.* comp. Il. I 410 seq. Aeschines likewise, c. Timarch. §§ 145, 150, refers to (in the one) and quotes (in the other) this same passage of Hom. Il. Σ. u. s., but with a totally different purpose.

τούτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν (*though* life) *συμφέρον*] Eth. Nic. IX. 8, 1169 *a* 18, *ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέῃ ὑπεραποθνήσκειν...τοῖς δ' ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει· αἱροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς.*

§ 7. The argument of this and the two following sections of this chapter will be found in a more connected shape in the paraphrase of the Introd. pp. 171—2. The sum of it is simply this: each of the two kinds of *τόποι* is equally necessary in all the three branches of Rhetoric; (1) the *εἴδη*, or *ἴδιοι τόποι*, or *ἴδια*, from which the rhetorical propositions or premisses, the *εἰκότα*, *σημεῖα*, and *τεκμήρια* are necessarily derived, § 7: and (2) the four *κοινοὶ τόποι*, here apparently reduced to three, the possible

ἔχειν πρῶτον τὰς προτάσεις· τὰ γὰρ τεκμήρια καὶ
τὰ εἰκότα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα προτάσεις εἰσὶ ῥητορικαί·
ὅλος μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ προτάσεων ἐστί, τὸ δ'
ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός ἐστι συνεστηκὼς ἐκ τῶν εἰρη-
8 *μένων προτάσεων. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε πραχθῆναι οἷόν τε*
οὔτε πραχθήσεσθαι τὰ ἀδύνατα ἀλλὰ τὰ δυνατά,
οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα ἢ μὴ ἐσόμενα οὐχ οἷόν τε τὰ
μὲν πεπρᾶχθαι τὰ δὲ πραχθήσεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ
τῷ συμβουλεύοντι καὶ τῷ δικαζομένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐπι-
δεικτικῷ ἔχειν προτάσεις περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου,
9 *καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μή, καὶ εἰ ἔσται ἢ μή. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ*
ἅπαντες καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ ψέγοντες καὶ προτρέ-
ποντες καὶ ἀποτρέποντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ
ἀπολογούμενοι οὐ μόνον τὰ εἰρημένα δεικνύναι πειρῶν-
ται ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ
κακὸν ἢ τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τὸ ἄδικον, p. 13.
ἢ καθ' αὑτὰ λέγοντες ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντιπαραβάλ-
λοντες, δῆλον ὅτι δέοι ἂν καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρό-
τητος καὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος προτάσεις
ἔχειν, καὶ καθόλου καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου, οἷον τί μεῖζον
ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ ἀδίκημα ἢ δικαίωμα· ὁμοίως δὲ

and impossible', 'fact past and future', and 'the great and small (the topic of magnitude or importance) either (1) absolute or (2) comparative (degree)'. §§ 8, 9.

§ 9. *δικαίωμα*] is used here and in c. 13 §§ 1, 3, as the opposite to *ἀδίκημα*, in the sense of 'an act of justice'. So Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 *a* 8, *διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει·* (i. q. *νόμῳ*, natural or of human institution.) *τὸ δ' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ὅταν πραχθῇ ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι οὔπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα. καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος*: where in the first clause it is used in its *ordinary acceptation* as 'a just act', = *δικαιοπράγημα*, and contrasted with *ἀδίκημα*, and afterwards distinguished from it in the more correct sense of 'a *rectification* of an act of injustice'. It is in this signification that Plato employs it, Legg. IX 8, 864 E, *τῶν δὲ ἄλλων δικαιωμάτων ἀφείσθω*, 'all other penalties', which are as it were 'amendments of a wrong or injustice'. In Thuc. I 41 init. it stands for 'just claims', '*rechtsgründe*', Poppo; *rechtsanspruch*', Heitz, l. c. In Arist. de Caelo,

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖ λαβεῖν τὰς προτάσεις, εἴρηται· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαιρετέον ἰδίᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου τούτων, οἷον περὶ ὧν συμβουλὴ καὶ περὶ ὧν οἱ ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι, τρίτον δὲ περὶ ὧν αἱ δίκαι.

1 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ληπτέον περὶ ποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ CHAP. IV.
ὁ συμβουλεύων συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἅπαντα
2 ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐνδέχεται καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μή. ὅσα δὲ ἐξ
ἀνάγκης ἢ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι,
3 περὶ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλή. οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ
τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἁπάντων· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ φύσει ἔνια

I 10, 1, it has a sense either derived from that rectification or amendment, an *ἐπανόρθωμα* of a wrong view or argument, *μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη πιστὰ τὰ μέλλοντα λεχθήσεσθαι προακηκοόσι τὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων δικαιώματα*: or rather, as in Thucydides, it denotes a justification or just claim, meaning what the conflicting arguments have each of them to say for themselves. *δικαίωμα* 'actio iuris, exsecutio iuris, iustificatio, ex qua (per arbitrum) status iustus qui erat violatus restituitur : nam *δικαιοῦν* est facere ut quid sit *δίκαιον*'. Fritsche ad Eth. Eudem. Δ 10, 1135 *a* 13 (p. 109) q. v., Heitz, *Verl. Schrift. Arist.* p. 253.

οἷον] 'for example', one of *several*, is used here, as constantly elsewhere, loosely and carelessly, by Aristotle, in the place of *τοῦτ' ἔστι*, *id est*, *videlicet*, as a more explanatory repetition.

CHAP. IV.

§ 1. On the first of the three branches of Rhetoric, *τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν* or *δημηγορικὸν γένος*.

§ 2. *εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι*] This 'fundamental antithesis' and cardinal distinction of ancient philosophy is noticed by Gaisford, incredible as it may appear, for the sole purpose of making merry with it as a sophistical quibble! 'Has *Sophistarum ineptias* facete ridet Antiphanes apud Athenaeum, III 99 A.'

περὶ δὲ τούτων] See note on *δῆλον δέ*, c. 1 § 11 p. 20.

§ 3. *καὶ φύσει...καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθά*] This same distinction of goods naturally and accidentally accruing to us, is found in Eth. Eud. I 3, 5, 1215 *a* 12, *εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γενομένοις ἢ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλῶς ζῆν ἐστιν, ἀνέλπιστον ἂν εἴη πολλοῖς*. These are opposed to those advantages and objects of desire the acquisition of which depends upon ourselves and our own exertions and studies. *οὐ γάρ ἐστι δι' ἐπιμελείας ἡ κτῆσις οὐδὲ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας* compared with *ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς ἡμᾶς* (to be referred to ourselves), *καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστίν*. The gifts of nature and the good things that result from accident cannot be included amongst the possible advantages,

καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μή, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου τὸ συμβουλεύειν· ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ὅσων ἐστὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστίν· μέχρι γὰρ τούτου σκοποῦμεν, ἕως ἂν εὕρωμεν εἰ ἡμῖν P. 1359 *b*.
4 *δυνατὰ ἢ ἀδύνατα πρᾶξαι. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν ἀκριβῶς διαριθμήσασθαι καὶ διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἴδη περὶ ὧν εἰώθασι χρηματίζειν, ἔτι δ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται περὶ*

the 'profitable' or 'expedient', which are the object and aim of the deliberative speaker, because they are not attainable by any exertions of our own; and so for the purposes of Rhetoric are just as useless as things necessary and impossible. The subjects of Rhetoric are the subjects of deliberation, and no one deliberates about anything which is beyond the sphere of his influence.

πρὸ ἔργου] Note on c. 1 § 10 p. 17.

ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι] (*τὸ συμβουλεύειν ἐστὶ*) *περὶ ὅσων κ.τ.λ.*

§ 4. The following passage, §§ 4—6, descriptive of the rhetorical method and its necessary limitations, and the distinction between it and the method of scientific demonstration, one of the most important in the entire work, will be found almost literally translated in the Introduction, pp. 173—4, to which the reader is referred.

ἀκριβῶς διαριθμήσασθαι] 'to make an exact numerical division', or 'to enumerate in an exact division or analysis'. Plat. Phaed. 273 E, Crat. 437 D, Gorg. 501 A, Legg. I 633 A, *et alibi*. It is used in a general sense of 'accurate distinction'.

διαλαβεῖν] 'to part, separate, divide, distinguish', is also familiar to Plato, Polit. 147 E, *τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν*, Symp. 222 E, *ἵνα χωρὶς ἡμᾶς διαλάβῃ*, Phileb. 23 C, *πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα...διχῇ διαλάβωμεν*, and numerous examples in Ast's Index, s. v.; and still more so *διαιρεῖν* in the same sense, and *διαίρεσις*, Sophist. 225 A, *διαιρεῖν αὐτὴν δίχα*, Polit. 262 D, *κατ' εἴδη δύο διαιρεῖν*, ib. 283 D, *διέλωμεν αὐτὴν δύο μέρη*, Phaedr. 273 E, *κατ' εἴδη διαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα*. *διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἴδη*, 'to classify by genera and species'. Similarly *διορίζειν*.

περὶ ὧν εἰώθασι χρηματίζειν] 'the subjects of ordinary business, i.e. deliberation (in the assembly)'. *χρηματίζειν*, which is properly to 'transact *χρήματα* or business' in general, is here 'transferred' by metaphor (of the class *ἀπὸ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος*, Poet. XXI 7), to the special signification of the particular kind of business which is transacted in the general assembly, its debates and consultations; so Pol. VI (IV), 14, 1298 *b* 29, *καὶ περὶ τούτων χρηματίζειν* (of a general assembly as opposed to a *βουλή* or *πρόβουλοι*) *περὶ ὧν ἂν οὗτοι προβουλεύσωσιν*. Ib. c. 15, 1299 *b* 39, *ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δημοκρατίαις ἐν αἷς ὁ δῆμος χρηματίζει περὶ πάντων* (holds its assemblies and discusses everything). Also to the consultations of the law-courts,

αὐτῶν διορίσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ζητεῖν διὰ τὸ μήτε τῆς ῥητορικῆς

Demosth. c. Timocr. p. 717, 26, *περὶ ὧν ἂν γνῷ τὸ δικαστήριον, πάλιν χρηματίζειν*: and again, v. 28, to the deliberations of the assembly. Æschin. c. Timarch. § 23, of the *πρόεδροι*. Lastly, Demosth. de F. L. p. 430, 24, § 317, applies it to the intrigues of individuals, *οὗτοι δ' οὐδὲν ἐπαύσαντο ἰδίᾳ χρηματίζοντες.*

κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν...ἐμφρονεστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς] of the scientific method which has 'certainty' or necessary truth for its aim and object, as opposed to the popular method of Dialectics and Rhetoric, which has no higher aim than *probable* opinion, *πρὸς δόξαν*. Top. A 14, 105 *b* 30, *πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν* (true philosophy, science) *κατ' ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτέον, διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν*. See references in Introd. p. 173, note 1. Add, Anal. Post. I 33, 88 *b* 30, *τὸ δ' ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δι' ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δ' ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν κ.τ.λ.* Eth. Nic. III 4, 1112 *a* 8, *δοξάζομεν ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν*. On *δόξα* in general, see Waitz *Comm. ad Org.* p. 444. On *ἐμφρονεστέρας*, 'more intelligent, wiser, more instructive', see above, note on c. 2 § 21 p. 50.

διὰ τὸ μήτε...πολλῷ δέ...] Wolf and MS A[c] have *πολλῷ τε*, which is of course the more regular and strictly grammatical usage. On the general question of the meaning and distinctions of *καί, δέ*, and *τε*, with and without the negative, see Hermann's excellent dissertation in his Review of Elmsley's Medea, on lines 4, 5. Porson, Elmsley, and their English followers were in the habit of laying down rigorous and inflexible rules of Greek grammar, which were supposed to admit of no exception; any apparent violation of them was to be summarily emended: one of the great services rendered by Hermann to the study of the Greek language is the relaxation of these over exact rules, and the substitution of a rational and logical explanation of these differences of expression, and the analysis of their distinctions, for these often unwarranted alterations of the text. '*Καὶ* particula est coniunctiva', says Hermann; '*τε* adiunctiva; *δέ* disiunctiva'. In the case of *οὐδέ* and *μηδέ, οὔτε* and *μήτε*, when several things are subordinated to, and included under, one negative conception, the one or the other (*δέ* or *τε*) is used according as the writer had or had not any notion of a *difference* between them. If the things under the general negative conception are represented *merely* as subordinate and with no expression of difference or opposition between them, the *adnexive τε* is employed, and the formula is *οὐ...τε...τε*, or *οὐ...οὔτε...οὔτε*, and similarly with *μή*: on the other hand, if some difference between any of the subordinate members of the division is to be marked, *τε* must be replaced by *δέ*, and the formula will be *οὐ...οὐδέ*, or *οὐδέ...οὐδέ*, or *οὐ...οὔτε...οὔτε...οὐδέ*, and so on for other similar cases. And the change of *τε* into *δέ* in the second clause of the sentence before us, represents the sudden occurrence to the writer's mind of the thought that there is an important difference between the two things that are assigned as reasons for not introducing a regular scientific division into the treatment of Rhetoric (viz. its necessarily unscientific character, and the fact that its

εἶναι τέχνης ἀλλ' ἐμφρονεστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς, πολλῷ τε[1] πλείω δεδόσθαι καὶ νῦν αὐτῇ τῶν οἰκείων θεωρημάτων· ὅπερ γὰρ καὶ πρότερον εἰρηκότες τυγχάνομεν, ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ σύγκειται μὲν ἔκ τε τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πολιτικῆς, ὁμοία δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τὰ

[1] πολλῷ δὲ (see note).

province has already been unduly extended by previous professors), which requires to be marked, and accordingly is marked by the change of the particle. This, however, is not the only irregularity in Aristotle's sentence; for, evidently intending at the commencement to include both the subordinate members under the original negative, he introduces in the second clause a positive conception; contributing perhaps to enforce the distinction of the two, but in violation of grammatical accuracy.

πλείω δεδόσθαι...τῶν οἰκείων θεωρημάτων] 'far more has been already assigned to it than its own proper subjects of inquiry', refers doubtless to the sophistical professors of Rhetoric, his predecessors and contemporaries; who *ὑποδύονται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτικῆς*, and lay claim to the whole extent of the field of Politics, Rhet. I 2, 7. What this assumption of the Sophists implies is explained in Eth. Nic. X 10, 1181 *a* 1, *τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι κ.τ.λ.*, infr. v. 13, *τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι· ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χείρω ἐτίθεσαν κ.τ.λ.*

§ 5. *τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης*] See note on c. I § 11, p. 19, *ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι.*

ἀναλυτικῶς, opposed to *λογικῶς* (which is equivalent to *διαλεκτικῶς*, Waitz on Anal. Post. 82 *b* 35, p. 353, Poste, u. s., p. 19), properly implies scientific demonstration; and 'analytical' reasoning follows that method: see Anal. Post. I 22, 84 *a* 7 seq. It is there said to be exercised *ἐν ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις...ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι τῶν ὅσα ὑπάρχει καθ' αὑτὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν.* On 'Analytics' comp. Trendel. *El. Log. Arist.* p. 47 sq. Waitz *Comm. ad Anal. Pr.* p. 366, 7. When Dialectics is here called an 'analytical' science, either 'analytical' stands for 'logical' in general (which is Mr Poste's view, l. c.), or else it represents and includes methodical systematic reasoning of all kinds, which proceeds by way of 'analysis', 'resolving' the objects of knowledge into their ultimate elements, to discover their causes (Trendelenburg, l. c.); and the latter is the explanation that I should prefer.

τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πολιτικῆς] Ethics being a department or branch of the more general and comprehensive science of Politics, Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 *b* 11, *ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος (ἡ ἠθική) τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα*: *the end* of both being the same, viz. human good, v. 6. Ib. I 10, 1029 *b* 29, and c. 13, init. Ib. X 10, 1180 *b* 31, *μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι.* So that the two together make up the 'philosophy of humanity', of man as an individual and in society, *ἡ περὶ τἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία*, X 10, 1181 *b* 16.

6 δὲ τοῖς σοφιστικοῖς λόγοις. ὅσῳ δ' ἄν τις ἢ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἢ ταύτην μὴ καθάπερ ἂν δυνάμεις ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμας πειρᾶται κατασκευάζειν, λήσεται τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν ἀφανίσας τῷ μεταβαίνειν ἐπισκευάζων p. 14.

§ 6. *καθάπερ ἂν*] On *καθάπερ ἂν* (*κατασκευάζοι*), see above, note on 1 1, 5 p. 9.

δυνάμεις] sc. *τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους*, 1 2, 7. On Rhetoric as a practical faculty, see Introd. pp. 14—19.

It may be as well here to sum up the characteristics of Rhetoric which respectively entitle it to the name of 'art' and 'faculty'. In so far as it is systematic, and follows a method—a logical method—and can look forward to results (implying a knowledge of causes and effects) in *persuading* its hearers, it is an art; as a practical exercise, not admitting of absolute exactness, or universal conclusions, employing the propositions of all arts and sciences, and the axioms common to them all, only as probable and popular, and having itself no special subject-matter, taking opposite sides of the same question indifferently and arriving at opposite conclusions (so Alexander Aphrodisiensis), it is a *δύναμις*, a faculty, capable of development and to be exercised in practice.

μεταβαίνειν] See on 1 2, 20. Vater (who seems to have misunderstood the passage), without reason or authority, would omit the words *τῷ μεταβαίνειν*, as not properly applicable to the context *ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον λόγων*. And his view is so far supported by the Paraphrast, who also rejects them. Brandis, u. s. p. 46. No one but himself, however, would prefer to connect *εἰς ἐπιστήμας* with *ἐπισκευάζων* rather than *μεταβαίνειν*—a much more natural construction, though this often is certainly admissible—and secondly, the two words, though not absolutely necessary to the sense, are at least in perfect accordance with it when the passage is properly interpreted. 'In proportion as...he will be unconsciously, unintentionally, effacing their real nature by passing over, in his attempt to reconstruct them (alter their formation or system), into sciences of definite special subjects, instead of those (*ἐπιστήμας*) which deal with mere words', i.e. *instead of confining himself* to these latter. This is in fact a case of that very common violation of an ordinary grammatical rule which is called the 'figure', *ζεῦγμα*[1] (a mere carelessness of expression dignified by

[1] Of this so-called 'figure', *ζεῦγμα*, the illicit conjunction of the two heterogeneous notions or expressions under one *vinculum*, there are in fact two varieties, explained and abundantly illustrated from the works of Tacitus by Bötticher in his Lex. Tacit., Proleg. *de Stili Taciti brevitate*, p. LXXVIII sq., *σύλληψις* and *ζεῦγμα* proper. The figure in general is thus described, 'qua aut genere aut personis aut alio quo modo diversa uno eodemque constructionis genere *comprehenduntur*'; but as I have failed to enter into the distinction which Bötticher makes between the two varieties I will substitute my own explanation of the difference. In *σύλληψις* the two terms are united in one construction with a third, to which one is referred *literally*, the other *metaphorically*, or at all events in different senses. This appears in the instances given, as *dissimulationem nox et lascivia exemerat: nocte ac laetitia incaluisse: praeda famaque onusti: mixti*

εἰς ἐπιστήμας ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ
7 μὴ μόνον λόγων. ὅμως δ' ὅσα πρὸ ἔργου μέν ἐστι

that name), 'a figure of speech', as it is briefly expressed in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, 'wherein two subjects *are used jointly* with the same predicate, which strictly belongs only to one, as in Il. Α 533, where ἔβη must be supplied with Ζεύς.' So Herod. I 90, *χρηστὰ ἔργα καὶ ἔπεα ποιέειν*, where of course λέγειν is required with ἔπεα. Under this head comes the case before us, where to complete the intended sense we must supply ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον (not τῷ μεταβαίνειν, but τῷ ἐπισκευάζειν ἐπιστήμας) λόγων.

ἐπισκευάζειν, 'to re-construct or re-constitute', is opposed to κατασκευάζειν. The latter is 'to *lay down* (κατά), settle or establish a system'; the former, 'to construct anew or afresh, to renew'. ἐπί, from the primary sense of direction to, *in place*, passes into a secondary one of direction or succession *in time*, 'after'; hence, thirdly, it takes the meaning of repetition, as anew, afresh, re- (in comp.), and of development in the way of growth, as in ἐπιδιδόναι 'to augment or grow'. Hence ἐπισκευάζειν is properly to 'refit', 'renew', 'repair', 'restore', as walls, ships, bridges, roads (Thucyd., Xenoph., Demosth., see the Lexx.), and thence transferred to 'reconstruction' of a science or study. A similar sense of ἐπί appears in the verbs, ἐπειπεῖν 'to say *after*, or *add* the words', ἐπαγείρειν 'to collect after or in addition', ἐπιμανθάνειν, ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἐπανθεῖν, ἐπιβιοῦν (to live after, outlive), ἐπαναθεᾶσθαι (Xen. Cyr. V. 4, 11, to look at repeatedly, over and over again), ἐπαναχωρεῖν ibid., ἐπανιέναι, ἐπανέρχεσθαι, ἐπανορθοῦν. Rost. u. Palm, Lex. Art. ἐπί, p. 1046 *a*.

§ 7. *ὅσα πρὸ ἔργου μέν ἐστι διελεῖν, ἔτι δ' ὑπολείπει σκέψιν*] Another case of grammatical irregularity and of the 'figure' ζεῦγμα. ὅσα in the first clause is the accus. after διελεῖν: in the second it must be *repeated*, as the nomin. to ὑπολείπει.—On πρὸ ἔργου, see supr. c. 1 § 10 p. 17.

copiis et laetitia. To these I will venture to add from a modern English writer the case of Miss Bolo in *Pickwick*, who after her defeat at whist in the Bath Assembly Rooms retires '*in* a flood of tears *and* a sedan chair'; to which Eur. Hel. 182, *αὐγαῖσιν ἐν ταῖς χρυσέαις ἔν τε δόνακος ἔρνεσιν*, is an exact parallel. In ζεῦγμα proper, this third term will not apply in *any sense* to *both* of the others, and some other word or phrase must necessarily be *supplied* to complete the sense; as in the passage of Herodotus quoted above, and in the text of Aristotle.

Add to the examples collected from Tacitus by Bötticher, Hor. Od. III 4. 11, *ludo fatigatumque somno*. Liv. XXVII 46 sub fin. *fessi somno ac vigiliis* (*fessi vigiliis ac propterea somnc graves*). Hom. Il. Κ 98, *καμάτῳ ἀδηκότες ἠδὲ καὶ ὕπνῳ*. Soph. Oed. R. 271, Electr. 72, 435, 6. Eur. Heracl. 312 Elms. ad loc., 839, 1040. Dem. de F. L. § 93, μή...ἐᾶτε, ἀλλ' ὡς κ.τ.λ. Dorvill. *ad Charit.* p. 394, seq. and Matth. *Gr. Gr.* 634, Obs. 3, supply examples. Ernesti, in *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s. v., thus defines ζεῦγμα: *in qua figura unum ad verbum plures sententiae referuntur, quarum unaquaeque desideraret illud, si sola poneretur.* This use of the figure he has not illustrated. It seems to represent something quite different from the other; but what? The ζεῦγμα in fact is a kind of grammatical bracket, under which two heterogeneous expressions are improperly included. Another well-known example of this *figure* is the truly Irish epitaph on Boyle the Philosopher: 'He was the father of Chemistry, and grand-uncle of the Earl of Cork.'

διελεῖν, ἔτι δ' ὑπολείπει σκέψιν τῇ πολιτικῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, εἴπωμεν καὶ νῦν.

σχεδὸν γάρ, περὶ ὧν βουλεύονται πάντες καὶ περὶ ἃ ἀγορεύουσιν οἱ συμβουλεύοντες, τὰ μέγιστα τυγχάνει πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ περί τε πόρων, καὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας, καὶ τῶν εἰσαγομένων καὶ ἐξαγο-
8 μένων, καὶ περὶ νομοθεσίας. ὥστε περὶ μὲν πόρων τὸν μέλλοντα συμβουλεύσειν δέοι ἂν τὰς προσόδους τῆς πόλεως εἰδέναι τίνες καὶ πόσαι, ὅπως εἴτε τις παραλείπεται προστεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις ἐλάττων αὐξηθῇ, ἔτι δὲ τὰς δαπάνας τῆς πόλεως ἁπάσας, ὅπως εἴ τις περίεργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις μείζων ἐλάττων γένηται· οὐ γὰρ μόνον πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα προστι-

σχεδὸν γάρ, περὶ ὧν βουλεύονται πάντες κ.τ.λ.] The unaccountable difference between the list here given of the principal subjects of Politics with which the deliberative or public speaker will have to deal, viz. (1) *πόροι*, supplies, ways and means, revenue, finance; (2) war and peace (possibly including alliances); (3) the defence of the country; (4) exports and imports (commerce, trade); and (5) legislation; with that which is found in Polit. VI (IV), 4, has been already pointed out in the Introd. p. 176. In the corresponding chapter of the Rhet. ad Alex. 2 (3 Oxf.) § 2, we have seven such subjects enumerated: religion, *περὶ ἱερῶν*; legislation, *περὶ νόμων*, (*νόμων συμφερόντων θέσεις*, Dem. de Cor. § 309, in a parallel passage); the constitution of the state (*περὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κατασκευῆς*); alliances and commercial treaties (*συμβολαίων*) with foreign nations; war; peace; and revenue (*περὶ πόρου χρημάτων*).

In Xenophon, Memor. III 6, a conversation is reported between Socrates and Glaucon, whom the former cross-examines on the subject of his political knowledge, with the view of shewing him that he is not yet ripe for a statesman. The principal objects of a statesman's care there enumerated are, the *πρόσοδοι*, Aristotle's *πόροι*, the revenue: the state expenses, with the view of reducing them, *τὰ ἀναλώματα*: war, and the means of carrying it on: the enemy's forces, naval and military, and your own: the defence of the country, *ἡ φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας*: mines, and the supply of silver (this is from the *Athenian* point of view): and the supply of corn and other food. These details, and in the same order, are all, with the exception of the mines in Aristotle, and the legislation in Xenophon, enumerated by Aristotle in the following sections, 8—11, so that Gaisford may possibly be right in his suspicion, 'respexit fortasse Aristoteles Xenophontis Mem. III 6.'

§ 8. *ἀφαιρεθῇ*] 'it may be reduced, curtailed, retrenched'.

πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα προστιθέντες κ.τ.λ.] Not of course = *πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρ-*

θέντες πλουσιώτεροι γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφαιροῦντες τῶν δαπανημάτων. ταῦτα δ' οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἴδια ἐμπειρίας ἐνδέχεται συνορᾶν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὑρημένων ἱστορικὸν εἶναι
9 πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλήν. περὶ δὲ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης τὴν δύναμιν εἰδέναι τῆς πόλεως, ὁπόση τε

χουσιν, 'by *adding to* present resources', but '*with reference to* them', as πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμβάνει, and συμπαραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς ταῦτα, supr. c. 3, § 5. 'For not only *in respect of* their existing resources do they become wealthier by adding to them (προστιθέντες αὐτοῖς)'.

ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἴδια ἐμπειρίας] 'from one's own personal experience'. τὰ ἴδια are the facts which have come under one's own personal observation, i.e. the resources of our own country, and the system followed and methods adopted in providing, maintaining, and augmenting them, at home; not these alone are to be 'inquired into', ἱστορικὸν εἶναι, by the statesman and public speaker, but also the 'inventions', the practices and policy of other nations in regard of these same matters.

συνορᾶν] 'to take a *comprehensive* view', 'to look at *together*', for the purpose of *comparison*. See note on συνάγειν, c. 2 § 13 p. 41.

ἱστορικόν] The termination -ικος corresponds to the English -ive, and denotes a capacity for, or tendency to. ποιητικός productive, αἰσθητικός sensitive, δεκτικός receptive, πρακτικός active, εὑρετικός inventive, ἀποδεικτικός demonstrative, and so on: though in some cases there is no corresponding English word actually in use. According to this analogy ἱστορικός is 'inquisitive', qualified and disposed to inquire into things in general.

When Herodotus at the opening of his work uses the term ἱστορίη, he means no more than the 'inquiries' or 'researches' which he is now collecting into a continuous narrative. (Comp. § 13, αἱ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἱστορίαι and the note there.) It is not till we come to Polybius that the word assumes its modern signification, a scientific history, a systematic work that can be employed in education, Hist. I 1, 2. It is *now* defined, and distinguished from other departments of study by the addition of πραγματική, I 2,8, the study of human actions and affairs. Its scientific character, which entitles it to the epithet 'demonstrative', ἱστορία ἀποδεικτική, II 37, 3, ἀποδ. διήγησις, IV 40, 1, is derived from its method of tracing causes and motives of actions: ἱστορίας γὰρ ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸ διὰ τί, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τίνος χάριν ἐπράχθη, καὶ τὸ πραχθὲν πότερα εὔλογον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀγώνισμα μὲν μάθημα δὲ οὐ γίγνεται· καὶ παραυτίκα μὲν τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὸ παράπαν.

But it is only the term, not the thing, that is new in Polybius' time. Thucydides' History, though not so called, (Thucydides is called a ξυγγραφεύς, see Poppo on 1, 1, 2,) is at least as scientific in all essential points as that of Polybius, or indeed any other.

On the distinction of λόγιος, λογοποιός, and ἱστορικός, see some good observations in Dahlmann's *Life of Herod.* c. 6 § 2.

ὑπάρχει ἤδη καὶ πόσην ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρξαι, καὶ ποία

§ 9. *ὑπάρξαι, ἀρκεῖν*, *Anonymus*, ap. Brandis, u. s., p. 44.

The verbs *ὑπάρχειν, εἶναι, γίγνεσθαι*, stand to one another in the relation of past, present, and future; to be already in existence, to be (simple and absolute being, independent of time), and to become, to come into being from a state (if that be possible) of non-being. The *aorist* infin. gives *ὑπάρξαι* here a future sense, 'to become or to be made', which does not naturally, *ex vi verbi*, belong to it. Hermann, in one of those notes which have thrown so much light upon the niceties of Greek grammar (on Ajax 1061 subsequently referred to without further discussion in the treatise *de Part.* *ἄν* IV, 2, *Opuscula*, Vol. IV), contends against Elmsley (who had condemned as a solecism this use of the aorist infin. without *ἄν*, after verbs such as *δοκεῖν, νομίζειν, οἴεσθαι, φάναι, ἐλπίζειν, προσδοκᾶν*, in reference to future time) in support of the usage; and distinguishes three modes of expression in which futurity is conveyed by the infinitive: first, the simple future inf. as *δοκεῖν πεσεῖσθαι*, which conveys directly the simple and absolute notion of futurity, without modification or qualification; second, the infin., aorist or present, with *ἄν*, *πίπτειν ἄν, πεσεῖν ἄν*, which indicates a merely conditional futurity, might or would fall, under certain circumstances or conditions; and thirdly, the present or aorist infin. without *ἄν*, *πίπτειν*, or *πεσεῖν*, which, corresponding to the indefinite (in point of time) present and aorist, *πίπτει* and *ἔπεσε*, denote simply the possibility or likelihood of the object falling at some uncertain future time; *caducum esse*. The distinction between the *present* and *aorist* infinitive is this: 'Praesentis autem et aoristi infinitivis, sive accedat *ἄν* sive non, ita utuntur, ut aoristus rei transeunti, praesens duranti adhibeatur.'

Without disputing the truth of this, it is yet possible to explain the difference otherwise. *Permanence* ('duranti') does not seem to me to be in any way connected with the conception of present time, though the perfect often is; as when we say 'this *has been*' up to the present time, we often imply our belief in its continuance; and I should rather explain the present infin. in these cases as expressing the mere fact of the existence of the thing named, or the abstract notion of it. The present tense, as it is called, I act, I do, to act, to do, is in reality independent of time: the time present is, I am acting, I am doing; and the present infin. 'to do' is the naked conception of 'doing' without any connotation of time (so the *present* infinit. with the definite article stands for a *substantive; τὸ εἶναι* is the mere notion of being). The aorist infin. again may derive its notion of futurity and likelihood, either, as Hermann thinks, from the indefiniteness expressed by the tense, or, in other cases, from the connotation of *habit*, implying *liability*, which is also one of its acquired senses. The broad distinction will be, *δοκῶ πεσεῖσθαι*, 'I think it *will* fall', at some future time, and nothing more: *δοκῶ πίπτειν* or *πεσεῖν ἄν*, 'I think it *could*, *would*, or *might* fall', under certain conditions; *δοκῶ πίπτειν*, 'I think the notion of falling belongs to it', 'I think it *may* fall'; that is, that it is *liable*, or *likely*, to fall, *caducum esse*: and *δοκῶ πεσεῖν*, implying also the liability or likelihood of the preceding, is distinguished from it (according to Hermann) by

τις ἥ τε ὑπάρχουσά ἐστι καὶ ἥ τις ἐνδέχεται προσγενέσθαι, ἔτι δὲ πολέμους τίνας καὶ πῶς πεπολέμηκεν. οὐ μόνον δὲ τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὁμόρων ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι. ἢ καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἐπίδοξον πολεμεῖν, ὅπως πρὸς μὲν τοὺς κρείττους εἰρηνεύηται, P. 1360a. *πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἥττους ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ᾖ τὸ πολεμεῖν. καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, πότερον ὅμοιαι ἢ ἀνόμοιαι· ἔστι γὰρ*

representing the act or event as transient and not permanent. But such a distinction as this last, though it be intelligible, is at least untranslatable; as in such a case as *νοεῖς δρᾶσαι* (Soph. Phil. 918), 'what dost thou intend to do', where the expression of the liability must needs be omitted, and still more the transient nature of the proposed act. But we can hardly suppose that any distinction can be seriously intended when Sophocles writes *νοεῖς δρᾶσαι*: and then, three lines afterwards, v. 921, *δρᾶν νοεῖς*. The choice between the two seems to be dictated rather by convenience than by any other motive.

With regard to the distinction of the present and aorist infin., it may be observed, that we are often obliged, as the practice of translation shews, to disregard whatever difference there may be conceived to be between them, as either inappreciable or at all events inexpressible, and to render them by the same English words. Take, for example, the ordinary phrase *δεῖ λαβεῖν* (it occurs, for instance, II 8, 12). It is quite certain that in this case past time is not directly signified; though it may possibly be included as an accessory in the notion of it in the way of an addition to the abstract conception of 'taking up, acquiring'—as representing the *previous formation* of the opinion, which has been *taken up* before. But at all events no one would think of *translating δεῖ λαβεῖν* in any other form than that of the simple verb 'to assume or suppose'.

ἥ τις ἐνδέχεται] *ἐνδέχεσθαι* is here used, as is customary with other writers, as a personal verb; Aristotle generally employs it as an impersonal. Comp. note on c. 2, 14.

ἢ καὶ οὓς ἐπίδοξον] 'or indeed of those with whom war may be expected'. Supply for the sense, *ἢ καὶ (δεῖ εἰδέναι τὴν δύναμιν τούτων) πρὸς οὓς ἐπίδοξον* (*ἡμῖν* or *ἡμᾶς*) *πολεμεῖν*. *ἐπίδοξος*, 'subject to, liable to expectation', *ἐπί penes*, note on I 1, 7, *ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι*. Similarly *ἐπίδικος*, subject to a *δίκη*, *ἐπιζήμιος* infr. I 14, 7, II 23, 21, *ἐπαίτιος* liable to blame, *ἐπάξιος*, *ἐπικίνδυνος*, *ἐπιθάνατος* (Demosth.), *ἐπίκληρος*, *ἐπισφαλές* (liable to trip) Pol. II 5, *ἐπίμαχος*, *ἐπίβατος*, *ἐπίδρομος*. This notion is more directly expressed by *ὑπό* in composition, *ὑπόδικος*, *ὑπεύθυνος*, &c.

εἰρηνεύηται] *εἰρηνεύειν*, though used as a neuter in Plat. Theaet. 180 B, and in other authors, is properly transitive, 'to bring into a state of peace, pacificate, or reconcile' contending parties, and hence employed here as a passive.

ἐπ' αὐτοῖς] Note on I 1, 7 p. 10; and on I 1, 12 p. 22, *δι' αὐτῶν*: I 7, 35, *τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἁπλῶς*, and note there.

καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις] (*τῶν ὁμόρων ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι*) *πότερον ὅμοιαι ἢ ἀνό-*

καὶ ταύτῃ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἐλαττοῦσθαι. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα μὴ μόνον τοὺς οἰκείους πολέμους τεθεωρηκέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, πῶς ἀποβαίνουσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων τὰ ὅμοια γίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν. ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας μὴ λανθάνειν πῶς φυλάττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰδέναι τῆς φυλακῆς καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τοὺς τόπους τῶν φυλακτηρίων (τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον μὴ ἔμπειρον ὄντα τῆς p. 15.
χώρας), ἵν' εἴτ' ἐλάττων ἡ φυλακὴ προστεθῇ καὶ εἴ τις περίεργος ἀφαιρεθῇ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τόπους

μοιαι (εἰσὶ ταῖς οἰκείαις). This rule is well illustrated by Archidamus' comparative estimate of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian forces preparatory to engaging in the war, Thuc. I 80, 3.

πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἐλαττοῦσθαι] properly contrasted. πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον ἔχειν, 'to have too much or too little', 'more or less than your due'. So in Thucyd. I 77, ἐλασσοῦσθαι and πλεονεκτεῖσθαι (the irregular passive of πλεονεκτεῖν) represent the same notion, 'to come by the worse, or to be overreached'. And so here, 'for in this point also we may be at an advantage or disadvantage'.

ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων κ.τ.λ.] 'for similar circumstances are naturally followed by, or naturally give rise to, similar results'.

§ 10. ἵν' εἴτ' ἐλάττων] (ἐστὶν ἡ φυλακὴ), ἡ φυλ. προστεθῇ, or perhaps rather, εἴτ' ἐλλάττων (ἐστὶν) ἡ φυλακή, (αὕτη) προστεθῇ.

περίεργος] is properly said of one 'who troubles himself over much' (περί), either about his own affairs, or those of others; (these two significations will be found illustrated in the Lexicons). Hence it acquires the general sense of 'superfluity', as here. Comp. Plat. Polit. 286 C, περίεργα λέγειν, and Apol. 19 B, Σωκράτης...περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια (of an idle curiosity). Dem.? Phil. δ' 150, 24, ἐξ ὧν ἐργάζῃ καὶ περιεργάζῃ τοὺς ἐσχάτους ὄντας κινδύνους. Ib. 143, 17, περίεργον καὶ μάταιον ἀνάλωμα, and elsewhere in Dem. and the other orators. Arist. Eccles. 220, εἰ μή τι καινὸν ἄλλο περιειργάζετο. See also in *Ind. ad Fragm. Com. Graec.* Meineke, Vol. V. Pt. 2.

καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τόπους τηρῶσι μᾶλλον] Translate the whole passage, 'in order that whether the defence (defensive preparation) be too little, addition be made to it, or if superfluous, it be retrenched, and their attention be rather directed to the watching or guarding (fortification) of favourable positions'. ἐπιτηδείους τόπους are places favourable, defensible, *suitable* to the purpose for which they were intended, viz. for protecting the country. Thuc. II 20, ὁ χῶρος ἐπιτήδειος ἐφαίνετο ἐνστρατοπεδεῦσαι: Herod. IX 2, χῶρος ἐπιτηδεώτερος ἐνστρατοπεδεύεσθαι: VI 102, ἐπιτηδεώτατον χώριον ἐνιππεῦσαι, always apparently of a 'favourable' position, and this seems to be here the natural, as it is the usual, sense of ἐπιτήδειος and of the passage in general. And so Victorius, 'et ut relictis parum opportunis

11 τηρῶσι μᾶλλον. ἔτι δὲ περὶ τροφῆς, πόση δαπάνη ἱκανὴ τῇ πόλει καὶ ποία ἡ αὐτοῦ τε γιγνομένη καὶ εἰσαγώγιμος, καὶ τίνων τ' ἐξαγωγῆς δέονται καὶ τίνων εἰσαγωγῆς, ἵνα πρὸς τούτους καὶ συνθῆκαι καὶ συμβολαὶ γίγνωνται· πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφυλάττειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνεγκλήτους τοὺς πολίτας, πρός τε τοὺς κρείτ-
12 τους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς ταῦτα χρησίμους. εἰς δ' ἀσφάλειαν ἅπαντα μὲν ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάχιστον δὲ περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαΐειν·

locis magis idoneos tueantur.' (There is another possible—but I think not probable—interpretation of ἐπιτηδείους τόπους, viz. *loca commoda* or *opportuna*, suitable or convenient *to the enemy*, easy of access, readily assailable: τηρεῖν, as before, being to guard or defend.)

§ 11. πρὸς τούτους] i. e. παρ' οἷς ἐστιν ὧν δέονται: those that are capable of providing them with that they want.

συνθῆκαι καὶ συμβολαί] On συμβόλαια and συναλλάγματα see above, note on I 1, 10 p. 16.

συνθήκη is a general term for a treaty, compact, contract, convention, usually of a *public* nature, between two states, but also all private contracts, covenants, and bargains; see Rhet. I 15, 20—23, περὶ συνθηκῶν. σύμβολα—here called συμβολαί, apparently a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον in this sense; in Pol. III 9, 1280 *a* 38, συνθῆκαι and σύμβολα are contrasted—are technically confined by the grammarians to a particular and special kind of contract, international commercial treaties. Meier ü. Schömann, *Att. Process*, p. 494, note 49. In the passage referred to, σύμβολα first occurs apparently in its proper sense, πάντες οἷς ἔστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους: and then, as distinguished from συνθῆκαι, which here stand for commercial treaties in general, συνθῆκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων, seems to be applied to those special and subordinate articles of commercial contracts which made provisions against the infliction of mutual damage and wrong, or established a system of compensation which protected the contracting parties against mutual injury, σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν. In the usual sense, Pol. III 1, 1275 *a* 9, τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν, 'even the members of different states who are connected by international commercial treaties have reciprocal legal rights, so that it cannot be *this* which constitutes a citizen'. In Thuc. I 77, the ξυμβόλαιαι πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαι denote the actions at law which arise out of these ξύμβολα. Dem. c. Mid. 570, τὰ σύμβολα συγχέων. See Buttm.'s *Ind.*, s. v.

πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφυλάττειν κ.τ.λ.] 'for there are two classes of persons between whom and the citizens it is necessary that irreproachable conduct or behaviour, or a thoroughly good understanding, should be steadily, persistently (διά, thoroughly, throughout), maintained'.

§ 12. περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαΐειν] 'to understand the subject of legislation'.

In this section occur several points in common between the Rhetoric

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι πόσα τ' ἐστὶ πολιτειῶν εἴδη, καὶ ποῖα συμφέρει ἑκάστῃ, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων φθείρεσθαι πέφυκε καὶ οἰκείων τῆς πολιτείας καὶ ἐναντίων. λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι, ὅτι ἔξω τῆς βελτίστης πολιτείας αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι καὶ ἀνιέμεναι καὶ ἐπιτει-

and Politics, which, though they may not be direct references from one to the other, yet serve to illustrate the relation between them. They are noticed by Brandis, in Schneidewin's *Philologus*, u. s. p. 33. I will compare them in the order in which they stand.

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως] On legislation comp. I 1, 7. That the laws ought to be supreme in a state, and not any one or several, or the entire body of citizens, is argued and concluded in Polit. III 15, 1286 *a* 7 seq. and again c. 16, 1287 *a* 18, *τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα τινά κ.τ.λ.* The different forms of constitutions, and what is salutary and conservative or destructive of each of them, are treated, for instance, in Pol. III 6, and VIII (V) 1 et seq. And not only is the substance of the next sentence, *λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι κ.τ.λ.*, found in the discussions of the Politics VIII (V) 1, but the very same metaphor, from the tightening and relaxation of the strings of the lyre, is employed there, 1301 *b* 17, as here; and in c. 9, 1309 *b* 18, the same illustration, derived from the flat and aquiline nose, is used to represent the excessive exaggeration and intensification, or depression and relaxation of the constitution, as of the feature, which altogether effaces its true character.

ἀνιέμεναι καὶ ἐπιτεινόμεναι] This metaphor from the screwing up or relaxation of the strings of the lyre, producing a difference of musical pitch or tone, which it raises or lowers, is a very favourite one both with Plato and Aristotle, and is used to represent, as I have already said, exaggeration or intensification on the one hand, (exactly as we speak of 'screwing up our courage' *Macbeth* I 7, 60), and depression or relaxation on the other. If for example the nose is lowered or depressed to excess in the way of flatness as a snub-nose, or exaggerated in the other direction to excessive sharpness and prominence as an aquiline nose, it ends by losing the character of a nose altogether, and is either altogether effaced or becomes a beak: and so with the constitutions of states.

τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι therefore means that forms of government are destroyed or change their character by the exaggeration or relaxation of their own proper and peculiar institutions, and it is in the 'mean' state alone between these two excesses that the constitution can be said to maintain its true character. For instance the *ὅρος*, definition or principle, of a democracy is equality; if this be intensified or exaggerated, or carried to excess, if the thing be logically carried out, and everybody actually becomes equal, the government degenerates into mob-rule or anarchy and thus loses its true democratic character; if it be relaxed and the equality diminished, the democratic principle and its institutions become

νόμεναι φθείρονται, οἷον δημοκρατία οὐ μόνον ἀνιεμένη ἀσθενεστέρα γίνεται ὥστε τέλος ἥξει εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιτεινομένη σφόδρα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ γρυπότης καὶ ἡ σιμότης οὐ μόνον ἀνιέμενα ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφόδρα γρυπὰ γινόμενα ἢ σιμὰ οὕτω διατίθεται ὥστε μηδὲ μυκτῆρα δοκεῖν εἶναι. χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ μὴ μόνον ἐπαΐειν
13 τίς πολιτεία συμφέρει ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων θεωροῦντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδέναι, αἱ

so enfeebled, that the inequalities increase until at last it becomes an oligarchy, *ἀνιεμένη ἀσθενεστέρα γίνεται ὥστε τέλος ἥξει εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν.*

Plat. Lys. 209 B, Rep. IV 441 E, *τὸ μὲν ἐπιτείνουσα καὶ τρέφουσα...τὸ δὲ ἀνιεῖσα παραμυθουμένη*, VI 498 B, *ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια*, III 412 A, *ἐπιτεινομένῳ καὶ ἀνιεμένῳ*, ib. 410 D, *μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιταθὲν τοῦ δέοντος σκληρόν τε καὶ χαλεπὸν γίγνοιτ' ἄν...μᾶλλον ἀνεθέντος αὐτοῦ μαλακώτερον κ.τ.λ.* Phaedo 98 C, *οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι*, 86 C, 94 C and elsewhere.

This was transmitted by the master to his disciple. In Aristotle it occurs, Pol. VIII (V) 1, 1301 *b* 16, *ἢ ἵνα ἐπιταθῶσιν ἢ ἀνεθῶσιν.* Ib. c. 8, 1308 *b* 2, *τὰ τιμήματα ἐπιτείνειν ἢ ἀνιέναι, ἐὰν μὲν ὑπερβάλλῃ ἐπιτείνοντας...ἐὰν δὲ ἐλλείπῃ ἀνιέντας*, ib. c. 9, 1309 *b* 18, u. s., VII (VI) 6, 1320 *b* 30, VI (IV) 6, 1293 *a* 26 and 30 *ὑπερτείνειν*, Eth. Nic. VI 1, 1138 *b* 23, *ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν.* In Pol. V (VIII) 7 1341 *b* ult., he says of music as a 'relaxation' *πρὸς διαγωγήν*, that it is *πρὸς ἄνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας* (overstraining or exertion) *ἀνάπαυσιν.* Comp. Pol. VI (IV) 3, ult. *ἁρμονίας συντονωτέρας* and *ἀνειμένας*; whence *ἔντονος* (*intense*), *σύντονος, ἀνειμένος, ἀνειμένως*, are applied, the two first to *braced* nerves, vigorous exertion or character; the latter to relaxation or dissoluteness of life and manners, or to slackness, laxity, and effeminacy. In Pol. IV (VII) 17, 1336 *a* 30, it is said that children's sports should be neither *ἐπιπόνους* nor *ἀνειμένας*; and c. 4, 1326 *a* 26, that no well-constituted state should be *ἀνειμένην*, uncontrolled, slack, loose, relaxed, i. e. allowed to run to excess, in its numbers. Eth. Nic. II 4 sub. init. *ὀργισθῆναι σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως*, ib. III 7, 1114 *a* 5, *ἀνειμένως ζῆν*, open, easy, careless, dissolute life. Comp. Thuc. I 6, II 39 *ἀνειμένῃ τῇ διαίτῃ, ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι.* The corresponding Latin terms are *intendere* and *remittere*, Cic. Orat. § 59, Quint. X 3, 24, doubtless borrowed from the Greek.

οὕτω διατίθεται ὥστε κ.τ.λ.] 'it assumes such a condition or shape that it seems to be no nose at all'.

§ 13. *ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων θεωροῦντι*] 'by studying out of', i. e. 'drawing conclusions or deriving observations from the study of the past'.

ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle had already probably, when this was written, supplied the deliberative orators of his time with the means of acquainting themselves with this branch of political study, by his work called Πολιτεῖαι, a collection of the constitutions

ποῖαι τοῖς ποίοις ἁρμόττουσιν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς μὲν τὴν νομοθεσίαν αἱ τῆς γῆς περίοδοι χρήσιμοι (ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ λαβεῖν ἔστι τοὺς τῶν ἐθνῶν νόμους), πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς αἱ τῶν περὶ τὰς

of 158 states existing at that period, and serving apparently as an appendix to the extant Politics. It is included in the lists both of Diogenes, V 27, and of the *Anonymus* in Buhle, Arist. Vol. I p. 65. Diogenes' title, which is more descriptive than the other, runs thus: *Πολιτεῖαι πόλεων δυοῖν δεούσαιν ἑξήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ δημοκρατικαί, ὀλιγαρχικαί, ἀριστοκρατικαί, καὶ τυραννικαί.* The extant fragments of this work are collected in Rose's *Arist. Pseudepigraphus*, Pt. 2, p. 391—537 (this collection is much more complete than that of Neumann, which is printed in the Oxf. ed. of Bekker's text, Vol. X p. 234, as an appendix to the Politics). The latest results of the researches on this subject are given by Heitz, *Verlor. Schrift. Arist.* p. 230, seq.

αἱ τῆς γῆς περίοδοι] 'Travels round the world', 'survey of the earth'. These were books of Geography physical and descriptive, containing not only an account of the relative position of cities and countries, but also observations upon the manners and customs of the inhabitants. Hence they are recommended to the study of the Politician. These were founded either upon personal observation, or upon the reports of travellers; whence the name *περίοδοι*. Ar. Meteor. I 13, 13, *δῆλον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο θεωμένοις τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους· ταύτας γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι παρ' ἑκάστων οὕτως ἀνέγραψαν, ὅσων μὴ συμβέβηκεν αὐτόπτας γενέσθαι τοὺς λέγοντας* (quoted by Victorius). For a similar reason books of the same kind were called *περίπλοι*, 'circumnavigations or nautical surveys', as those of Scylax, Hanno, &c. or *περιηγήσεις*. (*Διονύσιος ὁ περιηγητής. Διόδωρος ὁ περιηγητής*, Athen. XIII 591 E. *Πολέμων ὁ περιηγ.*, ib. IX 372 A, XXI 552 B.) One of the earliest and best known of them was that of Hecataeus, referred to by Herodotus, IV 36 *γελῶ δὲ ὁρέων Γῆς περιόδους γράψαντας πολλοὺς ἤδη...οἳ Ὠκεανόν τε ῥέοντα γράφουσι πέριξ τὴν γῆν ἐοῦσαν κυκλοτερέα ὡς ἀπὸ τόρνου, καὶ τὴν Ἀσίην τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ποιεῦντας ἴσην.* In V 49 the term is applied to Aristagoras of Miletus' famous *map*, (by Strabo assigned to Anaximander), *πίνακα ἐν τῷ γῆς ἁπάσης περίοδος ἐνετέτμητο, καὶ θάλασσά τε πᾶσα, καὶ ποταμοὶ πάντες.* From the hints in Herod. IV. 36, Ar. Meteor. II 5, *διὸ καὶ γελοίως γράφουσι νῦν τὰς περιόδους τῆς γῆς· κ.τ.λ.* (where the author proceeds to say, following Herodotus, that the circular shape of the earth assigned to it by these writers is impossible), and from Pol. II 3, 1262 *a* 12, sub fin., the general nature of the contents of these works may be gathered. Eudoxus, the mathematician and astronomer, of Cnidos, was the author of one of these works, referred to by Athen. VII 288 C, *ἐν ἕκτῳ γῆς περιόδου* (Victorius), also Ctesias, Dionysius, Diodorus, Polemo. An account of Hecataeus' *περίοδος* is given by Mure, *Hist. Gk. Lit.* IV 144, Bk. IV ch. 3 § 3.

αἱ τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις γραφόντων ἱστορίαι] See note on *ἱστορίαι*, § 7. The addition 'about men's actions' is still required to define the kind of 'inquiries' in which 'history' engages: *ἱστορία* has not yet become technical, indicating a special department of study.

πράξεις γραφόντων ἱστορίαι· ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα πολιτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν.

περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα συμβου- P. 1360 *b.* λεύειν, τὰ μέγιστα τοσαῦτα ἐστίν· ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν, λέγωμεν πάλιν.

1 σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι σκοπός CHAP. V. τις ἐστίν, οὗ στοχαζόμενοι καὶ αἱροῦνται καὶ φεύ- p. 16. γουσιν· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν ἤ τ'

ἔχειν] 'to be informed or furnished'. 'The information' which he must 'have' is left to be supplied. Understand *τὰς προτάσεις*, which generally stands in Aristotle for the 'materials' of Rhetoric which the speaker must have at his command.

λέγωμεν πάλιν] 'let us go back, begin again, take a fresh start as it were, and proceed to state...' Compare the end of the first chapter. This form of expression and use of *πάλιν* are very familiar to Aristotle in commencing a new subject. See, for example, de Anima II 1 init., c. 2 init.

CHAPTER V.

The analysis of Happiness.

The object of the public or deliberative speaker lies in *the future*, and is always something attainable; no one deliberates about that which is altogether out of his power. Now happiness or some form or part of it is the universal aim; the complete analysis of happiness, therefore, will include every object of *πρὀτροπή* and *ἀποτροπή* which he can suggest to his audience, and every kind of political *expediency*.

§ 1. Eth. Nic. I 1 init. *πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθὸν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται.* Ib. 1094 *b* 3, *χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης (τῆς πολιτικῆς) ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν.* X 6 init. *ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν (τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν) τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων.* Polit. I 1 init. *ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν, τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες, δῆλον ὡς πᾶσαι ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς στοχάζονται.* Plat. Symp. 205 A *καὶ οὐκέτι προσδεῖ ἔρεσθαι ἵνα τί δὲ βούλεται εὐδαίμων εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενος, ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἡ ἀπόκρισις.* Phileb. 54 C *τό γε μὴν οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνοιτ' ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι.* Gorg. 499 E *τὸ ἀγαθὸν τέλος εἶναι ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκεν δεῖν πάντα τἆλλα πράττεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.* Euthyd. 278 E *alibi.*

ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν] 'to speak summarily', to sum up in one notion, to describe all human ends and aims by the single phrase 'happiness and its parts'.

2 εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς. ὥστε παραδείγματος χάριν λάβωμεν τί ἐστιν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ μόρια ταύτης· περὶ γὰρ ταύτης καὶ τῶν εἰς ταύτην συντεινόντων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ταύτῃ αἵ τε προτροπαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀποτροπαὶ πᾶσαι εἰσίν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρασκευάζοντα ταύτην ἢ τῶν μορίων τι, ἢ μεῖζον ἀντ' ἐλάττονος ποιοῦντα, δεῖ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ φθείροντα ἢ ἐμποδίζοντα ἢ τὰ
3 ἐναντία ποιοῦντα μὴ πράττειν. ἔστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία

§ 2. *ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν*] speaking broadly and generally, without descending to *particulars*. Opposed to *καθ' ἕκαστον*. See note on I 2, 4, p. 30.

§ 3. *ἔστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία*] Brandis, u. s. p. 48, note 42, (after Spengel) remarks upon this use of *ἔστω* as marking the *popular* character of the definitions that follow—as if it were a matter of indifference whether they are right or not, provided that they are so generally acceptable as to be certain to satisfy the audience. The same form is repeated c. 6, 2; 7, 2; 10, 3; II 2, 1, and throughout the chapters on the *πάθη*. On the definition of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 13; and on *this* definition of happiness, p. 176.

Aristotle's own definition of happiness in the Eth. Nic., the result of his inquiries in that work, is something far different, *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετήν*, the fully developed activity or active exercise (implying full consciousness) of the soul in respect of its proper (and therefore highest) excellence: that is contemplation, *θεωρία*, the exercise of the highest faculty, the *νοῦς*, or intuitive reason; the highest faculties being the *intellectual*. This is the theory; but practically a lower view of happiness is admitted (Bk. X), which consists in the exercise of the moral as well as the intellectual virtues. Of the definitions here given, *αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς* comes nearest to his own: it expresses a self-sufficing life, complete in itself, independent of all external aids and advantages, and is in fact essential to the notion of happiness. See Eth. Nic. I 5 (quoted below). The essentials of the three first of these definitions are found all united in the conception of happiness, the ultimate end of all human desire and effort, which forms the conclusion of the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, from the sixth chapter to the end. It contains first, the *εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς*, in the exercise of moral and intellectual virtue, the intellectual being the higher and more perfect form of it, and in that the intuitive contemplative energy; secondly, the *αὐτάρκεια τῆς ζωῆς*, the self-sufficiency and independence of everything external, which is necessary to perfection and happiness; and thirdly, the life *μετ' ἀσφαλείας*, the happiness residing in *θεωρία* being most secure because it is most independent and the nearest approach to the happiness of the Gods, who have all their wants and faculties satisfied in themselves, and want nothing from without (c. 7); and also *ἥδιστος*, because pleasure is the necessary accompaniment of

εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἢ αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς, ἢ ὁ βίος ὁ μετ' ἀσφαλείας ἥδιστος, ἢ εὐθηνία κτημάτων καὶ

every ἐνέργεια (active exercise, *realisation* in exercise, of any δύναμις or capacity), and θεωρία being the most perfect form of ἐνέργεια, the pleasure that accompanies it must needs be the highest and most complete; and the exercise of the moral faculties in proportion to their comparative excellence. καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος (ἥδιστος καὶ κράτιστος), εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος. Eth. N. X 7 ult. (In the popular and lower sense of the words this definition of happiness would belong to the *Epicurean* school.) The fourth definition, εὐθηνία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων· is only applicable to a state. The Stoic definition of happiness was εὔροια βίου. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hypot. Γ § 172, πρὸς Ἠθικούς § 30.

εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς] Comp. Pol. IV (VII) 1, 1323 *b* 20, ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἑκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὃς εὐδαίμων μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ δι' αὑτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἕτερον εἶναι κ.τ.λ. Ib. c. 3, 1326 *b* 12, ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. By comparing this latter passage with the definition, it would seem that the sense of εὐπραξία in the latter must be limited to 'well doing', and not extended to 'welfare', which it, like εὖ πράττειν, is capable of including. Pol. IV (VII) 1, καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς· ἀδύνατον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν τὴν μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσαν. Ib. c. 3 sub init. ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μηθὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δ' εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταὐτόν. Ib. c. 8, εὐδαιμονία...ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσίς τις τέλειος. c. 13, 1332 *a* 7.

αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς] Eth. Nic. I 5, 1097 *b* 7, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν (the notion of αὔταρκες leads to the same result, or conception of happiness as that of τέλειον, previously applied to determine it). τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὔταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ...τὸ δ' αὔταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι. Comp. X 6, 1176 *b* 5, οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. c. 7, 1177 *a* 28, ἥ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια (which is essential to happiness) περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· (and therefore the highest and most perfect happiness must consist in θεωρία). A similar αὐτάρκεια or independence is attributed to the perfect state in the Politics. On the notion of the perfect state or constitution in the second degree, that is, under the necessary limitations incident to a human condition, so far as humanity allows of perfection at all, see Pol. VI (IV) 11 init. In Pol. IV (VII) 5 init. αὐτάρκεια is thus defined, τὸ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηθενὸς αὔταρκες.

εὐθηνία] and εὐθηνεῖν are Ionic and also late Greek forms belonging to the κοινὴ διάλεκτος, for the Attic εὐθενεῖν and εὐθενία or εὐθένεια, and denote a '*flourishing* state', or 'prosperity' in general. 'εὐθενεῖν enim non tam robur (quod verbo εὐσθενεῖν subiectum est) quam vigorem et vitalitatem declarat, ut v. c. Aiax aliquis aut Hercules εὐσθενεῖν dicatur, sed vel

σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων· σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτων ἐν ἢ πλείω τὴν
4 εὐδαιμονίαν ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι ἅπαντες. εἰ δὴ ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειαν πολυφιλίαν χρηστοφιλίαν πλοῦτον εὐτεκνίαν πολυτεκνίαν εὐγηρίαν, ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς, οἷον ὑγίειαν κάλλος ἰσχὺν μέγεθος, δύναμιν ἀγωνιστι-

tenerrima planta, quum laeto iuventae flore nitet, εὐθενεῖν dici possit. Et maximi quidem proprie de succo sanitatis et corporis incremento deque uberi proventu et auctu, sed non minus apte de *prospero rerum publicarum privatarumque successu*, deque omni ubertate et affluentia dicitur.' (From an excellent note by Lobeck on these words, *ad Phryn. &c.* p. 465—7: Lobeck derives εὐθενεῖν from εὖ and θέω (τίθημι), comparing it with other verbs of similar formation. The MSS of Arist. give sometimes εὐθενία and εὐθενεῖν, but generally εὐθηνία and εὐθηνεῖν. Lobeck's note may be applied as a corrective of Victorius' ad h. l.)

κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων] 'property' of all kinds, goods and chattels, including especially flocks and herds; and 'population', here estimated by 'bodies', not by 'souls' as Christianity has taught *us* to reckon it.

§ 4. εὐτεκνία (εὔτεκνος, εὔπαις, εὐπαιδία, εὐτεκνεῖν, Aeschylus and Euripides), and εὐγηρία, εὔτεκνος, and εὐγήρως, 'blessing in children, and in old age', are applied by Aristotle to animals, as well as to the human race, in his works on Natural History: *e.g.* to birds, in the sense of 'prolific', Hist. An. IX 11, 1; 12, 3; 17, 1; IX 12, 3; εὔγηροι ὄρνιθες.

πολυφιλία, χρηστοφιλία, both defined by Aristotle himself in § 16, 'number of friends, worthiness of friends'. The latter is defined by Liddell and Scott, 'the love of good men or good deeds', [a slip corrected, however, in a subsequent edition. S.]

τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς] The ἀρετή or 'excellence' of anything is determined by its ἔργον or special function or business; that which it was made *to do*. On this notion of ἔργον, see the reff. given in note on c. 2, § 12. ἀρετή therefore is so far from being confined to moral virtue, though it is applied to this κατ' ἐξοχήν, that it may be extended to everything which has any use or object, animate or inanimate; but in the highest and most appropriate sense is attributed to human faculties bodily, mental, and moral.

μέγεθος] So Homer and Hesiod reckon size as well as strength and beauty amongst personal advantages. Od. ζ 276, τίς δ' ὅδε Ναυσικάᾳ ἕπεται καλός τε μέγας τε ξεῖνος; Ib. σ 248, περίεσσι γυναικῶν εἶδός τε μέγεθός τε. ω 252, οὐδέ τί τοι δούλειον ἐπιπρέπει εἰσοράασθαι εἶδος καὶ μέγεθος. σ 218. ω 373. Il. B 58, &c. Hesiod, Scut. Herc. 3, and Plato, Alc. I p. 123 E, in an enumeration of the personal qualities and other advantages that a young man might be proud of, εἰ οὖν λέγοιμεν ὅτι κάλλει τε καὶ μεγέθει καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ φύσει τῆς ψυχῆς... Charmid. 154 C, θαυμαστὸς ἐφάνη τό τε μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος. So Ovid's Romulus, after his deification, *pulcer et humano maior*. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1323 *b* 7, ἐν μεγέθει

κήν, δόξαν τιμὴν εὐτυχίαν ἀρετήν·[1] οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὐταρκέστατος εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τά τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα. ἔστι δ' ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἔξω δὲ εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμή. ἔτι δὲ προσήκειν οἰόμεθα δυνάμεις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τύχην·

[1] ἢ καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς, φρόνησιν ἀνδρίαν δικαιοσύνην σωφροσύνην.

γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι (pretty or neat) καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὔ. Pol. IV (VII) 4, 1326 *a* 33, τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι. Poet. VII 4, τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστί, ap. Zell, ad loc. Eth.

δόξαν] 'reputation', estimation in men's *thoughts* or *opinion*. ('Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise, that last infirmity of noble minds, to scorn delights, &c.' *Lycidas*).—τιμήν honours, substantial and externally manifested, which are *conferred* upon a man, offices, titles, προεδρίαι, civil privileges, and such like. See further in § 9. On the value of τιμή in general, Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 *b* 18, μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ μάλιστ' ἐφιένται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἆθλον· τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμή. μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, 1124 *a* 17.

εὐτυχίαν] distinguished from εὐδαιμονία, Pol. IV (VII) 1, 1323 *b* 20 seq., quoted above in note on § 3.

ἢ καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς, φρόνησιν ἀνδρίαν δικαιοσύνην σωφροσύνην] These words are omitted by MS A^c, put in brackets as doubtful by Bekker [4to ed. 1831], and rejected by Spengel.

αὐταρκέστατος] referring to the second definition, § 3. See note on § 3, p. 73.

τά τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά] When Aristotle adds 'besides these there are no others', he includes, as he tells us in the following sentence, the goods of body and mind under the first head, τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. His usual division of goods, called the Peripatetic division, is into three kinds; goods of 'mind, body, and estate'. This division, however, was not his own invention; as he tells us in Eth. Nic. I 8, 1098 *b* 17, ταύτην τὴν δόξαν (the opinion in question) παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. Cic. Tusc. V 30, *tria genera bonorum, maxima animi, secunda corporis, externa tertia, ut Peripatetici, nec multo veteres Academici secus.* Eth. Nic. I 8, sub init. νενημημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθά. Pol. IV (VII) 1 sub init. τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακαρίοις δεῖ. Zell ad Eth. Nic. I 8, 2. Cic. de Fin. III 13, 43, *et alibi.* Schrader ad h. l. This division cannot be at all events confined to the Peripatetics or derived from them alone, for it appears in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 (2 Oxf.) 8, διαιρήσεις δὲ τοῦτο (τὸ συμφέρον) τοῖς μὲν ἰδιώταις εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπίκτητα: unless indeed this be taken as an argument of the later authorship of the *Rhet. ad Alexandrum.*

δυνάμεις] either 'power' *of various kinds*, 'opes ac civilem potentiam',

οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀσφαλέστατος ὁ βίος εἴη. λάβωμεν τοίνυν ὁμοίως καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον τί ἐστιν.

εὐγένεια μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἔθνει μὲν καὶ πόλει τὸ αὐτόχθονας ἢ ἀρχαίους εἶναι, καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοὺς πρώτους ἐπιφανεῖς, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς γεγονέναι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ζηλουμένοις· ἰδίᾳ δὲ εὐγένεια ἢ ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, καὶ γνησιότης ἀπ' ἀμ-

Muretus, Victorius, 'potentiam', Vet. Transl.; or faculties and capacities, bodily and mental, 'facultates', Riccob. The first seems to agree better with *εὐτυχίαν*.

ἀσφαλέστατος] referring to the third definition of § 3.

§ 5. *εὐγένεια*] in an individual or family is defined in Pol. VI (IV) 8, 1294 *a* 21, *ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστιν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή*, and VIII (V) 1, 1301 *b* 2, *εὐγενεῖς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος.* Rhet. II 15. 2, 3. Plat. Theaet. 174 E, *τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνούντων, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἑπτὰ πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων ἀποφῆναι*, which seems to have been the current definition of *εὐγένεια* at Athens in Plato's time.

αὐτόχθονας] Herod. I 171, Thuc. I, 2 and 6, Arist. Vesp. 1076, Eur. Ion 29, 589, 737, of Athens; Isocr. Panath. § 124, also of Athens; Paneg. § 24, 25, Dem. de F. L. § 296, of the Athenians and Arcadians. Quint. III 7, 26, *laudantur autem urbes similiter atque homines. Nam pro parente est conditor; et multum auctoritatis affert vetustas, ut iis qui terra dicuntur orti.*

καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοὺς πρώτους ἐπιφανεῖς] 'and to have had for their first rulers famous men', like Theseus at Athens.

καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς—ἐπὶ τοῖς ζηλουμένοις] 'and many men sprung from their race renowned for things (personal qualities, feats of arms, noble deeds, and such like) that are esteemed and admired'. *ἐπί*, 'standing, resting upon', 'upon the basis, terms, or condition of ...'.

ἰδίᾳ δὲ εὐγένεια ἢ ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ γυναικῶν] 'privately, in a family, it may be derived either from the father's or the mother's side', i.e. from famous ancestors on either.

γνησιότης ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν] 'legitimacy on both sides', in birth and citizenship. *γνήσιος*, opposed to *νόθος*, Il. Λ 102, *υἷε δύω Πριάμοιο νόθον καὶ γνήσιον*, Plat. Rep. VII 536 A, *τὸν νόθον τε καὶ τὸν γνήσιον*, and also to *ποιητός*, *εἰσποίητος*, *θετὸς υἱός*, Dem. c. Leoch. 1095, 5, *τὸ μὲν γὰρ γνήσιόν ἐστιν ὅταν ᾖ γόνῳ γεγονώς, καὶ ὁ νόμος ταῦτα μαρτυρεῖ λέγων, ἣν ἂν ἐγγυήσῃ πατὴρ ἢ ἀδελφὸς ἢ πάππος ἐκ ταύτης εἶναι παῖδας γνησίους...ποιητὸς δ' ὁμολογῶν εἶναι φαίνεται οὐκ εἰσποιηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ τετελευτηκότος αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ.* and 1099, 19; and hence metaphorically 'genuine', real, true, as opposed to spurious, fictitious. Plat. Rep. IX 587 B, *μιᾶς μὲν (ἡδονῆς) γνησίας, δυοῖν δὲ νόθοιν.* On the *γνήσιος πολίτης*, cf. Ar. Pol. III 5. The conditions of citizenship vary according to the form of constitution, and the number of the population. In the normal state no *βάναυσοι* or *θῆτες*, no *mechanics* or paid agricultural labourers, still less slaves, should be admitted to the rights of citizenship. When the number of the *γνήσιοι πολῖται* (legitimate by birth) declines, *νόθοι* are admitted; in the opposite case a more stringent rule

φοῖν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ πόλεως τούς τε πρώτους γνωρίμους ἢ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ ἢ πλούτῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τῶν τιμωμένων, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς ἐκ τοῦ γένους καὶ p. 17.
ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους.
6 *εὐτεκνία δὲ καὶ πολυτεκνία οὐκ ἄδηλα. ἔστι δὲ τῷ* P. 1361.
κοινῷ μὲν [εὐτεκνία], νεότης ἂν ᾖ πολλὴ καὶ ἀγαθή, ἀγαθὴ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν σώματος, οἷον μέγεθος κάλλος ἰσχὺν δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικήν· ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία νέου ἀρεταί. ἰδίᾳ δὲ εὐτεκνία καὶ πολυτεκνία τὸ τὰ ἴδια τέκνα πολλὰ καὶ τοιαῦτα εἶναι,

prevails; and then, *εὐποροῦντες δ' ὄχλου κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦνται τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρῶτον ἢ δούλης, εἶτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν· τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστῶν πολίτας ποιοῦσιν*—as was the case at Athens.

καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ πόλεως] 'and as in the case of a city (so in the private family, *ἰδίᾳ*), the distinction of its founders for virtue or wealth, or anything else that is highly valued, and a number of illustrious members of the race, men and women, young or advanced in years'.

§ 6. *τῷ κοινῷ*] 'the community, the commonwealth', *respublica*. *τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἰώνων*, Herod. V. 109, *τῶν Σαμίων*, VI. 14, *τῶν Σπαρτιητέων*, VI. 58. '*τῷ κοινῷ communi* recte vertit Muretus, Latini enim Graecos imitantes gentem, nationem, rempublicam, civitatem appellant *commune*. Cic. in Verr. II 46, statuae a *communi* Siciliae, quemadmodum inscriptum videmus, datae. Item, I 28, quomodo iste *commune* Miliadum vexarit'. Schrader. Comp. Fr. *Commune*. Germ. *Gemeinde*.

ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία νέου ἀρεταί] This is a statement of what young men *ought* to be; their character, what they actually are, is minutely analysed and described in II 12, under the second head of *ἤθη*, c. 12—17. *ἀνδρία* appears as one of their characteristics in § 9.: *σωφροσύνη*, self-control, is *not* characteristic of this age, and is therefore not mentioned.

εὐτεκνία] The strong feeling of the blessing of children, implied, though not *directly* expressed, in *εὐτεκνία*, especially characteristic of the Jews, appears also in the Greek writers, as Euripides, who uses *εὐτυχεῖν* and *δυστυχεῖν* to express the possession and the absence of a family, as though the possession of them were happiness, and the want of them misery. See Ion, 699, 772, 775, Androm. 429 (Paley's note), and 713.

τοιαῦτα] 'such' as above described. On this use of *τοιοῦτος*, implying a notion suggested by a previous expression, see Stallbaum's note on Plat. Phaed. 80 C, *ἐὰν μέν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ* (i.e. *χαριέσσῃ*) *ὥρᾳ*. Compare, *inter alia*, 59 A, 67 A. Thuc. III 58, *νομίζων ἐν γῇ τε φιλίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ παρ' ἀνδράσι τοιούτοις* (of the like sort, i.e. *φιλίοις*). Dem. d. F. L. § 103, *ἀλλ' ὅσων οὗτος αἴτιος σκεψάμενοι, καὶ χάριν, ἂν ταύτης ἄξιος ᾖ, καὶ τοὐναντίον ὀργήν, ἂν τοιαῦτα* ('of *that* kind' sc. *ὀργῆς ἄξια φαίνηται πεποιηκώς, ποιεῖσθε.*) Arist. Pol. I 8, 1256 *a* 36, *οἱ δ'*

καὶ θήλεα καὶ ἄρρενα· θηλειῶν δὲ ἀρετὴ σώματος μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ φιλεργία ἄνευ ἀνελευθερίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ' ἄνδρας καὶ κατὰ γυναῖκας δεῖ ζητεῖν ἕκαστον ὑπάρχειν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅσοις γὰρ τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας φαῦλα ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμονίοις, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ ἥμισυ οὐκ εὐ-
7 δαιμονοῦσιν. πλούτου δὲ μέρη νομίσματος πλῆθος,

ἀφ' ἁλιείας, ὅσοι λίμνας καὶ ἕλη καὶ ποταμοὺς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην (of the same kind, suitable for fishing) προσοικοῦσιν. II 4, 1262 *b* 2, δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι, i. e. (from the preceding) less friendly, VIII (V) 10, 1310 *b* 12, τοιούτου γένους, 'a similar family' (similar to what had been just described).

φιλεργία ἄνευ ἀνελευθερίας] 'industry, without (mean, sordid, illiberal) *unladylike* habits'.

τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας, κ.τ.λ.] 'the character and conduct of the women', Polit. II 9, 1269 *b* 12, ἔτι δ' ἡ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄνεσις (relaxation, laxity of manners) καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως...ὥστ' ἐν ὅσαις πολιτείαις φαύλως ἔχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς πόλεως εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν ἀνομοθέτητον. ὅπερ ἐκεῖ (at Sparta) συμβέβηκεν...ζῶσι γὰρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀκολασίαν καὶ τρυφερῶς. On the condition of the Spartan women, and the difference in the account given of their moral character by Aristotle, here and in the Politics, on the one hand, and by Xenophon and Plutarch on the other, see Grote, *Hist. Gr.* Vol. II. p. 516 seq.

§ 7. πλούτου μέρη νομίσματος πλῆθος κ.τ.λ.] In the discussion of wealth, in the more exact and scientific Politics, this is denied of *true* wealth. Pol. I 9, 1257 *b* 8, καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον πολλάκις τιθέασι νομίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὁτὲ (sometimes) δὲ πάλιν λῆρος (mere nonsense, a mere joke or farce) εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι (an absolute convention, with no reality, no true nature, φύσις, in it), φύσει δ' οὐθέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐθενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστί, καὶ νομίσματος πλουτῶν πολλάκις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄτοπον τοιοῦτον εἶναι πλοῦτον οὗ εὐπορῶν λιμῷ ἀπολεῖται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδαν ἐκεῖνον...διὸ ζητοῦσιν ἕτερόν τι τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικήν, ὀρθῶς ζητοῦντες.—πλοῦτος is defined, Pol. I 8, sub fin. ὀργάνων πλῆθος οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν, 'a stock, or number, of implements or instruments for economical (domestic) and public or political uses'.

This confusion of money and wealth, the foundation of the famous 'Mercantile Theory', is exposed by Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Bk. IV. See also J. S. Mill, *Pol. Econ.* Prelim. Remarks, Vol. I. p. 2 seq. 'To mistake money for wealth, is the same sort of error as to mistake the highway which may be the easiest way of getting to your house or lands, for the house and lands themselves.' p. 8[1].

[1] It is well worth while to compare the chapters of the first book of the Politics in which the germs of the supposed invention, the science of Political Economy, already appear, with the corresponding passages of the *Wealth of Nations*. The

γῆς, χωρίων κτῆσις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπίπλων κτῆσις καὶ βοσκημάτων καὶ ἀνδραπόδων πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ κάλλει διαφερόντων, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐλευθέρια καὶ χρήσιμα. ἔστι δὲ χρήσιμα μὲν μᾶλλον τὰ

γῆς, χωρίων κτῆσις] γῆ, 'territory', the acquisition or possession of *public* property, χώρια (dim. of χῶρος or χώρα, little places, regions, countries, 'spots',) 'farms', 'estates', 'domains', *private* properties. Or perhaps rather, γῆ merely 'land' in general, and χώρια the divisions of land, the *actual* private properties.

ἔπιπλα, (a division of property) 'moveables', moveable furniture or property of all kinds: opposed to 'fixtures', such as houses and land. Xen. Oecon. IX 6 includes in it all sacrificial furniture or apparatus; and articles of dress, shoes, female ornaments; and of house furniture, as beds. In Thuc. III 68, ἃ ἦν ἐν τῷ τείχει ἔπιπλα, χαλκὸς καὶ σίδηρος, it stands for household furniture of bronze and iron: everything of this kind which was in the fort, the Laced., after the capture of Plataea, converted into couches (κλῖναι) and dedicated to Ἥρα. In Arist. Pol. II 7, 1267 *b* 12, καὶ κατασκευὴ πολλὴ (a large stock) τῶν καλουμένων ἐπίπλων, it is opposed, first, *with* money, slaves and cattle, to land, and then, secondly, to the three former. Similarly in the present passage, they are distinguished from cattle and slaves as *inanimate* moveable furniture, or 'plenishing'. Herodotus writes the word ἐπίπλοα in I 94; elsewhere, as usual, ἔπιπλα. The derivation appears to be, τὰ ἐπιπολῆς σκεύη, τὰ ἐπιπόλαια, superficial'. They are said to be 'superficial', to 'lie on the surface', because they are not fixed or rooted, like land, houses, trees; which are all 'property' nevertheless.

ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐλευθέρια καὶ χρήσιμα] All the kinds of property just mentioned are 'secure', (in the sense, 'that the use of it is always in your own power', *infra*), not liable to risk, as money made and employed in trade or commerce; and 'liberal', such as befit a gentleman, a man of 'liberal' education and pursuits, cultivated and accomplished and refined, ὁ πεπαιδευμένος (παιδεία, ᾗ διαγιγνώσκομεν τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 260); and also 'useful', πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν, and therefore a part of genuine *wealth* (with which *money* is here included, contrary to the true theory).

ἐλευθέριος, as here applied, expresses the general notion of liberality, in character and habits of mind. In the Ethics, and most frequently in the ordinary language, it is restricted as a moral virtue to a *species* of liberality, that namely which manifests itself περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν. Eth. Nic. II 7. The ἐλευθέριος represents the gentleman

resemblance is sometimes so close—see, for example, Aristotle's account of the origin and use of money in I 9 above referred to, and of the three earliest stages of civilisation indicated in c. 8, the hunting, the pastoral or nomad, and the agricultural stage (though it is true that Smith, and with him Mill, *Pol. Econ.* u. s., inverts the order of the two first and adds a fourth, the commercial stage), that it seems almost impossible that the notions at least should not have been suggested by Aristotle, though as far as I am aware Smith never mentions his name.

κάρπιμα, ἐλευθέρια δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν· κάρπιμα

from the democratic point of view; he embodies the notion of 'freedom which is the *ὅρος*, the principle, and the end and aim of the democratic commonwealth; he is the type of a free citizen, and therefore as expressive of *character* the term denotes 'that which a model free citizen ought to be'; and connotes or implies those qualifications, particularly education and enlightenment, which enable him efficiently to discharge the proper functions of a free citizen, and those social qualities and habits which fit him for such a society. This is opposed to the aristocratic conception of a gentleman which makes the character or notion depend rather upon birth, wealth and station; and according to which the *ἀγαθοί, ἄριστοι, ἀριστῆες*, the *boni, optimi, optimates*, &c., are the nobles, the men of rank, and of good family in a state. See further on this subject, Donaldson, *New Cratylus*, §§ 321—328.

Another characteristic of Greek feeling, which deserves notice, is brought into view in the application of the term *ἐλευθέρια* to distinguish a particular kind of property; and this is, the contempt for trade and commerce as a profession and a means of acquiring wealth, which as B. St Hilaire observes (note on *Transl. of Ar. Pol.* p. 36) was common to all antiquity. A similar observation is made by Böckh, *Publ. Econ. of Athens*, Bk. I c. 8 p. 43 (Transl.).

Plato's writings abound with contemptuous epithets and expressions applied to *ἐμπορία, καπηλεία, χρηματιστική, χρηματισμός*, and all arts and professions of which money-making was the only object; for instance, Legg. IV 1, 705 A, *ἐμπορίας γὰρ καὶ χρηματισμοῦ διὰ καπηλείας ἐμπιπλᾶσα αὐτήν, ἤθη παλίμβολα καὶ ἄπιστα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντίκτουσα, αὐτήν τε πρὸς αὑτὴν τὴν πόλιν ἄπιστον καὶ ἄφιλον ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ὡσαύτως*, where trade is represented as corrupting and demoralizing. In XI 4, 918 D, in the course of a discussion on the legitimate objects and uses of trade, he makes the remark, *διὸ πάντα τὰ περὶ τὴν καπηλείαν καὶ ἐμπορίαν καὶ πανδοκείαν γένη* (in the actual practice of them) *διαβέβληταί τε καὶ ἐν αἰσχροῖς γέγονεν ὀνείδεσιν*, which results from their general tendency to corrupt the character of those who follow these pursuits, by the immoderate desire of gain which they stimulate and foster. Accordingly no citizen of the model state is allowed to follow any retail trade; this must be confined to metics and strangers, *μέτοικον εἶναι χρεὼν ἢ ξένον ὃς ἂν μέλλῃ καπηλεύσειν*. VIII 11, 847 D, *καπηλείαν δὲ ἕνεκα χρηματισμῶν μήτε οὖν τούτου μήτε ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ὅλῃ καὶ πόλει ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι*. On Plato's general views on this subject, as expressed in the 'Laws', see Grote, Plato, III 431.

Aristotle similarly condemns trade and the business and practice of interchanging commodities, so far as its object is mere money-making, *χρηματιστική*. This is the accumulation of *unnatural*, artificial property: the only kind of property or wealth that is natural, *φύσει*, is that which can be applied directly to one's own use, *πρὸς χρῆσιν*, and ultimately *πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν*, and falls under the province of *οἰκονομική*, from which *χρηματιστική* is excluded. Pol. I 9. Hence of the two kinds of *κτητική*, the one, which may be called *οἰκονομική*, because it forms part of the science of œconomics (domestic economy) properly understood, is neces-

δὲ λέγω ἀφ' ὧν αἱ πρόσοδοι, ἀπολαυστικὰ δὲ ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν γίγνεται, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον.

sary and laudable; the other, ἡ καπηλική or μεταβλητική, with its offspring usury, which *breeds* money out of money, and is thence called τόκος, 'is justly reprehended' and usury 'most reasonably the object of abhorrence'. τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψεγομένης δικαίως, οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν, εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ἡ ὀβολοστατικὴ διὰ τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ὅπερ ἐπορίσθη. κ.τ.λ. I 10 sub fin.

On the character and tendencies of ἔμποροι, compare Xen. Œcon. XX 27, 28. In the same treatise, c. I 12, 13, 14, a distinction is taken, similar to that of Aristotle, between χρήματα, wealth or property which you can *use* directly, which does you direct service, and money, which is excluded from the notion of property *in this sense*. Xenophon, like Aristotle, approves of nothing but the agricultural mode of life as the best both for mind and body, and as cultivating and promoting the habits which go to form the best of citizens. See Œcon. c. VI 8, 9, 10, c. XV 9.

These extracts will throw light upon the meaning of the word ἐλευθέρια as applied to the land and stock and buildings and moveables of the landed gentleman or country proprietor. They are said to belong to the gentleman or man of cultivation, in contrast with the degrading or corrupting habits engendered by trade and commerce.

ἔστι δὲ χρήσιμα μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.] Property employed in business, and therefore productive, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ πρόσοδοι 'from which one derives one's income', is more useful, but carries with it the notion of sordidness or meanness; the other, because it produces nothing but the *enjoyment*[1], which proceeds from *using* it, because it is not corrupted and degraded by any contact or connexion with money-making, better befits the cultivated man, who should hold himself aloof from such pursuits, and partakes more of the notion of καλόν. Comp. I 9, 25, καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν, αἱρετά τε γὰρ ἄκαρπα ὄντα. § 26, καὶ κτήματα ἄκαρπα (καλά ἐστι). ἐλευθεριώτερα γάρ. Eth. N. IV 8 sub fin. (of the μεγαλόψυχος), καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων—the contrast of 'honour' and 'profit'.

ἀπολαυστικὰ δέ κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Metaph. A 1, 981 *b* 17, on the ascending scale of arts, in the order of superiority in knowledge and general excellence. πλειόνων δ' εὑρισκομένων τεχνῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν (*passe-temps*, pastime, diversion) οὐσῶν, ἀεὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. The highest in degree are 'sciences', the invention of which is due neither to necessity nor to the mere desire of amusements, and requires 'leisure': whence it happened that mathematics were first studied in Egypt by the priestly class.

ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον] καί emphatic 'which is in fact *at all* worth mentioning'.

[1] ἀπόλαυσις is properly 'sensual enjoyment'. In Eth. N. I 3, where the three kinds of lives, the ἀπολαυστικός, πρακτικός or πολιτικός, and θεωρητικός are distinguished and compared, the first is that which has ἡδονή for its sole object, the gratification of the animal appetites and desires, the satisfaction of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν; the second has ἀρετή moral virtue for its τέλος; the third, θεωρία, the highest activity of the intellect.

ὅρος δὲ ἀσφαλείας μὲν τὸ ἐνταῦθα καὶ οὕτω κεκτῆσθαι ὥστ' ἐφ' αὐτῷ εἶναι τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν, τοῦ δὲ[1] οἰκεῖα εἶναι ἢ μή, ὅταν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ᾖ ἀπαλλοτριῶσαι· λέγω δὲ ἀπαλλοτρίωσιν δόσιν καὶ πρᾶσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ πλουτεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκτῆσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων
8 καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλοῦτος. εὐδοξία δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ πάντων σπουδαῖον ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι, ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι

[1] *τε infra.* [*'scribendum τοῦ δὲ οἰκεῖα εἶναι, quod in scripto libro, quo Victorius utebatur, exstat.'* Spengel, *q. v.*]

ἄξιον (λόγου). This emphatic use of *καί*, to enforce the meaning, usually of the single word following, and attract special attention to it, is so common in all Greek authors as scarcely to require illustration. It may be worth while to quote one or two prominent examples. Thuc. I 15, πάντες δὲ ἦσαν, ὅσοι καὶ (actually) ἐγένοντο, 97, τούτων δὲ ὅσπερ καὶ ἥψατο...Ἑλλανικός, II 51, ὃ δὲ καὶ γένοιτο εἰ τοῦτο ἐτελεύτα. Arist. Nub. 840, τί δ' ἂν παρ' ἐκείνων καὶ μάθοι (what *could* one learn?) χρηστόν τις ἄν; Eur. Hippol. 91, τοῦ δὲ καὶ μ' ἀνιστορεῖς πέρι; 224, τί κυνηγεσίων καὶ σοὶ μελέτη; (what is *thy* concern with hunting?), Ion, 241, ὅτι καὶ θέμις, 346, ταῦτα καὶ μαντεύομαι. Aesch. Agam. 97, ὅτι καὶ δυνατόν. 279. Dem. de F. L. § 87, ὅπερ καὶ γέγονεν. § 97, ὃ καὶ θαυμάζω (Schäfer's note). Porson ad Phoen. 1373; in interrogation, Wunder ad Antig. 720.

ἐνταῦθα καὶ οὕτω] 'in such places and in such a way, as to &c.'

τοῦ τε οἰκεῖα εἶναι ἢ μή κ.τ.λ.] The definition of their being our own or not (of ownership), lies in the power of alienation, that is, giving or selling.

ὅλως δὲ τὸ πλουτεῖν κτ.λ.] Polit. I 9 referred to above, pp. 79 and 81.

ἡ ἐνέργεια] This technical term, and the opposition of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια which pervades Aristotle's entire philosophy, represents πλοῦτος as a mere δύναμις or dormant faculty or capacity, until it is 'developed' or 'realised' and 'set in action' (energized) by use (χρῆσις), by application to the 'service' of its owner. On this 'fundamental antithesis' of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια as a physical, moral, and metaphysical conception, consult Metaph. Θ 6—9, and Bonitz *Comm.;* Trendel. *El. Log. Arist.* § 6, p. 61, *Kategorienlehre*, p. 157 seq., *Comm. ad Ar. de Anima*, Lib. II p. 295—312; Grant, *Essays on Ethics*, Ess. IV. p. 181 seq. (1st ed.) [p. 231 (3rd ed.)].

§ 8. σπουδαῖον] As ἐπιεικής is transferred from the special sense of a *particular kind* of goodness, i.e. equity, or merciful consideration, to the sense of 'good' in general, (see *ante*, note on I 2,4); so σπουδαῖος (serious, earnest, Xen. Cyrop. II 2. 9, 3. 8, as opposed to παίζων[1] 'in jest'), to levity and frivolity; and thence, in the sense of something solid and substantial,

[1] Eth. Nic. X 6, 1177 *a*. 3, βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

ἔχειν οὗ πάντες ἐφίενται ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἢ
9 οἱ φρόνιμοι. τιμὴ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν σημεῖον εὐεργετικῆς
δόξης, τιμῶνται δὲ δικαίως μὲν καὶ μάλιστα οἱ εὐεργετηκότες, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ δυνάμενος εὐεργετεῖν· εὐεργεσία δὲ ἢ εἰς σωτηρίαν καὶ ὅσα αἴτια τοῦ εἶναι, ἢ εἰς πλοῦτον, ἢ εἴς τι τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, ὧν μὴ ῥᾳδία ἡ κτῆσις ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἢ ποτέ· πολλοὶ γὰρ διὰ μικρὰ δοκοῦντα τιμῆς τυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ P. 18.

sound and true, to *φαῦλος*, light, empty, trifling and worthless) acquires a moral sense coextensive with *ἀγαθός*, and is opposed to *φαῦλος*, Plat. Rep. VII 519 D, Legg. VI 757 A, &c. as the sound and solid to the light, empty, and unsubstantial. This familiar application of the word is recognized (as in the parallel case of *ἐπιεικής*, Eth. N. V 14) by Aristotle, Categ. c. 8, 10 *b* 7, *οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος· τῷ γὰρ ἀρετὴν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, ἀλλ' οὐ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς* (i. e. the *notion* is derived from *ἀρετή*, but not the word itself). Plat. *ὅροι*, p. 415 D (ed. Tur. p. 888) *σπουδαῖος ὁ τελέως ἀγαθός*.

There is however one point of difference between *ἐπιεικής* and *σπουδαῖος*, that *σπουδαῖος* is extended to every kind of excellence, like *ἀγαθός*, whereas *ἐπιεικής* is confined to the expression of excellence in *human character*. Also *σπουδαῖος* has another sense distinguishable from the preceding, as opposed to *γελοῖος*, the 'serious' to the 'jocose' or 'ridiculous'. Xen. Cyrop. II 3. 1, *τοιαῦτα καὶ γελοῖα καὶ σπουδαῖα ἐλέγετο*, and Symp. VIII 3, *σπουδαῖαι ὄφρυες*, 'grave and serious'. *σπουδή* and *παιδία* 'jest' and 'earnest', 'serious work' and 'play' or 'sport', are constantly brought into contrast by Plato.

§ 9. *σημεῖον εὐεργετικῆς δόξης*] 'a sign or mark' (in the recipient of the honour) of a reputation for beneficence, of a capacity for or tendency (τινὸς) towards doing good'. All these 'marks of honour' here specified, being intended for the use of the *public* speaker, have themselves a public or national character. Eth. Nic. IX 16, 1163 *b* 4, *τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας...οὕτω δὲ ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται. οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν.*

οὐ μὴν ἀλλά] 'not but that', 'though at the same time', marks a qualification of, or exception to, too large and unlimited an assertion: *οὐ μὴν* (*ὅλως*) *ἀλλὰ* (*τόδε*). 'Those who have already done good are fairly and more than all others entitled to such signs of reputation—not however that this need be understood absolutely, so as to exclude the capacity or inclination to do good as a title to honour.'

ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἢ ποτέ] 'either entirely, absolutely, or at particular places or times'.

πολλοὶ γὰρ διὰ μικρὰ δοκοῦντα κ.τ.λ.] Trifles acquire importance, and confer honour, on special occasions, under special circumstances of time and place. Thus what is in ordinary cases a very trifling and unimportant action, as the gift of a cup of cold water, becomes under the circum-

τόποι καὶ οἱ καιροὶ αἴτιοι. μέρη δὲ τιμῆς θυσίαι, μνῆμαι ἐν μέτροις καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων, γέρα, τεμένη, προεδρίαι, τάφοι, εἰκόνες, τροφαὶ δημόσιαι, τὰ βαρ-

stances in which Sir Philip Sidney gave it at the battle of Zutphen a renowned act of self-denial and heroism. And under other and different circumstances the same cup of water may assume an importance which does not naturally belong to it. 'For whosoever shall give you a cup of water to drink in my name, because ye belong to Christ, verily I say unto you, he shall not lose his reward.' Mark ix. 41, Matth. x. 42.

μέρη τιμῆς] Some of these are enumerated in Homer, Il. M 310, *Γλαῦκε, τίη δὴ νῶϊ τετιμήμεσθα μάλιστα ἕδρῃ τε κρέασί τ' ἠδὲ πλείοις δεπάεσσι ἐν Λυκίῃ; πάντες δέ, θεοὺς ὥς, εἰσορόωσι; καὶ τέμενος νεμόμεσθα μέγα Ξάνθοιο παρ' ὄχθας,—καλὸν, φυταλιῆς καὶ ἀρούρης πυροφόροιο;* comp. Z 194, Θ 161.

θυσίαι] as those that were instituted by the Amphipolitans in honour of Brasidas, Eth. Nic. V 10, 1134 *b* 24, *οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρασίδᾳ*, Thuc. V 11, *καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ Ἀμφιπολῖται περιέρξαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον ὡς ἥρωΐ τε ἐντέμνουσι καὶ τιμὰς δεδώκασιν ἀγῶνας καὶ ἐτησίους θυσίας κ.τ.λ.* Victorius quotes from Plutarch, Vit. Flam. c. 16, p. 378 B, the honours paid by the Chalcidians to T. Quinctius Flamininus, *ἔτι δὲ καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἱερεὺς χειροτονητὸς ἀπεδείκνυτο Τίτου, καὶ θύσαντες αὐτῷ τῶν σπονδῶν γενομένων ᾄδουσι παιᾶνα πεποιημένον.*

μνῆμαι ἐν μέτροις καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων] 'Memorials in prose and verse', possibly epitaphs; but rather, as these may be included in *τάφοι*, to be understood (as Vict.) of poems and prose compositions *in memoriam*, such as the English work that bears this title, poems in honour of the illustrious dead, and panegyrics in prose, like some of Isocrates' speeches and Xenophon's Agesilaus. Philosophical dialogues too were sometimes inscribed to the memory of departed friends and named after them, as Aristotle's Gryllus and Eudemus, and Theophrastus' Callisthenes, &c. Introd. p. 53.

γέρα] gifts of honour; as *μισθοί*, 'rewards of merit', not money, for mere *use*; such as privileges conferred on princes and persons of distinction *ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασιν πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι*, Thuc. I 13; constantly in Homer, (*pars praecipua, donum praecipuum, principi prae aliis datum*, Damm, *Lex. Homer.*) as the prime of the spoils, the fairest of the captives, *κούρην, ἣν ἄρα μοι* (Achilles) *γέρας ἔξελον υἷες Ἀχαιῶν*, Il. Π 56, the largest portion of meat, or drink, at the banquet, Il. M 312 (quoted above). Eth. Nic. V. 10, 1134 *b* 8, *μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας.* Fritzsche, ad h. l., quotes Plato, Rep. VII. 516 C, *τιμαὶ καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ γέρα*, and Legg. XI 922 A.

τεμένη] From *τέμνειν*, something 'cut off' and appropriated, as a portion of land, to the special service of a God or hero; also to chieftains and kings during their lifetime for their own use. Frequent in Homer, as Il. M 313 (u. s.). Z 194, *καὶ μὴν οἱ Λύκιοι τέμενος τάμον ἔξοχον ἄλλων*, Υ 184, 391.

προεδρίαι, τροφαὶ δημόσιαι] The privilege of the 'foremost or front seat' at public spectacles, public assemblies, games, the theatre, &c. (Herod. I 54, IX 73 &c.), and 'maintenance at the public expense'; at

βαρικά, οἷον προσκυνήσεις καὶ ἐκστάσεις, δῶρα τὰ

Athens in the Prytaneum or θόλος (Dem. de F. L. §§ 279, 361), σίτησις ἐν Πρυτανείῳ, Arist. Ran. 764, Pac. 1084, Acharn. 125, Dem. u. s. and §§ 35, 259; both of these privileges were conferred in acknowledgment of meritorious public services, and are often named together, Arist. Equit. 573, καὶ στρατηγὸς οὐδ' ἂν εἷς | τῶν πρὸ τοῦ σίτησιν ᾔτησ' ἐρόμενος Κλεαίνετον· | νῦν δ' ἐὰν μὴ προεδρίαν φέρωσι καὶ τὰ σίτια, | οὐ μαχεῖσθαί φασιν. Ib. 702, Κλέων ἀπολῶ σε νὴ τὴν προεδρίαν τὴν ἐκ Πύλου. Ἀλ. ἰδοὺ προεδρίαν· οἷον ὄψομαί σ' ἐγὼ | ἐκ τῆς προεδρίας ἔσχατον θεώμενον. 709, Ἀλ. ἀπονυχιῶ σου τὰν Πρυτανείῳ σίτια.

τὰ βαρβαρικά, οἷον προσκυνήσεις] προσκύνησις, from πρὸς and κυνεῖν, 'to kiss', denotes the oriental and 'barbarous' custom of saluting by 'kissing the hand to' another, in token of inferiority and subjection, and thence is applied to any act of *servile* obeisance or homage, or to worship and adoration in general: in the last or metaphorical sense it is found in most of the best Greek writers. This practice may very likely have been accompanied by the analogous one of prostration, as the two are often found associated together in one expression. It was distinctive of *Oriental* barbarism; and prevailed amongst the Medes, Herod. I 119, of Harpagus and Astyages, the Persians, Id. I 134, ἐντυγχάνοντες δ' ἀλλήλοισι ἐν τῇσι ὁδοῖσι, τῷδε ἄν τις διαγνοίη εἰ ὅμοιοί εἰσι οἱ συντυγχάνοντες. ἀντὶ γὰρ τοῦ προσαγορεύειν ἀλλήλους, φιλέουσι τοῖς στόμασι. ἢν δὲ ᾖ οὕτερος ὑποδεέστερος ὀλίγῳ τὰς παρειὰς φιλέονται· ἢν δὲ πολλῷ ᾖ οὕτερος ἀγεννέστερος, προσπίπτων προσκυνέει τὸν ἕτερον, and the Egyptians II 80, ἀντὶ τοῦ προσαγορεύειν ἀλλήλους ἐν τῇσι ὁδοῖσι προσκυνέουσι κατιέντες μέχρι τοῦ γούνατος τὴν χεῖρα. Obeisance by *prostration*, the *salâm* or *kotoo*, differs from this, though they probably were often used together. It is the latter that is referred to, as a barbarous practice and unworthy of a free Greek, by Aeschylus, Agam. 919 (Dind.), and Pers. 594, comp. 152. They appear to be confounded by Euripides, Orest. 1507, προσκυνῶ σ', ἄναξ, νόμοισι βαρβάροισι προσπιτνῶν. Plato distinguishes them, Legg. X 887 E, προκυλίσεις ἅμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις. Stallb., in his note on this passage of Plato, cites, in illustration of the προσκύνησις, Lucian. Encom. Demosth. § 85, καὶ τὴν χεῖρα τῷ στόματι προσάγοντας, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ προσκυνεῖν ὑπέλαβον. [Cf. Isocr. Paneg. § 151, (οἱ βάρβαροι) ἐξεταζόμενοι πρὸς αὐτοῖς τοῖς βασιλείοις καὶ προκαλινδούμενοι καὶ πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες, θνητὸν μὲν ἄνδρα προσκυνοῦντες καὶ δαίμονα προσαγορεύοντες, κ.τ.λ. S.]

ἔκστασις is the abstract conception of 'getting out of the way'. This 'making way or room' for the passage of a person of rank seems also to have been characteristic of Persian manners. Victorius quotes Plutarch, Artax. c. 11, p. 1016 C, ἐπαιρόμενος δὲ (ὁ Κῦρος) τῇ νίκῃ, καὶ μεστὸς ὢν ὁρμῆς καὶ θράσους, διεξήλαυνε βοῶν, 'ἐξίστασθε πενιχροί'· ('out of the way, beggars',) τοῦτο δὲ Πέρσιστὶ πολλάκις αὐτῷ βοῶντος, οἱ μὲν ἐξίσταντο προσκυνοῦντες. Herodotus, II 80, says of the Egyptians, συμφέρονται δὲ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο Αἰγύπτιοι Ἑλλήνων μούνοισι Λακεδαιμονίοισι· οἱ νεώτεροι αὐτέων τοῖσι πρεσβυτέροισι συντυγχάνοντες εἴκουσι τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ ἐκτράπονται· καὶ ἐπιοῦσι ἐξ ἕδρης ὑπανιστέαται. So Simonides to Hiero (Xenoph. Hiero VII 2, comp. § 9), in enumerating his privileges as a tyrant, ὑπανιστῶνται δ' ἀπὸ τῶν θάκων ὁδῶν τε παραχωρῶσι: and Aristotle of the respect due

παρ' ἑκάστοις τίμια. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δῶρόν ἐστι κτήματος δόσις καὶ τιμῆς σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ οἱ φιλοχρήματοι καὶ οἱ φιλότιμοι ἐφίενται αὐτῶν· ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ ἔχει P. 1361 *b.* *ὧν δέονται· καὶ γὰρ κτῆμά ἐστιν, οὗ ἐφίενται οἱ φιλοχρήματοι, καὶ τιμὴν ἔχει, οὗ οἱ φιλότιμοι.*
10 *σώματος δὲ ἀρετὴ ὑγίεια, αὕτη δὲ οὕτως ὥστε ἀνόσους εἶναι χρωμένους τοῖς σώμασιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ὑγιαίνουσιν ὥσπερ Ἡρόδικος λέγεται, οὓς οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειε τῆς ὑγιείας διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεσθαι*

from youth to age, Eth. Nic. IX 2, 1165 *a* 28, *καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν τὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις.* Cic. Cato Maior 18. 63. On the deference paid to old age, enjoined *by law* at Athens, see Aesch. c. Tim. § 24. Xen. Symp. 31, *ὑπανίστανται δέ μοι ἤδη καὶ θάκων, καὶ ὁδῶν ἐξίστανται οἱ πλούσιοι·* and de Rep. Lac. XV 6, of the customs at Sparta, *καὶ ἕδρας δὲ πάντες ὑπανίστανται βασιλεῖ, πλὴν οὐκ ἔφοροι κ.τ.λ.* Another illustration of *ἔκστασις* is the custom, once generally prevalent, of 'giving the wall' to a superior, as a mark of respect, *céder le haut du pavé.* (*Dict. Acad. Fr.*) [Ovid, Fasti, V 67, (senex) *et medius iuvenum, non indignantibus ipsis, ibat, et interior, si comes unus erat* and Horace, Sat. II 5. 17, '*comes exterior*'. S.]

προσκυνήσεις, ἐκστάσεις] The plural of *abstract* nouns denotes the various individual acts or moments or states included under the general conception.

δῶρα τὰ παρ' ἑκάστοις τίμια] 'quae apud singulas gentes in pretio sunt', Victorius: who illustrates by the olive crown as a prize in the Greek games, and quotes Horace, Ep. II 2. 32, *clarus ob id factum donis ornatur honestis*, of the prize of valour, bearing a special value in the *Roman Military service*, assigned to 'Lucullus' soldier'. Of the words by themselves this interpretation is perfectly fair and natural; but in connexion with what follows (as Aristotle seems to have intended, *καὶ γὰρ τὸ δῶρον...*) they may be understood somewhat differently, and the *παρ' ἑκάστοις* referred to 'the individuals of the two classes' mentioned immediately after, the *φιλοχρήματοι* and *φιλότιμοι.*

§ 10. *σώματος δὲ ἀρετὴ ὑγίεια*] Health, as a bodily excellence, necessarily implies vigour and the power of active exertion for the fulfilment of the duties of life, without these it is no *ἀρετή* at all, and no subject of congratulation to the possessor. Health is said to be the *ἀρετή* of the body, in reference to the doctrine of the proper *ἔργον* of anything; see note on p. 40 c. 2 § 12. Life is the special function of the body (Eth. Nic. I 6), and health is life in its best form, as far as the body is concerned.

Ἡρόδικος] a famous physician, native of Selymbria, in Thrace on the Propontis; to be distinguished from another less known physician, Gorgias' brother, of Leontini, Plat. Gorg. 448 B, 456 B. On Herodicus and

11 τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἢ τῶν πλείστων. κάλλος δὲ ἕτερον καθ' ἑκάστην ἡλικίαν ἐστίν. νέου μὲν οὖν κάλλος τὸ πρὸς τοὺς πόνους χρήσιμον ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα τούς τε πρὸς δρόμον καὶ πρὸς βίαν, ἡδὺν ὄντα ἰδεῖν πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν, διὸ οἱ πένταθλοι κάλλιστοι, ὅτι πρὸς

his medical practice, see Plat. Phaedr. 227 E, and Heindorf's and Ast's notes; also Rep. III 406 A seq., where an account of him and his system of self-tormenting is given. Protag. 316 E[1].

τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων] See note on c. 1 § 7, δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικάς.

§ 11. Personal beauty has no absolute standard or uniform expression, manifesting itself in the same forms at all periods and under all circumstances. It is *relative*, not only to the three stages of human life, youth, prime (ἀκμή) and old age, but also to the habits and functions natural and appropriate to each of those stages; manly and athletic exercises, in the way of *training*, to youth; military service, the imperative duty of an active and able-bodied citizen, to middle age; sedentary and intellectual pursuits, to old age, yet so that strength and vigour remain adequate to the endurance of ordinary or 'necessary' labours—*extraordinary* exertions, as in athletic exercises and service in the field, being no longer required. The habit of body which is fitted to the exercise of these several functions at the corresponding period of life is a constituent element of its personal beauty.

νέου μὲν οὖν κάλλος κ.τ.λ.] When it is said that the beauty of a young man consists partly in the possession of a body in a serviceable state for undergoing the labours and pains incident to the race and feats of strength, the meaning seems to be that the robust habit of body and the muscular development required for the one, and the *indications* of activity combined with strength, which *appear* in the outward form, necessary for the other, are pleasant to the eye, both in themselves and also as suggesting a fitness or adaptation or harmony of the exterior of the person with the habits and pursuits which are appropriate to youth.

πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν] means no more than the mere enjoyment afforded by the *sight* of personal beauty. Victorius, who suggests another interpretation, concludes finally in favour of this.

οἱ πένταθλοι κάλλιστοι] The combination of a natural aptitude or

[1] Macaulay, in his celebrated Essay on Bacon, *Edin. Rev.*, July, 1837, selects these opinions of Plato, which he describes at length from the passage of the Republic, as to the value of Herodicus' system of medical practice, as one of the illustrations of the contempt for all that is useful and practical which pervades the Platonic philosophy; contrasting this, much to the disadvantage of the ancient philosopher, with the opposite spirit and tendency of the Baconian system, which aims, as he assumes, exclusively at practical and attainable good, and promotes the investigation of truth solely with a view to the substantial and solid benefit of the human race. Schrader cites Dial. de Orat. XXIII 4 *Ne in corpore quidem valetudinem medici probant, quae animi anxietate contingat. Parum est aegrum non esse; fortem et laetum et alacrem volo. Prope abest ab infirmitate in qua sola sanitas laudatur.*

βίαν καὶ πρὸς τάχος ἅμα πεφύκασιν· ἀκμάζοντος δὲ

capacity (πεφύκασι πρός) for strength and speed, vigour and activity, as evidenced by success in the *various* exercises of the πένταθλον, and the outward expression of these faculties in the configuration of the body, when accompanied with beauty in the shape, symmetry, and expression of the features, is the highest form of personal beauty in the young man. '*Die übung im Pentathlon war wegen der verschiedenartigkeit der fünf wettkämpfe ganz vorzüglich das werk* junger rustiger *männer mit elastischem leibe. Die Pentathlen zeichneten sich daher durch gleichmässige stärke der glieder, allseitige gewandtheit und körperlich harmonische bildung vor allen übrigen vortheilhaft aus, und werden daher vom Aristoteles als die schönsten Agonisten genannt.*' Krause, *Gymn. u. Agon. der Griechen*, Vol. I, p. 494, *abschn.* VI § 31. The exercise of the πένταθλον is therefore mentioned in the passage before us as belonging solely to the period of youth[1].

The πένταθλον consisted of five exercises as the name implies. These are enumerated in an epigram of Simonides, Anthol. 67 (73), Bergk, Fragm. Lyr. p. 791,

Ἴσθμια καὶ Πυθοῖ Διοφῶν ὁ Φίλωνος ἐνίκα
ἅλμα, ποδωκείην, δίσκον, ἄκοντα, πάλην,

and in an epigram of unknown authorship quoted by Eustath. ad Il. Ψ. p. 1320, Anthol. ἐπιγράμματα ἀδέσποτα CCCLIV,

ἅλμα ποδῶν, δίσκου τε βολή, καὶ ἄκοντος ἐρωή,
καὶ δρόμος, ἠδὲ παλή· μία δ' ἔπλετο πᾶσι τελευτή.

The same five are named in the Schol. on Pind. Isthm. I 35, and in the Schol. on Plat. Erast. c. 4. 135 D, πάλη, σίγυννος (i.e. ἄκων), ἅλμα, δίσκος, καὶ δρόμος. On the πένταθλον and its contents, see Krause, *Op. cit.* p. 476 seq. *abschn.* VI § 29.

Πυγμή, boxing, was therefore not included in the πένταθλον; and we are driven to suppose that the concluding words of § 14, ὁ δὲ πᾶσι πένταθλος, which certainly according to the ordinary laws of the interpretation of language ought to include it with the rest of the foregoing exercises, are one amongst many instances of Aristotle's carelessness in expressing himself, and affirm something which he could not really have meant. πᾶσι, if it can be said to have any meaning at all, must be understood simply to imply, that the πένταθλον combines in one the greatest number and variety of the single and separate exercises. Such is also the opinion of Krause, *Op. cit.* p. 258, n. 6. He observes that such a conclusion (as would naturally be drawn from the words of Arist.) is opposed to all the

[1] The πένταθλος however, though by the number and variety of his accomplishments he is superior to all other athletes, yet in regard of certain *special* excellences, as compared for instance with the runner or wrestler, he is only second rate. Plat. Erast. 135 E. The philosopher in the popular sense, Aristotle's πεπαιδευμένος, the man of universal attainments, is compared to the all-accomplished athlete. Ἆρ' ἐννοῶ οἷον λέγεις τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ εἰσὶν οἱ πένταθλοι πρὸς τοὺς δρομέας ἢ τοὺς παλαιστάς. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τούτων μὲν λείπονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἆθλα καὶ δεύτεροί εἰσι πρὸς τούτους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀθλητῶν πρῶτοι καὶ νικῶσιν αὐτούς.

πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς πολεμικούς, ἡδὺν δὲ εἶναι δοκεῖν μετὰ φοβερότητος· γέροντος δὲ πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς ἀναγκαίους ἱκανόν, ἄλυπον δὲ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὧν
12 τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται. ἰσχὺς δ' ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις τοῦ

notices which we find in the ancient writers. *Aristoteles konnte hier in bekannten dingen die mehr worte bedürfende deutlichkeit einer gedrungenen präcisen, und in gemessener gradation fortschreitender redeweise, welche ihm eigenthümlich ist, aufopfern, da ja doch jedem Hellenen die fünf bestandtheile des Pentathlon bekannt waren.*

ἀκμάζοντος δέ κ.τ.λ.] The simplest way of filling up the elliptical construction seems to be to supply κάλλος after ἀκμάζοντος, and γέροντος in the next clause, and πεφυκέναι from the *immediately preceding* πεφύκασιν after πολεμικούς in the former clause and ἱκανόν in the latter. The required sense may be equally well supplied by repeating (as Victorius) the first words of the sentence, ἀκμάζοντος δὲ (κάλλος) (τὸ) πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς πολεμικοὺς (χρήσιμον ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα); but the consideration of the immediate proximity of πεφύκασιν seems more in favour of the other.

ἱκανόν] fit for, strong enough for, capable of.

ἄλυπον] causing no pain, no painful impression or repulsion, in consequence of the absence of all the ordinary deformities or disfigurements incident to old age.

ὧν τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται] i. e. ἐκείνων ἃ τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται. This unusual and irregular form of attraction of the relative to the case of its antecedent, where, had the antecedent been expressed, the relative should have been the *nominative* to a succeeding verb, is exemplified by Matthiae, *Gr. Gr.* § 473, obs. 1, from Herod. I 68, οὐδέν κω εἰδότες τῶν ἦν..., Thuc. VII 67 ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν παρεσκεύασται. Add to these, Plat. Protag. 334 C ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέλλει ἔδεσθαι, de Rep. V 465 D, εὐδαιμονίζονται ἐκεῖνοι ὧν τούτοις ὑπάρχει. Dem. de Cor. p. 318, 19, § 277, οὐδ' ἐφ' ἃ συμφέρει τῇ πόλει χρῆται. And from Aristotle, this passage, and Rhet. I 2, 11, ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν. In Dem. c. Steph. p. 1116, περὶ ὧν μὴ κατηγόρηται λέγειν, which has been cited as an instance, κατηγόρηται is the irregular passive 'has been accused', and therefore περὶ ὧν need not be interpreted as περὶ ἐκείνων ἃ; it is for περὶ ἐκείνων περὶ ὧν. Another doubtful example is Eur. Med. 262, τὸν δόντα τ' αὐτῷ θυγατέρ', ἥν τ' ἐγήματο, where Seidler retains this (the v. l.), and regards ἥν as a case of attraction for αὐτὴν ᾗ. An analogous case of this kind of attraction is Sophocles' οἵας γ' ἐμοῦ, Trach. 443, for οἵα ἐγώ εἰμι.

§ 12. ἰσχύς] bodily strength, is defined, in a very superficial and perfunctory manner, with a special view to strength in personal encounter—as appears in the several forms it takes, though it is afterwards more definitely expressed in ἀγωνιστικὴ ἀρετή—as the power of moving some one else (ἕτερον may possibly be neuter, *something* else, anything whatsoever), by pulling, or pushing, or lifting (possibly referring to the encounter of Herakles with Antaeus, who showed his great strength by 'lifting' him off the ground into the air; or, if ἕτερον be neuter, by lifting any heavy weight), or squeezing, or crushing; which seems to be intended for

κινεῖν ἕτερον ὡς βούλεται, ἀνάγκη δὲ κινεῖν ἕτερον ἢ ἕλκοντα ἢ ὠθοῦντα ἢ αἴροντα ἢ πιέζοντα ἢ συνθλίβοντα, ὥστε ὁ ἰσχυρὸς ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τούτων τισίν
13 ἐστιν ἰσχυρός. μεγέθους δὲ ἀρετὴ τὸ ὑπερέχειν κατὰ μῆκος καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτος τῶν πολλῶν τοσούτῳ μείζονι ὥστε μὴ βραδυτέρας ποιεῖν τὰς κινήσεις διὰ
14 τὴν ὑπερβολήν. ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ σώματος ἀρετὴ σύγκειται ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ ἰσχύος καὶ τάχους· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς ἰσχυρός ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δυνάμενος τὰ σκέλη ῥιπτεῖν

a complete analysis of the different ways in which a person or thing can be 'moved' by another.

§ 13. *μείζονι*] agrees with *τινί* understood after *ἀρετή*: the accusative *μείζονα*, with *τινά* understood in *τὸ ὑπερέχειν*, would be more usual. Two MSS read *μείζονα*. 'Excellence in size' implies superiority over the average (people in general), in length (height), depth (thickness), and breadth, but only (superior) to such an extent as not to impede the motions (of the body) by the excess (of size), lit. to one being only so much greater as not to make the body's motions (slower than they otherwise would be, or than they ought to be, i.e.) *too* slow. *Μῆκος*, *βάθος*, and *πλάτος* are the three dimensions of space; but it is not quite certain how they are applied here to the proportions of the human body; *μῆκος or βάθος* might possibly represent the abstract height. I have taken *μῆκος* in this sense here because it is found in Homer to represent the 'stature' of a man, and *μάκιστος* for 'tallest'. Odys. λ'. 309, Otus and Ephialtes, *οὓς δὴ μακίστους θρέψε ζείδωρος ἄρουρα*, and 312, *ἀτὰρ μῆκός γε γενέσθην ἐννεόργυιοι*. υ'. 71, of the daughters of Pandareus, *μῆκος δ' ἔπορ' Ἄρτεμις ἁγνή*, and in Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. II 5, *εἰς μῆκος αὐξάνεσθαι τὰ σώματα*. *Μῆκος* therefore is the man's height, *πλάτος* the breadth of the body, measuring from right to left, and *βάθος* the depth or thickness, measuring in the direction backwards and forwards. *Βάθος*, though it can be applied to *vertical* measure, up and down, yet as in the ordinary language it represents only what is *below* us, and not what is *above*, could hardly be applied to the more than average stature of a *tall* man.

§ 14. *ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ ἰσχύος*] for boxing and wrestling; *τάχους*, for the foot-race.

καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς ἰσχυρός ἐστιν] seems to be added as a mere passing observation, or note upon *τάχους*: and the *γάρ*, which implies that this clause gives a reason for the preceding, must therefore be regarded as due to mere carelessness of writing, there being no logical connexion between the two sentences. (If there were any such connexion between the two, the meaning could only be, that the relation of strength and speed as *genus* and *species*, speed being only a variety of strength, is the reason for the introduction of *τάχος* into the list of agonistic virtues: the *fact* being that this could only be a reason for omitting it.)

ῥίπτειν iacere, *ῥιπτεῖν iactare*, of a repeated action. Hermann ad Aiac.

πως καὶ κινεῖν ταχὺ καὶ πόρρω δρομικός, ὁ δὲ θλίβειν καὶ κατέχειν παλαιστικός, ὁ δὲ ὦσαι τῇ πληγῇ πυκτικός, ὁ δ' ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις παγκρατιαστικός, ὁ δὲ πᾶσι πένταθλος. εὐγηρία δ' ἐστὶ βραδυτὴς γήρως μετ' ἀλυπίας· οὔτε γὰρ εἰ ταχὺ γηράσκει, εὔγη- p. 19.

235, Trach. 776. See also Lobeck, Aj. 239, p. 177[1]. This distinction, which has been doubted by some scholars, is now I believe generally accepted. At all events it applies very well here, where the simple notion of flinging or hurling, once for all, from you, as a stone, would be quite inappropriate to the motion of the legs intended to be described. ῥιπτεῖν τὰ σκέλη is to 'toss about' or 'swing the legs', backwards and forwards, again and again.

κινεῖν πόρρω] 'to take long strides'.

ὦσαι τῇ πληγῇ] in boxing, to push or thrust away from you by the blow, so as *aliquem de statu deicere;* as when you knock a man down.

ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις] These two last, boxing and wrestling; not running. Supply therefore, in explanation of ἀμφοτέροις, θλίβειν καὶ κατέχειν, καὶ ὦσαι τῇ πληγῇ δυνάμενος. Victorius (and also Krause, u. s., p. 534, n. 1) quotes Plut. Symp. 4, ὅτι γὰρ μέμικται τὸ παγκράτιον ἔκ τε πυγμῆς καὶ πάλης, δῆλον, and Quint. Inst. Orat. II 8, 13, as confirming Aristotle's statement. Other ancient authorities are given in Krause's notes.

On the *pancratium*, and the size, strength, and skill required by those who engaged in it, see Krause, u. s. p. 534—538, *abschn.* VI § 41.

Compare with the four preceding sections the following passage of Plato on the use of athletic exercises. Legg. VIII 832 E seq. ἔστι γοῦν πάντων πολεμικώτατον ἡ σώματος ὀξύτης πάντως, ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ποδῶν, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν· φυγεῖν μὲν καὶ ἑλεῖν ἡ τῶν ποδῶν, ἡ δὲ ἐν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς (the παγκράτιον, and especially wrestling) μάχη καὶ σύστασις ἰσχύος καὶ ῥώμης δεομένη.

§ 15. εὐγηρία] supr. § 4, 'fortunate old age, good fortune or happiness in old age'.

βραδυτής] 'tardiness', i.e. slow approach or progress.

εὔγηρως] occurs under the form εὔγηρος in Hippocrates, and Ar. Hist. Anim. IX 12, 3.

[1] Lobeck in his elaborate dissertation on the question seems to leave the matter in doubt; and no doubt, from the uncertainty of the MSS readings, the distinction of the two forms of the verb being shewn in most cases merely by the difference of accent, it is difficult to decide in any particular case which of the two forms is to be preferred: and Lobeck shews by examples that (so far as the reading is to be depended on) the same notion of the verb is expressed indifferently by either form. At the same time in the somewhat obscure summing up at the conclusion of his note, he seems (as I understand him) to be in favour, as a general principle, of the hypothesis, that a difference of form in the termination of a verb radically the same (he cites ἴλλω or εἴλλω and its numerous varieties as a remarkable instance) *does* express a corresponding variety in the signification; as in the instance given, the various terminations correspond to different varieties of the general notion of 'rolling'.

ρως, οὔτ' εἰ μόγις μὲν λυπηρῶς δέ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν καὶ τύχης· μὴ ἄνοσος γὰρ ὢν μηδὲ ἰσχυρὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἀπαθής, οὐδ' ἄλυπος καὶ πολυχρόνιος [οὔτ'] ἄνευ τύχης διαμείνειεν ἄν. ἔστι δέ τις καὶ χωρὶς ἰσχύος καὶ ὑγιείας ἄλλη δύναμις μακροβιότητος· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν μακρόβιοί εἰσιν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἡ ἀκριβολογία
16 χρήσιμος ἡ περὶ τούτων εἰς τὰ νῦν. πολυφιλία δὲ καὶ χρηστοφιλία οὐκ ἄδηλα τοῦ φίλου ὡρισμένου, ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος ὅς τις, ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθὰ εἶναι

ἄνευ τύχης] in Muretus' excellent emendation of v. l. *ἂν εὐτυχής*.

ἔστι δέ τις κ.τ.λ.] The causes of length and shortness of life in plants and animals are further investigated in the little treatise *περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος*, in the collection of tracts called the *Parva Naturalia*, appended to the work *περὶ ψυχῆς*. They all belong to the 'Physical' department of philosophy. *π. μ. καὶ βρ.* I § 4.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἡ ἀκριβολογία κ.τ.λ.] Nice, exact, or scientific analysis and the treatment of a subject in minute detail, are out of place in a rhetorical treatise. Any further details on the subject of longevity would be useless to the rhetorician. On the various senses of *ἀκρίβεια*, see Grant on Eth. Nic. I 7, 18: and on the mode of handling a subject appropriate to Rhetoric, Introd. on the 'materials of Rhetoric', p. 11—14.

§ 16. *ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος κ.τ.λ.*] 'all such are friends, as, when they think anything good for some particular person' (*ἐκείνῳ*, some one in particular, *that* particular person, whoever it may be) 'are inclined to do it for his sake'. In this definition, friendship or love is described as a state of mind, a moral habit or disposition, not as a natural affection. The desire of doing our friend good for his own sake is a necessary accompaniment and consequence of the feeling or affection, but not identical with it. The definition is 'rhetorical', and does not give the 'essence' of the thing, as a scientific definition would. The definition of *φιλία* as a *πάθος*, II 4, 2, is in exact conformity with this, and equally deficient. In the Ethics, VIII 2, after quoting some of the ordinary current notions of love to be found in the preceding poets and philosophers, he proceeds to the establishment of his own. And here again the same conception of it reappears in the words *τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα*. Accordingly *φιλία* is *εὔνοια ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι*, *reciprocal* goodwill or affection; the reciprocity being essential to true *φιλία* or affection of two human beings to one another. For though we may be 'fond' of wine, *φίλοινος*, or 'fond' of animals, there is in these cases no true reciprocity of affection. Further, since 'fondness' is applicable to three classes of objects, the good, the pleasant, and the useful, three classes of corresponding 'friendships' or 'fondnesses' are hereby determined; but only the first of them, the love of the good, is the basis of true and perfect love; and consequently

ἐκείνῳ, πρακτικός ἐστιν αὐτῶν δι' ἐκεῖνον. ᾧ δὴ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι, πολύφιλος, ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρες,
17 χρηστόφιλος. εὐτυχία δ' ἐστίν, ὧν ἡ τύχη ἀγαθῶν P. 1362.
αἰτία, ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα. αἰτία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη ἐνίων

the highest and perfect form of 'love' can only exist between the good, *τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τἀγαθ', ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ᾗ ἀγαθοί· ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὑτούς*, c. 4, init. In the concluding definition of c. 2, the *feeling* or loving *disposition* is introduced in the word *εὐνοεῖν. δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας δι' ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.* These *τὰ εἰρημένα* are the three objects of affection. This is therefore the *general* conception of love according to Aristotle. The highest form of *human* love or friendship would be *εὐνοεῖν...διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν.*

ἐπιεικεῖς] Note on c. 2 § 4, p. 30.

§ 17. *εὐτυχία*] 'good fortune or luck', accidental, transitory, fragmentary, is opposed to *εὐδαιμονία*, complete, permanent, substantial happiness, the essence of which resides in its *αὐτάρκεια* or independence of all accidental and external conditions. Eth. Nic. I 5 (Bekk.), 1097 *b* 6 seq. X 7, 1176 *a* 27 (on *θεωρητική* as the highest happiness). Polit. IV (VII), 1, 1323 *b* 23, *μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὃς εὐδαίμων μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ δι' αὑτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέραν εἶναι· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον ταὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη, δίκαιος δ' οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ σώφρων ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἐστί.* Eur. Med. 1229, *ὄλβου δ' ἐπιρρυέντος εὐτυχέστερος ἄλλου γένοιτ' αν ἄλλος, εὐδαίμων δ' ἂν οὔ*, where Paley quotes, Troad. 509, *τῶν δ' εὐδαιμόνων μηδένα νομίζετ' εὐτυχεῖν πρὶν ἂν θάνῃ*, explaining the distinction; and Androm. 420, *ἧσσον μὲν ἀλγεῖ δυστυχῶν δ' εὐδαιμονεῖ.*

ἡ τύχη αἰτία] On Aristotle's conception of *τύχη* as 'a cause', with further details, see Introd. Appendix C to Bk. I c. 10, p. 218—224. On this passage, p. 223.

γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν] 'acquisition *or* possession'. *καί* in this and similar cases is properly rendered by 'or'. Aristotle frequently expresses as a combination two things which are not actually, but only hypothetically, combined in the conception, which we therefore more correctly represent as an alternative.

αἰτία ἡ τύχη ἐνίων ὧν καὶ αἱ τέχναι] 'Simplicius, ad Phys. II p. 73, 6, inter alia haec habet: *καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν δὲ ἔνιοι πάντα σχεδὸν εἰς τὴν τύχην ἄγουσιν, ὥστε καὶ τῆς τέχνης οἰκείαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖν, λέγοντες, τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην* (Agathon ap. Ar. Eth. Nic. VI 4[1]). *τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα δὲ καὶ φρονεῖν φασι* (Eur. Fragm. Inc. 204). *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁρῶμεν ἔνια τῶν ἀπὸ τέχνης γινομένων καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα· καὶ γὰρ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τέχνης· διψήσας γὰρ καὶ πιών τις ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ γέγονεν*

[1] *καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτά ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησί, τέχνη τύχην, κ.τ.λ.*

μὲν ὧν καὶ αἱ τέχναι, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνων, οἷον ὅσων ἡ φύσις· ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι· ὑγιείας μὲν γὰρ τέχνη αἰτία, κάλλους δὲ καὶ μεγέθους φύσις. ὅλως δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τύχης, ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος. ἔστι δε καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγον ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη, οἷον εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι αἰσχροὶ ἀδελφοί, ὁ δὲ καλός, ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι μὴ εἶδον τὸν θησαυρόν, ὁ δ' εὗρεν, ἢ εἰ τοῦ πλησίον ἔτυχε τὸ βέλος, τούτου δὲ μή, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἦλθε μόνος ἀεὶ φοιτῶν, οἱ δὲ

ὑγιής.' These are illustrated in the text by two examples; health, which may be due to chance as well as art; and beauty and strength, to chance as well as nature.

ἀτέχνων] 'independent of art'.

οἷον ὅσων ἡ φύσις] The contradiction between this and the statements in the scientific Physics is pointed out in the Introd., u. s., p. 223.

ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι] Most probably a mere occasional and parenthetical note, according to the usual practice of this author (comp. § 14), 'chance may give rise not only to things natural and independent of nature, but also to things unnatural, monstrous, or abnormal', *τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τέρατα*: on which see the reff. in Introd. p. 225. Compare the def. of *φύσις* in I 10, 13, *δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων*, i.e. *τῶν παρὰ φύσιν*. In this case the colon should be retained after *εἶναι*, the connexion being carried on from *οἷον ὅσων ἡ φύσις* to *ὑγιείας μέν κ.τ.λ.* as examples, *ὧν αἱ τέχναι, καὶ ἡ φύσις αἰτία*, and the *note* parenthetical.

Bonitz, however, *Aristotel. Stud.* I 87, would alter the punctuation, placing a comma at *εἶναι*, and connecting this clause closely with the preceding, in the sense, 'of which the cause is nature, but (which) may be also contrary to nature': regarding this as an instance of the Aristotelian custom of 'not repeating the relative in the second of two co-ordinated members', illustrated by Waitz, Organ. 25 *b* 35, and certainly common enough in our author. This is further supported by Muretus, who translates, 'quae natura efficiuntur, ita tamen ut etiam praeter naturam evenire possint.'

The words quoted above from I 10, 3, seem to me to be in favour of the former interpretation: and the practice of introducing 'notes' of this kind is at least as common with Aristotle as that which is noticed by Bonitz.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγον ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη] Phys. 197 *a* 18, *καὶ τὸ φάναι εἶναί τι παράλογον τὴν τύχην ὀρθῶς· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἢ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἢ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἡ δὲ τύχη ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις παρὰ ταῦτα· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἀόριστα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἡ τύχη ἀόριστος.* See further in Introd. p. 221.

τοῦ πλησίον] (*ὄντος, ἱσταμένου*), 'one's next neighbour', as *ὁ πέλας*. In Plat. Theaet. 174 C, it is distinguished from *γείτων*, *ὁ πλήσιον καὶ ὁ γείτων*, having a more extended and general sense, 'a fellow-creature'.

ἢ εἰ μὴ ἦλθε μόνος ἀεὶ φοιτῶν κ.τ.λ.] 'Or if one who was in the constant

ἅπαξ ἐλθόντες διεφθάρησαν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐτυχήματα δοκεῖ εἶναι.

18 περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐπείπερ οἰκειότατος ὁ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους τόπος, ὅταν περὶ ἐπαίνου ποιώμεθα τὸν λόγον, τότε διοριστέον.

1 ὧν μὲν οὖν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι προτρέποντα ὡς ἐσο- CHAP. VI.
μένων ἢ ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ ὧν ἀποτρέποντα, φανερόν· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τούτων ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον, βουλεύονται δὲ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν, ληπτέον ἂν εἴη στοιχεῖα περὶ
2 ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἁπλῶς. ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθὸν p. 20.

habit of visiting a certain place' (φοιτᾶν, to go backwards and forwards, ever and anon, repeatedly, to frequent, haunt) 'was the only one that failed to go (on some particular occasion), whilst those that went only once (ἅπαξ, once for all) all perished'. It is possible that this sense of repetition in the verbal termination ᾶν may be the origin of the other signification of 'disease' illustrated on the word πνευστιᾶν, c. 2 § 18 p. 45. A too-frequently repeated action might very well be interpreted as a diseased habit.

§ 18. ὅταν περὶ ἐπαίνου κ.τ.λ.] i. e. in c. 9 of this book, the chapter on the topics of encomium and censure, proper to the encomiastic or epideictic branch of Rhetoric.

CHAP. VI.

On the purport of this chapter, its principal divisions, and connexion with the general plan of the work, see Introd. p. 177.

§ 1. ἢ ὑπαρχόντων] On this addition over and above the theory, see note on c. 3 § 4; and Introd. p. 120.

βουλεύονται δὲ...τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος] Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 *b* 12, βουλευόμεθα δὲ οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. (This is because the means are within our own power to attain, the ends are not. βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρακτῶν, 1112 *a* 31, ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν...περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, Ib. line 12, and this is afterwards repeated.) Οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι, κ.τ.λ. Ib. *b* 34, οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

στοιχεῖα] i.e. τόπους, the 'Elements', the primary topics of the subject 'good'. See Introd. p. 127, 8.

ἁπλῶς] See note on p. 30, c. 2 § 4. The sense in which ἁπλῶς is here intended is evidently that of good in general, as a general or abstract

ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα ᾖ αἱρετόν, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἄλλο

conception, opposed to καθ' ἕκαστον special and particular goods. Schrader's rendering *extra comparationem*, if it means, as it seems to do, 'absolute good', 'good in itself', opposed to 'relative' or 'human good'—that which *cannot be compared with*, i.e. has no relation to, any other kind of good, but exists in itself independently—is certainly wrong. 'Absolute good' can have no place in a rhetorical system or in the practice of the rhetorician; such a definition would be in direct violation of the principle so often laid down by Aristotle, that the rhetorical method must be in conformity with the materials of the art, of a popular and practical character, adapted to the understanding of an unlearned and unscientific audience. This is especially the case with definitions. See Introd. p. 12, 13. The general notion of good is first considered in §§ 1—3, and then this is applied and illustrated in particulars in the remainder of the chapter.

§ 2. ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθὸν κ.τ.λ.] The 'popular' character of these definitions is marked by the introductory ἔστω, 'let it be taken for granted'; no demonstration is required, any current notion of good will serve our purpose. The same phraseology occurs again in a similar case, c. 7 § 2, ἔστω δὴ ὑπέρεχον κ.τ.λ.: c. 5 § 3, and 10 § 3.

First, 'Good is anything that is in itself and for its own sake desirable (an object of choice), and that for whose sake we choose something else (which is the ulterior end of our preference for anything); and that which is the universal aim, either of everything or' (as a qualification to exclude inanimate things) 'everything that has sensation or reason, or (would be their aim) if they were to *acquire* the reasoning faculty' (supposing they have it not yet, as infants and beasts). Comp. c. 7 § 21, ὁ λαβόντα τὰ πράγματα (anything) φρόνησιν ἕλοιτ' ἂν ἕκαστον[1].

The first of these two definitions, which represents Good as desirable in and for itself, and as *that* to obtain which we choose something else, is in fact identical with the second which describes it as the ultimate end or aim of all action and desire, only differing from it in terms. Every thing that we choose or desire, and every act that we perform, is as the means to one universal end, the Good. This view of the nature of Good is laid down and illustrated in the first chapter of the Nic. Eth. πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο (it is a current, popular, definition of) τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται—εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο (the means to the universal end) καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα, (there is *something*, i.e. Good, which we desire only for itself,)...δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, and so on. Comp. c. 5. Similarly at the commencement of the Politics, we find that this is the end of states as well as individuals, because τοῦ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ

[1] Schrader quotes Cic. de Fin. I 11, *non est igitur voluptas bonum. Hoc ne statuam quidem dicturam pater aiebat, si loqui posset.* v. 14, *earum etiam rerum quas terra gignit educatio quaedam et perfectio est—ut ipsae vites, si loqui possent, ita se tractandas tuendasque esse faterentur.* Add Aesch. Agam. 37, οἶκος δ' αὐτὸς εἰ φθογγὴν λάβοι σαφέστατ' ἂν λέξειεν. Eur. Iph. Taur. 51.

αἱρούμεθα, καὶ οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν, ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν· καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἑκάστῳ ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον νοῦς ἀποδίδωσιν ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθόν, καὶ

χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες. Comp. III 12, init. Metaph. B 2, 996 *a* 23—26, A 3, 983 *a* 31, *τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τἀγαθόν.*

The same view of the nature of Good is to be found equally in Plato, from whom Aristotle may have derived it. See, for instance, Phileb. 53 E, seq. particularly 54 C, where good is proved to be the *οὗ ἕνεκα*, or universal end. Sympos. 205 A, where happiness, which consists in the possession of good, is similarly represented. Gorg. 499 E, *τέλος εἶναι ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκεν δεῖν πάντα τἆλλα πράττεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων.* Euthyd. c. 8, 278 E, seq.

καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς κ.τ.λ.] 'And all that reason in general, or universal reason, would assign to each of us, and all that the individual reason assigns to each of us, *that* is good to every human being'. That is, all that this supreme or universal reason or the particular reason of each individual, would assign as suitable to each; the former what is good for all alike, the latter what is good for each particular individual; since these sometimes differ: or, as Schrader interprets it, the universal reason that dictates *general* principles or rules of action, as contrasted with *ὁ νοῦς ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον*, *mens quae de singularibus decernit*, which decides in special and individual cases. The reason as an agent is here opposed to mere nature, or to a blind natural impulse; the choice of good is a reasonable choice, good is what reason universal or individual would necessarily choose. (*νοῦς* stands here in a *general* sense for the special faculty or part of it *φρόνησις*[1], the practical reason, the calculating discursive and moral part of the intellect, which directs us in our choice between good and evil. In Eth. Nic. VI, *νοῦς* in its proper sense, the intuitive and speculative reason, is distinguished from the *διάνοια* or discursive intellect, and its special virtue *φρόνησις* or practical wisdom).

'Or *that*, by the presence of which anything (not only man in soul and body, but also things inanimate) is put in a healthy or proper condition (is made what it ought to be, what is best for it to be) and made self-sufficing (independent of all external conditions), and self-sufficiency or independence in general'. On *αὐτάρκεια* see note on § 3 of Chapter V, p. 74, *αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς.* It is thus briefly defined Pol. IV (VII) 5, init. *τὸ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηθενός.*

'Or any thing that is productive or preservative of (tends to produce or preserve) things of that sort, or that which is attended by such, or things that have a tendency to prevent and destroy the opposites of these'. These forms of good belong to a lower order, subordinate to *τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ ἀγαθά*, as means to the end. Eth. Nic. I 4, 1096 *b* 10, *λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἓν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον.*

1 This is actually substituted for *νοῦς* in the corresponding passages c. 7 § 21.

οὗ παρόντος εὖ διάκειται καὶ αὐτάρκως ἔχει, καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ φυλακτικὸν τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ κωλυτικὰ
3 τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικά. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἅμα ἢ ὕστερον, οἷον τῷ μὲν μανθάνειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ὕστερον, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν ἅμα. καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τριχῶς, τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ὑγιείας,

§ 3. *ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ διχῶς*] 'the term *attending upon* admits of two different senses, either simultaneous (attendance, accompaniment) or subsequent (consequence), as knowledge attends on learning subsequently, but life on health simultaneously[1]'. *ἀκολουθεῖν* and *ἕπεσθαι* are both used in logic to denote not merely something that follows, a 'consequence' in the ordinary acceptation of the words, but also an invariable or necessary attendant or concomitant in five different senses: (1) a *preceding* concomitant, or antecedent, Top. Γ 2, 117 *a* 11, *καὶ γὰρ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἕπεται*, as learning is always preceded by ignorance; Categ. c. 12, *πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται τετραχῶς...δεύτερον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, οἷον τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο πρότερον· δυοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθὺς τὸ ἓν εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.* (2) a *simultaneous* concomitant, *ἅμα*: as health and life, Rhet. I 6, 3; 7, 5. (3) a *subsequent* concomitant, or 'consequent', *ὕστερον*, as learning is followed by knowledge, Rhet. ll. cc. (4) *δυνάμει*, a virtual concomitant, *by implication*, as sacrilege necessarily implies, includes *potentially* or virtually the notion of theft or fraud, by the rule *omne maius continet in se minus;* and (5) *reciprocal contradictories* regarded as consequents, Top. B 8, 113 *b* 25, *ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἀκολούθησις*, or *ἀντικατηγορουμένως*, where two terms or propositions are 'convertible', *ἀντιστρέφει*: such are *ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον*, and *τὸ μὴ ζῷον οὐκ ἄνθρωπος*: *τὸ μὴ ἡδὺ οὐ καλὸν*, and *τὸ καλὸν ἡδύ*. It seems from this as if the primary sense of *ἀκολουθεῖν* were to attend or wait upon, and that that of 'following' is a special and secondary signification under the general notion of accompaniment. Hence *ἀκόλουθος* becomes *pedissequus*, a constant attendant, footman, or 'follower'. The 'simultaneous' kind of accompaniment appears also in this word sometimes even in the ordinary language, as when Plato writes, Menex. 249 D, *ἀκολούθει μετ' ἐμοῦ*, Lach. 187 D, *μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκολουθῶν*: and similarly Demosthenes and the Orators; and Xenophon joins it with *σύν*. Diog. Laert. VII § 125, *τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν*, of the Stoics. Plutarch, de Repugn. Stoic. c. 27, p. 1045 E, attributes the same doctrine in the same words to Chrysippus.

καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τριχῶς] This triple division of productive causes or conditions is thus explained by Majoragius. 'Ponit tres species rerum conficientium quae ita distingui possunt. Quae conficiunt, aut sunt a

[1] So Quintilian, Inst. Orat. V 10. 75. *Sed haec* consequentia *dico, ἀκόλουθα*; *est enim consequens sapientiae bonitas: illa* sequentia, *παρεπόμενα*, *quae postea facta sunt aut futura...hoc temporis, illud naturae.*

τὰ δὲ ὡς σιτία ὑγιείας, τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι, ὅτι
4 ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ποιεῖ ὑγίειαν. τούτων δὲ κειμένων ἀνάγκη τάς τε λήψεις τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθὰς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τῶν κακῶν ἀποβολάς· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ μὲν τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὸ κακὸν ἅμα, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν
5 ὕστερον. καὶ ἡ ἀντ' ἐλάττονος ἀγαθοῦ μείζονος λῆψις καὶ ἀντὶ μείζονος κακοῦ ἐλάττονος· ᾧ γὰρ ὑπερ- P. 1362 b.

natura, h. e. intrinsecus, aut extrinsecus adhibentur. A natura sunt, ut temperies humorum, et bona corporis constitutio, conficiens est bonae valetudinis. Quae extrinsecus adhibentur aut sunt tanquam instrumenta, aut sunt actiones; instrumenta, ut cibaria:...actiones, ut exercitatio corporis, et deambulatio, quae frequenter bonam valetudinem efficit.' This account, though correct in the main, requires a little further explanation and modification. The ground of the distinction of the first of the three classes, of which the illustration is *τὸ ὑγιαίνειν*, the healthy state of body, active, actual health, as produced by *ὑγιεία*, health in itself, we learn from two passages of the Nic. Eth. First, VI 13, 1144 *a* 4, *ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν (αὗται αἱ ἀρεταὶ) οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα.* Here *ὑγίεια* itself represents the formal cause of health, which is internal and essential (*μέρος, ἔχεσθαι*), and developes, quickens, and stimulates the bodily functions into healthy activity, gives health an active reality (*ἐνεργεῖ*), and is therefore contrasted with the efficient, and *external* cause, the physician, who, as the Paraphrast on the parallel passage, X 4, says, *συντηρεῖ καὶ φυλάττει, καὶ ὅπως παραμείνῃ ζητεῖ.* The second passage, X 4, 1174 *b* 25, is again an illustration: *οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τόπον ἥ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἴτιά ἐστι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν*: on which the Paraphrast's (Andronicus Rhodius) commentary is, *ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴ ποιεῖ μὴ οὖσα* (i. e. *ἐνέργεια*, not 'non-existent') *τὴν τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἐνέργειαν, ὁ δὲ συντηρεῖ κ.τ.λ.* as before. The second and third divisions represent two kinds of extraneous causes or conditions, distinguished from this formal, intrinsic cause. These are first, necessary conditions, as of health, represented by food; and secondly, probable conditions, as exercise, which, as Aristotle adds, only produces health *ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*.

§ 4. We now proceed to the application or illustration of the general principles laid down in the three first sections, which continues to the end of the chapter; *τούτων δὲ κειμένων κ.τ.λ.* Application of the two topics of 'consequents', *ἅμα* and *ὕστερον ἀκολουθεῖν*: the receipt of all good things is an instance of the latter, because it is *followed* by the possession of good things; and the loss or riddance of evil things, which is accompanied *simultaneously* by the relief from what is bad, exemplifies the former. This latter conclusion rests upon the principle, here understood, but stated in § 18, *ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν.* Comp. also Top. Γ 2, 117 *b* 2, on *λήψεις* and *ἀποβολαί*.

§ 5. *ᾧ γὰρ ὑπερέχει κ.τ.λ.*] 'for the amount of the excess of the greater

ἔχει τὸ μεῖζον τοῦ ἐλάττονος, τοῦτο γίνεται τοῦ μὲν
6 λῆψις τοῦ δ' ἀποβολή. καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δὲ ἀνάγκη
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας εὖ τε διάκεινται οἱ
ἔχοντες, καὶ ποιητικαὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ πρακτικαί.
7 περὶ ἑκάστης δέ, καὶ τίς καὶ ποία, χωρὶς ῥητέον. καὶ
τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· πάντα γὰρ ἐφίεται τὰ ζῷα

over the less, the same is the measure of the gain of the one (good) and the loss of the other (evil)'. γίνεται, 'becomes', i. e. 'amounts to'. The excess of the greater over the lesser good, and the excess of the greater over the lesser evil, is the measure of the gain in the one case, and the loss in the other; the loss of the *evil* being a gain, by the same rule as before, ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν.

§ 6. ποιητικαὶ...καὶ πρακτικαί] virtues, besides being 'productive of good', like many other things, have also this special peculiarity, that they are effective of good by *action*. The distinction is, that whereas ποιεῖν tends to some ἔργον or substantial enduring result, as a picture, or statue, or other work of art, the end of πράττειν is action itself, and there is no further result. See the commencement of the Nic. Eth., and what is there said about these two τέλη. Ethics and Rhetoric are πρακτικαὶ τέχναι, the arts of the painter and statuary ποιητικαί. Compare Introd. pp. 16—19. By the distinction here taken we find brought into view the specially 'practical' character of the virtues, which, like the art that describes them, end in action: though besides this, *some* of the virtues, at any rate, produce lasting effect, and leave results beyond the mere performance of the act, some *positive benefit* (as an ἔργον) to an individual or the community. But the words here distinguished are elsewhere employed indifferently to express generally the power of producing an effect or result, as appears in the comparison of 5 §§ 3, 16; 6 § 2. Of the two, ποιητικός is most frequently used in the expression of this conception, as may be seen in the following sections.

All moral virtues must necessarily be each a form of good: for they produce a good moral habit, or condition, or constitution in those that possess them, and are besides productive (and effective) of good in their actions and the results of these.

'Each of them, its substance or true nature' (the first Category, τί ἐστί, οὐσία, substance what the thing is, really and essentially), 'and qualities' (the third Category), 'must be treated separately, χωρίς, apart'. This is done in c. 9. The contents of the chapter to which reference is here made shew that ἀρεταί are here confined to the ἠθικαί or moral virtues, the 'virtues' *par excellence*, and do not include physical, or any other, 'excellences'.

§ 7. καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι] What is here taken for granted, as universally admitted, that pleasure is good (though not necessarily *the* good) is in both the treatises on pleasure, in the 6th and 10th books of the Nicomachean Ethics, carefully investigated and discussed, and the opinions held upon the question by preceding philosophers, as Eudoxus

αὐτῆς τῇ φύσει. ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς ποιητικά, τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ αἱρετά ἐστιν.

8 ὡς δὲ καθ' ἓν εἰπεῖν, ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τάδε. εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν καὶ αὔταρκες,

and Plato, examined, Bk. VII, c. 12, seq. and X, c. 2. Aristotle's conclusion (in Bk. X) is that though pleasure may be regarded as good it is not *the* good, i.e. the supreme good, good in itself, because there are *some* pleasures which are not proper objects of choice and therefore not good. Eudemus (if the seventh book be his), seems rather to be inclined to the contrary view; it is said at any rate, c. 14, init., ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι, and three lines further, ἄριστον τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονήν τινα εἶναι. And at the beginning of c. 13, in answer to Plato's objection in the Philebus, we find, ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. This difference of view between the master and pupil (on the supposition that Eudemus is the author of Bk. VII) is in fact in exact conformity with the difference of their respective definitions of pleasure; Aristotle defining it as the perfecting (τελείωσις) of the ἐνέργεια, but not our ἐνέργεια itself, and therefore not 'the supreme good'; whilst Eudemus goes further and describes it as an 'unimpeded energy', ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια: and in fact this variation may be regarded as one of the principal arguments for the difference of authorship of the two treatises on pleasure in the Nic. Eth. The principle upon which the fact is here assumed in the Rhetoric, is stated in both treatises of the Ethics; the universal recognition, namely, of the principle that pleasure is desirable. See VII 14 init. and X 2, 1172 *b* 35, οἱ δ' ἐνιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν· ὃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἶναι φαμέν.

τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα τὰ δέ κ.τ.λ.] This division of καλόν brings into view the physical and moral aspects of it united in the term beauty and right. καλόν as ἡδύ, an object of pleasure, is the physical beauty that pleases in nature and art; in καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετόν we are referred to the moral side of it, that which is 'fair' and right, which is an end in itself, in itself desirable, and to be sought on its own account and with no ulterior object. It is defined in this latter sense, c. 9, 3, ὃ ἂν δι' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ὂν ἐπαινετὸν ᾖ, (its being the object of 'praise' confers upon it its *moral* character) ἢ ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἡδὺ ᾖ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν. Comp. II 13, 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁπλῶς. Eth. Eudem. VII 15, 3, 1248 *b* 18, τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων τέλη ἐστιν, ἃ αὐτὰ αὑτῶν ἕνεκά ἐστιν αἱρετά. τούτων δὲ καλά, ὅσα δι' αὑτὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπαινετά ἐστιν. On the καλόν as a moral end, the ultimate object and motive of human action, to which all action should be directed and all lower interests sacrificed, see the fine passage of Eth. Nic. IX 8, 1169 *a* 6, seq., particularly 20—27.

§ 8. ὡς δὲ καθ' ἓν εἰπεῖν] 'to describe good things singly', in detail, by an enumeration of particular kinds of good.

εὐδαιμονία] happiness, the universal τέλος, aim and end of life and

9 καὶ ἕνεκα αὐτοῦ πολλὰ αἱρούμεθα. δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ
10 αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ τοιαῦται ἕξεις· ἀρεταὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς. καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ κάλλος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἀρεταὶ γὰρ σώμα-

action. See especially Eth. Nic. I 5, where happiness is defined by its three principal characteristics; it must be *τέλειον, αὔταρκες, τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος*. These same characteristics appear in the definition here given in the Rhetoric: *τέλειον* corresponds to *τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετόν*, its perfection or completeness being chiefly shewn in its desirability for its own sake. Eth. N. I 5, 1097 *b* 31, *τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἱρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὑτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἱρετῶν, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ· ταύτην γὰρ αἱρούμεθα ἀεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἱρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτὰ...αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο*: note on c. 5 § 1, p. 72. On *αὐτάρκεια*, the second characteristic of happiness, see c. 5 § 3, and note there, p. 74. The sentences of Eth. Nic. I 5, following those already quoted, are upon this same subject. The concluding summary of the contents of the chapter is, *τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος*, which gives the third of the conditions in the Rhetoric. A precisely similar description of happiness is found in Eth. Nic. X, cc. 6 and 7.

§ 9. The list of virtues here given is very incomplete, and a mere extract or sample of that given in the Nic. Eth. II 7, which is itself anything but a complete or satisfactory enumeration of them. A longer list is to be found in c. 9 § 5, which includes the two intellectual virtues, *σοφία* and *φρόνησις*, but still omits several of those which are distinguished in the table of the Ethics. All the virtues here mentioned are analyzed in detail in Eth. N. III, IV, V, justice being treated separately at great length in the fifth book.

ἕξις, the *genus* of the definition of virtue, is an acquired, developed, confirmed habit or state, physical, mental or moral—the last of the three, of course, when applied to virtue. It is properly opposed to *διάθεσις*, as a settled and permanent *state*, opposed to a temporary and changeable *disposition*. It is developed out of the *πάθη* by the operation of *ἔθος*, habit or association, till it has acquired a fixed tendency and direction and a confirmed character, which shews itself in the constant exercise of similar *ἐνεργείαι*, and is now no longer liable to change and the opposite tendency to vice. On the growth of virtue, and the formation of the *ἕξις*, see Eth. Nic. II 1—5, particularly 4 and 5. Also Sir A. Grant, *Ess. on Ethics*, I p. 120 seq. (1st Ed.) [=p. 164, 3rd Ed.] Trendel. on de Anima p. 311, and 366. *Kategorienlehre*, p. 95.

§ 10. *ὑγίεια...ἄριστον δοκεῖ εἶναι*] This is one of many *opinions*. So the 'Delian inscription', quoted by Aristotle, Eth. N. I 9, and Eudemus, Eth. Eud. I 1, 1, with a slight variation; also in Theogn. Eleg. 255 (Bergk), *κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν | ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὗ*

τος καὶ ποιητικαὶ πολλῶν, οἷον ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν, διὸ καὶ ἄριστον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι δύο τῶν p. 21.
τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμιωτάτων αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ἡδονῆς καὶ
11 τοῦ ζῆν. πλοῦτος· ἀρετὴ γὰρ κτήσεως καὶ ποιητικὸν
12 πολλῶν. φίλος καὶ φιλία· καὶ γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸν αἱρε-
13 τὸς ὁ φίλος καὶ ποιητικὸς πολλῶν. τιμή, δόξα·

τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν, for which Bergk gives in the second line, *πρῆγμα δὲ τερπνότατον τοῦ τις ἔραιτο τυχεῖν*. Soph. Creus. Fragm. ap. Stob. CIII 15 (Dind. Fr. Soph. 326), *κάλλιστόν ἐστι τοὔνδικον πεφυκέναι· λῷστον δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἄνοσον· ἥδιστον δ' ὅτῳ πάρεστι λῆψις ὧν ἐρᾷ καθ' ἡμέραν.* Ariphron, Dithyr. I (ap. Bergk, Fragm. Lyric. Gr. p. 841 [p. 984 Ed. 2]), *ὑγίεια, πρεσβίστα μακάρων, μετὰ σεῦ ναίοιμι τὸ λειπόμενον βιοτᾶς...σέθεν δὲ χωρὶς οὔτις εὐδαίμων ἔφυ.* See also a fragment of Licymnius, Fr. 4, in Bergk, u. s., p. 840 [p. 986 Ed. 2] (a dithyrambic poet and rhetorician, mentioned by Aristotle, Rhet. III 12, 2; 13, 5, and quoted, as Bergk supposes, in III 14, 5); Plut. de virt. mor. c. 10, quoting from some poet, *ἥ τε τοῦ σώματος ὑγίεια—δοκεῖ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν· οὔτε γὰρ πλούτου χάριν ἢ τεκέων, οὔτε τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιληΐδος ἀρχᾶς—τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν μὴ παρόντος.* de fraterno amore, c. 2, *ἧς χωρὶς οὔτε πλούτου, φασίν, οὔτε τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιληΐδος ἀρχᾶς εἶναί τινα χάριν καὶ ὄνησιν.* (ap. Bergk not.)

§ 11. *πλοῦτος, ἀρετὴ κτήσεως*] The *ἔργον*, special office or function, that which it was intended by its nature to do, determines the *ἀρετή* or special excellence of anything. If wealth is the object of acquisition, and acquisition fulfils its proper function, its destination, the law of its being, in the accumulation of wealth; then the *ἀρετή* or special excellence of the art of acquiring is manifested in the attainment of that object, or the wealth amassed. Wealth as a 'good' *seems* here to be regarded as an end; if so, this is in contradiction to the more scientific doctrine laid down in the Politics I 8, according to which wealth is only an instrument, see note on p. 79 (c. 5, 7), and note 1 on the same page. However, as some good things are only instrumental and means to an end, we are not obliged to suppose that Aristotle regards wealth here otherwise than as one of those mediate ends, subordinate and subservient to some other and higher end. On the relation of *ἔργον* and *ἀρετή*, see notes on c. 2, 12, and 5, 4, and the reff. in the former.

§ 12. *καθ' αὑτὸν αἱρετὸς ὁ φίλος*] This is an application of the general principle in § 2, that good in general is in itself desirable, to the special case of friendship. That a good friend, or the friendship of the good, is desirable in itself is made to appear in the course of a long and subtle argument in Eth. N. IX 9, of which the conclusion is (at the end of the chapter) *δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων.* The words most in point here are, *εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστι καθ' αὑτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὂν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἱρετῶν ἂν εἴη.*

§ 13. *τιμή, δόξα*] The distinction between these two is stated in note on c. 5, 4, p. 76. These are not only 'pleasant' and therefore good in them-

καὶ γὰρ ἡδέα καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ
14 αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἐφ' οἷς τι-
μῶνται. δύναμις τοῦ λέγειν, τοῦ πράττειν· ποιη-
15 τικὰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθῶν. ἔτι εὐφυΐα,

selves, but also productive of various advantages which accrue to them from the respect of others, and so 'good' in this secondary or subordinate sense likewise.

καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ.] 'and they are accompanied for the most part by the actual possession of the things' (natural gifts, qualities, accomplishments, acquirements, military distinction, rank and fortune, and such like) 'which the honours paid them (these supposed possessors) imply', ἐφ' οἷς τιμῶνται, on the basis of which, on account of, for which, they receive the honour paid, or 'on which the honours paid them rest, are grounded, or based'. ἐφ' οἷς τ. might possibly be rendered 'for which they (the honour and reputation) are valued'; on which their value depends, or, by which it is measured; but the other interpretation seems more direct and natural.

The rule here tacitly referred to, as warranting the inference that, when honour is conferred, those so honoured are generally worthy of it, is that a generally received opinion, or popularly current maxim, or the expression of these in the ordinary language, may be for the most part depended on as true[1]. With τὸ ὑπάρχειν, τοῖς κεκτημένοις, or something similar, must be supplied.

§ 15. εὐφυΐα] is a happy natural constitution of mind or body or both; εὐφυὴς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, Plat. Rep. III 409 E. In de Soph. El. c. 1, 165 *a* 5, we have εὐφυέστατος applied to 'a topic', in the sense (apparently) of 'naturally best adapted to a certain purpose'. And in the spurious addition to the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (Bekk. 39), 19, εὐφυΐα τόπων occurs to denote the 'natural advantages of situation', *opportunitas locorum*. The word is however applied here, as it usually is, to the mental faculties, and signifies cleverness, quickness of intellect, intellectual dexterity, differing very little from ἀγχίνοια. And so, infr. § 29 and II 15 3. Similarly de Anima B 9, 2, 421 *a* 25, οἱ μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς. Top. Γ 2, 118 *a* 22, φιλοπονεῖν ἀρνούμεθα ἵν' εὐφυεῖς εἶναι δοκῶμεν, 'we deny that we are industrious in order to gain the reputation of cleverness'. In Top. Θ 14, 163 *b* 13, ἡ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εὐφυΐα is defined, for dialectical purposes, τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς ἑλέσθαι τἀληθὲς καὶ φυγεῖν τὸ ψεῦδος· ὅπερ οἱ πεφυκότες εὖ δύνανται ποιεῖν. In Eth. Nic. III 7, 1114 *b* 9, it is used similarly to denote sagacity in aiming rightly at the true end, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα. Rhet. III 2, 10 init. In Poet. 22, 17 it stands for readiness in poetical invention. ἀφυής, the opposite, is 'dull' and 'stupid', Plat. Phaed. 96 C. In the Platonic ὅροι, p. 413 D, it is defined, τάχος μαθήσεως· γέννησις φύσεως ἀγαθή· ἀρετὴ ἐν φύσει.

[1] This principle is in fact constantly appealed to by Aristotle, and is one of the ordinary arguments to which he has recourse in the establishment of the doctrines of his philosophy.

μνῆμαι, εὐμάθεια, ἀγχίνοια, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιητικαὶ γὰρ αὗται ἀγαθῶν αἱ δυνάμεις εἰσίν. ὁμοίως δὲ
16 *καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ τέχναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἕποιτο ἀγαθόν, καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετόν ἐστιν· καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· συμφέρον γάρ τι κοινῇ ἐστίν.*

μνῆμαι] Victorius, Vater and Vahlen (in *Trans. of Vienna Acad.* Oct. 1861, p. 105) object to the plural of this word, on the ground either that abstract nouns do not admit of the plural formation, or (as Vahlen) that as it is the *faculty* of memory that is here in question the plural is inadmissible. As to the former, such is no doubt the rule, but the exceptions are abundant. Parallel to this is *ἀναμνήσεις*, '*acts* of recollection', de Memor. 2, 6 and 10. We have already noticed *προσκυνήσεις* and *ἐκστάσεις* as examples in c. 5, 9; three more occur together in c. 11, 4, *ῥαθυμίαι, ἀπονίαι, ἀμέλειαι.* Eth. N. I 13, 1102 *b* 4, *ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις*, II 1, 1103 *b* 19, *τὰς ὀργάς*, 2, 1104 *a* 27, *γενέσεις, αὐξήσεις, φθοραί*, *b* 25 *τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἠρεμίας.* Pol. II 5, 1264 *a* 35, *εἱλωτείας τε καὶ πενεστείας καὶ δουλείας.* The plural expresses the several acts or moments of these abstract conceptions when carried into operation, or particular cases or instances of the manifestation of them. *Μνῆμαι* therefore means here, any ordinary examples of retentive memory. It occurs itself, Metaph. A 1, 980 *b* 29, and Anal. Post. II 19, 100 *a* 5. [Also, in Eth. N. IX 4, 1166 *a* 25; X 2, 1173 *b* 19, *Index Aristotelicus.* S.]

εὐμάθεια] which is equivalent to *εὐφυΐα πρὸς μάθησιν*, is a particular kind of natural sagacity and readiness directed to learning. *εὐφυΐα ψυχῆς πρὸς τάχος μαθήσεως.* Ὅροι Platon. 413 D.

ἀγχίνοια] 'ready wit', 'quickness of apprehension', is mentioned as a kind of *εὐστοχία* and distinguished from *εὐβουλία* (*right* judgment), but not defined, Eth. Nic. VI 9. The defin. of *ὅροι* Platon. is *εὐφυΐα ψυχῆς, καθ' ἣν ὁ ἔχων στοχαστικός ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ τοῦ δεόντος· ὀξύτης νοῦ*, which agrees very well with the preceding. It is therefore an *intellectual* (not moral) 'presence of mind', the faculty of seeing the point at once, or 'ready wit'. In Anal. Post. I 34, init. it is thus defined, *εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ* (intuitive, immediate) *τοῦ μέσου* (the middle term of the syllogism, *which expresses the cause*), *οἷον εἴ τις ἰδὼν ὅτι ἡ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀεὶ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ταχὺ ἐνόησε διὰ τί τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου· ἢ διαλεγόμενον πλουσίῳ ἔγνω διότι δανείζεται· ἢ διότι φίλοι, ὅτι ἐχθροὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, which expresses in a logical form precisely the same characteristic of the faculty, rapidity of apprehension, *ταχὺ ἐνόησε.*

εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλο κ.τ.λ.] This seems to refer exclusively to the last mentioned of the three, *τὸ ζῆν*, to which alone it is strictly appropriate. Sciences and arts are avowedly 'productive of good', and rest their claims upon that alone.

§ 16. *καὶ τὸ δίκαιον κ.τ.λ.*] The argument is, justice is *κοινῇ συμφέρον*, it promotes the public interest, it is advantageous or expedient to society, whose interest it is that the laws should be duly observed and the rights of its citizens maintained, and evildoers punished, and all this is the effect of *τὸ δίκαιον*: but that which is useful or expedient is good, § 1,

17 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν τὰ ὁμολογούμενα ἀγαθά
18 ἐστιν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀμφισβητησίμοις ἐκ τῶνδε οἱ συλ-
19 λογισμοί. ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν. καὶ

because it is the means to an end, that end being happiness, the ultimate and universal aim.

§ 17. So far the good things treated of are universally acknowledged to be such, and we may therefore take it for granted that they are so. We now come to cases of *doubtful* good things, which are or may be disputed, and which therefore require argument for their support. συλλογισμός here stands for the rhetorical enthymeme, or rather, perhaps, for any kind of regular inference or ratiocination in general. See note on c. 2, 11, and c. 4, 5.

σχεδὸν] 'pretty nearly', 'about'. Used in qualification of a too general expression, just like ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. The author means to say that he has given a *tolerably* complete list, or exact account of them; he does not profess perfect accuracy.

§ 18. ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν] If, for instance, you can shew that vice and folly are bad, you may infer at once that their opposites, virtue and wisdom, are good. This is not universally true; Aristotle himself places it amongst the topics which are 'open to question'. So Bacon, *Cuius contrarium malum bonum; cuius bonum malum. Non tenet* (this does not hold) is the 'redargutio', *in iis rebus quarum vis in temperamento et mensura sita est. Dum vitant stulti vitia in contraria currunt.* Pref. to *Colours of Good and Evil.* Bacon's Works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, Vol. VII p. 67. According to Aristotle, Eth. N. II 8, there is double opposition in the case of virtue and vice, αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις. When virtue, the mean disposition, is opposed to either of the extremes or vices, the rule holds; when the extremes or vices are considered as opposed to one another, it fails. Categ. c. 11, 13 *b* 36, ἐναντίον δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγαθῷ μὲν κακόν· τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον τῇ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπαγωγῇ, οἷον ὑγιείᾳ νόσος καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ δειλία, ὁμοίως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. κακῷ δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον, ὁτὲ δὲ κακόν· τῇ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ κακῷ ὄντι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναντίον κακὸν ὄν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐναντία ἑκατέρῳ, οὖσα ἀγαθόν. ἐπ' ὀλίγων δ' ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν. 14 *a* 19, ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι, ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι...ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ κακὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη τινῶν ὄντα. Cic. Topic. XI 47, *deinceps locus est qui a contrario dicitur. Contrariorum autem genera sunt plura: unum eorum quae in eodem genere plurimum differunt* (Aristotle's ἐναντία, in his ordinary usage of the term. Good and bad however are different *genera*, not extremes of the same *genus*), *ut sapientia et stultitia. Eodem autem genere dicuntur quibus propositis occurrunt tamquam e regione quaedam contraria, ut celeritati tarditas, non debilitas: ex quibus argumenta talia existunt: si stultitiam fugimus sapientiam sequamur: et bonitatem si malitiam.* The dialectical topics of τὰ ἐναντία, in which this is not included, are analysed in Topic. B cc. 7, 8. To this head may also be referred the topic of στέρησις, *privatio*, criticised by Bacon, *Colours of Good*

οὗ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῖς ἐχθροῖς συμφέρει· οἷον εἰ τὸ δειλοὺς εἶναι μάλιστα συμφέρει τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνδρία μάλιστα ὠφέλιμον τοῖς πολίταις. καὶ ὅλως ὃ οἱ ἐχθροὶ βούλονται ἢ ἐφ' ᾧ χαίρουσι, τοὐναντίον τούτῳ ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται· διὸ εὖ εἴρηται

ἦ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος.

ἔστι δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει ἐνίοτε ταὐτὸ συμφέρειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις· ὅθεν λέγεται ὡς τὰ κακὰ συνάγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, P. 1363.

and Evil, No. 6, *cuius privatio bona, malum: cuius privatio mala, bonum.* στέρησις and ἕξις, one of the forms of *contrariety* or *opposition*, Met. I 4, 1055 *a* 33, πρώτη δὲ ἐναντίωσις ἕξις καὶ στέρησίς ἐστιν. And Top. B 8, 114 *a* 7 (though in a different application), ὁμοίως δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν στερήσεων καὶ ἕξεων σκεπτέον. Στέρησις contrasted with ἕξις is one of the four (Categ. 10, 11 *b* 17) or five (Metaph. Δ 10, 1018 *a* 20) kinds of opposition, ἀντικεῖσθαι. Comp. supr. § 4, in which this is implied.

§ 19. Victorius quotes in illustration, Cic. pro Muren. c. 39, *Si L. Catilina cum suo consilio nefariorum hominum quos secum eduxit hac de re posset iudicare, condemnaret L. Murenam: si interficere posset, occideret....Idemne igitur delecti amplissimis ex ordinibus honestissimi atque sapientissimi viri iudicabant quod ille importunissimus gladiator hostis reipublicae iudicaret?*

οὗ ἐναντίον] The gen. immediately following the ordinary construction ᾧ ἐναντίον, is remarkable. The genitive after the adjective is accounted for by the comparison implied in it, just as it follows ἕτερος, ἄλλος, διάφορος, διαφέρειν, διαφερόντως, ἀλλοῖος, ἀλλότριος. See for examples Matth. *Gr. Gr.* 366, on ἐναντίος, Obs. 2.

§ 20. ἦ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος] Il. A 255, 'Huc confugit fallacissimus homo Sinon apud Virgilium (Aen. II 104) et ab hoc loco praesidium petivit, cum salutem suam callide procurans, quam abiecisse videri volebat, inquit, *Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridae.*' Victorius.

ἔστι δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.] This last rule is liable to exceptions, as in the case where the same thing, the same course of action or policy, happens to be for the interest of two adversaries: a common misfortune has often this effect of 'bringing' enemies 'together', or uniting them, as when the Athenians were forced into alliance with the Thebans by their common dread and hatred of Philip. συνάγει γὰρ τοὺς ἐχθίστους ὁ κοινὸς φόβος, Polit. VIII (V), sub init. 'Misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows', says Trinculo in the *Tempest* (Act II Sc. 2), which illustrates the *proverb*. However, the ordinary rule is, that it is common interests that produce sympathy, συνέχει τὸ κοινόν, Eth. Nic. 14, ult.; and the example of Athens and Thebes is only an apparent exception, because in the given case the common danger had altered their original relations and engendered common interests and common sympathies and antipathies.

21 ὅταν ᾖ ταὐτὸ βλαβερὸν ἀμφοῖν. καὶ οὗ μή ἐστιν ὑπερβολή, τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ὃ δ' ἂν ᾖ μεῖζον ἢ δεῖ,
22 κακόν, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα πολλὰ πεπόνηται ἢ δεδαπάνηται· φαινόμενον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἤδη, καὶ ὡς τέλος τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμβάνεται, καὶ τέλος πολλῶν· τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀγαθόν. ὅθεν ταῦτ' εἴρηται,

καδ δέ κεν εὐχωλὴν Πριάμῳ

καὶ

αἰσχρόν τοι δηρόν τε μένειν·

23 καὶ ἡ παροιμία δέ, τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδρίαν. καὶ οὗ

§ 21. οὗ μή ἐστιν ὑπερβολή] 'that which does not admit of excess', health, life, virtue, and all that lies in a *mean* state, happiness, are all ends in themselves, and desirable in and for themselves. Pleasure by this rule, which *does* admit of being carried to excess, is properly speaking no 'good'.

ὃ ἂν ᾖ μεῖζον ἢ δεῖ, κακόν] by the rule, μηδὲν ἄγαν.

§ 22. πολλὰ πεπόνηται ἢ δεδαπάνηται] 'much labour or expense has been incurred'.

ἤδη] note on c. 1, 7, p. 13 'already', for that reason alone, and without looking any farther. The time, trouble, and expense which we have spent in the pursuit of an object shews *already*, without any further consideration, or without our knowing whether it is really good or not, that it *seems* at any rate good to us: it consequently becomes an *end* to us, and all ends are good. ἀγαθόν, οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα, 6, 2.

τὸ τέλος ἀγαθόν] because 'every art, science, action, and purpose has some good in view at which it aims, and which is therefore its end in every case'. Eth. Nic. init.

The two quotations from Homer are taken from Il. B 176, and 298. Vater observes that the half line quoted of the first does not convey the intention of the quotation; the 'boast to Priam' is not in point. The lines applicable are these: λίποιτε Ἀργείην Ἑλένην, ἧς εἵνεκα πολλοὶ Ἀχαιῶν ἐν Τροίῃ ἀπόλοντο φίλης ἀπὸ πατρίδος αἴης. The second line, αἰσχρόν τοι δηρόν τε μένειν κενεόν τε νέεσθαι, became proverbial; whence Cic. de Offic. III 2, 6 (of the result of his son's studies at Athens), *ad quos cum tamquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis profectus, inanem redire turpissimum est.*

§ 23. καὶ ἡ παροιμία δέ] This δέ, introduced after καί—always (except in Epic poetry, Il. Ψ 80, καὶ δέ σοι αὐτῷ μοῖρα, Odys. π' 418) with a word or more intervening—is inserted as something additional to the preceding, which it enforces or emphasizes, and has in these, as in all other cases, a reference to μέν expressed or implied. A first implies a second, and a second a first. Of μέν implied in δέ, see some instances in Herm., note on Soph. Phil. 86, and the reverse case, δέ in μέν, Don. *New Crat.* § 154, where the origin and derivation of the two particles is made out. The δέ here may

πολλοὶ ἐφίενται, καὶ τὸ περιμάχητον φαινόμενον· οὔ p. 22.

be readily explained as in correlation to a suppressed μέν after ταῦτα, 'these first, and secondly the proverb'; or 'these on the one hand, on the other the proverb'. It may be rendered 'too', 'also', or *from* the *emphasis that it conveys*, 'in fact', or any thing similar. This special usage, like the other senses of δέ, is derived from the primary meaning of μέν and δέ, 'one' and 'two'; and so, as conjunctions, in the sense of 'firstly' and 'secondly'. See Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 769, 2, where a few examples are cited. Others are given in Paley's note on Prom. Vinct. 994 (from Aeschylus): in Arnold's note on Thucyd. II 36, 6 (from Thucydides, Herodotus, and Xenophon): Plat. Rep. IX 573 B (ed. Tur.), καὶ μανίας δέ. It is found in all Greek writers, but is more common in Aristotle than elsewhere: Rhet. I 7. 18, 19, 20; 9. 29, 30; II 3. 12; 11. 11, καὶ ἀρχὴ δέ: Eth. N. V 5, 1130 *b* 21, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δέ: Polit. VI (IV), 13, 1297 *b* 10, καὶ εἰώθασι δέ: and again V 16, καὶ ἡ πρώτη δὲ πολιτεία, de Anim. A 4, init. καὶ ἄλλη δέ: c. 5, 411 *a* 7, καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ, B 3, 415 *a* 6, καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν δέ, et passim. ['Maxime in Ethicorum libro quarto octavo nono decimo.' Eucken, *de Arist. dicendi ratione* I p. 32. S.] The same meaning is much more frequently expressed by these particles in the inverted order, δὲ καί.

The proverb, τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδρίαν, 'to drop[1] or break the pitcher at the door', after you have carried it home from the distant well with much toil and trouble, expresses the general conception of 'lost labour', 'labour thrown away'. Erasmus, *Adagia*, p. 350, *in foribus urceum*, misinterprets the proverb as expressing something vile and contemptible, not worth the trouble of taking up.

Another more common corresponding proverb is πλύνειν πλίνθον, *laterem lavare* (Terent. Phorm. I 4, 9) 'to try to make a red brick white

[1] In the endeavour to represent these English words by precisely corresponding Greek terms, no difficulty is found in the case of *break*: if καταγνύναι λύραν (Pl. Phaed. 85 A) is *to break a lyre*, it is equally applicable to a pitcher. But when we try to render 'to drop' by a word *exactly corresponding* (ἀντίστροφος in its primary sense), the language seems to fail us. I examined all the analogous Greek words (that I could think of), βάλλειν, ῥίπτειν, ἐᾶν ('to let go', but intentionally), χεῖν, and a dozen others, with their compounds, and found them all infected with the same vice, in respect of the representation of the word 'to drop', viz. that they all express a voluntary and conscious action, whereas *drop* is applied to an accidental and unintentional relaxation of the muscles, which cannot properly be called an *action* at all. The notion may no doubt be expressed by a circumlocution, of which the Homeric ἔκπεσε, or ἔκφυγε, χειρός (said however of the *object*, not the *subject*), comp. Lat. *fugere*, is a frequent example. We might also say (of the subject) περιορᾶν τι πῖπτον or πίπτειν, or (of the object) λανθάνειν πεσόν. But these are not single words. And I am brought to the conclusion that the Greek language *has* no single word to express the notion exactly; which is the less surprising, inasmuch as the French language labours under the same deficiency; the periphrasis *laisser tomber* being made to supply the place of 'to drop'. ἐκχεῖν, Soph. Phil. 13, might seem to come nearest to the literal representation of it, were it not for Arist. Ran. 855, where the word undoubtedly expresses a conscious and intentional act. ὁ λόγος...ἐκπεσὼν οἰχήσεται, Plat. Phileb. 13 B.

γὰρ πάντες ἐφίενται, τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν ἦν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ
24 ὥσπερ πάντες φαίνονται. καὶ τὸ ἐπαινετόν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἐπαινεῖ. καὶ ὃ οἱ ἐχθροὶ [καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι] ἐπαινοῦσιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἤδη ὁμολο-

by washing it'. Theocr. Id. XVI 62, ἢ ὕδατι νίζειν θολερὰν ἰοειδέϊ πλίνθον[1], and answering to our 'washing a blackamoor white'. Compare also Eur. Iph. Taur. 116, οὔτοι μακρὸν μὲν ἤλθομεν κώπῃ πόρον, ἐκ τερμάτων δὲ νόστον ἀροῦμεν πάλιν.

περιμάχητον φαινόμενον] 'apparently, manifestly, conspicuously (with φαίνεσθαι in this sense, comp. II 2, 1, *bis*) an object of contention'.

τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν ἦν] 'this is, as was said', i.e. in § 2. This use of the imperfect, referring to a past transaction or statement referred to in present time, is so common both in Plato and Aristotle as to require no illustration.

οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ...φαίνονται] The acts and opinions of the great body of people, the most of those that you know or have heard of, are as convincing to the popular audience to which Rhetoric is addressed, as those of all mankind if they could be ascertained. The fact therefore that the possession of anything is much contested and coveted, implying that a great many people seek after it and care for it, is as sufficient a proof *to them* that it is a good, as if it could be shewn, as it ought by the rules, § 2, that it is the *universal* object of human aims: the sanction of 'the many' is as good as an universal admission.

§ 24. *τὸ ἐπαινετόν*] The proper object of ἔπαινος is virtue, any kind of *practical* excellence; ἔστι δ' ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς, Rhet. I 9, 33. On ἔπαινος as the test of virtue and the distinction of this from ἐγκώμιον and εὐδαιμονισμός, see Introd. Appendix B to Bk. I ch. 9, p. 212 seq. It is there said that ἔπαινος and ψόγος are the equivalents of Butler's 'moral approbation and disapprobation'. This requires some qualification. When the 'intellectual' virtues are included as the objects of ἔπαινος, as they certainly are in the Eth. Eud. II 1. 18, the approbation loses its exclusively moral character. In Eth. Nic. I 12, Aristotle together with the moral virtues, justice, courage, 'goodness' in general, includes also as objects of praise all kinds of ἀρετή or excellence, such as strength and swiftness, which are manifested in *action*.

καὶ ὃ οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἐπαινοῦσιν] Victorius, in illustration of the former of these two topics, quotes Virg. Aen. XI 282, *Stetimus tela aspera contra, Contulimusque manus; experto credite quantus In clypeum assurgat, quo turbine torqueat hastam.* The prowess of Aeneas could not be more highly extolled than by the praises extorted from his enemy Diomede.

καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι] is rejected as a subsequent insertion by Muretus, F. A. Wolf, Bekker, Brandis, and Spengel, because it is passed over unnoticed in the explanatory commentary that follows, ὥσπερ γὰρ—πεπονθότες.

[1] θολερὰν πλίνθον is to be interpreted here not of the colour of the brick, but of an unbaked brick dried in the sun, which melts away and turns to mud when it is washed.

γοῦσιν, εἰ καὶ οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες· διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανερὸν ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν, ὥσπερ καὶ φαῦλοι οὓς οἱ φίλοι

Vater alone defends it. The explanation of it is easy, and it is perfectly consistent with the context and with good sense. If the vilest and meanest, the 'worthless and contemptible', φαῦλοι, who are *least* likely to be sensible of merit in others, being almost devoid of right moral instinct, find themselves compelled to praise some signal act of valour, disinterestedness, or virtue—we are engaged here upon *actions*—*a fortiori* it must meet with the approbation of better judges, and be emphatically good. If with this reasonable explanation we take into account Aristotle's hasty and careless habit, twice already noticed, of interrupting an explanation or an argument by the insertion of something bearing indirectly on the subject, but not immediately appropriate, I think we may without scruple retain the words objected to.

ὥσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἤδη ὁμολογοῦσιν] 'for this is *now* as good as, equivalent to, an universal admission'. ἤδη, 'by this time', now that we have got as far as this, have reached, that is, the level of enemies, the extreme case of those who are interested in denying the merit—if *they* approve, all others must necessarily do so.

διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανερὸν...τὸ Ἴλιον] There is a difficulty here which has much occupied the commentators, arising from the want of connexion, as the present text stands, between the two rules laid down, ὥσπερ καὶ... ἐπαινοῦσιν, and the example (from Simonides) which is *said*, διό, to follow from them: the example, according to the present reading, is *not* an inference from either of them. The best way of meeting the difficulty seems to be to adopt, with Spengel, the reading of the best MS A^c. This omits the words οὓς οἱ φίλοι ψέγουσι καὶ ἀγαθοί, without which the sense is clear and consistent. 'For it must be owing to its being *evident* that they are inclined to (would) admit it, just as' (it is equally evident that, by the same rule, in the opposite case) 'those who are praised by their enemies must be worthless', (because if your enemy approves of your conduct towards him, which is assumed to be hostile, it shews that you can have done him no harm: and therefore that you have been wanting either in courage or patriotism or energy and skill). Of this the example of the Corinthians is now a real instance, and their suspicion of Simonides' intentions may be traced to the general rule. 'And this was why the Corinthians conceived the suspicion that they had been insulted by Simonides, when he wrote, 'Ilium has no fault to find with the Corinthians' (which it ought to have had if they had done their duty). The Corinthians misinterpreted Simonides' expressions; his intentions were innocent, but he failed to perceive the inference that might be derived from them. The line of Simonides is apparently misquoted by a lapse of memory. The Schol. Pind. Ol. XIII p. 78, who cites it, has μανίει (ῐ) for μέμφεται; and this reading appears also in another reference to it in Plut. Vit. Dion. c. I sub init. (cf. Bergk and Gaisf.), ὁ Σιμωνίδης φησὶ τοῖς Κορινθίοις οὐ μηνίειν τὸ Ἴλιον ἐπιστρατεύσασι μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ὅτι κἀκείνοις οἱ περὶ Γλαῦκον ἐξ ἀρχῆς Κορίνθιοι γεγονότες συνεμάχουν προθύμως. Homer only says, Il. Z 152 seq., that Glaucus himself attributed his origin to

ψέγουσι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οὓς οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν. διὸ λελοιδορῆσθαι ὑπέλαβον Κορίνθιοι ὑπὸ Σιμωνίδου ποιήσαντος

Κορινθίοις δ' οὐ μέμφεται τὸ Ἴλιον.

25 καὶ ὃ τῶν φρονίμων τις ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν προέκρινεν, οἷον Ὀδυσσέα Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ Ἑλένην Θησεὺς καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον αἱ θεαὶ καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ὅμηρος.

26 καὶ ὅλως τὰ προαιρετά· προαιροῦνται δὲ πράττειν

Sisyphus of Ephyre or Corinth. If this be the true explanation of the reason why Ilium was 'not wroth', or 'found no fault', with the Corinthians, and Aristotle remembered it when he used the example, it seems that the instance is very ill chosen for the purpose of illustrating the rule. In this case nothing is imputed to the Corinthians except that the aid of Glaucus and his men of Corinthian race compensated the Trojans for their own hostility, and therefore that Troy had nothing to reproach them with, which could scarcely be construed by them as an *insult:* and the example only applies to the rule which it is supposed to exemplify in this sense; that the Trojans ought by the rule to have been represented as having directly censured the Corinthians, if Simonides had intended to pay them a compliment; by the mere omission of this they thought that he had insulted them.

§ 25. Compare the corresponding topic of II 23, 12. On this kind of 'authority' see I 15, where it is exemplified under the head of 'witnesses', §§ 13 and 15. The *φρόνιμος*, the man of practical wisdom, skill and judgment, the 'artist' or expert in each pursuit, is the proper standard or measure to be appealed to in every disputed question. The general judgment of such well-qualified persons is the *ὀρθὸς λόγος*, which must be applied even to the determination of the due measure of virtue, which is a *μεσότης...ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν*. Eth. N. II 6, init.

ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν] so Eth. X 5, ult., the standard of moral judgment is said to be *ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός*. IX 4, 1166 *a* 12, *μέτρον ἑκάστῳ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος*. III 6, 1113 *a* 32, *διαφέρει πλεῖστον ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν.*

προέκρινεν] 'decided, distinguished by preference'.

Ἑλένην Θησεύς] The preference of Theseus, a man of consummate authority, *παντελῆ τὴν ἀρετὴν κτησάμενον*, for Helen, is actually introduced by Isocrates as one of the topics of his encomium of that much calumniated lady, Helen. §§ 18—22.

§ 26. *τὰ προαιρετά*] 'objects of deliberate and voluntary choice'. The *προαίρεσις* seems here intended in the more general sense in which *προαιρεῖσθαι* and *προαίρεσις* are employed in the ordinary language, and even sometimes in the Ethical treatise itself, as I 2, init. *ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται*. *προαίρεσις* is defined in Eth. Nic. III 5, ult. *βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, 'an impulsive faculty (implying, not directly expressing the free will) capable of deliberation, directed

τά τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κακὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς
27 φίλοις ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατά. ταῦτα δὲ διχῶς ἐστί,

to things within our power'—no one deliberates about things *beyond* his power, *οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον*. And again in precise conformity with this, de Mot. Anim. c. 6, *ἡ προαίρεσις κοινὸν διανοίας καὶ ὀρέξεως, ὥστε κινεῖ πρῶτον* (is the ultimate mover, the origin of motion or action) *τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητόν*, (it is the *object* of the two faculties, and not the faculties themselves, which is the real origin of motion, according to the Aristotelian doctrine that the primary moving agent must be itself unmoved,) *οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ διανοητὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος*. Thus the *προαίρεσις* is composed of two separate elements or faculties, intellectual and impulsive, of which the latter alone is the agent of motion, or stimulates to action: the intellectual part deliberates prior to action, and decides whether the proposed object of the action is good or bad, right or wrong[1]. Though the *προαίρεσις* in its general and wider signification of 'deliberate, voluntary purpose' is capable of prompting to action of every kind, yet in its narrower and specially ethical usage it is *moral* action alone that it originates and determines, *οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων*, Eth. N. III 4, init. Comp. III 2, 1110 *b* 31, *οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας*. From the ethical point of view therefore the definition will be 'a deliberate and voluntary moral purpose'. The principal passages on the subject of *προαίρεσις* are Eth. Nic. III cc. 4, 5, 6, where it is analysed and distinguished from *ἐπιθυμία* and *θυμός*, which are mere animal impulses, on the one hand, and from *βούλησις*, *βούλευσις* and *δόξα*, on the other: ib. VI 2; and de Anima III 9, 10, where it is treated in reference to its action as a motive principle.

τὰ εἰρημένα] all the objects of voluntary choice already mentioned which consist in, or are to be obtained by, action; such as health, pleasure, and especially the various moral virtues.

καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κακά] This was an article of the received code of popular morality amongst the Greeks and Romans: comp. § 29, where one class of good things are *ἃ ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς*. This is a duty, and a part of justice. In Rhet. I 9, 24, it is said to combine two kinds of virtue, *τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι· τό τε γὰρ ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, καὶ ἀνδρείου τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι*. II 5, 5. Rhet. ad Alex. I (2), 13. Xen. Memor. IV 2, 15, 16. Eur. Ion 1046, *ὅταν δὲ πολεμίους δρᾶσαι κακῶς θέλῃ τις, οὐδεὶς ἐμποδὼν κεῖται νόμος*. Med. 808, *βαρεῖαν ἐχθροῖς καὶ φίλοισιν εὐμενῆ κ.τ.λ.* Cic. de Off. I 7, *Iustitiae primum munus est ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus iniuria.*

§ 27. *ταῦτα*, sc. *τὰ δυνατά.*——*τὰ γενόμενα ἂν καὶ τὰ ῥαδίως γιγνόμενα.*] Two kinds of possibilities; 'things which might' (*ἄν*, under certain conditions, possibly difficult) 'be brought to pass, and those which *are* easily attained'.

[1] Accordingly, Metaph. Θ 5, 1048 *a* 11, *ὄρεξις* and *προαίρεσις* are distinguished; *ὄρεξις* is the general and spontaneous impulse to action, which when controlled and determined by the intellectual principle, *διάνοια*, becomes the compound *προαίρεσις*, the deliberate moral purpose.

τά τε γενόμενα [ἂν] καὶ τὰ ῥᾳδίως γιγνόμενα. ῥᾴδια δὲ ὅσα ἢ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· τὸ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ὁρίζεται ἡ λύπῃ ἢ πλήθει χρόνου. καὶ ἐὰν ὡς βούλονται· βούλονται δὲ ἢ μηδὲν κακὸν ἢ ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται, ἐὰν ἢ λανθάνῃ ἡ τιμωρία
28 ἢ μικρὰ ᾖ. καὶ τὰ ἴδια, καὶ ἃ μηδείς, καὶ τὰ περιττά·

The distinction is between ends or things hard and unlikely, and easy and likely, to be attained or obtained.

The same distinction of possibilities is found in Cic. de Inv. II 56, 169. (Victorius, who refers to it, quotes only the definition of *facilis*.) *Atque in iis omnibus quae ante dicta sunt, quid fieri et quid facile fieri possit oportet considerare. Facile id dicimus, quod sine magno aut sine ullo labore, sumptu, molestia quam brevissimo tempore confici potest; posse autem fieri quod quamquam laboris, sumptus, molestiae, longinquitatis indiget, atque aut omnes aut plurimas aut maximas causas habet difficultatis, tamen, his susceptis difficultatibus, compleri atque ad exitum perduci potest:* an excellent commentary on Aristotle's topic.

τὸ γὰρ χαλεπὸν κ.τ.λ.] 'facility' is defined by the absence of pain or laborious effort, or by the shortness of the time occupied in doing anything or getting anything done, *because* difficulty is defined by the opposites.

ὁρίζεται ἡ λύπῃ ἢ πλήθει χρόνου] A various reading in several of the earlier Editions is λύπη ἢ πλῆθος. In this case ὁρίζεται is the middle voice, as it usually is in the sense of 'defining'. ὁρίζεσθαι however, as a passive, is found, though rarely, elsewhere, as Eth. Nic. III 10, 1115 *b* 23, ὁρίζεται ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει, ib. IX 8, 1168 *b* 5, πάνθ' οἷς ὁ φίλος ὁρίζεται, Pol. VII (VI) 2, 1317 *b* 39, ὀλιγαρχία γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὁρίζεται, Theophrast. Hist. Plant. I 1, 6, ἡ μὲν ἀνομοιότης ὁρίζεται σχήματι χρώματι κ.τ.λ. It is not to be included in the class of irregular passives formed from neuter verbs, the act of ὁρίζειν being transitive.

καὶ ἐὰν ὡς βούλονται] sc. γένηταί τι (or τὰ πράγματα) ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, 'anything that turns out as they desire'; any result, either of their own acts, or of the course of events, such as they like; [Gaisford says, 'nescio an in ὡς ἂν βούλωνται' (*a various reading*) 'lateant vestigia melioris scripturae, ὅσ' ἂν βούλωνται.' This is not so suitable to what follows.] 'but what they *do* like is either no evil at all, or less than the good (ensuing): and this (the latter of the two preceding) will be the case, when (for instance) the penalty (which is attached to some illicit gain or advantage) is either unfelt (λανθάνῃ, escapes *your* notice, not the notice of *others*,) or trifling'. In both of these cases the profit, or good, is greater than the loss, or evil.

§ 28. καὶ τὰ ἴδια] Things or qualities, special and peculiar, not shared by the rest of the world in general, such as personal gifts, graces, or accomplishments: anything that *distinguishes* a man from the mass. Of the three kinds of ἴδια distinguished in Top. A 5, 102 *a* 18—30 (ἴδιον proper, the fourth predicable, *proprium*), these are ἴδια ἁπλῶς; the second, are not absolutely and at all times ἴδια, but only at particular times, under particular circumstances of time, ποτέ; the third class, to which those

8—2

τιμὴ γὰρ οὕτω μᾶλλον. καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα αὐτοῖς· τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύνα-

here spoken of belong, are 'relative' ἴδια, ἴδια πρός τι, special and peculiar, i. e., in this case, to a few men as compared with the rest.

ἃ μηδεὶς (ἄλλος ἔχει)] This is only a particular case of the preceding: in *that* the advantage is shared by few, in *this* the possessor stands alone. Anything excessively rare or unique, as a coin, a tulip, a piece of china, a book, may acquire a special value from this circumstance. Comp. Magn. Mor. B 7, 1205 *b* 29, τὸ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν οὐκ ἀγαθόν. This feeling is characteristic of ambition, τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ φιλοτιμοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ φιλοτιμίας οἰκεῖόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ φιλοτιμός ἐστιν ὁ μόνος βουλόμενος ἔχειν καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν.

περιττά] 'things that are singular, preeminent, specially distinguished' amongst their fellows or congeners, or among things of the same sort, 'for by this they obtain greater credit'. περιττός is 'odd[1], singular, striking, remarkable'. From περί, 'over and above', 'exceeding', (Homer, περὶ δ' ἄλλων φασὶ γενέσθαι, περὶ μὲν Δαναῶν,) the derivative περιττός passes into the metaphorical sense of surpassing, preeminent, standing out from the rest, out of the common way, extraordinary. This signification of the word will be found illustrated in the Lexicons. Add to these, as marked examples of some of its various significations, Eur. Hippol. 437, 445, 948. Ar. Pol. II 6, 1265 *a* 10, in the well-known passage on Plato's style, Ib. VIII (V) 10, 1312 *a* 27, πράξεως περιττῆς (extraordinary, signal) καὶ δι' ἣν ὀνομαστοὶ γίγνονται καὶ γνώριμοι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ib. II 8 init. of Hippodamus of Miletus, that he became περιττότερος 'rather odd, eccentric, extravagant', in his dress and habits. Top. Z 4, 141 *b* 13, ἀκριβὴς καὶ περιττὴ διάνοια. Metaph. I 2, 1053 *b* 3, of Protagoras' dictum, (πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος), οὐθὲν δὴ λέγων περιττὸν φαίνεταί τι λέγειν, Rhet. II 15, 3, Probl. XXX 1 init. περιττοί ('distinguished' in any art or science) φαίνονται μελαγχολικοὶ ὄντες. (Waitz, on Top. Γ 2, 118 *a* 6, illustrates other senses of the word in Aristotle.) Of excellence of style, Dion. de Comp. Verb. c. 3, *bis*, sub init. et sub fin. From περί again, in the sense of 'over and above, exceeding', comes περιττός as applied to an 'odd' number; the supposition on which the name is based being, that the ἄρτιος ἀριθμός, or even number, was the primary number—2 was in fact considered as the first arithmetical number, 1 being the principle of unity—the odd number is an *addition* to or excess over the other, the next step in advance.

The three kinds of good just enumerated are all repeated in c. 9. 25, 26, under the head of καλόν. As 'goods' they are in fact all of them of the specially 'questionable' sort', ἀμφισβητήσιμα; supr. § 17.

τὰ ἁρμόττοντα] 'suitable, appropriate', specially applicable or belonging to them.

τὰ προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύναμιν] 'things that naturally belong to them, or are due to them in respect of birth and power'.

[1] 'Odd' in early English is sometimes employed by a similar metaphorical application to denote superiority to others, striking excellence. 'For our tyme the odde man to performe all three perfitlie,...is in my poor opinion Joannes Sturmius'. Ascham, *Scholemaster*, p. 113 (Mayor's ed.). Richardson has omitted to notice this use of 'odd' in his Dictionary.

μιν, καὶ ὧν ἐλλείπειν οἴονται, κἂν μικρὰ ᾖ· οὐδὲν γὰρ
29 *ἧττον προαιροῦνται ταῦτα πράττειν. καὶ τὰ εὐκατέργαστα· δυνατὰ γὰρ ὡς ῥᾴδια· εὐκατέργαστα δὲ ἃ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ ὅμοιοι ἢ οἱ ἥττους κατώρθωσαν. καὶ ἃ χαριοῦνται τοῖς φίλοις, ἢ ἃ ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. καὶ ὅσα οὓς θαυμάζουσι προαιροῦνται*

ὧν ἐλλείπειν οἴονται] *ἐλλείπειν* with genitive, 'to come short of, be deficient in'. 'And anything men think wanting to them, as appropriate, or suitable to their condition' (a second case of *τὰ ἁρμόττοντα*), 'however trifling', (they regard as a good, and eagerly pursue it): 'for none the less for *that* (*διὰ τὸ μικρὰ εἶναι*) do they choose (deliberately purpose) to do it'; i. e. to *do* things, to act, so as to attain their end. So Victorius, who illustrates the topic by Hor. Sat. II 6, 8, *O si angulus ille proximus accedat qui nunc denormat agellum.* If this is right, as I suppose it is, *προαιροῦνται πράττειν* is carelessly written for *ζητοῦσιν* or *ἐπιθυμοῦσιν*, or *ἐφίενται*, or some verb that would imply the object of action, and not the mere action itself.

§ 29. The things mentioned in this and the following section all of them designate what is considered good because *men like to do it.*

τὰ εὐκατέργαστα] 'things easily effected, or easy achievements', are considered as good, because they are possible, by the rule §§ 26, 27; they belong to the *second* class of things 'possible', such as are 'easy'.

κατώρθωσαν] aor. '*ever* succeeded in'; or indicating the notion of 'habit' which the verb *ὀρθοῦν* and its compounds acquire. The secondary and metaphorical signification of safety and success, from the notion of going through a career, as a race, erect and in an upright position, without stumble or fall, is well illustrated by the following passages of Sophocles, Electr. 741, *καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους πάντας ἀσφαλεῖς δρόμους ὠρθοῦθ' ὁ τλήμων ὀρθὸς ἐξ ὀρθῶν δίφρων.* Oed. Col. 394, *Ismene, νῦν γὰρ θεοί σ' ὀρθοῦσι, πρόσθε δ' ὤλλυσαν. Oed. γέροντα δ' ὀρθοῦν φλαῦρον ὃς νέος πέσῃ.*

ἃ χαριοῦνται τοῖς φίλοις] 'anything by which one will oblige one's friends'. *ἃ* cognate accus. for *ἃς χάριτας*. In obliging a friend you may be said to oblige yourself, a true friend being *ἕτερος αὐτός*: Eth. N. IX 9, sub init. Ib. 1170 *b* 7. Ib. c. 4, 1166 *a* 31, *προς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτόν, ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός.*

ἃ ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς] 'or by which one may shew one's hostility to (offend or annoy) one's enemy'. As before, *ἃς ἀπεχθείας ἀπεχθ. τ. ἐχθροῖς. ἀπεχθάνεσθαι πρός τινα*, or *τινί*, is 'to make oneself odious or hostile to', 'to quarrel with', or 'to disoblige, offend, annoy'. Compare *διαβάλλεσθαι πρός*, in Plato, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Aristotle, to have a hostile feeling towards one, to be set against him, to quarrel with him (from *διαβάλλειν*, to set two people at variance, to engender animosity and ill feeling between them, and hence to give one an ill opinion of the other, and so, finally, to calumniate). Both of these, men think good and right, and proper objects of pursuit.

θαυμάζειν, 'to look up to, respect, reverence, admire'. Valck. ad

πράττειν. καὶ πρὸς ἃ εὐφυεῖς εἰσι καὶ ἔμπειροι· ῥᾷον γὰρ κατορθώσειν οἴονται. καὶ ἃ μηδεὶς φαῦλος· ἐπαινετὰ γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦντες τυγχάνουσιν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡδὺ ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον φαίνεται. καὶ μάλιστα ἕκαστοι πρὸς ἃ τοιοῦτοι, οἷον οἱ φιλόνικοι P. 1363 *b*. p. 23. *εἰ νίκη ἔσται, οἱ φιλότιμοι εἰ τιμή, οἱ φιλοχρήματοι εἰ χρήματα, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὡσαύτως.*

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἐκ τούτων
1 *ληπτέον τὰς πίστεις· ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις ὁμολογοῦν-* CHAP. VII.

Hippol. 106. Ar. Rhet. II 6. 15, 16, 24. Aristoph. Nub. 180, 428, *ἡμᾶς τιμῶν καὶ θαυμάζων*. Ran. 1008, *alibi*. Isocr. Areop. *ter* &c.

εὐφυεῖς] 'clever', § 15, note on p. 105. Comp. c. II 28, Probl. XVIII 6, there quoted.

ἔμπειροι] those who have *acquired* skill by practice and experience, distinguished from the naturally clever and dexterous. Success, the attainment of one's object, in any practice or occupation for which any one has either a natural talent or an acquired aptitude, is regarded as a good, because it is more *easily* attained, § 27; 'more easily', either than by others who are not so skilful, or than in other pursuits and practices.

ἃ μηδεὶς φαῦλος] (*οὐδείς*, no definite particular person; *μηδείς*, no indefinite person, no man *whatever*); sub. *πραξείεν ἄν*. 'Hinc ducto argumento, apud Euripidem quidam divitias non se movere dixit, quas etiam saepe improbissimi homines facillime consecuti sunt: Fragm. Aeol. 14 (5, Dind.) *μὴ πλοῦτον εἴπῃς· οὐχὶ θαυμάζω θεὸν ὃν χὠ κάκιστος ῥᾳδίως ἐκτήσατο*'. Victorius.

ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον] All objects of *desire* are supposed to be good, all *αἱρετά*, and *ὧν ἐφίενται*, § 2. The desire of a thing therefore implies not only that the satisfaction of it will give you pleasure, but also that you suppose it (*φαίνεται*) to be good.

§ 30. *καὶ μάλιστα ἕκαστοι* (*ἀγαθὰ ἡγοῦνται ταῦτα*) *πρὸς ἃ τοιοῦτοι*] 'to which they are so and so', disposed in such and such a way. In the parallel passages of the Ethics this is expressed by *φιλοτοιοῦτοι*. Eth. N. I 9, 1099 *a* 8, *ἑκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ*. Ib. III 13, 1118 *b* 22, *τῶν φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων*. Ib. IV 10, 1125 *b* 15, *πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου*.

CHAP. VII.

The *κοινὸς τόπος* of *μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον* or degree applied to *τὸ συμφέρον*, expediency. Most of the special topics of this chapter are derived from, or at all events coincide with, those of the third book of the Dialectical Topics. Brandis, *über Ar. Rhet. ap. Schneidewin's Philologus*, IV 1. pp. 14, 15, infers from certain slight differences of the mode of treatment, in the case of two or three of these topics in the two works, the later composition of the

τες ἄμφω συμφέρειν περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη λεκτέον περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ
2 τοῦ μᾶλλον συμφέροντος. ἔστω δὴ ὑπερέχον μὲν τοσοῦτον καὶ ἔτι, ὑπερεχόμενον δὲ τὸ ἐνυπάρχον. καὶ μεῖζον μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ πλεῖον πρὸς ἔλαττον, μέγα δὲ

Rhetoric; but in this latter work the references, tacit or acknowledged, to the Topics, are so numerous and so precise, that we do not need this indirect evidence to establish the point. The passages to be compared are, Top. Γ 2, 117 *a* 11, with Rhet. I 6. 3, and 7. 5; Top. Γ 3, 118 *b* 20, with Rhet. I 7. 36; Top. Γ 1, 116 *a* 29, and 6. 8, with Rhet. I 7. 8. Cicero, Topic. XVIII 68—70, in a passage too long to quote here, enumerates the topics of *Comparatio*, following Aristotle very closely: most of Aristotle's topics of this chapter are found in Cicero's list. The topics of comparison fall under four general heads. *Comparantur igitur ea quae aut maiora aut minora aut paria dicuntur: in quibus spectantur haec, numerus, species, vis, quaedam etiam ad res aliquas affectio;* which are there severally illustrated at length. First, some general principles are laid down; then we are referred back to c. 6. 2, for the various definitions of good; and then, (from § 3 to the end of the chapter), these general principles and definitions are applied to the determination of cases, special τόποι or εἴδη, of comparison of two good things, so as to shew which of them in each case is the greater.

§ 1. ἄμφω] 'both'—of two things, left to be understood.

§ 2. ἔστω] See note on c. 5. 3, 6. 2, 10. 3.

ὑπερέχον—ὑπερεχόμενον] 'Hae definitiones possunt declarari duabus lineis parallelis, quarum una ultra alteram protenditur: item numeris, e.g. 6 et 9. Maior enim sive linea sive numerus et aequat minorem et excurrit: minor vero inest in maiori.' Schrader. On the passive form ὑπερέχεσθαι, see Appendix (B) *On the irregular passive* (at the end of the notes to this Book).

τοσοῦτον καὶ ἔτι] 'so much and something over'.

τὸ ἐνυπάρχον] 'that which is contained or included in the other'.

καὶ μεῖζον μὲν ἀεὶ κ.τ.λ.] That all 'quantity', and all terms that express it, μέγα μικρόν, πολὺ ὀλίγον, are relative, πρός τι, we learn from the Categories, c. 6, 5 *b* 15—29, of which this passage is a summary repetition. The same thing, as a mountain or a grain of millet, when compared with two different things, is called great or little, greater or less—and so of 'many' and 'few'. None of them is absolute αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό: all of them are relative to something else, with which they are compared, πρός τι, πρὸς ἕτερον.

"And 'greater' and 'more' have always reference to a 'less', and 'much' and 'little'[1] to the average, magnitude (τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος, the object to which the term is applied being thereby compared with

[1] If πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον are here intended to include 'many' and 'few', πολλοὶ καὶ ὀλίγοι, as they most probably are, since they occur in the Categories and are wanted to complete the list, we must extend the τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος to number, πλῆθος, as well as magnitude.

καὶ μικρὸν καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον πρὸς τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος, καὶ ὑπερέχον μὲν τὸ μέγα, τὸ δὲ ἐλλεῖπον
3 *μικρόν, καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον ὡσαύτως. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν τό τε αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου αἱρετόν, καὶ οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, καὶ ὃ νοῦν ἂν καὶ φρόνησιν λαβόντα ἕλοιτο, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ φυλακτικόν, ἢ ᾧ ἕπεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ τέλος ἐστί, τέλος δ' ἐστὶν οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ ἄλλα, αὑτῷ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πρὸς αὑτὸ ταῦτα πεπονθός, ἀνάγκη τά τε πλείω τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων,*

its congeners, as a mountain or man with the average, *τοῖς πολλοῖς*, of mountains and men, in order to estimate its size): and that which is called 'great' exceeds (this average ordinary size), whilst that which falls short of it is called 'small', and 'much' and 'little' in like manner[1].

§ 3. The following definitions of good are repeated from c. 6. 2, with a few trifling alterations. This section is translated, and the illogical character of the construction explained, in Introd. pp. 177—8.

αὑτῷ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πρὸς αὑτὸ ταῦτα πεπονθός] This clause contrasts the notion of good in itself, *καθ' αὑτό*, here expressed by the dative *αὑτῷ* 'to', or, 'for and by itself', with good as the universal *τέλος*, the object of all men's aims and aspirations. Schrader, Vater, Buhle, and Bonitz (*Aristotelische Studien*, I p. 89), are in favour of *αὐτῷ* and *αὐτόν*, which would thus contrast 'good to the individual with good in general'. Eth. N. VII 13, init. *ἀγαθὸν διχῶς, τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς, τὸ δέ τινι.* Top. Γ 1, 116 *b* 8, *τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τινὶ αἱρετώτερον.* This use of the pronoun is quite in conformity with ordinary Aristotelian usage, as *infra* § 35, *τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἁπλῶς*, and frequently elsewhere. Vater says that the Greek Scholiast gives *αὐτῷ* as well as *αὐτό*: and Bonitz adds that Muretus' rendering, *cuique autem bonum id quod ita est affectum ad ipsum*, shews that he followed this reading. Nevertheless it appears that there is no manuscript authority for the change, and Bekker and Spengel have retained *αὑτῷ* and *αὑτό*.

ἀνάγκη...μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι] Top. Γ 2, 117 *a* 16, *ἔτι τὰ πλείω ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων (αἱρετώτερα), ἢ ἁπλῶς, ἢ ὅταν τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις ἐνυπάρχῃ, τὰ ἐλάττω ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν.* Two *ἐνστάσεις* ('reprehensions of the fallax' Bacon calls them, *Colours of Good and Evil*), objections, or instances opposed to the universal validity of this rule, are next given: (1) when one thing is done for the sake of another, to attain a certain end, as getting well, healthy practices for the sake of health; in this case the two together are in no way preferable to health alone: (2) and things not good accom-

[1] Gaisford refers to Harris, *Philosophical Arrangements* ('arrangements' mean collections of notions under general heads; and the 'arrangements' that he treats of are Aristotle's *summa genera*, or Categories), ch. 9 p. 191. Harris merely repeats what Aristotle had already said in his Categories to which Gaisford does *not* refer.

συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ὑπερέχει γάρ, τὸ δὲ ἐνυπάρχον ὑπερέ-
4 χεται. καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχῃ, καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν· καὶ ὅσα αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου· οἷον εἰ ὁ μέγιστος ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς τῆς μεγίστης μείζων, καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἄνδρες τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους· καὶ εἰ οἱ ἄνδρες ὅλως τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους, καὶ ἀνὴρ ὁ μέγιστος τῆς μεγίστης γυναικὸς μείζων· ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχουσιν αἱ ὑπεροχαὶ

panied by a single good (so Waitz), *may* be preferable to several good things, as happiness, in conjunction with something not good, to justice and courage together, *καὶ ταῦτα μεθ' ἡδονῆς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς (αἱρετώτερά ἐστιν) καὶ ταὐτὰ μετ' ἀλυπίας ἢ μετὰ λύπης.*

ὑπερέχει γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] On *ὑπεροχή* as a test of excellence, besides other topics of this chapter, comp. c. 9, 25, 39, Eth. N. IV 8 init. there quoted. The opposition of the active and passive, superiority and inferiority, occurs Eth. N. ib. 1124 *b* 10, *τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου.*

§ 4. *καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχῃ κ.τ.λ.*] Top. Γ 2, 117 *b* 33, *ἔτι εἰ ἁπλῶς τοῦτο τούτου βέλτιον, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον τῶν ἐν τούτῳ βέλτιον τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ βελτίστου, οἷον εἰ βέλτιον ἄνθρωπος ἵππου, καὶ ὁ βέλτιστος ἄνθρωπος τοῦ βελτίστου ἵππου βελτίων. καὶ εἰ τὸ βέλτιστον τοῦ βελτίστου βέλτιον, καὶ ἁπλῶς τοῦτο τούτου βέλτιον, οἷον εἰ ὁ βέλτιστος ἄνθρωπος τοῦ βελτίστου ἵππου βελτίων, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἄνθρωπος ἵππου βελτίων.* A practical application of this rule occurs in Pol. IV (VII) 1, 1323 *b* 13, *ὅλως τε δῆλον ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἑκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, ἥνπερ εἴληχε διάστασιν ὧν φαμὲν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος τιμιώτερον καὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν ἀναγκὴ καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἑκάστου ἀνάλογον τούτων ἔχειν.*

ἀνάλογον ἔχουσιν] 'are proportional to one another'.

In Bacon's *Colours of Good and Evil*[1], ('a table of colours or appearances of good and evil and their degrees, as places of persuasion and dissuasion, and their several fallaxes, and the elenches of them',) this topic is given in the form, *cuius excellentia vel exuperantia melior id toto genere melius.* 'This appearance, though it seem of strength, and rather logical than rhetorical, yet is very oft a fallax'; and he proceeds accordingly to 'reprehend' it. Bacon's works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, vol. VII. p. 78. He certainly proves the non-universality of the rule; but by the theory of Rhetoric all these positions are alike open to question, and can always be argued on either side.

[1] Some of the topics selected for 'reprehension' are identical with those of Aristotle, and probably borrowed from him. The meaning of the word 'Colours' in this application is thus explained by Erasmus, *Adagia*, s.v. *fucus*, p. 1915, "Qui ad exornationes atque figuras se conferunt apud Gallos proverbio dicuntur 'rhetoricis coloribus' uti: hoc est, fucatis pigmentis, quibus nihil ineptius si bonis sententiis non fuerint conjuncta". And by Bacon himself in his preface.

5 τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτοῖς. καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν τῷδε ἕπηται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τούτῳ μή· ἕπεται δὲ ἢ τῷ ἅμα ἢ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἢ τῇ δυνάμει· ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις ἡ τοῦ ἑπομένου ἐν τῇ θατέρου. ἕπεται δὲ ἅμα μὲν τῷ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν, τούτῳ δὲ ἐκεῖνο οὔ, ὕστερον δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, δυνάμει δὲ τῷ ἱεροσυλεῖν τὸ ἀποστερεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἱεροσυλήσας κἂν

§ 5. *καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν τῷδε ἕπηται κ.τ.λ.*] 'and whensoever one thing 'follows' (i.e. attends upon, always *accompanies* it, in one of its five senses) 'another, but not reciprocally (or conversely, the other does not always follow *it*)'. Any good A, which is necessarily accompanied by another good B, where the converse does not hold, must be the greater of the two; because the one (A) always implies the presence of B, and includes the use of it, whereas this is not always true of the converse; and when there is no such reciprocal consequence A must be superior to B. Let A and B be health and life; life invariably accompanies health, but health by no means invariably accompanies life: and therefore *from this point of view* health may be regarded as superior to life.

ἕπεται δὲ ἢ τῷ ἅμα κ.τ.λ.] On the various senses of *ἕπεσθαι* and *ἀκολουθεῖν* see note on c. 6, 3.

δυνάμει· ἐνυπάρχει γάρ κ.τ.λ.] 'Potential concomitance or accompaniment', is explained as 'the inherence, (i.e. the virtual existence, which may be developed into actual, active, existence, or realized, *ἐνεργείᾳ*,) of the use or practice of the consequent or concomitant in the other', that namely which it accompanies. The higher crime of sacrilege or temple robbing, for instance, necessarily implies, virtually contains, the lower crime of simple theft or fraud (cheating[1]), the lower habit always accompanies, but not necessarily in a state of activity, the higher, and is included in it: *omne maius continet in se minus.* Or thus, the use of cheating, fraud, resides, is included in, sacrilege, not actually, in a fully developed realized state, *ἐνεργείᾳ*, but in a dormant state, latent; it is a faculty or capacity, always ready and liable to be developed into actual sacrilege.

The use of the general topic of 'consequence' is explained, Top Γ 2, 117 *a* 5, *ἔτι ὅταν δύο τινὰ ᾖ σφόδρα αὐτοῖς παραπλήσια καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα ὑπεροχὴν μηδεμίαν συνιδεῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον, ὁρᾶν ἀπὸ τῶν παρεπομένων· ᾧ γὰρ ἕπεται μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦθ' αἱρετώτερον. ἂν δ' ᾖ τὰ ἑπόμενα κακά, ᾧ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀκολουθεῖ κακόν, τοῦθ' αἱρετώτερον. ὄντων γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων αἱρετῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει δυσχερές τι παρέπεσθαι. διχῶς δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἕπεσθαι ἡ σκέψις κ.τ.λ.* See note, c. 6, 3.

[1] *ἀποστερεῖν* is properly 'to defraud or cheat', and especially applied to keeping back a deposit. Rhet. II 6. 3, *τὸ ἀποστερῆσαι παρακατάθηκην.* Gaisf. quotes Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 373, *ἀποστερῶ ἐστὶν ὅταν παρακαταθήκην παραλαβὼν εἰς διαβολὴν χωρήσω καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλω διδόναι αὐτῷ ἃ ἔλαβον.* [See Shilleto's note on Thuc. I 69, 1. S.]

6 ἀποστερήσειεν. καὶ τὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ μείζονι
7 μείζω· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑπερέχειν καὶ τοῦ μείζονος· καὶ p. 24.
τὰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὰ μείζω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τὸ μείζονος ποιητικῷ εἶναι. καὶ οὗ τὸ ποιητικὸν μεῖζον,

§ 6. *καὶ τὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ.*] 'anything which (all that, *plural*) exceeds the same thing by a greater amount (than a third thing) is the greater (of the two); because it must exceed the greater also (i. e. as well as the less)'. This with the mere substitution of *μεῖζον* for *αἱρετώτερον* is taken from Top. Γ 3, 118 *b* 3, *ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ δύο τινὰ τινὸς εἴη αἱρετώτερα, τὸ μᾶλλον αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ἧττον αἱρετωτέρου αἱρετώτερον.* Let A be 9, B 6, and C 3. A (9) exceeds C (3) by a greater amount than that by which B (6) exceeds it, A therefore must be greater than B—*must* be (*ἀνάγκη*), because, by the hypothesis, it is greater than the greater of the other two. This is certainly not a good *argument*, though the fact is true, and the application easy: and yet I think it is what Aristotle must have meant. There is no various reading, and no suspicion of corruption. The interpretation is that of Schrader, the most logical of the Commentators on the Rhetoric. And it seems, as the text stands, the only possible explanation. The fact at all events is true; and the only objection to the explanation is that the *γάρ*, which professes to give the reason, does in fact merely repeat in other words the substance of the preceding proposition. I believe that Aristotle, in framing his topic, *meant* by the first clause to state the fact, and by the second to give, as he thought, the reason: and that the expression actually adopted is one of the very numerous evidences of haste and carelessness in his writings. On the application of the topic, see Introd. p. 180.

§ 7. *καὶ τὰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὰ κ.τ.λ.*] 'Eundem hunc locum commutatis verbis exponit in III Topicorum c. 1 (116 *b* 26), *ἔτι δύο ποιητικῶν ὄντων, οὗ τὸ τέλος βέλτιον καὶ αὐτὸ βέλτιον.* Ad haec verba Alex. Aphrod. p. 125, *ἀσαφῶς εἴρηται διὰ βραχύτητα· ὁ τόπος δ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος· εἰ δύο εἴη τινὰ δύο τελῶν ποιητικά, οὗ τὸ τέλος βέλτιον καὶ αἱρετώτερον καὶ αὐτὸ βέλτιον. οὕτως παιδεία γυμνασίων δεικνύοιτ' ἂν ἀμείνων, εἴ γε γυμνάσια μὲν ὑγιείας ἐστὶ ποιητικά, παιδεία δὲ φρονήσεως, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ φρόνησις τῆς ὑγιείας αἱρετώτερον· πάλιν τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι αἱρετώτερον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλούτου, τὸ δὲ ὑγιείας ποιητικόν, βέλτιον δ' ἡ ὑγίεια πλούτου.*' Victorius.

τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν] 'this is what was meant by', this *is* what *was* (said to be) good; viz. in § 3.

τὸ...ποιητικῷ εἶναι] On this Aristotelian formula which denotes the abstract conception of a thing by the mind, as opposed to its actual existence as an object of sense, see Trendel. *de Anima*, p. 471 seq. and on I 1, 2; II 1, 8, also in *Rheinisches Museum* 1828, Vol. II 457 seq., *Kategorienlehre*, p. 35 with reff. in note, and Waitz, *Organ.* Vol. II p. 386. The distinction, which is nowhere expressly stated, is, as may be gathered from numerous passages, the following: *τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι universam esse notionem, qua res constituitur, a materia avocatam, universa cogitatione conceptam*—the *λόγος* of the thing—*τὸ μέγεθος vero ad singula quaeque pertinere quae sub sensus cadant.* Metaph. Z 15, 1039 *b* 25, *οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ*

ὡσαύτως· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ἡδέος καὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τῆς ἡδονῆς μείζων.
8 *καὶ τὸ αἱρετώτερον καθ' αὑτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ' αὑτό, οἷον*

οἰκίᾳ εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῇδε τῇ οἰκίᾳ. Anal. Post. II 4, 91 *b* 5, *ἀληθὲς γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ζῴῳ εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ πάντα ἄνθρωπον ζῷον, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε ἓν εἶναι.* Phys. I 3, 4, *οὔτε γὰρ τῇ συνεχείᾳ ἓν ἔσται τὸ λευκὸν οὔτε τῷ λόγῳ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἔσται τὸ εἶναι λευκῷ κ.τ.λ.* It abounds in the de Anima. Why and when Aristotle employs it, and whether the distinction is always necessary and appropriate, are questions that I will not undertake to answer. [*Index Aristotelicus*, p. 221 *a* 34—40; p. 764 *a* 50—p. 765 *a* 6. S.]

The Syntax of the phrase, which only Trendelenburg, as far as I know, has attempted to explain[1], seems to be this:—The dative is in apposition with a supposed *τινί, τό τινι εἶναι μεγέθει*, and the construction is analogous to *ὥστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν*, I 10, 18. Other instances of a similar use of the dative, which lead up to the explanation of this, are such as Thuc. I 24, *ἐν δεξιᾷ ἐσπλέοντι τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον*: and others are to be found in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 388.

καὶ οὗ τὸ ποιητικὸν μεῖζον ὡσαύτως] 'and that of which the productive agent or producing cause is of a higher order, (superior), follows the same rule', viz. that the product or result of the superior cause or agent is superior in a comparison between two. If wholesome food and exercise which produce health are more desirable and therefore superior to things which are merely pleasant, then the result of the former, health, is superior to the result of the latter, pleasure.

§ 8. *καὶ τὸ αἱρετώτερον καθ' αὑτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ' αὑτό*] Top. Γ 1, 116 *a* 29 *καὶ τὸ δι' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον αἱρετοῦ αἱρετώτερον, οἷον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δι' αὑτὸ αἱρετόν, τὸ δὲ δι' ἕτερον.* And again, Ib. *b* 8, *καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τινὶ αἱρετώτερον, οἷον τὸ ὑγιάζεσθαι τοῦ τέμνεσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τινὶ τῷ δεομένῳ τῆς τομῆς.* These two though differing in expression seem to be reducible to the same head, and, from the *examples* given, applicable to the same cases: for the absolute good is that which is in itself desirable, and conversely; and *τέμνε-*

[1] Trendel. in *Rhein. Mus.* 1828, Vol. II p. 481—3. The author, who has discussed with great learning and ingenuity the meaning of this Aristotelian technicality, and its relation to *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*, is, it seems to me, less successful in his grammatical explanation. I think that from the analogy of similar constructions of this dative in the ordinary language, the use of it here must needs be a case of *attraction*, as I have explained it in the note. Trendelenburg, who takes nothing into account but the possible meanings of the dative (or, as he rightly prefers to call it, the 'acceptive') case, locative, instrumental, acceptive, selects the last of the three as that which belongs to the dative in this phrase. *τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι* express, according to him, 'the abstract conception (*τὸ εἶναι*) belonging to (given to and received by) magnitude': making this dative depend solely upon *εἶναι*, and leaving out the attraction to a word in the dative, actually or hypothetically preceding, as in any way concerned in the 'government' of it. This is all that I have to object to in Trendelenburg's paper: in the rest he has shewn the same ability and intimate knowledge of his author which characterizes all his other writings upon Aristotle.

ἰσχὺς ὑγιεινοῦ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ P. 1364.
9 αὑτοῦ, ὅπερ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθόν. κἂν ᾖ τὸ μὲν τέλος, τὸ δὲ μὴ τέλος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ,
10 οἷον τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι τοῦ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα. καὶ τὸ ἧττον προσδεόμενον θατέρου ἢ ἑτέρων· αὐταρκέστερον γάρ· ἧττον δὲ προσδεῖται τὸ ἐλαττόνων ἢ ῥᾳόνων
11 προσδεόμενον. καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν ἄνευ τοῦδε μὴ ᾖ ἢ μὴ δυνατὸν ᾖ γενέσθαι, θάτερον δὲ ἄνευ τούτου· αὐ-

σθαι the example in the second case of particular good, is only good as the means to an end, δι' ἕτερον.

ἰσχὺς ὑγιεινοῦ] strength is more desirable in itself; the 'wholesome' only as the means to an end, health. Strength is considered by Aristotle not as *absolutely* desirable αἱρετὸν καθ' αὑτό, but only relatively to other things—'*more* desirable in itself than many others.' Brandis, *Philologus*, IV, i, p. 44.

ὅπερ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθόν] ἦν, § 7. The reference is to 6 § 2 p. 97.

§ 9. κἂν ᾖ τὸ μὲν τέλος κ.τ.λ.] Top. Γ 1, 116 *b* 22, καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος αἱρετώτερον δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ δυοῖν τὸ ἔγγιον τοῦ τέλους. The end, the ultimate object of your aims, must always be more desirable than the means which are only serviceable for the attainment of that end, as health and exercise.

§ 10. τὸ ἧττον προσδεόμενον θατέρου ἢ ἑτέρων] 'that which less stands in need of any subsidiary aid' (to make it a good), 'either of *the* other' (when two things are brought into comparison, as wealth and health,) 'or of *other* things (in general)'. A topic, which may be brought under this of the Rhetoric, but is not identical with it, occurs in Top. Γ 2, 117 *a* 37, where justice is preferred to courage on the ground of its comparative αὐτάρκεια, though this word is not there employed. Victorius quotes in illustration Virgil's comparison of the 'olive' and 'vine'. Georg. II 421, 2 and 428. (Victorius has here quoted from memory, and forgotten the original. It is not the 'vine' but '*poma*', of which is said, *vi propria nituntur opisque haud indiga nostrae;* and the example is hardly in point. The note is cited by Gaisford without remark).

αὐταρκέστερον] 'it makes a nearer approach to independence, self-sufficiency': appealing to the definitions of good in c. 6, 2, of which τὸ αὔταρκες is one. On αὐτάρκεια, note on c. 5, 3, ἡ δ' αὐτάρκεια τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. Pol. I 2, 1253 *a* 1.

ῥᾳόνων] 'easier' to do or to get, to effect or procure, πράττειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ κτήσασθαι.

§ 11. καὶ ὅταν κ.τ.λ.] 'and any case in which one thing cannot exist or be obtained (by acquisition or production) without some other, but the other can without it'. As agriculture, compared with the other arts, Xen. Œcon. V. 17 (Victorius). Corn. Nep. Thrasyb. I 3, *Peloponnesio bello multa Thrasybulus sine Alcibiade gessit, ille nullam rem sine hoc.* Schrader. He also quotes from Plutarch, Apothegm. Reg. § 84, a saying of Agesilaus about the superiority of justice to virtue; it is the same example as occurs in the Topics (quoted on § 10) Γ 2, 117 *a* 39.

ταρκέστερον δὲ τὸ μὴ δεόμενον, ὥστε φαίνεται μεῖζον
12 ἀγαθόν. κἂν ᾖ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή. κἂν ᾖ αἴτιον,

§ 12. κἂν ᾖ ἀρχή] supply τὸ μέν, and with αἴτιον in the following topic. On the omission, see Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 288, Obs. 4.

ἀρχή] in this topic, is used in its most general and popular sense, an 'origin', or 'beginning', or 'source'. In this sense it may be regarded as the fountain of all good. ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν (ἡ εὐδαιμονία) καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον ἐτίθεμεν (Eth. N. I. 13 ult.). God himself is an ἀρχή (Metaph. A 2, 983 *a* 8, ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἀρχή τις). The free will, one of the ὀρέξεις or impulsive faculties, the origin of motion in the human subject, and of moral action, the ἀρχὴ πράξεως, is an ἀρχή: the importance of this, as the origin of human action and the ground of moral responsibility, in moral philosophy and practical life, may be estimated by the perusal of the first seven chapters of the third book of the Nicom. Ethics. It is more comprehensive than αἴτιον; ἀρχαί are not *all* causes, (see in the following note), and therefore the two may be distinguished, as they are in these two topics. An origin or beginning necessarily implies that something follows, a consequence; it leads to something: in this respect it is 'greater', more important, superior to, anything that is *not* a beginning or origin, which leads to nothing. Plat. Rep. II 377 A, οὐκοῦν οἶσθ' ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον; μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσιν (αἱ ἀρχαί) ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἑπόμενα, Eth. Nic. I 7, sub fin. And the same applies to αἴτιον in the following topic. These two topics are well illustrated in Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4), 10, 11.

The importance of an ἀρχή for good or for evil is recognized by several proverbs. On the one side we have ἀρχὴ ἥμισυ παντός, (quoted in Demetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας § 122, ἀρχὴ δέ τοι ἥμισυ παντός,) Arist. Eth. N. I 7 ult. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, Pol. VIII (V) 4, 1303 *b* 29, ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἥμισυ εἶναι παντός, de Soph. El. c. 34, 183 *b* 22, μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντὸς ὥσπερ λέγεται. Erasm., *Adag.* 29, quotes Soph. Fr. Inc. (715, Dind.) ap. Plut. Mor. p. 16 A, ἔργον δὲ παντὸς ἤν τις ἄρχηται καλῶς, καὶ τὰς τελευτὰς εἰκός ἐσθ' οὕτως ἔχειν, *Anglice* 'Well begun is half done'. *Dimidium facti qui coepit habet*, Hor. Ep. I 2, 40. The first step: *Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coute*, see Rhet. II 19, 5, and note. On the other side, the importance of the ἀρχή in respect of the tendency to evil, we have Ovid's well-known line, become proverbial, Rem. Am. 91, *Principiis obsta, sero medicina paratur.* Fast. I 178, *Omina principiis, inquit* (Phoebus), *inesse solent.* (This is indifferent as to the issue.) Herodotus, after mention of the twenty ships which the Athenians on the solicitation of Aristagoras sent in aid of the Ionians, concludes the chapter, V 97, with the emphatic words, αὗται δὲ αἱ νέες, ἀρχὴ κακῶν ἐγένοντο Ἕλλησί τε καὶ βαρβάροισι. This phrase became proverbial, see Rhet. III 11, 7 *bis*, and Isocr. Paneg. § 119, there quoted.

On the different senses of ἀρχή in the Aristotelian philosophy consult Metaph Δ 1, where they are enumerated and distinguished; and Bonitz's *Commentary*. They are thus summed up; πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι ὅθεν ἢ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ γιγνώσκεται· τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν

τὸ δ' οὐκ αἴτιον, διὰ τὸ αὐτό· ἄνευ γὰρ αἰτίου καὶ

ἐνυπάρχουσαί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ ἐκτός, 1013 *a* 17. 'Ἀρχαί are 'origins', heads or starting-points, of a series, of three kinds; (1) of being, οὐσία[1], (2) of generation or growth, γένεσις, and (3) of knowledge, γνῶσις. ἄνευ γὰρ αἰτίου καὶ ἀρχῆς ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, Rhet. I 7, 12. The six senses in which ἀρχή may be employed are all reducible to these three. Of these some are inherent (as the στοιχεῖον, the mathematical point, the origin of the line, or the starting-point of anything, that out of which it grows and is developed[2]; the keel of a vessel, the foundation of a house; in animals the heart or the brain, or any other part which has been assumed to be the original seat of life); some external, the origin of motion or change, (as father and mother, of child; abusive language[3], of a fight; or again the human will or deliberate purpose, and intellect, προαίρεσις and διάνοια[4], in the case of 'governments' [ἀρχαί] and arts, all of which set things in motion and produce change). The origin or starting-point of knowledge is illustrated by the ὑποθέσεις, the assumed first principles of a demonstration, as the major premiss of a syllogism. Another 'external origin' is the οὗ ἕνεκα, or τέλος, the final cause, πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ τοῦ γνῶναι καὶ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλόν, *a* 21. Comp. de Anima Γ 10, 433 *a* 15, καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ἕνεκά του πᾶσα· οὗ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ· τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως.

ἀρχή is not identical with αἴτιον, though, as all αἴτια (all the four causes) are ἀρχαί, the two terms are frequently identified (Bonitz, *Comm.* p. 219; Waitz, *Org.* p. 458): but the converse is not true; as is shewn by some of the examples given above: the assertion therefore that ἰσαχῶς (ταῖς ἀρχαῖς) καὶ τὰ αἴτια λέγεται· πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἴτια ἀρχαί (*a* 16) must be limited to what is *directly* stated, the converse is not included. On the point of difference between the two, and also the identification with στοιχεῖον, see Waitz, *Organ.* p. 458.

Another definition of ἀρχή occurs in de Gen. Anim. V 7, 23, 788 *a* 14, τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀρχὴν εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὴν μὲν αἰτίαν εἶναι πολλῶν, ταύτης δ' ἄλλο ἄνωθεν μηδέν. See also Trendel. on de Anima p. 187.

On scientific and logical ἀρχαί or first principles, ultimate axioms, κοιναί and ἴδιαι, see note in Introd. p. 73. In the Eudemian Ethics, II 6, three kinds of ἀρχαί, general, moral, and mathematical, are distinguished, and some account given of them. [See also *Index Aristotelicus*, s.v. S.]

§ 12. κἂν ᾖ αἴτιον κ.τ.λ.] Top. Γ, 116 *b* 1, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ἀγαθοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίου, καθάπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς τύχης· ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὑτὴν ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτία τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου (τοῦ κακοῦ) κ.τ.λ.

τὸ δ' οὐκ αἴτιον] On οὐκ after ἄν, understood from the preceding clause, see Appendix (C) on εἰ οὐ, c. 15, 23.

[1] The ἀρχή as essence, origin of being, οὐσία, is the primal cause, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. Bonitz.

[2] στοιχεῖον "hoc loco eum (Aristotelem) non tam elementi naturam cogitasse, quam principem illam rei alicuius partem, in qua primum continetur et destinata est ipsa rei natura, ex exemplis allatis facile cognoscas." Bon. *Comm.* p. 218.

[3] This is an ἀρχὴ κακῶν.

[4] καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρεκτόν. de Anima I 10, 433 *a* 19.

ἀρχῆς ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι. καὶ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μείζονος μεῖζον, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίοιν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος αἰτίου μεῖζον. καὶ ἀνάπαλιν δὴ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν ἡ τοῦ μείζονος ἀρχὴ μείζων, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίοιν
13 τὸ τοῦ μείζονος αἴτιον μεῖζον. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν

καὶ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν κ.τ.λ.] and again, of two origins or causes, the consequence and effect of the superior is greater. The following passage of the Topics will illustrate the preceding as well as the present topic. Γ 3, 118 *a* 29, *ἔτι εἰ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖνο ᾧ ἂν παρῇ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ, τὸ ποιοῦν αἱρετώτερον, καθάπερ καὶ θερμότερον τὸ θερμαῖνον τοῦ μή. εἰ δὲ ἄμφω ποιεῖ, τὸ μᾶλλον ποιοῦν· ἢ εἰ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ κυριώτερον ποιεῖ ἀγαθόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὲν τὴν ψυχήν, τὸ δὲ τὸ σῶμα*: c. 5, 119 *a* 17, *καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔχον τοιόνδε, μᾶλλον τοιοῦτο ὃ ποτε ποιεῖ ἢ ὃ μὴ ποιεῖ. εἰ δ' ἄμφω ποιεῖ, τὸ μᾶλλον ποιοῦν τοιοῦτο.*

καὶ ἀνάπαλιν] 'and conversely, of two origins; the origin of the greater consequence is greater...'.

§ 13. *δῆλον οὖν κ.τ.λ.*] 'It is plain therefore from what has been said (§ 11, *κἂν ᾖ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή*), that in both (the following) ways it may be said to be greater: for whether it be an origin (or beginning), and the other not a beginning, it may be shewn to be made to appear greater; or if it be not itself a beginning, but the other be a beginning (it may be equally shewn to be so), because the 'end' is greater (superior), and yet no beginning'. 'The end is greater', because *τέλος ἐστὶν οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ ἄλλα*: and if 'everything else' is but a mean to an end, the beginning must be included with the rest, and is therefore subordinate and inferior. *μεῖζον* is here 'greater', 'more important', superior in respect of influence or effective power; not necessarily 'better'. In the examples, first, the 'adviser' is the *ἀρχή*, the origin or originator of the plot; so in Metaph. Δ 2, 1013 *a* 31, *ὁ βουλεύσας* is an *αἴτιον*, namely the efficient cause, or origin of motion and change, *ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς*. The adviser of a scheme is therefore according to this view the 'cause' of all that resulted from his advice, which is made to appear (*δοκεῖ*) by the argument more important than the result or actual crime (which is not 'the beginning'); and, secondly, the converse (*ἀνάπαλιν*) is proved, that the crime, the 'end' of the advice or deliberation, is the more important thing of the two, because it was for that, as a mean to attain that, that the whole scheme was undertaken. It appears from the expressions of this text that Callistratus devised the scheme and Chabrias carried it into execution.

Leodamas of Acharnae was a famous orator, an earlier contemporary of Demosthenes and Aeschines. The latter mentions him, c. Ctesiph. § 138, as having been sent as ambassador to Thebes, and as a speaker the rival of Demosthenes; indeed in his opinion even pleasanter to listen to. He is mentioned again in II 23, 25 (comp. the note there); in Dem. adv. Lept. 501 and 502, who also speaks of him as a distinguished orator, where allusion is made to a certain proposition of his to cancel the 'grant', especially the *ἀτέλεια*, made to Chabrias for his public services —*οὗτος ἐγράψατο τὴν Χαβρίου δωρεάν*[1], a proposition which he failed to

[1] This cannot be the same accusation as that which Aristotle here refers to;

εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀμφοτέρως μεῖζόν ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή, δόξει μεῖζον εἶναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ ἀρχή· τὸ γὰρ τέλος μεῖζον καὶ οὐκ ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ὁ Λεωδάμας κατηγορῶν ἔφη Καλλιστράτου τὸν βουλεύσαντα τοῦ πράξαντος μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πραχθῆναι μὴ βουλευσαμένου· πάλιν δὲ καὶ

carry; and in other places of Aeschines. See Sauppe, *Fragm. Or. Att.* II 216; Fr. XVI, and p. 244; Fr. XXVI; Clinton, *F. H.* Vol. II p. 111, sub an. 372, 3.

Callistratus, son of Callicrates, of Aphidna, a distinguished Athenian orator and politician, of the earlier half of the 4th cent. B.C. His name first appears in history in the year 379 B.C. Aristotle refers to two speeches of his, Rhet. I 14. 1, and III 17. 14. Leodamas' accusation of him, here mentioned, seems to have been directed against his conduct in the affairs of Oropus, in 366, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* X p. 392; Smith's *Dict. Biogr.* Art. Callistratus; Clinton, *Fast. Hell.* II 396, note *w*. He was associated with Chabrias, the celebrated Athenian general, in the transactions with respect to Oropus, and with him was brought to trial; and it is most probable that both of the speeches referred to in the text were made by Leodamas on this occasion.

On Callistratus and Chabrias Mr Elder's articles in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.* may be consulted. Callistratus' name occurs very frequently in the Attic orators. See Baiter and Sauppe, *Orat. Att.* Vol. III; Ind. Nom. p. 73.

βουλεύσαντα, βουλευσαμένου, βουλεύσαντος, ἐπιβουλεύειν] are all applied to the same transaction, viz. Callistratus' 'advice' or 'device'. They express precisely the same thing, each from a somewhat different point of view. βουλεύειν τινί τι, is to give advice, to advise. βουλεύεσθαι to give *oneself* advice, to deliberate; or secondly, of a number of people deliberating together, and giving one another advice, 'consulting in common'. So μὴ βουλευσαμένου here is, 'if he had not deliberated upon it'

ἐγράψατο δωρεάν *and* τὸν πράξαντα, 'the man that carried into execution a nefarious scheme', are quite inapplicable to the *same* offence. Again Demosthenes, c. Mid. 535, tells us that *Philostratus* was the accuser of Chabrias, ὅτ' ἐκρίνετο τὴν περὶ Ὠρωποῦ τὴν κρίσιν θανάτου. Were there two accusers of Chabrias on his trial? Or two separate trials? (this seems improbable): or has Aristotle made a slip of memory in assigning the accusation of Chabrias to Leodamas? None of these suppositions is necessary to reconcile the, at first sight, conflicting statements. The accusation of Leodamas is directed against *both* parties; he takes the case of Callistratus first, and then secondly (πάλιν δέ) applies the converse of the argument which he had issued against the other to the offence of Chabrias. Philostratus, who took part in the same proceedings, was another and independent accuser. Mr Grote, p. 393, note 3, who does not refer to the passage of Aristotle, assigns the trial or trials of Callistratus and Chabrias to this period, 366 B.C., and the alleged misconduct about Oropus. The other speech of Leodamas against Chabrias, referred to by Dem. adv. Lept. l. c. was earlier, and had nothing to do with the affair of Oropus. [Arnold Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* I p. 96. s.]

Χαβρίου, τὸν πράξαντα τοῦ βουλεύσαντος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἦν ὁ πράξων· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα
14 ἐπιβουλεύειν, ὅπως πράξωσιν. καὶ τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου, οἷον χρυσὸς σιδήρου ἀχρηστότερος ὤν· μεῖζον γὰρ ἡ κτῆσις διὰ τὸ χαλεπωτέραν εἶναι. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ ἄφθονον τοῦ σπανίου, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις

preparatory to 'suggesting' or 'advising' it. ἐπιβουλεύειν retains its proper sense of a *hostile* design (ἐπί 'against'); the advice, or scheme which resulted from it, and the deliberation which suggested it, are now represented as 'a plot', a hostile, aggressive, design. It appears therefore that there is no occasion to have recourse to the explanation of Victorius and Buhle, that ἐπιβουλεύειν is (or can be) put for βουλεύειν or βουλεύεσθαι. Gaisford prints these two notes of V. and B. without comment.

εἰ μὴ ἦν ὁ πράξων] On this use of the definite article, indicating a member of a class or γένος, which we express by our indefinite article, see Buttmann, *Gr. Gr.* § 124, Obs. 2. Engl. Tr. p. 319. The two senses of the Greek definite article are, according to Schneider, on Pl. Rep. VIII 564 A, that it marks *quod praesens et in conspectu positum cogitatur*, and (2) the *genus*. 'Articulus definit indefinita, idque duobus modis: aut designando certo de multis, aut quae multa sunt cunctis in unum colligendis' (the second describes the *generic* use). Herm. Praef. ad Iph. Aul. p. xv. Several examples of this usage of the def. art. are collected from the N. T. by Dean Alford, in a pamphlet in reply to Bishop Ellicott, p. 45 seq. I will only quote Matth. xiii. 3, ὁ σπείρων: xxv. 32, ὁ ποιμήν. In a subsequent passage of this work, II 4, 31, Aristotle has quite unconsciously and unintentionally stated this grammatical distinction, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ κ.τ.λ.

We render ὁ πράξων '*anyone* to do it', carry it out, put it in execution.

§ 14. τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου] 'The rarer, scarcer, is greater, more valuable or important, than the abundant'. This, as is implied in ἀχρηστότερος ὤν in the example, is only true *in a sense;* it is in fact a paradox, which may however be asserted in argument, since there is something to be said for it, and examples may be found in which it is true; as in the case of gold and iron. In the true and proper sense, in utility and real value, iron is greater and better than gold. Isocrates, ἀντίδ. § 80, 81, on this ground of comparative rarity, ὅσῳ πέρ εἰσι σπανιώτεροι καὶ χαλεπώτεροι, thinks that, in his time at least, great orators and politicians 'who can speak worthily on behalf of their country's interests' are more valuable and to be more highly prized than legislators. A similar topic occurs in Top. Γ 2, 117 *b* 28, τὸ ἐπιφανέστερον τοῦ ἧττον τοιούτου, καὶ τὸ χαλεπώτερον· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἀγαπῶμεν ἔχοντες ἃ μὴ ἔστι ῥᾳδίως λαβεῖν. καὶ τὸ ἰδιαίτερον τοῦ κοινοτέρου.

ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον] This gives the true side of the alternative, that the value of a thing is in proportion to its usefulness. Estimated by this standard, 'water', as Pindar says, at the opening of his first Olympian ode, 'is the best of all things.' Böckh, who cites this passage of Aristotle

ὑπερέχει· τὸ γὰρ πολλάκις τοῦ ὀλιγάκις ὑπερέχει· ὅθεν λέγεται

ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ.

15 καὶ ὅλως τὸ χαλεπώτερον τοῦ ῥᾴονος· σπανιώτερον
γάρ. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ ῥᾷον τοῦ χαλεπωτέρου· p. 25.
16 ἔχει γὰρ ὡς βουλόμεθα. καὶ ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον μεῖζον,
καὶ οὗ ἡ στέρησις μείζων. καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ ἀρετῆς καὶ

in his note, evidently agrees with him in interpreting Pindar's *ἄριστον* as 'best' because most useful, or necessary to the support of human life[1]. Dissen thinks that Pindar had in his mind the great 'wholesomeness' of water, *ἄριστον dicitur τὸ ὕδωρ quia saluberrimum est.* A dry and hot climate and a parched soil would also readily suggest the notion that water is the best of all things. But I agree nevertheless with Böckh in his interpretation of Pindar's thought.

These two opposite topics represent two prevailing modes of estimating 'value', by *use* and *price:* Political Economy teaches us that the former is the true, the latter the false standard. In the one view air and water are the most valuable, in the other the least valuable, of all things. Plato, Euthyd. 304, 3, gives both sides: *τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τίμιον· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ εὐωνότατον, ἄριστον ὄν, ὡς ἔφη Πίνδαρος.*

§ 15. *ὅλως τὸ χαλεπώτερον*] See the passage of the Topics quoted in § 14. Anything harder to do or to attain may be said to have a higher value, when the value is estimated by the price. On the other hand measured by the standard of our own nature, of our own love of ease and comfort, and also of the extent of usefulness, that which is *easier* to do or to make or to obtain is more valuable.

§ 16. *ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον μεῖζον*] 'And one thing is greater than another when the opposite of the former is greater than that of the latter'. 'Exemplum accommodatum erit *valetudo* ac *divitiae;* quae ambo sunt bona: contraria eorum *morbus* et *paupertas:* maius autem malum corporis morbus quam paupertas; praestat igitur valetudo divitiis.' Victorius. On this, and the next topic, *στέρησις*, comp. supr. c. 6, 4, and § 18; and the passages of the Topics (Γ 2, 117 *b* 2,) and the Categories there referred to.

οὗ ἡ στέρησις μείζων] On the various applications of *στέρησις* in Aristotle's philosophy, see Met. Δ c. 22, and Bonitz's *Commentary:* Categ. c. 10, p. 12 *a* 26, and Waitz, ad loc. Trendel. *Kategorienlehre*, p. 103 seq.

The following illustration of the topic is given by Schrader. 'Peius est caecum esse quam surdum: ergo visus auditu praestantior est.

[1] Pindar's own view of the meaning may be readily seen by comparing the first three lines of the 10th Olympian Ode: note the word *χρῆσις*. In a speech, quoted by Spedding (*Letters and life of Fr. Bacon*, Vol. III. p. 18), Bacon says: I liken this bill to that sentence of the poet (Pindar), who sets this as a paradox in the fore-front of his book, *first water, then gold*, preferring necessity before pleasure; and I am of opinion, that things necessary in use are better than those things that are glorious in estimation.

κακία μὴ κακίας μείζων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τέλη, τὰ δ' οὐ
17 τέλη. καὶ ὧν τὰ ἔργα καλλίω ἢ αἰσχίω, μείζω αὐτά.

Gravius malum est fama quam pecunia privari; ergo bona existimatio praestat divitiis.' 'Things of which the privation is greater' or more deeply felt, are those which are most *necessary*, essential to our existence or comfort; as air and water again, in this point of view.

καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ ἀρετῆς—τέλη] 'and virtue is superior to non-virtue, and vice to non-vice; because the one is an end, and the other not'. The application of this seems to be to things compared as *positive* and *negative:* positive virtue and positive vice, which can be ends or objects to aim at, are in so far superior to mere negatives which can not[1]. Moral considerations are altogether laid aside, and Rhetoric is here permitted (not recommended) to take the immoral side of the question: vice may be regarded as an 'end' of human desire and exertion.

Bonitz, *Arist. Stud.* I. p. 87, proposes an ingenious alteration, which no one who is satisfied with the preceding explanation will consider necessary. It is to substitute for the existing text, καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ κακίας καὶ κακία μὴ ἀρετῆς μείζων, 'positive, downright, virtue is greater (better *or* worse) than mere absence of vice, and downright vice than mere absence of virtue': which he neither translates nor explains; but, it is to be presumed, it means that the superiority of the one to the other still rests upon its *positive* character. The *morality* remains constant; for vice is still represented as the object of men's aims: it is therefore no improvement in that respect. His reason for the change is, 'that it never could occur to any one to institute a comparison in respect of magnitude (*Grösse*) between ἀρετή and μὴ ἀρετή, and κακία and μὴ κακία.' Not perhaps if μείζων implied nothing but mere magnitude or quantity; but when it is extended to the general notion of superiority the comparison may very well be made between them. And besides, Bonitz's altered comparison appears to rest upon the very same distinction of the positive and negative; for in what other sense can vice be regarded as superior to non-virtue?

§ 17. The two topics of this section are founded upon the relation of the ἀρετή of anything to its proper ἔργον or function, the work that it has to do, described by Plato, Rep. I 352 E and foll., and taken up by Aristotle as the foundation of his theory of virtue, Eth. Nic. II 5, init. The virtue or excellence of everything, horse, dog, knife, axe, the eye, the ear, the mind, is shewn in and depends upon the due performance of its proper function (*supra* 2. 12; 5. 4; 6. 11). τὰ ἔργα therefore, though they extend beyond the moral virtues from which Victorius draws his illustration—the comparison of ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη and their opposites in respect of their results good or bad, the kinds of actions that they give rise to—and include the functions of all things that can be applied to any purpose, and everything which has a τέλος, to which the ἔργον must be subservient, and in the approach to which the ἀρετή is shewn; yet the epithets

[1] Victorius, perhaps rightly, explains μὴ ἀρετή and μὴ κακία as states of growth and development, which have not yet reached their 'end', the formed ἕξις, but are mere διαθέσεις, transient dispositions, and so far inferior.

καὶ ὧν αἱ κακίαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ μείζους, καὶ τὰ ἔργα
μείζω, ἐπείπερ ὡς τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί, καὶ τὰ ἀπο-
βαίνοντα, καὶ ὡς τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ
18 *ἀρχαί. καὶ ὧν ἡ ὑπεροχὴ αἱρετωτέρα ἢ καλλίων,*
οἷον τὸ ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι·
καὶ γὰρ ὄψις ὀσφρήσεως· καὶ τὸ φιλεταῖρον εἶναι P. 1364 *b*.
τοῦ φιλοχρήματον μᾶλλον κάλλιον, ὥστε καὶ φιλε-
ταιρία φιλοχρηματίας. καὶ ἀντικειμένως δὲ τῶν
βελτιόνων αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ βελτίους καὶ καλλιόνων καλ-
19 *λίους. καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι καλλίους ἢ βελτίους· αἱ*

καλλίω and αἰσχίω shew that Aristotle had the moral virtues uppermost in his mind.

καὶ ὧν αἱ κακίαι κ.τ.λ.] the converse of the preceding, the argument from the virtue or vice, excellence or defect, of anything, back again to its function or proper *work*. Virtues and vices, excellences and defects stand to 'works' in the relation of cause and origin to consequence and effect or result. Now as of the greater cause and origin, the one produces a greater effect, the other leads to a greater end, (§ 12,) and the less to a less, so in the case of excellence and defect the greater produces a greater work, the less a less, both in human action or comparative virtues, and in instruments of all kinds; in men and things.

§ 18. This topic is analogous to, not identical with, that in § 4. When anything in excess is preferable to, or finer and nobler than, the excess of something else, then the former *in its ordinary state* is preferable to the other. See the passage of Polit. IV (VII) 1, quoted in § 4. Top. Γ 3, 118 *b* 4, ἔτι οὗ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς αἱρετωτέρα, καὶ αὐτὸ αἱρετώτερον, οἷον φιλία χρημάτων· αἱρετωτέρα γὰρ ἡ τῆς φιλίας ὑπερβολὴ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων. *Omne maius continet in se minus.*

τὸ φιλεταῖρον...μᾶλλον κάλλιον] Victorius, followed by Buhle, and Waitz, *Org.* 116 *b* 24, understand μᾶλλον κάλλιον as a double comparative, a form of expression not unfamiliar to Aristotle (see Vict. on this place, and Waitz, *Org.* 116 *b* 24, II p. 465), but certainly not employed by him here. The μᾶλλον denoting the 'excess' of the two qualities, which is absolutely essential to the illustration of the topic, is added for that reason to φιλέταιρον and φιλοχρήματον, the *comparison* being conveyed by κάλλιον: and thus the topic is exemplified. 'Excess in love of friends being fairer, and nobler than that in love of money, friendship in its average degree is to be preferred to a similar average of love of money'. See also note on II 8, 3.

§ 19. καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι κ.τ.λ.] The objects of the nobler and better desires are themselves nobler and better: because all 'impulses' (ὀρέξεις, which include ἐπιθυμίαι, all *natural* desires and appetites, as well as θυμός and βούλησις, Eth. Eud. II 7. 2, de An. B 3, 414 *b* 2; see note on Rhet. II 2. 1), in proportion as they are higher or stronger, have for their objects

γὰρ μείζους ὀρέξεις μειζόνων εἰσίν. καὶ τῶν καλλιόνων δὲ ἢ καὶ βελτιόνων αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι βελτίους καὶ
20 *καλλίους διὰ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι καλλίους ἢ σπουδαιότεραι, καὶ τὰ πράγματα καλλίω καὶ σπουδαιότερα· ὡς γὰρ ἔχει ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές· κελεύει δὲ τὸ αὑτῆς ἑκάστη. καὶ τῶν σπουδαιοτέρων δὲ καὶ καλλιόνων αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἀνάλογον διὰ ταῦτα.*
21 *καὶ ὃ κρίνειαν ἂν ἢ κεκρίκασιν οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ πάντες*

things 'greater', i. e. either better and higher in themselves, or more important. The stronger impulse is always towards the greater object—in some sense. And the converse: 'the nobler and better the objects, the nobler and better the desires, for the same reason'.

§ 20. *καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι κ.τ.λ.*] The same rule is now applied to sciences or departments of knowledge, and their objects; *τὰ πράγματα*, 'their *subjects*[1]'. *ἡ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη, τὰ ὑποκείμενα.* Top. Γ 1, 116 *a* 21, *ἔστι δὲ ἁπλῶς μὲν βέλτιον καὶ αἱρετώτερον τὸ κατὰ τὴν βελτίω ἐπιστήμην, τινὶ δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν.* The higher and nobler sciences deal with higher and nobler materials; and in proportion to the dignity and value of the objects that it treats, so is the dignity and value of the corresponding science: *ἀνάλογον*, 'proportionally'; greater to greater, and less to less. 'For as is the science, so is the (particular kind of) truth at which it aims: and each of them is authoritative (lays down the law, prescribes what is to be done, dictates, *κελεύει*) in its own special province'. On the order in invention and dignity of arts and sciences, see the instructive chapter, Metaph. A 1. *ἐπιστῆμαι* includes here all arts as well as sciences, the two terms being constantly interchanged. The word *ἀληθές*, from its strict and proper sense (when the two provinces of philosophy are distinguished, *θεωρητικῆς τέλος ἀλήθεια, πρακτικῆς δὲ ἔργον*, Metaph. A 1), might seem to confine the application of the topic to science pure, or the 'theoretical' department of philosophy, but it is plainly here employed in a wider and more popular sense: truth, theoretical or practical, is the common object of every kind of scientific or artistic pursuit. And the word *κελεύειν*, to prescribe or dictate, is alike applicable to the necessary principles and necessary conclusions of mathematical demonstration, and to a practical science like Politics, which not only like the other prescribes the method in which its investigations are to be carried on and rules of action, but 'orders and arranges' *διατάσσει*[2], determines, and limits at its pleasure the provinces and extent of the operations of the subordinate sciences and arts. Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 *a* 26—*b* 7. On *κελεύει*, Victorius quotes Eth. Eud. II 3, *τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος.*

§ 21. *καὶ ὃ κρίνειαν ἂν κ.τ.λ.*] 'the judgment or decision, upon any dis-

[1] The terms 'subject' and 'object' from different points of view may be applied to express the same thing. The *object* of sense or of thought, material or mental, quod sensibus vel menti objicitur, is when looked at from the logical side the *subject* of all that is or can be predicated of it.

[2] So printed in Bekker's texts.

ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ πλείους ἢ οἱ κράτιστοι ἀγαθὸν ἢ μεῖζον, ἀνάγκη οὕτως ἔχειν, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ᾗ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν ἔκριναν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ γὰρ τὶ καὶ ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ φρόνησις εἴποι. ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀγαθῶν εἰρήκαμεν· ὥρισται γὰρ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὃ λα-

puted question, of...' Top. Γ 1, 116 *a* 14, καὶ ὃ μᾶλλον ἂν ἕλοιτο ὁ φρόνιμος ἢ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ, ἢ ὁ νόμος ὁ ὀρθός, ἢ οἱ σπουδαῖοι περὶ ἕκαστα αἱρούμενοι ᾗ τοιοῦτοί (σπουδαῖοι) εἰσιν, ἢ οἱ ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει ἐπιστήμονες, ἢ ὅσα οἱ πλείους ἢ πάντες, οἷον ἐν ἰατρικῇ ἢ τεκτονικῇ ἃ οἱ πλείους τῶν ἰατρῶν ἢ πάντες, ἢ ὅσα ὅλως οἱ πλείους ἢ πάντες ἢ πάντα, οἷον τἀγαθόν· πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθοῦ ἐφίεται. This passage will serve as a commentary on the topic of the Rhetoric. It describes the authority of φρόνησις (practical wisdom, the intellectual virtue which selects the proper means and directs them to the end, Eth. N. VI), and the impersonation of it in the φρόνιμος. In the definition of ἀρετή, Eth. N. II 6, init. the φρόνιμος is the measure or standard, which fixes the variable mean, in which virtue resides, for each individual character. In all arts and sciences it is the professional man, the expert, who has to decide, each in his own department. The ἀγαθός decides in moral questions, which is *his* special province. Comp. note on 6. 25.

ἢ πάντες—οἱ κράτιστοι] a descending scale of the φρόνιμοι, those who are competent to decide; all, or most (the many, the great mass of them, οἱ πλεῖστοι), or the (bare) majority, or the best and ablest amongst them (in point of judgment, and professional skill).

ἀγαθὸν ἢ μεῖζον] So the MSS and Edd., with the exception of one MS and Buhle's Ed., which omit ἢ, as does Muretus in his Transl. The omission certainly improves the sense; but Vater with some reason objects to this order of the two words, which he says should have been inverted, μεῖζον ἀγαθόν. ἀγαθόν, which Vater proposes to omit, is certainly wanted to explain κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων in the following clause.

ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ᾗ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν] 'either absolutely, universally, or in respect of their practical wisdom', specially and alone. κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν corresponds to ᾗ τοιοῦτοι in the passage of the Topics, 'in so far as they *are* such' (φρόνιμοι), and in no other respect.

καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων] 'of everything else as well', as good. κατά with the genit. is very common in Arist. in the sense of 'of', 'in the case of'; derived from its proper and primary sense 'down upon', and hence, 'applying to', 'of'. This use of it seems to come through the intermediate sense of 'predication', κατηγορεῖν, κατηγορεῖσθαί τινος, 'to predicate, be predicated, *of* something'.—ἐπί, 'upon', 'applying to', 'in the case of', so and so, is similarly used (ἐπ' ἀγαθῶν) in the same section.

τί, ποσόν, ποιόν] are the first three categories; (1) the substance or true nature of a thing, (2) quantity and (3) quality. These, though properly falling under the domain of science or exact knowledge, may yet be dealt with by the 'practical judgment' which may convey a popular and practical acquaintance with them, sufficient for the purposes of the Rhetorician.

εἰρήκαμεν· ὥρισται γάρ] supr. § 3.

βόντα τὰ πράγματα φρόνησιν ἕλοιτ' ἂν ἕκαστον· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ μεῖζον, ὃ μᾶλλον ἡ φρόνησις λέγει.
22 καὶ τὸ τοῖς βελτίοσιν ὑπάρχον, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ᾗ βελτίους, οἷον ἀνδρία ἰσχύος. καὶ ὃ ἕλοιτ' ἂν ὁ βελτίων, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ᾗ βελτίων, οἷον τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ

ὃ μᾶλλον ἡ φρόνησις λέγει] If that is good in genera' which is pronounced to be so by the man of practical sagacity, then that must be a greater good which is pronounced by the same authority to be more so, to be so in a higher degree.

§ 22. καὶ τὸ τοῖς βελτίοσιν ὑπάρχον] 'Animi bona bonis corporis praevalent quia animus est corpore praestantior'. Schrader. Courage and strength is Aristotle's illustration; for the reason assigned by Schrader.

ἢ ἁπλῶς] 'ut viri' (man as the nobler animal) 'virtutes praestant mulieribus *simpliciter*'. Schrader.

ἢ ᾗ βελτίους] '*aut quatenus meliores sunt:* viri effeminati actiones deteriores sunt actionibus virilis animi feminae'. Id. I prefer the other explanation, as more direct and natural, 'either *generally*, in respect of the entire character and qualities, or in respect of some *special* excellence'.

καὶ ὃ ἕλοιτ' ἂν ὁ βελτίων] The better man will make the better choice in general, ἁπλῶς, by virtue of his *whole* character; or 'in so far as he is better, in respect of that particular kind of excellence, as some special virtue, in which his superiority is shewn, ᾗ βελτίων ἐστί. So Victorius; who proceeds (after Alexander) to distinguish between this and the preceding topic, § 21; in that the φρόνιμοι as a class choose between different *kinds of good;* here the comparison is between two different *kinds of choosers*, and the one who makes the better selection is the better in *moral character.*

οἷον] (sc. ἑλέσθαι, or εἴ τις ἕλοιτο). The higher and nobler choice is illustrated by the preference of being wronged to doing wrong. This, though cited here as a popular sentiment, was by no means the current and prevailing opinion at Athens. Plato, Rep. II 358 C, makes Glaucon say, speaking of the *opposite* view, ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων: and again, at the commencement of Glaucon's exposition of the *dis*advantages of justice and the superiority of injustice successful and unpunished, he uses the word φασί, which seems to imply that this was the general opinion. In fact one of the main objects of the Republic is to prove that the reverse of this is true; and the long and laborious process which he is obliged to go through in the establishment of his position is quite sufficient to shew how strong must have been the prejudices in favour of the adverse doctrine which must be surmounted before he could hope to make his own views acceptable. The Gorgias also is occupied with the solution of this same question, in the comparison namely of doing and receiving injury and wrong, on *which* side the advantage, when rightly estimated, really lies. The Sophists, as represented by Thrasymachus in the Republic, and Callias in the Gorgias, appear to have held the lower, and as we now hold it to be, immoral doctrine. Ast, in his *Comm.* on Pl.

23 ἀδικεῖν· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ δικαιότερος ἂν ἕλοιτο. καὶ τὸ
ἥδιον τοῦ ἧττον ἡδέος· τὴν γὰρ ἡδονὴν πάντα διώκει,
καὶ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἥδεσθαι ὀρέγονται, ὥρισται δὲ
τούτοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος. ἥδιον δὲ τό τε p. 26.
24 ἀλυπότερον καὶ τὸ πολυχρονιώτερον ἡδύ. καὶ τὸ
κάλλιον τοῦ ἧττον καλοῦ· τὸ γὰρ καλόν ἐστιν ἤτοι
25 τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετόν. καὶ ὅσων αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς
ἢ φίλοις βούλονται αἴτιοι εἶναι μᾶλλον, ταῦτα μείζω
26 ἀγαθά, ὅσων δὲ ἥκιστα, μείζω κακά. καὶ τὰ πολυ-
χρονιώτερα τῶν ὀλιγοχρονιωτέρων καὶ τὰ βεβαιότερα

Rep. p. 391, has collected a number of references to authors who sided on this point with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

§ 23. ὥρισται δέ] in § 3.

ἥδιον δὲ τὸ ἀλυπότερον κ.τ.λ.] Pleasure is subject to two drawbacks to its enjoyment, which vary in different kinds of pleasure. Some pleasures are accompanied, preceded, or followed by pain (Plato held that this is the case with all bodily pleasures), and most of them are of a very transient character and very brief duration. This may in many cases afford a measure for the comparison of pleasure: those which are marked by the entire absence or lower degree of these qualifying circumstances are superior.

§ 24. τὸ γὰρ καλὸν κ.τ.λ.] This distinction of the two different kinds of καλόν, arises from its twofold aspect, physical and moral: in the former of the two senses it is the beautiful, in the latter the morally right and noble. The beautiful, to the sight and sense, is the 'pleasant' form or aspect of τὸ καλόν; the right is καλὸν τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετόν, that which is desirable in and for itself and for no ulterior object, and therefore an end in itself. In this latter sense the τὸ καλὸν may be regarded as the end of all moral action, Eth. N. III 7, 1113 *b* 8, c. 10, 1115 *b* 24, IX 8, 1168 *a* 34, 1169 *a* 6, seq. 21 to the end. In Rhet. I 9. 3, two definitions of it are given and the distinction of its moral and physical aspects again suggested: and again II 13. 9 it is contrasted with the expedient or profitable, the one being a relative the other an absolute form of good.

§ 25. καὶ ὅσων κ.τ.λ.] Things are shewn to be good by our desire of them, because all things universally desirable are good: and the more we desire anything for ourselves or our friend (the friend is the 'second self', the *alter ego*, and therefore his interest is our own,) and therefore to be the causes of it, to procure it for ourselves or our friends; the more we shew that we think it good: and the things we desire *least* to bring upon ourselves or our friends are by the same rule the worst and most mischievous things. The topics of Top. Γ 2, 118 *a* 1, are akin to this, not identical with it.

§ 26. τὰ πολυχρονιώτερα καὶ τὰ βεβαιότερα] Top. Γ 1, 116 *a* 13, 'more lasting and more secure, stable, safer'. One measure of the use or value

τῶν μὴ βεβαιοτέρων· ὑπερέχει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις τῶν μὲν τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν δὲ τῇ βουλήσει· ὅταν γὰρ βού-
27 *λωνται, ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ βεβαίου. καὶ ὡς ἂν*

of a thing is the length of time during which it remains in our possession; another, the security or stability of it, immunity from decay or corruption and the *fear* of losing it. The absence of these very much diminishes the value of any possession. The superiority in the value of a thing is shewn in, or measured by, either the duration or the amount of desire or wishing for it (*βουλήσει*) because our wishing for it shews that we consider it a *secure* possession, one of which we are little likely to be deprived, or which itself is not likely to be impaired, and so lose its value. A safe investment, which every one desires who has spare cash, is an example of this kind of security, and of the superiority in value that it carries with it.

§ 27. *καὶ ὡς ἂν (ἀκολουθοίη) ἐκ τῶν συστοίχων*] as the consequences *would* follow (if, whenever the topic were applied) in general, so here 'in all the rest', in the particular case of the *rhetorical* application of them, the same consequences *do* actually follow. Perhaps the general application of this topic, which seems to be understood in the protasis, may have a tacit reference to the more *general* treatment of the same in the dialectical Topics. I think that only *one* topic is here intended; so far as *σύστοιχα* are distinguished from *πτώσεις*, the former includes the latter as the *genus* the *species*.

With this topic compare Rhet. II 23, 2, Top. Γ 3, 118 *a* 34—39. The instances of *πτῶσις* there given are the substantive and corresponding adverb, *δικαιοσύνη δικαίως, ἀνδρεία ἀνδρείως*. *σύστοιχα* and *πτώσεις* are explained, distinguished, (quite unintelligibly, however, were our information derived solely from this place,) and the use of them illustrated, in Top. B 9, 114 *a* 26—*b* 5. *σύστοιχα* are coordinate *logical notions*, as *δίκαια* and *δίκαιος* with *δικαιοσύνη*, *ἀνδρεῖα* and *ἀνδρεῖος* with *ἀνδρεία*; and again *a* 38, *δικαιοσύνη δίκαιος δίκαιον δικαίως* are coordinates. Also, *a* 29, *τὰ ποιητικά* and *τὰ φυλακτικά* are coordinate with the things which they produce and preserve, as *τὰ ὑγιεινά* with *ὑγίεια*, *τὰ εὐεκτικά* with *εὐεξία*. *πτώσεις* are these same coordinates in their *grammatical* aspects—*terms* that can be similarly predicated, and applicable to the same things—and they are therefore sometimes identified with the others. The *πτώσεις* 'inflexions' of the same word are not confined to the mere 'declension' of nouns, substantive or adjective, (the nominative is the *casus rectus*, or *πτῶσις ὀρθή*, improperly so called, the noun in its upright or normal state or position, the *casus* or *πτώσεις* are fallings away, declensions, from that standard typical form by a change of termination[1],) but include adverbs,

[1] *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* 2, 16 *a* 32, *τὸ δὲ Φίλωνος ἢ Φίλωνι καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ὀνόματα ἀλλὰ πτώσεις ὀνόματος*. Poet. 20. 10, 1457 *a* 18, *πτῶσις δ' ἐστὶν ὀνόματος ἢ ῥήματος ἡ μὲν τὸ κατὰ τούτου ἢ τούτῳ σημαίνουσα καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα* (cases), *ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἑνὶ ἢ πολλοῖς* (numbers) *οἷον ἄνθρωποι ἢ ἄνθρωπος, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ὑποκριτικά, οἷον κατ' ἐρώτησιν ἢ ἐπίταξιν* (moods of verbs). Illustrated by *ἐβάδισεν* and *βάδιζε*, indicative and imperative. *πτώσεις* are referred to the general head of *παρώνυμα*.

ἐκ τῶν συστοίχων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων, καὶ τἆλλ' ἀκολουθεῖ· οἷον εἰ τὸ ἀνδρείως κάλλιον καὶ αἱρετώτερον τοῦ σωφρόνως, καὶ ἀνδρία σωφροσύνης αἱρετωτέρα καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι τοῦ σωφρονεῖν.

28 *καὶ ὃ πάντες αἱροῦνται τοῦ μὴ ὃ πάντες. καὶ ὃ οἱ* P. 1365.

the generic and numerical terminations, masc. and femin., singular, dual, and plural, and the inflexions of verbs; in fact, as it appears, any change of termination which a root undergoes in passing into different parts of speech, and the inflexions of these: in Aristotle πτῶσις is a 'declension' *from a root.* This logical signification of σύστοιχος and συστοιχία is 'transferred' by metaphor, from the *ranks* of an army or of a chorus in the theatre (like ἀντίστροφος), to logic or grammar: but in either of the two senses, they always denote things *on the same level, coordinates.* Trendel. *El. Log. Arist.* 75, Bonitz ad Metaph. A 5, 986 *a* 23. Xenophon, Conv. 2, 20, has ἀντιστοιχεῖν in the sense of 'to be one's opposite, or partner in a dance'. Anab. V 4, 12, ἔστησαν ἀνὰ ἑκατὸν μάλιστα, ὥσπερ οἱ χοροί, ἀντιστοιχοῦντες ἀλλήλοις, 'in opposite, corresponding ranks'. In Met. l. c., and Eth. N. I 4, 1085 *b* 7, it is applied to the ten parallel rows or columns of the opposite ἀρχαί of the Pythagoreans, the two opposite members of the ten being in each case a συστοιχία, or pair of coordinate conceptions. Hence σύστοιχα are notions of the same order: as the four elements, which have the same rank, belong to the same *row*, i. e. order in nature, de Caelo 302 *a* 29; and hence, notions which fall under the same *genus*, as black and white, sweet and bitter; and even such as are under different *genera*, so long as they have something in common, de Sens. c. 7, 447 *b* 30, 448 *a* 14 and 16.

In Aristotle therefore σύστοιχα and πτώσεις, though occasionally identified, are, when strictly and properly applied, distinguished thus: σύστοιχα are *logical* notions or conceptions corresponding to things of the same rank or order in nature, having a wider and more comprehensive sphere of application than the πτώσεις, which are *grammatical* like the 'declensions', from which the name is derived, and include the various deflexions or inflexions, expressed by changes of termination, from a root.

Cicero's *coniugata*, which are defined Top. III 12, correspond to Aristotle's πτώσεις. *Coniugata dicuntur quae sunt ex verbis generis eiusdem. Eiusdem autem generis verba sunt, quae orta ab uno varie commutantur, ut sapiens sapienter sapientia. Haec verborum coniugatio συζυγία dicitur, ex qua huiusmodi est argumentum: si compascuus ager est, ius est compascere.*

Besides the authorities already referred to, see on this subject Waitz on περὶ ἑρμ. c. 2, 16 *b* 1; Anal. Post. II 15, 79 *b* 6; Trendel. *Kategorienlehre*, p. 27 seq.; Donaldson, *New Crat.* § 227.

§ 28. τοῦ μὴ (ὄντος) ὃ πάντες (αἱροῦνται)] The negative of the preceding: 'than that which is *not* what all prefer'.

Top. Z 10, 148 *a* 10, ὠφέλιμον, ὠφελίμως, ὠφελητικός are πτώσεις. Ib. H 1, 151 *b* 30, 153 *b* 25—34, where several examples are given.

πλείους ἢ οἱ ἐλάττους· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἦν οὗ πάντες ἐφίενται, ὥστε καὶ μεῖζον οὗ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὃ οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἢ οἱ κρίνοντες ἢ οὓς οὗτοι κρίνουσιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἂν εἰ πάντες φαῖεν
29 ἐστί, τὸ δὲ οἱ κύριοι καὶ οἱ εἰδότες. καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν οὗ πάντες μετέχουσι μεῖζον· ἀτιμία γὰρ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν·
30 ὁτὲ δὲ οὗ μηδεὶς ἢ οὗ ὀλίγοι· σπανιώτερον γάρ. καὶ τὰ ἐπαινετώτερα· καλλίω γάρ. καὶ ὧν αἱ τιμαὶ μείζους, ὡσαύτως· ἡ γὰρ τιμὴ ὥσπερ ἀξία τις ἐστίν.
31 καὶ ὧν αἱ ζημίαι μείζους. καὶ τὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων

ἦν] 'was' as we have said, c. 6. 2. *οὗ μᾶλλον*] (*ἐφίενται*).

οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες] 'rival claimants or competitors'.

ἢ οἱ ἐχθροί] c. 6. 24. This applies especially to contested superiority in personal excellences or accomplishments. If rivals and enemies, (*τὸ μὲν*) who are most interested in disparaging their adversary, and most inclined to do so, if even *these* admit his superiority, we may take it for granted that every one else will do so, and therefore this is equivalent to the universal admission of it (*ὡς ἂν εἰ πάντες φαῖεν*). If 'judges', those that have the right to decide by reason of special qualification, the artist or professor, the expert or adept in any pursuit or study, or those whom they select as qualified to pronounce a decision, if such as *these* decide in a man's favour, then it is the decision (*τὸ δὲ*) of 'authorities', as it were, men empowered and entitled, or who have *the right* (*κύριοι*) to judge and decide, and (or rather, 'because of') *the special knowledge* which the occasion requires (*οἱ εἰδότες*); and this decision is final. Compare notes on 6. 25, 7. 21.

Victorius and Schrader appear to confine *κρίνειν* to its judicial sense of deciding a legal cause, *οὓς οὗτοι κρίνουσι* being those who are selected or deputed to try a particular case when the ordinary judges are prevented from being present themselves. If there were any doubt between the two interpretations, the question would be decided by the following passage: *ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής*. Eth. N. I 1, 1094 *b* 27.

ὡς ἂν εἰ] Note on *κἂν εἰ*, I 1. 5, p. 9.

§ 29. This topic also is best exemplified in personal advantages, accomplishments, or possession. It can be applied either way. Sometimes (*ὁτὲ μὲν, ἔστιν ὅτε, ἐνίοτε*), in some cases, the superior value of a possession of this kind is in proportion to its universality, because the greater the number of those who have the advantage, the greater the disgrace of being without it (a case of *στέρησις*, § 16): in other cases the reverse may be maintained on the principle that the scarcity of a thing lends it a superior value, § 14.

§ 30. *καλλίω γάρ*] § 24. Virtue is the only true object of 'praise', *ἔπαινος*. Introd. Appendix Bk. I, c. 9, p. 212 seq.

ὧν αἱ τιμαί κ.τ.λ.] 'and things (especially actions) may be regarded as

ἢ φαινομένων μεγάλων μείζω. καὶ διαιρούμενα δὲ

'greater', or superior in respect of their power or effect, of which the honours or rewards are greater; because honours and rewards are as it were (may be considered) a kind of valuation, estimate of the value, of a thing, ἀξία, which will afford a comparison, or measure of the comparative value of two things: and the opposite acts which involve a higher penalty, are superior in a sense, more important and effective. ζημίαι, not 'losses', ἀποβολαί, as it has been understood, but 'penalties', directly opposed to τιμαί 'rewards'. So Victorius.

§ 31. Things which are, at first sight, or can be shewn to be, greater than others which are universally acknowledged to be great or are manifestly so, are seen to be so at once and without reflexion, present themselves at once as such, φαινόμενα. A conspicuous instance of this common sense of φαινόμενος, apparent, manifest to the eye, occurs Rhet. II 2, 1 (see note) in the definition of ὀργή. Comp. I 9.32, 8.6; III 2.9.

καὶ διαιρούμενα κ.τ.λ.] This and the following are purely *rhetorical* topics, and belong rather to the third book, *On style*. One mode of exaggerating the importance of anything, of making it assume a magnitude which it does not really possess, is in the way of description, to break up into parts or describe in detail what might be stated summarily as a whole. 'The same facts or events', when thus individually represented, will 'seem greater' than if they were all summed up together in one statement; because in the former case the excess or superiority, in point of importance and interest, of the facts exhibited in detail over the summary statement, will *seem* to be shewn 'in more points', which are all brought severally into view. πλειόνων ὑπερέχειν is 'to exceed in a greater number of points', whether we understand the genitive as one of *quantity* '*in* more things', which is probably right, or as the comparative genitive after ὑπερέχειν, 'to surpass more things', by which the meaning is not so distinctly expressed: in either case it is the *number* of things detailed that makes the superior impression. The use of this topic is well illustrated by Quintilian, Inst. Or. VIII 3. 61 sq., who however refers the strong impression produced by this detail to the ἐνέργεια or vividness of the picture. § 67, *sic urbium captarum crescit miseratio. Sine dubio enim qui dicit* expugnatam *esse civitatem complectitur omnia quaecunque talis fortuna recipit; sed in affectus minus penetrat brevis hic velut nuncius. At si aperias haec*, et cet. [then follows the description]. Majoragius refers to Cicero's description of Pompey's military experience in the speech *pro lege Manilia*, and Gaisford to Harris, *Philol. Inquiries*, p. 58 [on p. 62, this passage of the Rhet. is quoted]. *He* assigns this to 'accumulation' and 'concatenation'. Shakespeare, in the *Tempest*, will supply us with a brilliant example: The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces, the solemn temples, &c. [IV. i. 152]. Comp. Acts of the Apostles, ii. 9 seq., where the wonder of the gift of tongues is heightened by the enumeration in detail of all the different nations whose language was spoken; 'Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites.' Bacon's *Colours of Good and Evil* (Vol. VII p. 81, Ellis and Sped. ed.), No. 5, is a good commentary on this topic in its most general application.

εἰς τὰ μέρη τὰ αὐτὰ μείζω φαίνεται· πλειόνων γὰρ ὑπερέχειν φαίνεται. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησι πεῖσαι λέγουσαν τὸν Μελέαγρον ἀναστῆναι

ὅσσα κάκ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλει τῶν ἄστυ ἁλώῃ·
λαοὶ μὲν φθινύθουσι, πόλιν δέ τε πῦρ ἀμαθύνει,
τέκνα δέ τ' ἄλλοι ἄγουσιν.

καὶ τὸ συντιθέναι δὲ καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν, ὥσπερ Ἐπίχαρ-

λέγουσαν] is omitted in MS A^c., and consequently put in brackets by Buhle and Spengel. The latter adds, *Praef. ad Rhet. Gr.* p. vi, 'aliud excidisse videtur, v. c. παράκοιτιν.' ['Intellige τὴν γυναῖκα, quo aegre cares'. Spengel, ed. 1867. S.] 'Deest λέγουσαν in Cod. antiquissimo Victorii, et videtur sane illud interpolatum esse. Uncinos applicavi'. Buhle.

ὁ ποιητὴς φησι] Homer to wit, Il. IX 592. The reading of the Vulg. is κήδε' ὅσ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλει τῶν ἄστυ ἁλώῃ· ἄνδρας μὲν κτείνουσι, and the rest as quoted by Ar. This example is the same as that given by Quintilian. Victorius thinks that he borrowed it from Aristotle. Spalding, ad Quint. VIII 3. 67, quotes the following Schol. on Il. XV 496, referring to the other passage of Homer: ῥητορικῶς τὸ ἓν πρᾶγμα, τὴν πόρθησιν, εἰς πολλὰ κατεμέρισεν.

τὸ συντιθέναι καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν] are added to the preceding topic of 'detail' as closely akin to it. That the first at all events is so, may be inferred from the identification of 'detail' with 'accumulation' by Harris, p. 58, above quoted. The two figures are 'accumulation' and 'climax'. ἐποικοδόμησις is the building up of one phrase upon (ἐπί) another, one rising above another step by step, like the rounds of 'a ladder' (κλίμαξ), or the stages of a building. Rhet. ad Alex. 3 (4). 9, ἐποικοδομοῦντα τὸ ἕτερον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον αὔξειν τρόπῳ τοιῷδε, which is then illustrated. Arist. de Gen. An. I 18, 34, 724 *a* 28, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα ὡς Ἐπίχαρμος ποιεῖ τὴν ἐποικοδόμησιν, ἐκ τῆς διαβολῆς ἡ λοιδορία, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης ἡ μάχη, ταῦτα δὲ παντα ἔκ τινος ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως. Eustath. ad Hom. Il. B, p. 181, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τοῦ ῥηθέντος χωρίου (verse 101) κλίμακα καὶ κλιμακωτὸν λέγουσιν οἱ παλαιοί, ἕτεροι δὲ ἐποικοδόμησιν. γίνεται δὲ σχῆμα κλιμακωτὸν ὅταν τὸ λῆγον τῆς φθασάσης ἐννοίας ἀρχὴ γένηται τῆς ἐφεξῆς, οἷον ὡς εἴ τις εἴπῃ, ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀγαθός, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀγαθὰ ποιεῖ, ὁ ἀγαθὰ ποιῶν εὐεργετεῖ, ὁ εὐεργετῶν θεὸν μιμεῖται, κ.τ.λ. Demetrius περὶ ἑρμηνείας § 270 (III 320, *Rhet. Gr.* Spengel) λαμβάνοιτ' ἂν καὶ ἡ κλῖμαξ (sic) καλουμένη, ὡς παρὰ Δημοσθένει, τὸ (de Cor. § 179, p. 288) οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔγραψα δέ· οὐδ' ἔγραψα μέν, οὐκ ἐπρέσβευσα δέ· οὐδ' ἐπρέσβευσα μέν, οὐκ ἔπεισα δὲ τοὺς Θηβαίους· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐπαναβαίνοντι (mounting a staircase or a hill, from higher to higher) ὁ λόγος ἔοικεν ἐπὶ μείζονα. This figure by the Latin Rhetoricians is called *gradatio*, Cic. de Or. III 54. 207, Quint. IX 3. 54—7, where it is explained and illustrated by the same passage of Demosth. and from Latin authors. In Auct. ad Heren. IV 25, it is thus defined: *Gradatio est, in qua non ante ad consequens verbum descenditur quam ad superius conscensum est*, and then illustrated. See Aquila Romanus, cited by Ernesti, *Lex. Tech. Gr. et Lat.* sub vv. κλίμαξ, et *gradatio*, and at length by Schäfer, *App. Crit. ad Demosth.* p. 288, 8, Vol. II p. 250. Aquila calls it *ascensus*.

μος, διά τε τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ διαιρέσει (ἡ γὰρ σύνθεσις
ὑπεροχὴν δείκνυσι πολλήν) καὶ ὅτι ἀρχὴ φαίνεται
32 μεγάλων καὶ αἴτιον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ

ὥσπερ Ἐπίχαρμος] Besides the illustration of the figure climax from Epicharmus quoted above from the de Gen. Anim., there is another and a more complete one in Athen. II 36 C. D, indicated by Schrader, *ἐκ μὲν θυσίας θοίνη, ἐκ δὲ θοίνης πόσις ἐγένετο, ἐκ δὲ πόσιος κῶμος, ἐκ κώμου δ' ἐγένετο θυανία, ἐκ δὲ θυανίας δίκη, ἐκ δίκης δὲ καταδίκη, ἐκ δὲ καταδίκης πέδαι τε καὶ σφάκελος καὶ ζημία*[1].

διά τε τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ διαιρέσει] Two reasons are now given for the impression that these two figures make upon the hearer: the first, the same as that which accounts for it in the case of *διαίρεσις*; the accumulation of particulars, and the rising by steps to a climax, have the same effect as the division or detail, in increasing the number of effective strokes, and so producing the impression of superiority, *ἡ γὰρ σύνθεσις ὑπεροχὴν δείκνυσι πολλήν*: and secondly, you make that which you are endeavouring to magnify *appear* to be the cause and origin of a number of important effects, which you seem to *multiply* by detailing them. The following passage of the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4), §§ 10, 11, will serve as a commentary on this and the entire section: *συλλήβδην δὲ, ἐὰν πολλῶν αἴτιον ἀποφαίνῃς, ἐάν τε ἀγαθῶν ἐάν τε κακῶν, μέγαλα φανεῖται. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὁποῖον φανεῖται κατὰ μέρη διαιρούμενον ἢ καθόλου λεγόμενον, καὶ ὁποτέρως ἂν μεῖζον ᾖ, τόνδε τὸν τρόπον αὐτὸ λέγειν. τὰς μὲν οὖν αὐξήσεις οὕτω μετιὼν πλείστας ποιήσεις καὶ μεγίστας, ταπεινώσεις δὲ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ τὸν ἐναντίον τρόπον μετιὼν, ὡς εἰρήκαμεν ἐπὶ τῶν μεγάλων, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἂν μηδενὸς αἴτιον ἐπιδεικνύῃς, εἰ δὲ μὴ ὡς ἐλαχίστων καὶ σμικροτάτων.*

§ 32. *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ σπανιώτερον μεῖζον*] supr. § 14. An exemplification of this topic is found in Eth. Nic. VIII 15, 1163*a* 12, *οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἃ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ' ἑτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἃ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρείαις.* The additional value or importance for good or for evil that things, especially actions, acquire at particular ages or times of life (illustrated in the Topics), in particular places, at particular times, at particular critical seasons and occasions (*καιροί*), or from the special nature of the powers or faculties that are called into exercise (*δυνάμεις*), is derived from the scarcity of such things and actions, and the difficulty of obtaining or performing them. The *καιρός* in two aspects is exemplified in the Topics, Γ 2, 117

[1] Müllach, *Fragm. Philos. Gr.* p. 143, gives these lines as corrected by Meineke, Dindorf, and Bochart.

A. *ἐκ μὲν θυσίας θοίνα,*
ἐκ δὲ θοίνας πόσις ἐγένετο. B. *χαρίεν, ὥς γ' ἐμὶν δοκεῖ.*
A. *ἐκ δὲ πόσιος κῶμος, ἐκ κώμου δ' ἐγενεθ' ὑανία,*
ἐκ δ' ὑανίας δίκα, 'κ δίκας δ' ἐγένετο καταδίκα,
ἐκ δὲ καταδίκας πέδαι τε καὶ σφαλὸς (the stocks) *καὶ ζαμία.*

The other passage, in the de Gen. An., Müllach attempts to correct himself, and produces this melodious verse, p. 144,

ἐκ διαβολᾶς μῶμος ἐγένετο, πολλοῦ δ' ἐκ μώμου μάχα.

σπανιώτερον μεῖζον, καὶ οἱ καιροί. καὶ αἱ ἡλικίαι καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ποιοῦσι μεγάλα· p. 27. *εἰ γὰρ παρὰ δύναμιν καὶ παρ' ἡλικίαν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ὁμοίους, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἢ τόθ', ἕξει μέγεθος καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ ὀλυμπιονίκῃ·*

a 26—*b* 2[1]. Add Prov. xv. 23, *a word spoken in due season, how good is it.* χρόνοι is illustrated by the case, already quoted, of Sir Phil. Sidney, and the cup of cold water at the battle of Zutphen [p. 84]: δυνάμεις, as Aristotle himself tells us, applies to cases in which any one does something 'beyond his powers', above his ordinary level, and more than you would expect from him; and παρὰ τοὺς ὁμοίους is exemplified by the epigram and the saying of Iphicrates.

καὶ εἰ οὕτως κ.τ.λ.] 'and if *such* things be done (οὕτως), at particular places or times, they will acquire a magnitude and importance in things (i. e. actions) right, and good, and just, and their opposites'. οὕτως may however mean *under particular circumstances.*

τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ ὀλυμπιονίκῃ] The substantive taking the same case as the verb from which it is derived is illustrated in the dative by Matthiae, *Gr. Gr.* § 390. Stallbaum on Phaedo 88 C. Soph. 252 D. and Euthyphr. 13 D, 15 A. Add, Aesch. Agam. 415, πτεροῖς ὀπαδοῖς ὕπνου κελεύθοις. Soph. Oed. Col. τὰ γὰρ δόλῳ τῷ μὴ δικαίῳ κτήματ' οὐχὶ σώζεται. Trach. 668, Ἡρακλεῖ δωρημάτων. Aj. 696, Wunder ad loc. Eur. Ion, 508, τὰ θεόθεν τέκνα θνατοῖς. Iph. T. 1384, οὐρανοῦ πέσημα (i. e. τὸ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ πεπτωκός). Plat. Parmen. 128 C, Theaet. 177 A, Gorg. 522 D, Symp. 182 D, Rep. VI 493 D, 498 B. Ar. Pol. VII (VI) 5, 1320 *a* 32, βοήθεια τοῖς ἀπόροις. Some examples of an analogous construction, in which a substantive follows the ordinary construction of a verb, with prepos. and subst., are given by Stallbaum on Phaedo 99 B. Add to these, Plat. Protag. 354 A, Gorg. 472 E, Rep. II 378 D, Eur. Herc. Fur. 1334, στέφανος Ἑλλήνων ὕπο, Arist. Eth. N. X 9, 1179 *a* 25, ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ θεῶν, Categ. 8 *b* 32, μεταβολὴ ὑπὸ νόσου, de Anima B. 8, 11, 420 *b* 27, ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς.

This epigram is expressly attributed to Simonides by Eustath. ad Hom. p. 1761, 24 (Buhle). It is found in the Anthol. I 80 (ed. Jacobs), No. 107 of the Epigrams attributed to Simonides. Bergk, *Fragm. Lyr.* p. 793 [p. 921, 2nd ed.], Simonidis Fragm. 166.

Eustathius l. c. explains ἄσιλλα, σκεῦός τι ἰχθυηρόν. It is described by Hemsterhuis ad Hesychium s.v. ἀστυπολεῖ, as a *iugum*, a sort of wooden yoke, which was carried over the two shoulders to support the fish-baskets.

[1] καιρός 'due season', 'the right time', 'occasion', 'opportunity', the time suitable, appropriate, to the performance of anything, is that form of good which comes under the Category of time, χρόνος; Eth. Nic. I 4, 1096 *a* 26. On this the Paraphrast (Andronicus Rhodius) notes, ἔστι γὰρ ὁ καιρὸς ὁ ἐπιτήδειος ἑκάστῳ χρόνος. Pind. Pyth. IX 82, ὁ καιρὸς παντὸς ἔχει κορυφάν. Ib. IV 286 (508). Soph. Electr. 75, καιρὸς ἀνδράσιν μέγιστος ἔργου παντός ἐστ' ἐπιστάτης. Philoct. 837.

πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφ' ὤμοισιν ἔχων τραχεῖαν ἄσιλλαν
ἰχθῦς ἐξ Ἄργους εἰς Τεγέαν ἔφερον.

καὶ ὁ Ἰφικράτης αὐτὸν ἐνεκωμίαζε λέγων ἐξ ὧν
33 *ὑπῆρξε ταῦτα. καὶ τὸ αὐτοφυὲς τοῦ ἐπικτήτου·*
χαλεπώτερον γάρ. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησιν

αὐτοδίδακτος δ' εἰμί.

34 *καὶ τὸ μεγάλου μέγιστον μέρος, οἷον Περικλῆς τὸν*

Alciphron I, I. p. 6, *εὐθὺς οὖν ὀψῶναι πλήσιον, καὶ τὰς ἀσίλλας ἐπωμίους ἀνελόμενοι, καὶ τὰς ἑκατέρωθεν σπυρίδας ἐξαρτήσαντες* (quoted in Anthol.). Otherwise called *τύλη*. Arist. Ach. 860, 954. Diog. Laert. IX 53, of Protagoras, who *πρῶτος τὴν καλουμένην τύλην, ἐφ' ἧς τὰ φόρτια βαστάζουσιν, εὗρεν, ὥς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ περὶ παιδείας· φορμοφόρος γὰρ ἦ·, ὥς καὶ Ἐπικουρός πού φησι.* So that Protagoras may be added to the examples of *ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα*, I 9. 31, or *ἐξ ὧν ὑπῆρχε ταῦτα.*

The exclamation of Iphicrates 'from what I rose to this' (from what an origin this my fortune was made) is repeated in a more correct form (Buhle) in c. 9. 31, *ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα*, as is also part of the Epigram. Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. et Imp., under the head of Iphicrates, Nos. I and 5, has these notices of him. *Ἰφικράτης δοκῶν υἱὸς εἶναι σκυτοτόμου κατεφρονεῖτο· δόξαν δὲ τότε πρῶτος ἔσχε ὅτε τραυματίαν πολέμιον ἄνδρα μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων ζῶντα συναρπάσας εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τριήρη μετένεγκεν.* No. 5, *πρὸς δὲ Ἁρμόδιον τὸν τοῦ παλαιοῦ Ἁρμοδίου ἀπόγονον εἰς δυσγένειαν αὐτῷ λοιδορούμενον ἔφη, τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ἀπ' ἐμοῦ γένος ἄρχεται, τὸ δὲ σὸν ἐν σοὶ παύεται.*

§ 33. *τὸ αὐτοφυὲς τοῦ ἐπικτήτου*] 'native superior to acquired talents and advantages (of person, mind or character), because they are harder to come by'; *nature* being rather chary of such gifts, and the *acquisition* of them comparatively easy. Top. Γ I, 116 *b* 10, *καὶ τὸ φύσει τοῦ μὴ φύσει, οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τὸ δ' ἐπίκτητον.* This topic has a wider scope than the rhetorical, and again, c. 4, 119 *a* 7—10. Comp. Pind. Ol. IX 152, *τὸ δὲ φυᾷ κράτιστον ἅπαν.* II 155, *σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φυᾷ· μαθόντες δὲ λαβροὶ παγγλωσσίᾳ ἄκραντα γαρύεμεν Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιχα θεῖον.* Nem. III 69, *συγγενεῖ δέ τις ἀρετᾷ μέγα βρίθει· ὃς δὲ διδάκτ' ἔχει ψεφηνὸς ἀνήρ.* *Specie autem comparantur ut anteponantur quae propter se expetenda sunt iis quae propter aliud: ut innata atque insita assumptis et adventitiis* et seq. Cic. Topic. XVIII 69.

ὁ ποιητής] Homer. Odys. χ' (XXII) 347.

§ 34. *οἷον Περικλῆς τὸν ἐπιτάφιον κ.τ λ.*] This celebrated simile does not occur, as is well known, in the funeral oration put into Pericles' mouth by Thucydides in his second book. Thucydides, who merely gives the general meaning of his speakers and never their actual words, *may* have omitted it intentionally, if Pericles really made use of it. But as Herodotus, VII 162, attributes nearly the same identical words to Gelo, it seems more probable that it was erroneously ascribed to the other: at all events it is quite clear that it could not have been original in his mouth. It appears, likewise, in a somewhat altered form, in Euripides (Suppl. 447, *πῶς οὖν ἔτ' ἂν γένοιτ' ἂν ἰσχυρὰ πόλις, ὅταν τις ὡς λειμῶνος ἠρινοῦ στάχυν*

ἐπιτάφιον λέγων, τὴν νεότητα ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀνῃρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰ ἐξαιρεθείη.
35 καὶ τὰ ἐν χρείᾳ μείζονι χρήσιμα, οἷον τὰ ἐν γήραι καὶ νόσοις. καὶ δυοῖν τὸ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ τέλους. καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἁπλῶς. καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ ἀδυνάτου·

τόλμας ἀφαιρῇ κἀπολωτίζῃ νέους), who no doubt might have borrowed it from Pericles; and it is ascribed to Demades by Athenaeus, III 99 D. It is repeated in Rhet. III 10. 7.

§ 35. *τὰ ἐν χρείᾳ...μείζονι χρήσιμα (μείζω ἐστί)*] *A friend in need is a friend indeed.* 'Auget manifesto vim beneficiorum tempus, angustiaeque eorum qui beneficium accipiunt, quod etiam Demosthenes in Leptinem significavit (p. 471, 1), *πάντες μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἴσως ἄξιοι χάριν ἀνταπολαμβάνειν οἱ προϋπάρχοντες τῷ ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς εὖ, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ παρὰ τὰς χρείας.*' Victorius. Comp. Eth. N. VIII 15, 1163 *a* 16, in estimating the value of services to a friend, when you wish to make the most of them you say that they are *τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς* (the best you have to give), *καὶ ἃ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρείαις.*

δυοῖν τὸ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ τέλους] This topic is distinguishable from those in §§ 9 and 16. There the comparison is between end and not-end: here it is between different degrees or orders of means to an end. Top. Γ 1, 116 *b* 22, quoted on § 9. Alexander, in his Comm. on that passage, illustrates this by the comparison of shaving and exercise as means to the end, health; the active exercise of *ἀρετή* (this is the *definition* of *εὐδαιμονία* in the Eth. Nic.) to the mere *ἕξις* of it, as nearer to the end, happiness; in practical arts, the higher and more comprehensive are superior to the narrower and subordinate in each department, the latter being mere means to some higher end; so horsemanship is superior to the saddler's art, both being subordinate, but the former nearer, to the end, the military art; the woodman's and carpenter's arts as means to shipbuilding; medicine and gymnastics as both tending to a healthy habit of body.

τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἁπλῶς] The *comparison* in the expression of this topic is left to be understood, and the two terms are merely placed in juxtaposition by *καί*, one *and* the other are laid before us, in order that we may choose between them. The topic is a comparison of absolute good, or good in general, and relative good. That which is absolutely good, or good in itself, *καθ' αὐτό*, or good in general, need not be the best for us ('to a man's own self'), any particular individual, *αὐτῷ*, though theoretically, from the higher point of view, it is superior to the other. Top. Γ 1, 116 *b* 8, *τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τινὶ αἱρετώτερον*[1]. Alexander, in his Comm. on Top. p. 125 (Top. 116 *b* 26, *τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἀδύνατον*), illustrates this by the contrast of immortality and long life, which will apply as

[1] The comparison of these two topics well illustrates the difference of treatment in dialectical and rhetorical reasoning. In the former that which is generally and theoretically true is put forward: in the latter, looking at this same question from the practical side, we see that there are many exceptions, and that this other side is equally capable of being maintained.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' οὔ. καὶ τὰ ἐν τέλει τοῦ
36 βίου· τέλη γὰρ μᾶλλον τὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει. καὶ τὰ
πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν. ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς P. 1365 *b*.

well to the ἁπλῶς and αὐτῷ as to that for which it is immediately intended: immortality may perhaps be absolutely the best, most desirable in itself, but it is out of our reach; *for us* therefore a long life, which *may possibly* be attained, is better: it is of no use to choose or prefer immortality. Another example is supplied by Heraclitus' dictum, quoted in Eth. Nic. X 5, 1176 *a* 7, that an ass would prefer any rubbish or refuse (σύρματα) to gold; because it is pleasanter to *him*. Comp. I 15. 12, τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αἱρεῖται οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῷ.

αὐτῷ (al. αὑτῷ) [on p. 146] is the reading of Vict., Buhle, Gaisf., Bekker, Spengel, and Bonitz, *Arist. Stud.* I p. 88. It is the equivalent of τινί in the familiar antithesis of general and particular good, as in the passage of the Topics above quoted; comp. I 9. 17 αὐτῷ, I 15. 20, II 13. 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁπλῶς: and as in the repetition of the antithesis, I 15. 12, it assumes the form of αὑτῷ, 'good to a man's own self', i.e. each particular individual, it is quite plain that the one form can in many cases be substituted for the other. On αὐτοῦ for αὑτοῦ and the rest, see Waitz, *Org.* p. 486, 54 *a* 14. Rhet. I 1. 12, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι. Also, Buttm. *Excurs.* X *ad Dem. c. Mid.* p. 140, *de formis* αὐτόν *et* αὑτόν. ἢ for καί, which is adopted by Vict. and Gaisf., and suggested by Bonitz, l. c., is, as I have above endeavoured to shew, unnecessary.

τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ ἀδυνάτου] Top. Γ 1, 116 *b* 26. See Alexander's example in the last note but one. Another occurs in II 2. 2, on anger, ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἴεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, ὁ δ' ὀργιζόμενος ἐφίεται αὐτῷ. We deliberate, with a view to action, and that which is *to be preferred* of two courses of action, only about things which we believe to be possible, and possible to *us*; κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται...ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνηται ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 *b* 25.

This topic is stated as a consequence from the preceding; the possible is to be preferred to the impossible, because the attainable good is the only good for *us*, τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' οὔ.

τὰ ἐν τέλει τοῦ βίου] The end in question is not the temporal end, but the final cause. The τέλος is in itself good, 7. 8, 9; 6. 2; the higher or nearer to the end (τὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει) are any of the means employed for the attainment of it, the more they approximate in their character to the end itself; hence τὰ ἐν τέλει τοῦ βίου, the means included in, or those which subserve, the end of life—happiness, or whatever else the end of life may be—are in so far superior, being nearer to that great and final end, than other means to other and lower ends. Top. Γ 1, 116 *b* 23, τὸ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, οἷον τὸ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντεῖνον ἢ τὸ πρὸς φρόνησιν.

§ 36. τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν] the real and the apparent or sham; τὸ εἶναι and τὸ δοκεῖν, τὸ ὂν and τὸ φαινόμενον; the solid, genuine, substantial reality contrasted with the mere outside show and 'appearance'; or truth as absolute certainty, and *probable* opinion. Top. Γ 3, 118 *b* 20,

δόξαν, ὃ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἕλοιτο. διὸ καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν τοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν δόξειεν ἂν αἱρετώτερον εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κἂν λανθάνῃ αἱρήσεται, ποιεῖν δ'
37 εὖ λανθάνων οὐ δοκεῖ ἂν ἑλέσθαι. καὶ ὅσα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν βούλονται· πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γὰρ μᾶλλον.

καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι' αὑτὸ τὸ δὲ διὰ τὴν δόξαν αἱρετόν (αἱρετώτερόν ἐστιν), οἷον ὑγίεια κάλλους. (τὴν μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν δι' αὑτὴν αἱρούμεθα κἂν μηδεὶς εἴσεσθαι μέλλῃ, τὸ δὲ κάλλος διὰ τὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ δόξαν· μάταιον γοῦν δοκεῖ τὸ κάλλος εἶναι μὴ γνωριζόμενον. Alex. Aphrod. ad loc.) Aesch. Sept. c. Th. 592, of Amphiaraus the just, *οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν δίκαιος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει.* This topic is No. 3, in Bacon's *Colours of Good and Evil* (Works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, VII 79). It is shewn to fail in the case of virtue ; the virtuous man 'will be virtuous *in solitudine*, and not only *in theatro*'.

ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν κ.τ.λ.] Top. l. c. *b* 21, *ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν τὸ μηδενὸς συνειδότος μὴ ἂν σπουδάσαι ὑπάρχειν.* 'The distinguishing mark or characteristic of that which is directed to mere opinion (is found in) anything that a man would not choose if he were sure that it would not be known or recognised by others'. And the same thing is expressed in the Topics, 'anything which a man would not be anxious to possess if no one else was to be privy to it'. It is the credit of possessing the thing, in the eyes of others, and not the mere possession for its own sake, that gives it its value and superiority. Compare with this *ἃ μὴ λανθάνει κ.τ.λ.* § 40, which gives the other side of the question.

In the example, the superiority of receiving to conferring a benefit, the words *δόξειεν ἂν* suggest that we need not take this for granted; it can be 'made to appear' that it is true, but the real truth lies on the other side of the question; from a higher point of view, to confer is better than to receive a benefit.

§ 37. *ὅσα εἶναι μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.*] The difference between this and the preceding topic seems to lie in this. That lays down the *general* rule, and refers to 'every thing' that comes under it; and is therefore appealed to, *πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γὰρ μᾶλλον*, as the warrant and foundation of this. The second is a special variety of the first, 'what men wish *to be*'; the qualities, such as virtues, which they desire to possess, or seem to possess. Here again the reality is preferable to the mere credit and external appearance of the virtue. 'And, therefore, it is a vulgar and popular opinion (*φασί*, Plat. Rep. II 358 A; and not merely the doctrine of the vulgar, *οἱ πολλοί*, but maintained also by would-be philosophers, as Thrasymachus and Callicles) that justice is a thing of small value (mean and contemptible), because the appearance of it is preferable to the reality, whereas in the case of health it is the reverse'. Victorius quotes, in exemplification of *φασί*, two iambic lines from Plutarch de Aud. Poet. p. 18 D, *τοῦ μὲν δικαίου τὴν δόκησιν ἄρνυσο, τὰ δ' ἔργα τοῦ πᾶν δρῶντος ἔνθα κερδανεῖς.* Eur. Ixion. Fr. 1. Dind. Quoted also in Stobaeus p. 30, 8. Another fragment to the same effect is ascribed by Valckenaer (*Diatr. in Fragm. Eur.* p. 166) to Euripides' Ixion.

διὸ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φασὶ μικρὸν εἶναι, ὅτι δοκεῖν
38 ἢ εἶναι αἱρετώτερον· τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν οὔ. καὶ τὸ πρὸς
πολλὰ χρησιμώτερον, οἷον τὸ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν
καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ καλά. διὸ καὶ ὁ
πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια μέγιστα δοκεῖ εἶναι· ἅπαντα
39 γὰρ ἔχει ταῦτα. καὶ τὸ ἀλυπότερον καὶ[1] μεθ' ἡδονῆς·
πλείω γὰρ ἑνός, ὥστε ὑπάρχει καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν
καὶ ἡ ἀλυπία. καὶ δυοῖν ὃ τῷ αὐτῷ προστιθέμενον
40 μεῖζον τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ. καὶ ἃ μὴ λανθάνει παρόντα ἢ
λανθάνει· πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γὰρ τείνει ταῦτα. διὸ τὸ

[1] +τὸ *infra, cum Bekker*[2]. 'sed melius abest alterum τὸ quod pr. A[c] om. et auctore Vahleno Bekker[3].' Spengel.

§ 38. *τὸ πρὸς πολλὰ χρησιμώτερον*] Top. Γ 3, 118 *b* 27, *ἔτι διελέσθαι ποσαχῶς τὸ αἱρετὸν λέγεται καὶ τίνων χάριν οἷον τοῦ συμφέροντος ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος· τὸ γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἢ πρὸς τὰ πλείω χρήσιμον αἱρετώτερον ἂν ὑπάρχοι τοῦ μὴ ὁμοίως.* Wealth and health are supposed to be of the highest value because they are serviceable in so many ways; for the support and preservation of mere life, and of a virtuous and happy life (for which they supply the means), also for pleasure and for good and noble actions.

§ 39. *καὶ τὸ ἀλυπότερον καὶ τὸ μεθ' ἡδονῆς*] Top. Γ 2, 117 *a* 23, *καὶ ταὐτὰ μεθ' ἡδονῆς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς. καὶ ταὐτὰ μετ' ἀλυπίας μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ λύπης.* The desirability of anything even which is desirable in itself or on other grounds, as things useful, is increased by the addition of any pleasure that accompanies such things; so the *ἐνέργειαι* are completed and perfected by the accompanying *ἡδονή* in each case, Eth. N. X 3, 4, 5. And likewise the absence of pain, as compared with its presence, may be regarded as a positive good. The topic in the Rhetoric *combines the two*, positive pleasure and negative relief from pain; these together being 'more than one' are superior to either of the two separately. *καί* is therefore 'together with'; and *ὥστε ὑπάρχει κ.τ.λ.* 'and so (in the case supposed) we have (there are there, *ὑπάρχει*) the positive pleasure and the absence of pain, which may both be regarded as a good'.

καὶ δυοῖν...τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ] A + B is greater than A + C, therefore B is greater than C. Top. Γ 5, 119 *a* 22, *ἔτι ἐκ τῆς προσθέσεως, εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ προστιθέμενον τὸ ὅλον μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τοιοῦτο, ἢ εἰ τῷ ἧττον τοιούτῳ προστιθέμενον τὸ ὅλον μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τοιοῦτο.* In the second of these two cases, if the addition of a quantity to the less of two other quantities makes the sum total of the two greater than the sum total arising from the addition of another different quantity to the other, we may infer that the former of the two added quantities is greater than or preferable to the latter. 4 is less than 6: if the addition of 8 to 4 produces a total 12, which is greater than the total resulting from the addition of an unknown quantity x, to 6, and therefore less than 12, we may infer (by calculation) that x is less than 8.

§ 40. *ἢ λανθάνει*] *ἃ* has been omitted, either by the author or a tran-

41 πλουτεῖν φανείη ἂν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ δοκεῖν. καὶ p. 28.
τὸ ἀγαπητόν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μόνον τοῖς δὲ μετ' ἄλλων.

scriber. A similar omission occurs in Plat. Phaedr. 275 A, τοὐναντίον εἶπες ἢ δύναται. Similar examples quoted from Plato by Stallbaum (note ad loc.) make it probable that the oversight is due to the author. 'Things that do shew themselves, and are conspicuous, have a greater air of reality about them than those that do not (that lurk out of sight), and may therefore lay claim to the preference'.

διὸ τὸ πλουτεῖν φανείη ἂν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ δοκεῖν] This, the vulgar reading, which Victorius found in all his MSS, is no inference or exemplification of the preceding rule, though it is supported by Schrader, who however does not explain the connexion. If it be applied to the rule, the show or appearance, τὸ δοκεῖν, of wealth is said λανθάνειν, *not* to be seen; which is absurd. It *does* follow from the topic in § 37, and may possibly have been thence transferred to this place. Some MSS and the Greek Scholiast give πλουτεῖν...καὶ δοκεῖν, but it seems unlikely that the two verbs, if the combination of the two was intended, should be so widely separated: also καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν would be required. This was corrected by Muretus, τὸ πλουτεῖν καὶ δοκεῖν φανείη ἂν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πλουτεῖν, which seems rather too violent an alteration. Brandis would adopt the reading of his anonymous commentator, διὸ τὸ πλουτεῖν καὶ δοκεῖν φανείη ἂν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν (Schneidewin's *Philologus* IV i p. 42), also conjectured by Vater, and confirmed by the Greek Schol., who explains it, καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν καὶ φαίνεσθαι μεῖζον τοῦ πλουτεῖν καὶ μὴ φαίνεσθαι. Another mode of correction had occurred to me, the interchange, viz. of τό and τοῦ, τοῦ πλουτεῖν...τὸ δοκεῖν. The meaning of this would be, that the appearance or outward show of wealth, together with the wealth itself which it manifested, might upon this principle be made to appear superior to the wealth without the show, because the possessor would lose all the credit of it—but this involves perhaps rather a non-natural interpretation of πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τείνει. I am indebted to Mr Munro for a suggestion that deserves attention: the substitution of τῷ, for τοῦ, δοκεῖν: the alteration is very slight, and gives an excellent sense; the value of wealth by this rule may be considered to be augmented by the addition of the prominent and conspicuous display of it. Bekker and Spengel retain the vulgate.

§ 41. τὸ ἀγαπητὸν κ.τ.λ.] not here 'to be acquiesced in', 'that which one may be content with', (as in Eth. Nic. I, 1094 *b* 19); nor in the reputed Homeric sense of 'unique', 'only[1]', but '*highly valued*', '*dearly prized*'

[1] Of the four places in which ἀγαπητός occurs in Homer, and is interpreted μονογενής, *unicus*, one, Od. β' 365, has the addition of μοῦνος, which seems to shew that there, at any rate, ἀγαπητός cannot mean μοῦνος or μονογενής; and in the others the translation 'dearly beloved' is just as suitable and probable. It is similarly explained (in the supposed Homeric sense) by many of the Interpp. of Matth. iii. 17, Mark i. 11, Luc. iii. 22, and other places where Christ is called ὁ ἀγαπητὸς υἱὸς Θεοῦ. Dr Lightfoot, in *Camb. Journ. of Classical and Sacred Philol.* Vol. III. p. 92, No. 7, thinks that from the primary notion of ἀγαπᾶν 'to welcome'—which is undoubtedly its original and Homeric sense—it expresses rather the external act than the inward feeling, and should be translated

διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἴση ζημία, ἄν τις τὸν ἑτερόφθαλμον τυφλώσῃ καὶ τὸν δύ' ἔχοντα· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἀφῄρηται.

1 ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰς πίστεις φέρειν ἐν τῷ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, σχεδὸν εἴρηται· μέγιστον CHAP. VIII.

('beloved', something which one is very fond of. Comp. *unicus*, as in Catullus, Carmen 64, 215). So it is used in Eth. Nic. IX 12 init. ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρῶσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατον. In Pol. II 4, 1262 *b* 23, the meaning is more doubtful, and the sense of 'unique' possible. Here it cannot have this meaning, because in some cases it is μετ' ἄλλων, and it is only by the addition of μόνον that the 'great rarity' which gives it its high value becomes the 'solitary specimen'. Comp. Buttm. *ad Mid.* p. 567, note 398.

ἑτερόφθαλμον] Gaisford refers to a very pertinent passage of Dem. c. Timocr. p. 744, in which the orator tells with admirable conciseness a story of a one-eyed man of Locri, who under a law framed on the retaliatory principle ('an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth') was threatened by an enemy with the loss of his solitary visual organ. 'Vexed at this, and thinking life intolerable at the price, he is said to have ventured to propose a law, that if any one deprived a one-eyed man of an eye, he should lose both his own in return, that the loss of each might be equalized'. This is a case of ἐπιείκεια, the spirit of the law rectifying the imperfection of the letter. Rhet. I 13. 13—19.

This concludes the treatment of the *general* principles and topics from which arguments may be derived by the political rhetorician in the deliberative kind of Rhetoric: there remains one special subject under this head, which is indispensable to the orator who takes part in public business, and is sketched very briefly in outline in the next chapter, with a reference to the Politics for complete details.

CHAP. VIII.

§ 1. On the general connexion of this chapter with its context, on the two rhetorical uses of the study of Politics, and the various classifications of Constitutions by Aristotle in other works, by Plato and Polybius, see Introduction, p. 181—3, and Append. A, p. 208.

'The subject, which is most important and effectual (is of the highest

in Homer rather by 'fondled or caressed', than 'beloved'. Fritzsche, on Eth. Eud. III. 6, 1233 *b* 2, renders τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ, *filii unice dilecti*. See the references in his note. Heinsius, *Exercit. Sacr. in Marc.* i. 11 (quoted by Gaisford), pronounces very decidedly in favour of this interp. *unicus, unigenitus, praeter quem alius non datur:* referring to this passage (which is decisive against him), to Homer, and to Hesychius ἀγαπητόν, μονογενῆ. Victorius more in accordance with facts says, "*carum* valet, ut puto, idque significare voluit Catullus cum inquit '*si quid carius est oculis*' quo uno se aliquis consolatur, in quo omnem spem suorum gaudiorum collocatam habet, quo impetrato ac retento contentus vivere potest:" which exactly defines it. The use of the Latin *unicus* is precisely similar.

δὲ καὶ κυριώτατον ἁπάντων πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι πείθειν καὶ καλῶς συμβουλεύειν, τὰς πολιτείας ἁπάσας λαβεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑκάστης ἔθη καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέ-
2 ροντα διελεῖν. πείθονται γὰρ ἅπαντες τῷ συμφέροντι, συμφέρει δὲ τὸ σῷζον τὴν πολιτείαν. ἔτι δὲ κυρία μέν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ κυρίου ἀπόφασις, τὰ δὲ κύρια

authority, carries most weight, κυριώτατον) of all in conferring the power and cultivating the faculty of persuasion and good counsel, includes the exact (*analytical* διελεῖν) knowledge of all the existing varieties of constitutions, together with the habits (i.e. the habits and manners which they severally engender in those who live under them), institutions, and interests (συμφέροντα) which respectively belong to them'. *Ad consilium autem de republica dandum caput est nosse rempublicam; ad dicendum vero probabiliter nosse mores civitatis, qui quia crebro mutantur, genus quoque orationis est saepe mutandum.* Cic. de Orat. II 82. 337.

§ 2. ἔτι δὲ κυρία κ.τ.λ.] Not only must the public speaker be acquainted with the manners and customs, institutions, and all that is expedient to or for the interest of these various forms of government, but also with the nature of the governing body (τὸ κύριον) in each; it is by the declarations or proclamations (ἀποφάνσεις) of this supreme authority that the law is given to the citizens and their conduct prescribed to them, and as these are various under the several constitutions (τὰ δὲ κύρια διῄρηται—κύριά ἐστιν), so he must be thoroughly acquainted with all the existing varieties.

ἀπόφασις] so the Vulg., retained by Bekker and Spengel: ἀπόφανσις is found in two MSS: ἀπόφανσις also occurs, with a *varia lectio* ἀπόφασις in two MSS, in the sense of 'a declaration or utterance' (as here) in II 21. 2. ἀπόφασις is no doubt used in the common language in two different senses, (1) 'denial, contradiction', as usually in Aristotle, from ἀποφάναι, and (2) 'a declaration', from ἀποφαίνειν[1], as in Demosthenes and Polybius, VI 3. 1, τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀπόφασιν, 9. 11; 12. 10. But Aristotle most expressly distinguishes the two words again and again in the περὶ ἑρμηνείας, as c. 1, 16 *a* 1, δεῖ θέσθαι...τί ἐστιν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις (negative and affirmative) καὶ ἀπόφανσις (an enunciation) καὶ λόγος. c. 5, 17 *a* 8, λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς κατάφασις, εἶτα ἀπόφασις· c. 6, 17 *a* 25, κατάφασις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος ἀπό τινος: and in very many other places. Is it possible that the author of this treatise could use the one word for the other? On the other side it may be said that Aristotle is extremely hasty and careless in writing, and that the inconsistency is in this case justified and explained by his having for the nonce conformed to the ordinary usage of the language: and the evidence on either side seems so nicely balanced, manuscript authority included, that the question cannot be positively determined. Buhle is very emphatic on the point, 'equidem iure meo ἀπόφανσις reposui.'

[1] As φάσις is derived from φαίνειν, so of course may ἀπόφασις be formed from ἀποφαίνειν.

διήρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας· ὅσαι γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι,
3 τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ κύριά ἐστιν. εἰσὶ δὲ πολιτεῖαι τέτταρες, δημοκρατία ὀλιγαρχία ἀριστοκρατία μοναρχία· ὥστε τὸ μὲν κύριον καὶ τὸ κρῖνον τούτων τί
4 ἐστιν ἀεὶ μόριον ἢ ὅλον τούτων. ἔστι δὲ δημοκρατία

§ 3. On the classifications of forms of government, see Appendix A, Introd. p. 208. On this ordinary, popular, fourfold division, see Pol. VI (IV) 7, init.

τὸ μὲν κύριον καὶ τὸ κρῖνον κ.τ.λ.] 'the sovereign power, the highest authority', *τὸ κύριον*; or the 'power' which 'decides', *τὸ κρῖνον*, with which rests the ultimate decision, to which lies the ultimate appeal—this sovereign power 'is always either a part of one of these four or the whole of it'; the 'part' in the three latter cases of the forms named: the 'whole' in the democratical form alone.

§ 4. The distinctions of the four forms of government are determined, like everything else, by the object or end proposed to itself by each of them; this is the *ὅρος*, the characteristic *mark*, or determining *principle*, of each, that which severally 'characterizes' them; and this is in each case a special conception of political justice, *τὸ δίκαιον*. Pol. III 9, init.

Democracy is a form of government that is distinguished from the rest, (is characterised), by the distribution of offices amongst the people *by themselves* (*διανέμονται*, mid.) and *by lot*, each member of the entire body of citizens having an equal chance of obtaining them: this is equivalent to saying that the *ὅρος* of a democracy, its determining principle, that which gives its special character is 'equality', *ἰσότης*, which is the foundation of the *ἐλευθερία* (usually assigned as its *ὅρος*), and therefore its proper *τέλος*. This is laid down in Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 *b* 30 seq. 'Liberty' and 'equality' are the catchwords of a democracy. *δύο γάρ ἐστιν οἷς ἡ δημοκρατία δοκεῖ ὡρίσθαι, τῷ τὸ πλεῖον εἶναι κύριον καὶ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον ἴσον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἴσον δ' ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῷ πλήθει τοῦτ' εἶναι κύριον, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ ἴσον τὸ ὅ τι ἂν βούληταί τις ποιεῖν* (Pol. VIII (V) 9, sub fin.). Liberty alone is not sufficient in the way of a distinction, (Ib. 1290 *b* 7 seq.), though it is commonly assigned as such, Ib. c. 8, 1294 *a* 10, *ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὅρος ἀρετή, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, δήμου δ' ἐλευθερία.* Another current *ὅρος* of democracy is the will of the majority: where that is sovereign the state is democratical. Ib. VII (VI) 3, 1318 *a* 18, *φασὶ γὰρ οἱ δημοτικοὶ τοῦτο δίκαιον ὅτι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσιν*[1]. But this again rests upon the notion of equality, because it implies that as all the citizens are individually equal, and have equal rights, the greater number has the higher right, and *therefore* prevails over the minority. The theory of democracy is, that all citizens are equal; not that all men are born equal, because all barbarians are *naturally* inferior to Greeks. The use of the 'lot',

[1] This however is common to all three, democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy; in all of them alike, *ὅτι ἂν δόξῃ τῷ πλείονι μέρει τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς πολιτείας, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ κύριον.* Pol. VI (IV) 8, 1294 *a* 13.

μὲν πολιτεία ἐν ᾗ κλήρῳ διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς, ὀλι-

which leaves the choice of the candidate to chance, is an exemplification of this, because it assumes the equality of the claims of all citizens to office. On the different kinds of democracy, see Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 *b* 14 seq.

The ὅρος of *oligarchy* is πλοῦτος: and therefore property, a census, τίμημα (estimated value of property), is necessary as a qualification for office, for that which confers authority or sovereignty, ἐν ᾗ οἱ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων (διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς, they likewise distribute amongst *themselves*, keep to themselves, all offices of state, all the powers of government). Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1290 *b* 1: the different kinds of oligarchy, Ibid. c. 5, the first is τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. The oligarchical theory of 'justice' is therefore ὅτι ἂν δόξῃ τῇ πλείονι οὐσίᾳ· κατὰ πλῆθος γὰρ οὐσίας φασὶ κρίνεσθαι δεῖν, VII (VI) 8, 1318 *a* 19. A complete definition of δημοκρατία and ὀλιγαρχία is given, VI (IV) 4, 1290 *b* 17. In the popular Rhetoric οἱ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων is the general designation of the privileged class: but in the exacter Politics VI (IV) 5, two kinds of τιμήματα are distinguished which characterise two different kinds of oligarchies; one in which the property qualification is only so high as to exclude the poor, and acquired property procures admission into the privileged class: the other in which the qualification is high, and the governing class, which is therefore small, fill up themselves the vacancies as they occur. Again, ἀπὸ τιμημάτων is too wide a term, and therefore not properly characteristic: it includes *more* than oligarchies, one form of democracy, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι, βραχέων δὲ τούτων ὄντων, Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 *b* 39. Plato has the same phrase to describe an oligarchy, ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτεία, Rep. VIII 550 C. Legg. III 698 B, πολιτεία καὶ ἐκ τιμημάτων ἀρχαὶ τεττάρων, of the Solonian constitution.

The ὅρος of *aristocracy* is in the Politics ἀρετή and not παιδεία. The two following observations are added in the way of notes to explain the apparent discrepancy. 'Aristocracy is a kind of polity in which education is the qualification for a share in the government. By education, I mean that which is established by the law of the land: for it is those who have lived in constant obedience to the state institutions that bear rule in the aristocracy'. The virtue of a citizen is not one and the same; it varies under different forms of government. The system of education must therefore be fixed and controlled by the government and conformed to its established institutions. This is the 'education established by the law' of the text. On the absolute necessity of this kind of training in virtue under state direction for grown men as well as children, see Eth. N. X 10, 1179 *b* 32 seq., and the unfinished treatise on education in Bk. V (VIII) of the Politics. "Such men as these must necessarily appear 'best', and it is from them that this (form of constitution) has derived its name". Since παιδεία therefore is the necessary preparation for ἀρετή, either of them may be represented as the object of the state. Definitions of ἀριστοκρατία are to be found, Pol. III 7, 1279 *a* 34, where two explanations of the ἀριστο- in the name are given: either διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν (which is adopted here), or διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς. c. 15, 1286 *b* 4, τῶν πλειόνων ἀρχὴν ἀγαθῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν, Ib. VI (IV) 8, 1294 *a* 9, δοκεῖ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν εἶναι μάλιστα τὸ τὰς τιμὰς νενε-

γαρχία δὲ ἐν ᾗ οἱ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἀριστοκρατία δὲ
ἐν ᾗ οἱ κατὰ παιδείαν. παιδείαν δὲ λέγω τὴν ὑπὸ
τοῦ νόμου κειμένην· οἱ γὰρ ἐμμεμενηκότες ἐν τοῖς
νομίμοις ἐν τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ἄρχουσιν. ἀνάγκη δὲ
τούτους φαίνεσθαι ἀρίστους· ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα εἴληφε
τοῦτο. μοναρχία δ' ἐστὶ κατὰ τοὔνομα ἐν ᾗ εἷς P. 1366 a.
ἁπάντων κύριός ἐστιν· τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν κατὰ τάξιν
τινὰ βασιλεία, ἡ δ' ἀόριστος τυραννίς. τὸ δὴ τέλος

μῆσθαι κατ' ἀρετήν· ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὅρος ἀρετή. But, c. 15, 1299 *b* 25, *ἐν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις* (*αἱ ἀρχαὶ*) *ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων.*

μοναρχία] the sole government of one, includes *βασιλεία κατὰ τάξιν τινά*, a monarchy under certain fixed regulations or conditions, a limited, constitutional monarchy, *ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασιν πατρικὴ βασιλεία*, Thuc. I 13, and the 'indefinite', unrestricted, unlimited tyranny. The distinction between the two here rests upon the limitation of the sovereign power or the absence of it. So in Pol. III 14, 1285 *a* 27, *οἱ μὲν γὰρ* (*βασιλεῖς*) *κατὰ νόμον καὶ ἑκόντων, οἱ δ' ἀκόντων ἄρχουσιν.* The second of these two distinctions of the voluntary and involuntary obedience is repeated 1285 *b* 2 (*βασιλεῖαι*) *διὰ μὲν τὸ τυραννικαὶ εἶναι δεσποτικαί, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἱρεταὶ καὶ ἑκόντων βασιλικαί.* 'Usurpation', as the distinctive difference of tyranny as opposed to monarchy (Eth. N. VIII 12), is insufficient. The government of the hereditary monarchs of Persia is 'tyrannous' in respect of the nature and mode of exercise of their power, though these and other barbarian monarchies are *κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαί*, Pol. III 14, 1285 *a* 18 and 22, *ὁ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τύραννος γίνεται*, Eth. N. VIII 12. Lastly, the tyrant has a mercenary 'body-guard', *φυλακή* (this is distinctive of 'tyranny'; see Rhet. I 2. 19). The regular constitutional sovereign is protected, if at all, by a national guard of citizens, III 14, 1285 *a* 24. But the true distinction between them is determined by the *end* of the government of each: with the one it is his own interest, *τὸ αὑτοῦ συμφέρον*: with the other it is the interest of the governed, *πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον*, III 7, 1279 *a* 27—31, VIII (V) 10, 1311 *a* 2, *ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς...πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπει κοινόν, εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὠφελείας χάριν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς τυραννικὸς τὸ ἡδύ, βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν.*

§ 5. The 'end' of each form of government may be identified with its *ὅρος*, because 'everything being *determined* by its end', the end *does* determine (*ὁρίζεται*) or characterise the special form which each kind of government assumes. These *ὅροι* or *τέλη* have already been considered in the preceding note. All choice is directed to some end: the end of the state, or its governing and guiding principle, must control and give a direction to all the choice and the consequent action of its citizens; and hence the necessity that the statesman and public speaker should be acquainted with it. 'Plainly therefore it is with a view to the end of each form of government that our analysis of its habits, institutions, and interests should be conducted, because it is to this that the motives and actions of the body of men that we have to address are ultimately directed'.

ἑκάστης πολιτείας οὐ δεῖ λανθάνειν· αἱροῦνται γὰρ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ἔστι δὲ δημοκρατίας μὲν τέλος ἐλευθερία, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ τὰ πρὸς παιδείαν καὶ τὰ νόμιμα, τυραννίδος δὲ φυλακή. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἑκάστης ἔθη καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέροντα διαιρετέον, εἴπερ
6 αἱροῦνται πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπαναφέροντες. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον αἱ πίστεις γίνονται δι' ἀποδεικτικοῦ λόγου

τυραννίδος δὲ φυλακή] φυλακή is here 'precaution', 'self-defence'—a form of *self-interest*. τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον, characteristic of 'tyranny'—and hence, as a means to this end, the φυλακή in its other sense, the mercenary body-guard, becomes a necessity, and distinctive of a tyranny. But as a φυλακή, in some sense, is equally required by any sole ruler or monarch, who is always in danger from the attempts of rivals, or rebels, or revolutionists,—the sole ruler has only one life to lose, and hence the *personal* danger; in governments of many, where the members are numerous, the attempt to get rid of them all would be difficult or impossible, and consequently it is not made—so here βασιλεία or μοναρχία is included under the general head of τυραννίς: so Schrader. Failing to see this, some transcriber, whose reading appears in the Greek Scholiast[1], had inserted the clause βασιλείας δὲ τὸ ἐννόμως ἐπιστατεῖν, which being wanting in all the MSS, and not rendered by the Latin Translators, was deservedly rejected by Victorius. Vater, who does not agree with Victorius' and Schrader's view, thinks that some words descriptive of the τέλος of the βασιλεία have dropt out; and Spengel, by 'indicating a lacuna' (*Rhet. Gr.* Praef. VI), appears to be of the same opinion.

Upon the whole I think that Brandis' view of the question is to be preferred (*Philologus* IV i p. 43). It certainly is not likely, though possible, that Aristotle would have identified monarchy and tyranny, considering the treatment of them which he adopts in the Politics, and that he has already subdivided μοναρχία into βασιλεία and τυραννίς in § 4. Consequently, it appears that this division was adhered to in § 5, and something to represent the τέλος of βασιλεία has been lost.

§ 6. On this kind of ἤθη, one of the three by which an ethical character is conveyed to the speech, and which is employed as an indirect argument or means of persuasion, see Introduction on this passage, p. 182, and on the ἤθη in general, p. 110 seq.

The spirit and tone of the speech, and the expressions employed, must be in conformity with the national character of the audience, as determined by the end of their special form of government; a democratical tone and language must not be adopted in addressing an oligarchical audience, and *vice versa*.

[1] It is Brandis' 'Anonymus.' See his paper in Schneidewin's *Philologus*, IV i p. 43.

ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἠθικοῦ (τῷ γὰρ ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα πιστεύομεν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἂν ἀγαθὸς φαίνηται ἢ εὔνους ἢ ἄμφω), δέοι ἂν τὰ ἤθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστης ἔχειν ἡμᾶς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἑκάστης ἦθος πιθανώτατον ἀνάγκη πρὸς ἑκάστην εἶναι. ταῦτα δὲ P. 29. *ληφθήσεται διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἤθη φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀναφέρεται πρὸς τὸ τέλος.*

7 *ὧν μὲν οὖν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι προτρέποντας ὡς ἐσομένων ἢ ὄντων, καὶ ἐκ τίνων δεῖ τὰς περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος πίστεις λαμβάνειν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἠθῶν καὶ νομίμων διὰ τίνων τε καὶ πῶς εὐπορήσομεν, ἐφ' ὅσον ἦν τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ σύμμετρον, εἴρηται· διηκρίβωται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς περὶ τούτων.*

ταῦτα δὲ ληφθήσεται κ.τ.λ.] These 'political characters', he says, 'will be found by the same means', by the same kind of observation and study, as the other *ἤθη*, the individual characters: 'in both, the characters are manifested in the choice or purpose[1], which is always directed to the end (which we desire to attain)'. As the individual character is shewn by the purpose or intention of every act, so the national character of the people, as a body, is manifested in *their* choice and purpose, which is directed to the general end, aim, and object, or the general pervading *principle*, of the state and its institutions: it is this common view and purpose which gives them their *national* character; and to this the speech must conform in order to be acceptable.

§ 7 gives a summary of the contents of the first division of the analysis of the three kinds of Rhetoric, the deliberative. 'We have treated of the general objects of the public speaker's aims and efforts, viz. of what is good or expedient in itself, and in relation to something else; and the topics from which arguments may be drawn on these subjects (in cc. 4—7); and we have further pointed out the channels and modes (*διὰ τίνων καὶ πῶς*) by which we may supply ourselves with materials for the treatment of the characters and institutions of the various forms of government; but only so far as was (commensurate with) suitable to the present occasion, because (*γάρ*) exact detail (is not required here, and) is to be found (if required) in the Politics'.

[1] *ἤθη φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν.* Rhet. II 21. 16, *ἦθος δ' ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι, ἐν οἷς δήλη ἡ προαίρεσις.* Poet. VI. 24, *ἔστι δὲ ἦθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁποία τις· διόπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἦθος τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μηδ' ὅλως ἔστιν ὅ τι προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων.* Schrader.

1 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λέγωμεν περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας CHAP. IX.
καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ· οὗτοι γὰρ σκοποὶ τῷ ἐπαι-
νοῦντι καὶ ψέγοντι· συμβήσεται γὰρ ἅμα περὶ τού-
των λέγοντας κἀκεῖνα δηλοῦν ἐξ ὧν ποιοί τινες ὑπο-
ληφθησόμεθα κατὰ τὸ ἦθος, ἥπερ ἦν δευτέρα πίστις· ἐκ
τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλον ἀξιόπιστον δυνη-
2 σόμεθα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀρετήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβαίνει καὶ

CHAP. IX.

The following passage of Cicero, de Or. II 84. 342, will serve as a commentary on the treatment of 'good' and 'virtue' in this chapter and c. 6; and also on the distinction of virtues in respect of their *utility*, § 6:

Perspicuum est igitur alia esse in homine optanda, alia laudanda. Genus, forma, vires, opes, divitiae, ceteraque quae fortuna dat aut extrinsecus aut corpori, non habent in se veram laudem, quae deberi virtuti uni putatur; sed tamen quod ipsa virtus in earum rerum usu ac moderatione maxime cernitur, tractanda in laudationibus etiam haec sunt naturae et fortunae bona: [this is illustrated.] Virtus autem, quae per se ipsa laudabilis et sine qua nihil laudari potest, *tamen habet plures partes, quarum alia est alia ad laudationem aptior. Sunt enim aliae virtutes quae videntur in moribus hominum et quadam comitate ac beneficentia positae; aliae quae in ingenii aliqua facultate aut animi magnitudine et robore. Nam clementia, iustitia, benignitas, fides, fortitudo in periculis communibus iucunda est auditu in laudationibus; omnes enim hae virtutes non tam ipsis qui eas habent quam generi hominum fructuosae putantur.*

§ 1. The subject of this chapter is the analysis of virtue and vice, the noble and disgraceful, moral right and wrong, as the objects of praise and blame, and therefore furnishing materials for the epideictic or encomiastic branch of Rhetoric, of which praise and blame are the characteristic functions.

We may also derive from this analysis topics of the ἤθη, characters or dispositions which serve to give the speech an ethical colour. This is to be effected by producing *by the speech* (artistically, not by any evidence of character previously acquired, 'authority') the impression upon the audience of our truthfulness and probity; of our practical wisdom which will enable us to give them useful advice, and finally of our goodwill towards themselves; this being 'the second mode of persuading' (ἦν 'was said', cf. c. 2 §§ 3, 4): because the same materials can be employed in representing ourselves as well as others as 'trustworthy in respect of virtue', as men of such a character as can be depended upon.

§ 2 marks a division of panegyrics, the ordinary subjects of the ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος of Rhetoric. A panegyric may be written and delivered 'with or without a serious purpose (σπουδή)'; the latter are burlesques. On these, and the subjects of encomiastic speeches in general, see Introd. p. 121—123. In the burlesque kind, anything

χωρὶς σπουδῆς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐπαινεῖν πολλάκις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον ἢ θεὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄψυχα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τὸ τυχόν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ περὶ τούτων ληπτέον τὰς προτάσεις, ὥστε ὅσον παραδείγματος χάριν εἴπωμεν καὶ περὶ τούτων.

3 καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὃ ἂν δι' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ὂν ἐπαινετὸν ᾖ, ἢ ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἡδὺ ᾖ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλόν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρετὴν καλὸν
4 εἶναι· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ὂν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν. ἀρετὴ δ' ἐστὶ

however mean and trifling, 'inanimate things, or any insignificant animal', may be made the object of the panegyric. But as the materials, the topics which furnish the arguments, are the same in both, we may include the burlesque with the serious in our treatment of them in the way of examples or illustrations.

ἄψυχα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τὸ τυχόν] Thus Polycrates, the Sophist, wrote in praise of pots, and pebbles, and mice (see note on II 24. 2); and others on humble-bees and salt (Isocr. Hel. § 12). As an extant specimen of these trifling productions we have the μυίας ἐγκώμιον of Lucian (cf. note on Isocr. Paneg. § 189). S.]

§ 3. καλόν] See note on c. 7, 24. Eth. Eudem. VII 15. 3, τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων τέλη ἐστίν, ἃ αὐτὰ αὑτῶν ἕνεκά ἐστιν αἱρετά. τούτων δὲ καλὰ ὅσα δι' αὑτὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπαινετά ἐστιν. ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἐφ' ὧν αἵ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετά, δικαιοσύνη καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ αἱ πράξεις κ.τ.λ. It has either a moral aspect (marked by the characteristic ἐπαινετόν; on praise and blame, approbation and disapprobation, as characteristic of virtue and vice, see Introd. on ἔπαινος, Append. B, p. 212, seq.), what is right and noble, an end in itself, δι' αὑτό; or is physical and sensual, what is beautiful, in which pleasure always accompanies that which is otherwise good. The ugly may be good in the sense of useful, but gives no pleasure.

Virtue therefore must of necessity be καλόν, because it comes under the first definition of it, it is good in itself, beneficial to the individual and to society, and also has the stamp and seal of general 'approbation'.

§ 4. ἀρετή] The definition of virtue here given compared with the celebrated one of Eth. Nic. II 6, init., and the detailed treatment of the list of virtues and the meagre and incomplete account here given of them, contrasted with the elaborate and ingenious analysis of them in the third and fourth books of the same work, is a most striking illustration of the difference between the point of view and method of treatment in the popular Rhetoric and comparatively scientific Ethics. For example, the definition here given coincides in no single point with that of the Ethics. It regards virtue solely on the side of its usefulness, probably because this feature of it is likely to produce the greatest effect upon the popular mind. Instead of a ἕξις it is a mere δύναμις, an undeveloped faculty or power—this is most expressly denied in Eth. N. II 4, 1106 *a* 5,

μὲν δύναμις, ὡς δοκεῖ, ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτική, καὶ δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων,
5 καὶ πάντων περὶ πάντα. μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη,
ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία,
6 ἐλευθεριότης, πραότης, φρόνησις, σοφία. ἀνάγκη

—the προαίρεσις, the special moral element is omitted, as is also the doctrine of the mean in its application to virtue, and the standard by which this relative mean is to be determined.

Regarded as a δύναμις, virtue is a practical faculty, employed in 'providing and securing or keeping good things'—for oneself, apparently, by the exercise of any ἀρετή, excellence or accomplishment bodily or mental—and secondly, 'a power of conferring benefits, or doing services, many and great, in fact *all in everything* (on all occasions)'. πάντων περὶ πάντα is doubtless, as Victorius intimates, a proverbial expression, more especially as it is found in a letter of Cicero to Cassius (ad Div. XV 17. 1, *sed expecta* πάντα περὶ πάντων[1]). This is the moral side of virtue so far as it appears in its usefulness to society.

§ 5. μέρη ἀρετῆς] Comp. 5 § 9. The list of virtues here given differs from that in the Nic. Ethics II 7, and III 9—IV 15, in the following particulars. All the moral virtues from δικαιοσύνη to πρᾳότης inclusive appear in the Ethics, δικαιοσύνη being treated separately in Bk. V, and the two intellectual virtues of the speculative and practical parts of the intellect, φρόνησις practical wisdom, and σοφία speculative wisdom or philosophy, in Bk. VI. σοφία is omitted in the detailed explanation of the virtues, most likely because it has very little in common with Rhetoric, and would be useless to the rhetorician. πρᾳότης, which in the Ethics is ranked, as well as here, amongst the virtues, which are there ἕξεις, here δυνάμεις, in the second book of the Rhetoric becomes a πάθος, so that it belongs to all the three divisions of our moral nature distinguished in Eth. Nic. II 4. The anonymous mean between φιλοτιμία and ἀφιλοτιμία is omitted in our list, as well as the three social virtues of an accomplished gentleman, viz. ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπελία, and φιλία, and also the two virtues of the πάθη, viz. αἰδὼς and νέμεσις. No notice is taken here of ἐγκράτεια, the examination of which occupies the earlier part of Bk. VII, but this perhaps may be considered as an additional argument in favour of ascribing that book to Eudemus, which on all grounds is most probable.

§ 6. The most useful virtues are the highest and greatest, by the foregoing definition. Of these, justice and courage, the one most serviceable in peace, the other in war, are for this reason most held in honour amongst mankind: and in the next degree liberality, because it is lavish, and does not enter into competition with others (ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι) for money, which everybody else covets more than anything besides.

[1] Cicero has altered the form and the application of the proverb. In the text it means 'all kinds on all occasions', in Cicero it is 'all the news about everything'.

δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική. διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶσιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ χρήσιμος ἄλλοις. εἶτα ἡ ἐλευθεριότης· προΐενται γὰρ
καὶ οὐκ ἀνταγωνίζονται περὶ τῶν χρημάτων, ὧν p. 30.
7 μάλιστα ἐφίενται ἄλλοι. ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν
ἀρετὴ δι' ἣν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ
νόμος, ἀδικία δὲ δι' ἣν τὰ ἀλλότρια, οὐχ ὡς ὁ
8 νόμος. ἀνδρία δὲ δι' ἣν πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν καλῶν

§ 7. Justice is the virtue which assigns to every one his due, and in this shews obedience to the law. This virtue and the two following, which are all specially characterised by 'obedience to the law', are thereby invested with a *political* and objective character, and distinguished from the remainder, which are rather subjective and individual. The end and object of the true statesman is to make the citizens good, and this must be effected by training them in obedience to the laws of that form of government under which they live; the type of the perfect citizen varying under various constitutions. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην (τὴν ἀρετὴν) μάλιστα πεπονῆσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. Eth. N. I 13, sub init.

ὡς ὁ νόμος] sc. λέγει, κελεύει, προστάττει; i.e. the law settles the legal rights of the citizens of a state, the observance of which is justice. Injustice is the cause of unfair distribution, to injustice it is owing that men take what does not belong to them, τὰ ἀλλότρια, and thus it acts or operates in disobedience to the law. Of the three kinds of justice distinguished in Eth. N. V, this takes in only the first, δικαιοσύνη διανεμητική, c. 6; the other two are (1) διορθωτική or ἐπανορθωτική 'corrective' justice, which ratifies and corrects wrong, and restores plaintiff and defendant to an equality, c. 7; and (2) reciprocal justice, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός the *lex talionis*, the law of retaliation or reciprocity transferred to commercial justice, which regulates exchanges and contracts of all kinds, c. 8.

§ 8. ἀνδρία] In the chapter on this virtue of 'gratitude' in the Nic. Ethics, III 11, ἀνδρεία (as it is there written) is first defined in general terms as a virtue residing in a mean state in things that inspire confidence, or encouragement, or boldness, τὰ θαρραλέα, on the one hand, and fear on the other: its sole object and aim in choosing a course of action and encountering danger being τὸ καλόν, the right and noble as an ultimate end, because it is so, and for no other reason; which implies also the opposite, the spurning of what is base and disgraceful. This is the general notion of fortitude, the endurance of pain, labour, danger, in the pursuit of an unselfish, honourable, high and noble object, when the opposite course would be base, mean, disgraceful[1]. From this are

[1] Acts of fortitude must likewise be deliberate and voluntary, δεῖ δ' οὐ δι' ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν (1116 *b* 2).

ἔργων ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει, καὶ
9 ὑπηρετικοὶ τῷ νόμῳ· δειλία δὲ τοὐναντίον. σωφροσύνη δὲ ἀρετὴ δι' ἣν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει· ἀκολασία δὲ
10 τοὐναντίον. ἐλευθεριότης δὲ περὶ χρήματα εὐποιη-

then distinguished five popular notions of 'courage', ἀνδρεία in a narrower sense, none of which can be properly called 'fortitude'. The first of these is *political courage*, the courage of a citizen, as a member of a state, and living under and directed by its laws, described in 1116 *a* 17—*b* 2. And this seems to be the view of courage which is taken here, the terms employed in each corresponding very closely, δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους (this restricts the virtue to facing *danger* and gives it a narrower sense than 'fortitude') οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς, *a* 18. δι' αἰδῶ (it is due to a sense of honour) καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν, τιμῆς γάρ, καὶ φυγὴν ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος, *a* 28. Further, one of the characteristics of this form of ἀνδρεία reappears in Eth. Eudem. III 1. 13, as belonging to political courage, μία μὲν πολιτική· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ δι' αἰδῶ οὖσα, and another § 16, διὰ νόμον δὲ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία. The prominence of the military character of this virtue is likewise marked in the description both of the Ethics and Rhetoric by ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους in the one, and by ἔργων ἐν κινδύνοις § 8, and ἡ...ἐν πολέμῳ § 6, in the other; so that it seems that there is sufficient warrant for the identification of the two; the duty to the state and obedience to its laws being again made the ground of the obligation to practise this virtue.

§ 9. The third virtue, σωφροσύνη, *temperantia*, is likewise represented under a *political* aspect. It is a virtue by which men's bodily appetites are regulated according to the dictates of the laws of the state, 'are so disposed towards bodily pleasures as the law enjoins'. In Eth. Nic. III cc. 13, 14, there is no regular definition of it; but we gather from the contents of the two chapters that it is a virtue of self-control, which consists in a mean state with regard to the indulgence in bodily pleasures, (pains having less to do with the virtue); and in a due *measure* or estimate of the value of them. It is thus a 'mean' between ἀκολασία, 'excessive indulgence in them', and ἀναισθησία, total 'insensibility'. II 7, 1107 *b* 4.

§ 10. ἐλευθεριότης] The principal difference between the views taken of the virtues in the Ethics and Rhetoric respectively, is that in the latter they are regarded solely on the side of their utility to society—a political view—in the Ethics they are confirmed habits or states resulting from a due regulation of the elementary πάθη out of which they are formed and developed. They are 'relative means', μεσότητες πρὸς ἡμᾶς, mean states varying in individuals according to the special character of each, lying at a variable distance between two extremes of the πάθη out of which they grow, the proper mean in any given case being determined by the φρόνησις or practical wisdom, the objective standard being the collective judgment of those who are specially endowed with this faculty, the φρόνιμοι. Consequently here 'liberality' in expense is represented as a dis-

11 τική, ἀνελευθερία δὲ τοὐναντίον. μεγαλοψυχία δὲ
ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητικὴ εὐεργετημάτων, μικροψυχία
12 δὲ τοὐναντίον. μεγαλοπρέπεια δὲ ἀρετὴ ἐν δαπανή-
μασι μεγέθους ποιητική, μικροψυχία δὲ καὶ μικρο-
13 πρέπεια τἀναντία. φρόνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας,

position or habit inclined to do good, to make oneself useful in dealing with money.

§ 11. *μεγαλοψυχία*] 'high-mindedness' is represented in the same way as the preceding, as a virtue which is 'productive of benefits', shews its utility, 'on a large scale'; to which 'little-mindedness', meanness of spirit, is the opposite. This is a very different and much narrower view of the virtue than that which is conveyed by the description of it in Nic. Eth. IV 7—9, which is summed up in the brief phrase at the end of c. 9, *ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμήν ἐστι μεγάλην*, and defined c. 7, 1123 *b* 2, *δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὤν*. The *μεγαλόψυχος* of the Ethics is a man of high aims and lofty spirit, full of scorn and contempt for all that is beneath him, men and things, and with a pride which is justified by his deserts: pride without merits to support it is no longer proper pride, a virtue; but degenerates into vanity *χαυνότης*, an undue sense of one's own merits.

μικροψυχία δὲ τοὐναντίον] is put in brackets by the recent Edd. as a gloss. It certainly seems to be superfluous, as it is repeated in the following sentence; and also if it be retained, *μικροπρέπεια* and *μικροψυχία* are *both* contrasted as opposites with *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, which in the latter case is certainly incorrect. At the same time if the words are omitted the repetition of *ἀρετή* is quite equally objectionable.

§ 12. *μεγαλοπρέπεια*] 'magnificence' in expenditure, is distinguished from 'liberality' merely by this, that whereas the one is *περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις* (every kind of money transactions), magnificence is *περὶ δαπανηρὰς μόνον*, 'those alone in which a large cost is involved'. Eth. N. IV 4, sub init. It is only to men distinguished either by birth or reputation, or anything else that confers distinction, that this virtue is suitable —in others it is no virtue at all, 1122 *b* 30. Plato and his *dramatis personae* sometimes add *μεγαλοπρέπεια* to the four cardinal virtues, the classication which he usually adopts. Meno 74 A, 88 A. Rep. II 402 C, VI 490 E, 494 B, VII 536 A, VIII 560 E. It does not, however, exactly correspond with Aristotle's interpretation, but has a wider and more general signification. See Rep. VI 486 A, where it is applied to the *διάνοια*. It seems from the definition, (*ὅροι*, 412 E, *ἀξίωσις κατὰ λογισμὸν ὀρθὸν τὸν σεμνότατον*), to be a nearer approach to Aristotle's *μεγαλοψυχία*.

§ 13. *φρόνησις*] appears much in the same character here as in Eth. Nic. VI 5—9, where it is analysed at length. It is 'practical wisdom which shews itself in the discrimination between good and evil, and particularly moral good and evil, in general, *δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν*, 1140 *a* 25. *διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ*

καθ' ἣν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.

14 περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καθόλου καὶ περὶ τῶν μορίων εἴρηται κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν ἱκανῶς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν· φανερὸν γὰρ

καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς, Ib. 1140 *b* 7. *ἀρετή τίς ἐστιν καὶ οὐ τέχνη*, *b* 24. *δυοῖν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ·* (or *τοῦ λογιστικοῦ*, i.e. the *διάνοια* or reasoning faculty, the discursive reason, as opposed to the *νοῦς*, the speculative, intuitive reason, the organ of the other intellectual virtue *σοφία*): *ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ φρόνησις*, *b* 25. *ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική*, c. 8, 1141 *b* 31. *τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας*, c. 9, 1142 *a* 14.

§ 14. *τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν*] 'the present (*instant*) time'. *ἐνιστάναι*, 'to place in' a position: *ἐνίστασθαι, ἐνστῆναι, ἐνεστηκέναι, ἐνεστάναι*, 'to be placed, set in, stand in', a position. Hence (2) (I think) of things 'standing in the way', and so either (α) close by, 'present', 'instant', '*instans*' (*tempus, bellum*, &c.), 'impending', 'threatening'; (for *instans*, 'present', Quint. V 10. 42, *praeteritum, instans, futurum*). In grammar, *ἐνεστὼς χρόνος*, 'the present tense', *ἐνεστῶσα μετοχή*, 'the present participle', *instans tempus* (Facc. Lex. s.v.); or (β) 'to stand in the way' as an obstacle, impediment, or 'objection'; as the logical *ἐνστῆναι* and *ἔνστασις*, of an objection, or contrary instance, to a supposed conclusion; and hence also 'instance', something which stands in your way and so possibly attracts your attention, or as a generalisation of the logical 'instance' or objection. See Introd. p. 269, and note.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων] 'The rest are easily discerned'—'the rest' are what follows, the causes namely and consequences of virtue—'anything that is productive of, because it tends to or promotes (*πρός*), virtue, or that is the effect or result of it (*τὰ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς γινόμενα*), is estimable and an object of *praise* (*καλόν*). Such things are (the first) the 'signs', (the second) the works of virtue (and *therefore* praiseworthy)'. The *σημεῖον* (Introd. p. 161—163) is the *probable*—or, in the case of the *τεκμήριον*, *certain*—indication of the existence of the thing which it accompanies; from the 'signs' of virtue in a man we infer, with more or less probability, its actual existence. Schrader quotes the little tract *περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν*, printed as an appendix to the three Ethical treatises in Bekker's 4to ed. Vol. II p. 1249. It is an abridgment or epitome of Aristotle's account of the virtues in the third and fourth books of the Ethics, with a slight admixture of Platonism and other occasional alterations. *ἐπαινετὰ μέν ἐστι τὰ καλά, ψεκτὰ δὲ τὰ αἰσχρά. καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡγοῦνται αἱ ἀρεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσχρῶν αἱ κακίαι. ἐπαινετὰ δ' ἐστι καὶ τὰ αἴτια τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα ταῖς ἀρεταῖς* (these are the *τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς* and 'signs'), *καὶ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, ψεκτὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία*, 1249 *a* 26.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων...ἰδεῖν] for the more usual *τὰ ἄλλα ἰδεῖν*. This substitution of a preposition with its case for the direct government of the

ὅτι ἀνάγκη τά τε ποιητικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς εἶναι καλά (πρὸς ἀρετὴν γάρ) καὶ τὰ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς γινόμενα, τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε σημεῖα τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὰ ἔργα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἅ ἐστιν ἀγαθοῦ

verb, has been noticed by Heindorf in the case of *εἰς*, on Plat. Lys. § 16, and in that of *περί* and *ἀμφί*, on Phaedo § 65, p. 250 C (in which place *περὶ κάλλους* takes the place of the *nominative*); likewise of *περί* and *ὑπέρ* by Bremi on Dem. Olynth. I p. 14. 18 (ap. Schäfer *Appar. Crit. ad Demosth.* I 208); and a similar use of the Latin, &c. by Heusing, ad Cic. de Off. I 15. 3. Comp. Epist. ad Div. II 17. 1; III 12. 2 (Schäfer). But what has not been observed of this usage is, that it is almost exclusively *characteristic of a middle or later period of the Greek language*, viz. the fourth century B.C.

The earliest instances I have noted of it are Soph. Oed. Col. 422, *ἐν δέ μοι τέλος αὐτοῖν γένοιτο τῆσδε τῆς μάχης πέρι*, and Aj. 684, *ἀμφὶ τούτοισιν εὖ σχήσει*. In Plato it is not uncommon, Phaedo 231 D, *βούλεσθαι περί τινος*, Rep. IV 427 A, *εἶδος νόμων πέρι καὶ πολιτείας* (a good example), Ib. 436 B, *καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πράττομεν*, Phaedo 249 C (this use of *καθ' ἕκαστον* for the simple accusative is found in various writers; see Stallbaum on Rep. ll. cc.), Ib. VII 533 B, *περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν*, Theaet. 177 B, Gorg. 487 A. But in Demosthenes and Aristotle it becomes quite a usual mode of expression. In the *de Fals. Leg.* alone it occurs in §§ 6, 7, 64, 167, 239, and probably elsewhere in the same speech.

From Aristotle, with whom it is still more familiar, I will content myself with referring to Rhet. I 15. 1, *περὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων...ἐπιδραμεῖν*, Ib. § 27, *περὶ ὅρκων...διελεῖν*. II 4. 30; 5. 21, *τοιούτους περὶ ὧν* (i.e. *οὓς*) *φοβοῦνται*, a good example. 18. 4, *περὶ μεγέθους* (i.e. *μέγεθος*) *κοινόν* (*ἐστι*), Ib. 21, init., in both of which it stands for the nominative, as it does also in Pol. VI (IV) 2, 1289 *a* 11, and III 3, init. Pol. I 1 ult. I 9, 1257 *a* 5, II 1 init., Ib. c. 4, 1262 *b* 25, *περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν—πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν*. Eth. N. IV 4 init., *περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν*, X 1 sub init., 1172 *a* 26, *ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων—παρετέον εἶναι*, where it stands for the accusative. de Insomniis c. 2, 459 *a* 29, *ἐπὶ τῶν φερομένων—κινεῖται*, would be more regularly *τὰ φερόμενα*.

§ 15. *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ σημεῖα κ.τ.λ.*] An exemplification of the preceding rule, and application of it to the special virtues. 'Seeing that the signs of virtue, and all such things as are works (results, effects), or affections' (properties, qualities, attributes—on *πάθη* and its various senses see Introd. pp. 113—118; on the special sense here, p. 114) 'of it are *καλά*', the same rule will apply to each special manifestation of it, as *ἀνδρία*. The *πάθη* of virtue are illustrated in the examples by *ἀνδρείως, δικαίως, ἀδίκως*: these are *πάθη*, 'affections', of courage, justice, and injustice, in the sense of 'what happens to them', some change they have undergone, consisting in a modification of them in form and signification; as *δικαίως* 'justly', denotes a certain *mode of action*, viz. *just* acting. An exception occurs to the general application of the rule to the special virtues in the case of *δικαιοσύνη*: in this alone, though it is true of the *ἔργα*, it is not true of the *πάθη*: in other words, in the rest of the virtues the *πάσχειν* are

ἔργα ἢ πάθη, καλά, ἀνάγκη ὅσα τε ἀνδρίας ἔργα ἢ σημεῖα ἀνδρίας ἢ ἀνδρείως πέπρακται καλὰ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ δικαίως ἔργα (πάθη δὲ οὔ· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ταύτῃ τῶν ἀρετῶν οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ δικαίως καλόν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ζημιοῦσθαι αἰσχρὸν τὸ δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως), καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας δὲ ἀρετὰς ὡσαύτως.
16 καὶ ἐφ' ὅσοις τὰ ἆθλα τιμή, καλά. καὶ ἐφ' ὅσοις

σύστοιχα, the changes of termination represent true co-ordinates, all being terms referable to the same notion or class, viz. that of virtue, as *ἀνδρία, ἀνδρεῖος, ἀνδρείως*: all are equally *καλά* and praiseworthy (see note on c. 7. 27); but in the single case of justice this does not universally apply, for *τὸ δικαίως ζημιοῦσθαι*, just (deserved) punishment, is not equally praiseworthy with a just act, *τὸ δικαίως πράττειν*, but the contrary; since it is more disgraceful than an *unjust* punishment. (This seems to be a mere fallacy of *ὁμωνυμία*, ambiguity, *equivoque*, *δικαίως* not standing in the same relation to *ζημιοῦσθαι* and *πράττειν*: in the one case the 'justice' of the act lies in the intention of the actor; in the other it belongs not to the actor, but to the law and the judge who inflicts the punishment. A similar equivocal meaning lies in the word *πάθος*: in the rule and the general application of it, it stands for properties or attributes: in the special exception it denotes an 'affection' in the sense of suffering or punishment.)

§ 16. *ἐφ' ὅσοις τὰ ἆθλα τιμή, καλά*] The *καλόν* is an end in itself; it is independent of all ulterior considerations and aims: therefore any act of which honour alone, and not profit (*ἐφ' ὅσοις τιμὴ μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα*) is the prize, is *καλόν*: the prize aimed at, or the *end* of the exertions and efforts, determines the character of those efforts or actions, which are therefore fair and noble like the end at which they aim. *τιμή* is an end of this kind. Eth. N. I 4, 1096 *b* 16, *καθ' αὑτὰ (ἀγαθά) δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἢ* (are they not?) *ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν.* c. 3, 1095 *b* 22, *τιμή* is the end of the *πολιτικὸς βίος*, pursued by the *χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοί*, v. 30, *δῆλον οὖν κατά γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων.* In IV 7—10, *τιμή* is represented as the end of the *μεγαλόψυχοι* and *φιλότιμοι*, the sphere in which these two virtues are exercised. c. 7, 1123 *b* 18, *μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἆθλον. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμή.*

καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα κ.τ.λ.] The general characteristic of all the following topics (to § 19) is disinterestedness; *unselfish* acts, of which the object is the good of some one else, and not one's own. Any act of this kind, where there is no *ulterior end* of profit or advantage to oneself, which is done therefore for its own sake, and 'because it is in itself desirable', conforms to the definition, § 3, and is *καλόν*. So the highest and purest form of friendship or love is distinguished from the two lower forms, those whose end is profit and pleasure. Both of these are selfish; true

τιμὴ μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα. καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα
17 πράττει τις τῶν αἱρετῶν. καὶ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά, ὅσα
ὑπέρ τε πατρίδος τις ἐποίησε, παριδὼν τὸ αὑτοῦ.
καὶ τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθά, καὶ ἃ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθά· αὐτοῦ P. 1367.

friendship is disinterested, *οἱ βουλόμενοι τἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι*, Eth. N. VIII 4 init.; and the true friend is *ἕτερος αὐτός*, IX 9 init. and Ib. 1170 *b* 6, or *ἄλλος αὐτός*, c. 4, 1165 *a* 31, 'a *second* self' (not one's own self) *alter ego*. And on the other hand, *ἐπιτιμῶσι τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ μοχθηρότερος ᾖ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον· ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, κ.τ.λ.* IX 8, init. And in the Politics, III 7, the distinction of the two classes of government, normal and abnormal, *ὀρθαί* and *παρεκβάσεις* (deviations from the true standard), is determined by the *end* of each, according as it is *τὸ κοινόν* or *τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον*: the public interest *of others*, or the private interest of the governors themselves, one or several; in other words, it is determined by the selfishness or disinterestedness of the governing powers of the state.

§ 17. *ὅσα ὑπέρ τε—τὸ αὑτοῦ*] This clause seems certainly out of place here, though Schrader defends it as an example of *τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά*. 'Qui enim ut patriam iuvet commoda sua negligit, is bonum *simpliciter* praefert illi quod *huic* bonum foret': that is, he prefers *general* to special or particular good, (his own). But this does not account for the *τε*, which if the words are retained in the received order is as superfluous as it is inexplicable. The sense would be improved and the particle accounted for by transferring the clause so as to follow *τὰ τοιαῦτα* (§ 17 ad fin.) The passage will then run thus: 'and all absolute (or general, see note on *ἁπλῶς*, c. 2 § 4) goods: and all natural goods (things which are naturally good, in themselves, and so good for all) and (therefore, or *καί*, 'that is') things which are *not* (specially and particularly) good to oneself (*αὐτῷ*), appropriated to particular individuals, because such things (things that are thus special and particular, and not common to others) carry with them the notion of selfishness or self-interest'. Here the clause comes in as the first example—'anything, namely, which a man does *either* (*τε*) for his country, to the neglect of his own interest, *or* (*καί*) anything that a dead man may have the benefit of, rather than one who is living (such as posthumous fame, funeral orations, monuments to his memory); because such honours paid (or advantages accruing) to a man while he is alive, involve or imply more self-interest', and are therefore less *καλά*.

τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά] 'Talia sunt quae absolute, citra respectum ad hunc hominem, locum, tempusve bona sunt. Unde *τῷ ἁπλῶς*, *illi quod simpliciter tale* dicitur, opponuntur *τὰ αὐτῷ* Rhet. I 7. 35, et III 13. 4, *τὰ τούτοις* III 19. 1, *τὰ τινί* Top. III 1 (116 *a* 21), *τὰ ἡμῖν* Magn. Mor. I 1, *τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα* de Gen. An. VII (sic); *τὰ πῇ, ποῦ, ποτέ, πρός τι*, de Soph. El. c. 5, 166 *b* 22.' Schrader. Add *ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις*, Eth. N. I 11, 1101 *b* 3. *οὐδὲ ὁ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς*, Ib. II 4, 1106 *a* 1.

καὶ τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθά] Comp. 7. 33, *τὸ αὐτοφυές*. 'Sunt profecto laudationibus minime incongruentes materiae, genus, parentes, patria, pul-

18 γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ὅσα τεθνεῶτι ἐνδέχεται p. 31.
ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶντι· τὸ γὰρ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα
19 μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰ ζῶντι. καὶ ὅσα ἔργα τῶν ἄλλων
ἕνεκα. ἧττον γὰρ αὑτοῦ. καὶ ὅσαι εὐπραγίαι περὶ
ἄλλους, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ αὑτόν. καὶ περὶ τοὺς εὖ ποιή-
σαντας· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ τὰ εὐεργετήματα· οὐ γὰρ
20 εἰς αὑτόν. καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐφ᾽ οἷς αἰσχύνονται· τὰ
γὰρ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχύνονται καὶ λέγοντες καὶ ποιοῦν-
τες καὶ μέλλοντες, ὥσπερ καὶ Σαπφὼ πεποίηκεν,
εἰπόντος τοῦ Ἀλκαίου

critudo, ingenii acumen, solertia, docilitas, tenax memoria, ingenita animi magnitudo, et quae a natura proveniunt bona alia.' Schrader.

αὐτῷ ἀγαθά] 'good for him', that is, for this or that individual. See note on c. 7. 35, *τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἁπλῶς*, and Schrader (quoted above on *τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά*).

§ 19. *τὰ εὐεργετήματα*] 'any benefits conferred', because they are necessarily conferred on others, and therefore, so far, more praiseworthy than acquisitions. These are distinguished from *εὐπραγίαι περὶ ἄλλους* (*ante*), which are 'any good and noble deeds done in the service of others, and not for oneself', for the same reason as the preceding. Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1163 *a* 1, *καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ, ὠφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι*.

§ 20. *τὰ γὰρ αἰσχρὰ κ.τ.λ.*] 'for shameful things we are all ashamed of, when we say, do, or are intending to do them'. Sappho's verses, for instance, in answer to Alcaeus,—'something I would say, but shame prevents me'—she infers from this that it was something to be ashamed of, *αἰσχρόν*, and replies, 'Hadst thou yearned after things good or fair, and had not thy tongue stirred up mischief to utter it, shame had not possessed thine eyes, but thou wouldst have spoken of the thing that is right'. The third line in particular of this Alcaic stanza requires correction, and there is not much help to be derived from the Aristotelian MSS. In the first, Blomfield, *Mus. Crit.* I p. 17, reads *ἰκέ τ' ἐυλῶν*: and Hermann (much better), *El. Metr. Gr.* III 16, de stroph. min. *ἰκέ σ'* ('reached thee', the Homeric *ἵκειν*), from the reading *ἴκες* of one MS. Bergk, *Fragm. Lyr. Gr.* p. 607, follows MS A^c in reading *ἦχε* and the Aeolic *ἐσλῶν*. The third line, which in the MSS appears as *αἰδώς κέν σε οὐκ εἶχεν ὄμματ'*, without *varia lectio*, is written by Blomfield, u. s., *αἰδώς κεν οὐχί τ' ὄππατ' εἶχεν*: by Hermann, *αἰδώς κέ τευς οὐκ εἶχεν ὄππατ'*: and by Bergk, *αἰδώς κε σ' οὐκ ἂν ἦχεν ὄππατ'* (surely *κε* and *ἄν* thus repeated in different forms and almost immediate juxtaposition is indefensible): none of these seems to be satisfactory, but I have nothing better to suggest. [In Bergk's 2nd ed. p. 674 the fragment is printed as follows: *αἰ δ' ἦχες ἔσλων ἵμερον ἢ κάλων, | καὶ μή τι ϝείπην γλῶσσ' ἐκύκα κάκον, | αἴδως κέ σ' οὐ κίχανεν ὄμματ', | ἀλλ' ἔλεγες περὶ τῶ δικαίως.* S.]

The fact that the eye is the principal organ of the *manifestation* of

θέλω τι ϝειπῆν, ἀλλά με κωλύει
αἰδώς,
αἰ δ' εἶχες ἐσθλῶν ἵμερον ἢ καλῶν
καὶ μή τι ϝειπῆν γλῶσσ' ἐκύκα κακόν,
αἰδώς κέ σ' οὐκ ἂν εἶχεν ὄμματ',
ἀλλ' ἔλεγες περὶ τῶ δικαίω.

21 καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγωνιῶσι μὴ φοβούμενοι· περὶ γὰρ τῶν
22 πρὸς δόξαν φερόντων ἀγαθῶν τοῦτο πάσχουσιν. καὶ
αἱ τῶν φύσει σπουδαιοτέρων ἀρεταὶ καλλίους καὶ
23 τὰ ἔργα, οἷον ἀνδρὸς ἢ γυναικός. καὶ αἱ ἀπολαυ-
στικαὶ ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἢ αὑτοῖς· διὸ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ
24 ἡ δικαιοσύνη καλόν. καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμω-

some of the feelings or emotions, as love, shame, fear, is here, as often elsewhere, expressed poetically by the phrase that 'shame has its seat in the eye'. Compare the proverb in II 6. 18, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ, where see note.

§ 21. καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγωνιῶσι μὴ φοβούμενοι] 'and things about which we are excessively anxious or distress ourselves, without fear': the acquisition of which causes us a violent mental struggle (ἀγών), distress, or anxiety, 'agony' in our exertions to attain, or in the fear of losing, it. The addition of μὴ φοβούμενοι is made here, because fear is the usual concomitant of the emotion, and generally included in the notion. Probl. II 31, ἢ ὅτι ἀγωνία φόβος τίς ἐστι πρὸς ἀρχὴν ἔργου (Vict.). ἀγωνιᾷν belongs to that class of verbs which imply a diseased state or condition of the mind or body; see note on πνευστιᾷν, I 2. 18.

The anxious feeling is usually excited about the kind of good things that 'tend to our reputation'; and this is why they are praiseworthy.

§ 22. 'The virtues (excellences) and functions of men and things naturally worthier, are nobler and more praiseworthy, as in man than in woman'.

§ 23. αἱ ἀπολαυστικαί (ἀρεταί)] 'those which contribute to the gratification or enjoyment of others rather than of ourselves, of which justice is an instance'. ἀπόλαυσις is not here confined to sensual gratification, its proper meaning. In Eth. N. I. 3, Sardanapalus, the type of sensuality, is taken as the representative of the βίος ἀπολαυστικός: note on I 5. 7. Here again it is the unselfishness that is laudable.

§ 24. καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον] 'and the heavier vengeance on, punishment of, one's enemies' (μᾶλλον may be either to punish them in a higher degree, the more the better; or as contrasted with καταλλάττεσθαι, 'rather than the reverse'), and 'refusing to be reconciled, come to terms, with them'. The reason being, that 'retaliatory' or 'reciprocal justice' (note on § 7) requires this, and therefore it is right, and of course laudable; and also because 'not to be beaten' (an unyielding resolution)

ῥεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι· τό τε γὰρ ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καλόν, καὶ ἀν-
25 δρείου τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι. καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν· αἱρετά τε γὰρ ἄκαρπα ὄντα, καὶ ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς δηλοῖ. καὶ τὰ μνημονευτά, καὶ τὰ μᾶλλον μᾶλλον. καὶ ἃ μὴ ζῶντι ἕπεται. καὶ οἷς τιμὴ ἀκολουθεῖ. καὶ τὰ περιττά. καὶ τὰ μόνῳ ὑπάρχοντα

is a sign of a 'manly character'. Comp. I 6. 26 (ἀγαθὰ) *τὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κακά*, and § 29. This was a constant article of the popular morality, and is cited as such here: see, for instance, Xen. Mem. IV 2, 14 seq. Rhet. ad Alex. I (2), 13, 14. Again in Aristotle's Rhet. II 5. 5, Eur. Ion 1045—7, Med. 808, Cic. de Off. I 7. 2.

§ 25. 'Victory and honour are noble and praiseworthy things; for they are desirable though unproductive (see c. 5. 7, note *infra* § 26), and manifest (are signs of) an excess, superiority, higher degree, of virtue', i.e. a higher degree than the virtues which they crown would attain without them: a man may be *good* without them; with them he must be *better*. Comp. Eth. N. IV 8 init. *οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ οἱ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον.* Comp. *infra* § 39.

μνημονευτά] 'things to be, capable of being, or that deserve to be, remembered'; as *εὐμνημόνευτα* (*infra*) is 'easy to be remembered'. *μνημονεύματα*, which Victorius adopts upon the superior authority of MSS, is *monumenta*, memorials, *elogia, et quae memoriam alicuius ornant.* He does not seem to have observed, what Bekker, who prefers the former, doubtless did, though he does not say so, that *μᾶλλον* can be construed with the *adjective* *μνημονευτά*, but hardly, or not so well, with the *substantive* *μνημονεύματα.*

ἃ μὴ ζῶντι ἕπεται] 'things that outlast life, that follow a man beyond the grave', as posthumous fame.

οἷς τιμὴ ἀκολουθεῖ] Honour itself, especially as contrasted with *profit* (*supra* § 16), imparts a praiseworthy character as the prize of action, and is itself *καλόν* and a thing to be praised (§ 25, *supra*). It must therefore convey this in some measure to everything, particularly actions, by which it is attended upon or accompanied.

τὰ περιττά] (see note on 6. 28) are *καλά* as well as *ἀγαθά*. They are thus illustrated by Schrader. 'Quae aliis sui generis praestant. Gellius I XIII *P. Crassus Mucianus traditur quinque habuisse rerum bonarum maxima et praecipua, quod esset ditissimus, quod nobilissimus, quod eloquentissimus, quod iuris consultissimus, quod Pontifex Maximus.* Velleius (de Pompeio), II 53, *Vir in id evectus super quod ascendi non potest.*'

τὰ μόνῳ ὑπάρχοντα] *τὰ ἴδια καὶ ἃ μηδείς*, 6. 28. The difference between the two lies in this, that the topic of 6. 28 denotes positive good, as excellences, accomplishments, personal or intellectual advantages, which are peculiar to a man, and shared by no one else; here they rather refer to

26 καλλίω· εὐμνημονευτότερα γάρ. καὶ κτήματα ἄκαρπα· ἐλευθεριώτερα γάρ. καὶ τὰ παρ' ἑκάστοις δὲ ἴδια καλά, καὶ ὅσα σημεῖά ἐστι τῶν παρ' ἑκάστοις

peculiar *actions*, or qualities that can be manifested in action, which are more easily remembered, and therefore more the objects of praise, and in this sense καλλίω: ἐκ πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος, § 32.

'In bibliotheca, quae prima in urbe ab Asinio Pollione publicata est, unius M. Varronis viventis posita imago est, Plin. VII 30. *L. Metello tribuit populus Romanus quod nunquam ulli alii ab condito aevo ut quoties in senatum iret curru veheretur ad curiam.* Plin. VII 43.' Schrader. I have quoted these instances because *from Schrader's point of view* they very well illustrate the topic. But I believe they are not exactly what Aristotle had in his mind when he wrote the words. These are not exactly subjects of 'praise', which the topics of this chapter deal with, exclusively or more immediately. τὰ περιττά and τὰ μόνῳ ὑπάρχοντα are to be taken together, the latter being a step higher in degree than the former. τὰ περιττά are distinguished and exceptional (as Schrader puts it) excellences, qualities, achievements. τὰ μόνῳ ὑπάρχοντα are a step beyond, 'unique'.

§ 26. κτήματα ἄκαρπα] note on 5. 7, ἔστι δὲ χρήσιμα μᾶλλον. A pleasure-garden on this principle is a finer thing and more deserving of approbation than a market-garden from which you make a profit. The reason here given for this preference is different to that assigned in Eth. N. IV 9 (quoted in the note referred to). There it is accounted for by the self-sufficiency or independence (αὐτάρκεια) that it implies; here by its being more in accordance with the *gentleman's* character, in contrast with the vulgarity of trade and money-making.

τὰ παρ' ἑκάστοις ἴδια] These are special pursuits, modes of action, manners, and customs cultivated in particular countries, 'national' and 'peculiar to them'. In England, for instance, special skill in cricket and other athletic exercises gains a man applause; in Greece, running, boxing, wrestling, chariot-racing, are the great games. In Europe a man is applauded for his skill in dancing, which the Chinese utterly contemn, and regard as a useless waste of labour. Quint. Inst. Or. III 7. 24, *Minus Lacedaemone studia literarum quam Athenis honoris merebuntur; plus patientia, fortitudo.*

ὅσα σημεῖά ἐστι τῶν παρ' ἑκάστοις ἐπαινουμένων] 'all signs, or distinctive marks, of habits (characters, actions), that are approved in particular countries, as the habit of wearing long hair in Lacedaemon. This is a 'sign' of a gentleman, a character very much approved in that country. It is a sign of this, because with long hair it is difficult to perform any menial task[1], and therefore the wearing it shews that menial occupations are alien from that character. Gaisford quotes, Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. XI 3, ἐφῆκε δὲ (Lycurgus sc.) καὶ κομᾶν τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡβητικὴν ἡλικίαν, νομίζων οὕτω καὶ μείζους ἂν καὶ ἐλευθεριωτέρους καὶ γοργοτέρους φαίνεσθαι. [Aristoph. Aves, 1282, ἐλακωνομάνουν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι τότε, ἐκόμων κ.τ.λ. S.]

[1] οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' ἐπιτηδεῦσαι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βίον βάναυσον ἢ θητικόν, Pol. III 5, 1278 *a* 20.

ἐπαινουμένων, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κομᾶν καλόν· ἐλευθέρου γὰρ σημεῖον· οὐ γάρ ἐστι κομῶντα ῥᾴδιον
27 οὐδὲν ποιεῖν ἔργον θητικόν· καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην· ἐλευθέρου γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς

θητικόν] Θῆτες, *θητεύειν*, denote *hired service in agriculture*, but not *slavery*; the *θής* is no *δοῦλος*. In this sense both words are used by Homer. The *θῆτες* formed the fourth and lowest class under the Solonian constitution. At Athens, in Aristotle's time, the *θῆτες, τὸ θητικὸν (πλῆθος)*, still denotes the class of paid *agricultural* labourers, as an order of the state or population; and is expressly distinguished from the *βάναυσοι* or *τεχνῖται*, artisans and petty manufacturers, who are still *hired labourers*, but work at *mechanical* employments, and in towns, forming with the others the lowest order of the population of the state. In Pol. III 5, *βάναυσος* and *θής* are several times thus distinguished. It is there said that in some constitutions (such as monarchies and aristocracies) neither of these classes is admitted into the governing body; in oligarchies the *θής* cannot, the *βάναυσος* can, be a citizen. In the account given, VI (IV) 4, 1291 *b* 14 seq., of the various kinds of population which form the bases of so many different varieties of democracy, we have in line 25 the term *χερνητικόν*, of precisely the same import, substituted for *θητικόν*: the other had been already mentioned. In Pol. VII (VI) 4, 1319 *a* 27, three classes of these lower orders are distinguished, *τὸ πλῆθος τό τε τῶν βαναύσων* (artisans) *καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων* (small tradesmen or retailers, buyers and sellers in the market, VI (IV) 4, 1291 *a* 4, *λέγω δὲ ἀγοραῖον τὸ περὶ τὰς πράσεις καὶ τὰς ὠνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας διατρῖβον*), *καὶ τὸ θητικόν*. Of all these it is said just before, *ὁ γὰρ βίος φαῦλος, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔργον μετ' ἀρετῆς*. *θητικόν* metaph. = *δουλικόν*, 'servile, menial', occurs again Eth. Nic. IV 8, 1125 1.

§ 27. *μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην*] This again applies to Lacedaemon: Gaisford quotes Aelian, V. H. VI 6, *βάναυσον δὲ εἰδέναι τέχνην ἄνδρα Λακεδαιμόνιον οὐκ ἐξῆν*. Xen. Oecon. IV 2, *καὶ γὰρ αἵ γε βαναυσικαὶ καλούμεναι καὶ ἐπίρρητοί εἰσι καὶ εἰκότως μέντοι πάνυ ἀδοξοῦνται πρὸς τῶν πόλεων* (add VI 5).

βάναυσον] Of the various kinds of population of a state, enumerated in Pol. VI (IV) 4, the first is the *περὶ τὴν τροφὴν πλῆθος, τὸ γεωργικόν*: the second, *τὸ βάναυσον· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι· τούτων δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὰς δὲ εἰς τρυφὴν ἢ καλῶς ζῆν*, 1291 *a* 1. So that here the fine arts, as well as the necessary, indispensable, or mechanical arts, are all included in the class *βάναυσοι*. See on this subject Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* (Cab. Cycl. 2nd. ed.) c. 18, Vol. III p. 64, note. Pol. V (VIII) 2, 1337 *b* 8 seq., *βάναυσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τάς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας· ἄσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ταπεινήν*. I 11, 1258 *b* 37, (*τῶν ἐργασιῶν*) *βαναυσόταται ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα*. Eth. Eudem. I 4, 1215 *a* 30, *λέγω δὲ*

28 ἄλλον ζῆν. ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ σύνεγγυς τοῖς ὑπάρ-

βαναύσους (τέχνας) τὰς ἑδραίας καὶ μισθαρνικάς (arts sedentary and mercenary). The *ἑδραίας* in this last passage explains the *bodily* degradation and injury of the preceding. Comp. Plato, Rep. VII 522 B, IX 590 B, Phileb. 55 C, Theaet. 176 (Heind. note § 85), (Legg. VIII 4, 846 D No native must learn or practise any handicraft. One art is enough for any man; and the natives or citizens must occupy themselves *exclusively* in statecraft or public duties). Arts are inferior in dignity in proportion to their necessity or utility, Arist. Metaph. Α 1. Cic. de Off. I 42. 5.

ἐλευθέρου...τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν] 'to live with reference to, dependent upon, at the beck and call of, another'. Independence, *αὐτάρκεια*, is a characteristic of the *ἐλεύθερος*, the 'free and independent' citizen. Aristotle is writing at Athens, and for Athenians. So it is said of the *μεγαλόψυχος*, Eth. N. IV 8, 1124 *b* 32, *καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ.* Metaph. Α 2, 982 *b* 25, (Vict.) of *ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, δῆλον ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρείαν ἑτέραν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, φαμέν, ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὤν, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὖσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ αὑτῆς ἕνεκέν ἐστιν.* Victorius also quotes, in illustration of *πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν*, Dem. (*pro Ctesiphonte*, as he calls it) de F. Leg. p. 411, *τοῖς δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ζῶσι καὶ τῆς παρ' ὑμῶν τιμῆς γλιχομένοις.* The import of the phrase is, to look to another in all that you say and do, to direct your life and conduct by the will and pleasure of another; in the relation (*πρός*) of servant or dependent to master.

It is to be observed that the reason here assigned for avoiding all mechanical occupations as disreputable, viz. that it destroys a man's independence, so that he cannot subsist *without looking to others*, places the objection to it upon a different ground to that assigned in the Politics (quoted in the last note), where it is that they disqualify a man for doing his duty to the state.

§ 28. *ληπτέον δὲ κ.τ.λ.*] 'and we may assume (or represent, substitute one for the other, on occasion) things (qualities, and the terms expressing them) that are very nearly related to the identical, both in commendation and censure, as that the cautious is cold and designing, the simple (simpleton) worthy and amiable, and the insensible mild and calm'. This lays down the general rule, of which the next topic is a special variety, *ὑποκορισμός*.

Quint. Inst. Orat. III 7. 25. *Idem praecipit* (Aristotle in this place) *illud quoque, quia sit quaedam virtutibus ac vitiis vicinitas, utendum proxima derivatione verborum ut pro temerario fortem, pro prodigo liberalem, pro avaro parcum vocemus: quae eadem etiam contra valent. Quod quidem orator, id est vir bonus, nunquam faciet, nisi forte communi utilitate ducatur.* To the same effect, Cic. Orat. Part XXIII 81 (Schrader). [Liv. XXII 12, (Fabium) *pro cunctatore segnem, pro cauto timidum, affingens vicina virtutibus vitia, compellabat.* S.]

χρηστός for *ἠλίθιος* is one of those ironical euphemisms which Plato is so fond of employing; as also are *γλυκύς, ἡδύς*, and *εὐήθης*, this last belonging also to the common language. *γλυκύς*, Hipp. Maj. 288 B; *ἡδύς*, in several places, Theaet. 209 E, Gorg. 491 E, Rep. I 337 D, VII 527 D, and elsewhere; Lat. *suavis, lepidus. χρηστός*, Phaedr. 264 B, Theaet. 161 A, 166 A, Rep. V 479 A, &c. Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 131. [On *εὐήθεια*, cf. note on Isocr. Paneg. § 169, and Rep. 400 E, quoted *infra*, p. 175. S.]

χουσιν ὡς ταὐτὰ ὄντα καὶ πρὸς ἔπαινον καὶ πρὸς ψόγον, οἷον τὸν εὐλαβῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον καὶ p. 32.
29 *τὸν ἠλίθιον χρηστὸν καὶ τὸν ἀνάλγητον πρᾶον. καὶ ἕκαστον δ' ἐκ τῶν παρακολουθούντων ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, οἷον τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ τὸν μανικὸν ἁπλοῦν καὶ τὸν αὐθάδη μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ σεμνόν. καὶ τοὺς* P. 1367 b.

§ 29. καὶ ἕκαστον κ.τ.λ.] "and in every case from the accompanying, attendant, qualities (the qualities that come *next*, but always on the higher and better side; on ἀκολουθεῖν and its various senses, see note on c. 6. 3) derive (ἐκ) a term or expression always in the best direction (with the most favourable tendency, *interpretatio in melius*, putting the most favourable construction on the actual facts of the case); call, for instance, the irascible and insane, 'simple and straightforward', and self-will (headstrong, stubborn, obstinate temper; αὐθάδης, one who *pleases himself*, αὐθ-άδης, 'self-pleaser', and *will* have his own way), 'magnificence', or proper pride, and a due sense of dignity (σεμνόν)"[1].

On ὀργίλος Victorius compares Hor. Sat. I 3. 51, *at est truculentior atque plus aequo liber: simplex fortisque habeatur*, with Cic. de Legg. I 7, *solent enim, id quod virorum bonorum est, admodum irasci*, and therefore an angry temper may be attributed to a virtuous disposition.

μανικός represents an excitable, violent, furious temper, which sometimes almost assumes the appearance of raving madness. In Plato it is applied to Chaerephon, Socrates' intimate (in the Charmides, init.), and to Apollodorus, Symp. 173 D, where it expresses a very impetuous, excitable temperament, inclined to extravagant and violent manifestations in feeling and utterance; which is illustrated by the conduct ascribed to him at Socrates' death, Phaedo 117 D.

On ἁπλοῦς, as expressive of character, see note I 2. 4.

αὐθάδης. In Eth. Eud. II 3, 1221 *a* 8, III 7, 1233 *b* 34, σεμνότης, proper pride, the due measure of personal dignity in one's bearing and behaviour to others, πρὸς ἕτερον ζῆν, is a mean between the two extremes, ἀρεσκεία the defect (over-complacency and obsequiousness), and αὐθάδεια the excess (undue contemptuousness καταφρόνησις, and disregard of their feelings and wishes). In the Magn. Mor. I 29, it is likewise the excess of σεμνότης, as ἀρεσκεία is the defect. It is exercised περὶ τὰς ἐντεύξεις, in the ordinary

[1] It seems to me nearly certain that μεγαλοπρεπῆ is a mistake, either of the author himself or one of his transcribers, for μεγαλόψυχον. The two have already been distinguished *in this very chapter*, §§ 11, 12, and μεγαλοπρέπεια, when it *is* distinguished from the other as by Aristotle, and not made to include it as by Plato (see the note on § 12), is altogether unsuitable to express the character of the αὐθάδης, being confined as it is to liberality in bestowing money on a large scale: whereas the virtue of μεγαλοψυχία is precisely what αὐθάδεια might be represented to be by the figure ὑποκορισμός, by bestowing on it a 'flattering' designation. I refer for the proof of this to the Nic. Eth. IV 7. 8: it will be found that σεμνότης, another false interpretation which is here put upon αὐθάδεια, is also characteristic of the μεγαλόψυχος. Plato points out the true ὑποκορισμός in the case of μεγαλοπρέπεια, Rep. VI 560 E, ὑποκοριζόμενοι...ἀσωτίαν δὲ μεγαλοπρέπειαν.

ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς ὡς ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὄντας, οἷον τὸν θρασὺν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸν ἄσωτον ἐλευθέριον· δόξει τε γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ ἅμα παραλογιστικὸν ἐκ τῆς

intercourse of society, and manifests itself in the character οἷος μηθενὶ ἐντυχεῖν μηδὲ διαλεγῆναι, in a wilful and stubborn reserve which repels all social converse. The character is represented in the name itself; which is αὐτο-ἀδης, 'self-pleasing'. So that when we give the name of μεγαλόψυχος and σεμνός to one who is really αὐθάδης, we are substituting a virtue for a vice, a mean state for an excess. αὐθάδεια is one of Theophrastus' 'Characters' defined by him as ἀπήνεια ὁμιλίας, 'social brutality'.

The special form of this misapplication of names in praise and censure is called ὑποκορισμός, when it takes the *favourable* side, and *interpretatur in melius*. On this figure, the name of which is derived from the endearing terms used by nurses to children (πρὸς κόρην ἢ κόρον λέγειν ἀποσμικροῦντα, Tim. Lex., lisping in imitation of them), compare Aesch. c. Timarch. p. 17 § 126, ταύτην ἐξ ὑποκορίσματος τιτθῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχω, Theophr. περὶ ἀηδίας: ὑποκορίζεσθαι ποππύζων (Ast ad loc.), or by lovers, Plat. Rep. V 474 E, ἢ ἐραστοῦ ὑποκοριζομένου, Arist. Plut. 1012, νηττάριον ἂν καὶ φάττιον ὑπεκορίζετο (whence it stands for a 'diminutive', Rhet. III 2. 15); hence it is transferred to flattering or endearing expressions in general, and especially such as, in describing the moral character of anything, substitute some nearly associated virtue for a vice; to palliate, extenuate, gloss over. Examples occur in Plat. Rep. VIII 560 E (already referred to), III 400 E, ἄνοιαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐήθειαν. Alexis, Tarantini Fr. 3, Meineke, Fragm. Comm. III 484, ἆρ' οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τὸ καλούμενον ζῆν τοῦτο διατριβῆς χάριν ὄνομ' ἐστὶν ὑποκόρισμα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μοίρας: Ovid, Ar. Am. II 657, *nominibus mollire licet mala*, followed by a long string of examples. Lucr. IV 1154 seq. Horat. Sat. I 3. 44—54. Thucydides, III 82, in a well-known passage, mentions this perversion of moral terms amongst the signs of demoralization prevalent in Greece at the period of the Corcyrean sedition, καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει κ.τ.λ. See Ruhnken, ad Tim. p. 266, 6; Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s. v.; Shilleto, ad Dem. de F. L. § 293; Stallbaum, Plat. Rep. VI l. c.—Quintilian calls it *derivatio verborum* in the passage above quoted; and V 13. 25, describes it, *si acri et vehementi fuerit usus oratione, eandem rem nostris verbis mitioribus proferre;* which he then illustrates from Cicero's speeches. The opposite practice is described II 12. 4, *est praeterea quaedam virtutum vitiorumque vicinia, qua maledicus pro libero, temerarius pro forti, effusus pro copioso accipitur.* [Farrar's *Chapters on Language*, p. 281 sqq. S.]

καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς κ.τ.λ.] The only difference between this and the preceding form of ὑποκορισμός is, that this is a special variety of the other, which substitutes the mean for the excess, but still according to the favourable interpretation of it. θρασύτης is the ὑπερβολή of ἀνδρεία, Eth. N. II 7, 1107 *b* 3, 8, 1108 *b* 20, 1109 *a* 3, and ἀσωτία, prodigality, the spendthrift's habit, c. 7, 1107 *b* 10, c. 8, 1108 *b* 24.

παραλογιστικὸν ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας] 'liable to lead to a false inference', Rhet. II 24. 4, '*suberit fallacia manans ex causa*', Portus. 'The mis-reasoning

αἰτίας· εἰ γὰρ οὗ μὴ ἀνάγκη κινδυνευτικός, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειεν ὅπου καλόν, καὶ εἰ προετικὸς τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις· ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ ἀρετῆς τὸ πάντας εὖ ποιεῖν. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ παρ' οἷς ὁ ἔπαινος·

(*παραλογιστικόν*), or false reasoning, proceeding from the cause', is the identification of two different causes which must necessarily produce dissimilar effects or actions; these latter are confounded by the fallacy, and ascribed to the same cause. The *cause* of an action is the *προαίρεσις*, the voluntary and deliberate *purpose* of it; otherwise represented as the 'motive' (the efficient cause). Now this cause or motive is different in the case of an act of wanton rashness, where there is no necessity (obligation) to incur the danger (*οὗ μὴ ἀνάγκη κινδυνευτικός*), and of an act of virtue, *true* courage, which *has* a noble end, *τὸ καλόν*, in view: they are prompted by different motives, one belonging to the class 'bad', the other that of the 'good'. This identification of the causes of the two actions leads to the 'false inference', that as the same cause produces the same effect, and the cause of both actions is the same, the effects are likewise the same, and both of them are acts of virtue. And then the further inference is drawn, that whatever a man will do from a less powerful motive, he will do *a fortiori* from one which is higher and more prevailing: the higher the motive or cause, the more powerful the impulse or effect. Similarly it is *inferred* that if a man is lavish to everybody, this must include his friends; by the rule, *omne maius continet in se minus*.

ὑπερβολὴ ἀρετῆς] Cic. Tusc. Q. V 26. 105, *exsuperantia virtutis*. *ὑπερβολή* and *ὑπεροχή* are frequently employed to express an excess above a given standard, average, or mean; the general conception of 'excess', of mere 'superiority'; without the additional notion of a 'vicious' excess, a depravation or deviation from a *true* standard, which usually accompanies the word, and more especially in Aristotle's theory of virtue, where it stands for a class of moral *vices*. 'Non significat hic *nimium* sed *praestantia*.' Victorius. With the notion here expressed, comp. Eth. N. II 2, sub fin. 1105 *a* 9, *περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ*. The average standard of excellence is surpassed, 'good becomes better', in proportion to the degree of difficulty surmounted in accomplishing any task. Pol. IV (VII) 1, 1323 *b* 3, *κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολήν*, lines 8 and 14, *κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν*, c. 4, 1326 *a* 21, Ib. *b* 12, *τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὅρος*, *b* 24. Pol. VI (IV) 12, 1296 *b* 19, *ποσὸν δὲ* (by 'quantity' I mean) *τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχήν*. This sense of the word is also common in Demosthenes, as de Cor. 291. 24, *ἐγὼ δὲ τοσαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ποιοῦμαι*, and the same phrase de F. L. p. 447. 25. c. Mid. 519. 24, *ἔστι δὲ ὑπερβολὴ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα. ὑπερβολὴ συκοφαντίας, κακίας, δωρεῶν, ἀναιδείας, ὠμότητος, ὕβρεως*, &c., in all which *ὑπερβολή* denotes not *the vice*, but merely the 'measure' of it.

§ 30. *σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ παρ' οἷς ὁ ἔπαινος*] Compare III 14. 11. The same illustration of the topic, from Plato's Menexenus, is there repeated, with the addition of *ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ*, 'in the funeral oration', meaning the Platonic dialogue. Socrates, Plato's principal character, or hero, or

ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν. δεῖ δὲ τὸ παρ' ἑκάστοις τίμιον λέγειν ὡς ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις ἢ Λάκωσιν ἢ φιλοσόφοις. καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ τίμιον ἄγειν
31 εἰς τὸ καλόν, ἐπείπερ δοκεῖ γειτνιᾶν. καὶ ὅσα κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον, οἷον εἰ ἄξια τῶν προγόνων καὶ τῶν

spokesman, is here taken *more Aristotelio* as a substitute for Plato himself, whose opinions and sentiments he is supposed exactly to represent[1]. The passage of the Menex. 235 D runs thus, εἰ μὲν γὰρ δέοι Ἀθηναίους ἐν Πελοποννησίοις εὖ λέγειν ἢ Πελοποννησίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις, ἀγαθοῦ ἂν ῥήτορος δέοι τοῦ πείσοντος καὶ εὐδοκιμήσοντος· ὅταν δέ τις ἐν τούτοις ἀγωνίζηται οὕσπερ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ οὐδὲν μέγα δοκεῖ εὖ λέγειν.

On this passage, Quintilian, Inst. Or. III 7. 23, *Interesse tamen Aristoteles putat ubi quidque laudetur aut vituperetur. Nam plurimum refert qui sint audientium mores, quae publice recepta persuasio: ut illa maxime quae probant esse in eo qui laudabitur credant, aut in eo contra quem dicemus ea quae oderunt. Ita non dubium erit iudicium quod orationem praecesserit.*

τὸ παρ' ἑκάστοις τίμιον κ.τ.λ.] These are appeals to national and class prejudices and preferences. We should attribute to the object of our encomium the possession of any gift, quality, accomplishment which happens to be esteemed by the particular audience that we are addressing; as in a company of Scythians it would be advisable to address ourselves to their national habits and modes of thinking, and to praise our hero for his skill in hunting or strength or bravery; at Sparta for patience and fortitude (Quint. u. s.); at Athens for literary accomplishments.

'And in a word, (or, as a general rule), to refer (in praising any one before an audience of this kind) what *they* highly value to the καλόν, since they appear to border closely upon one another'. 'To refer τίμια to τὸ καλόν', is to invest them with a *moral* character, τὸ καλόν being the moral end, the right, the end of *action*. This is as much as to say that these things, which are so precious in their eyes, are not only valuable, but *right* in themselves, and therefore they do well to hold them in high esteem.

§ 31. ὅσα κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον κ.τ.λ.] 'all that seems naturally to belong to a man in virtue of his birth or antecedents', qualities, actions, achievements; 'such things as were *to be expected* from him'.

[1] Bp. Fitzgerald (ap. Grant, ad Eth. N. VI 13. 3) remarks, on Eth. N. III 8. 6, that Aristotle in referring to Socrates prefixes the article when he speaks of him as Plato's interlocutor and representative, and omits it when he has the real historical Socrates in his mind. This is no doubt the general (Grant says, invariable) rule; but I have noted one exception in Pol. V (VIII) 7, 1342 *b* 23, where we find Σωκράτει without the article in a reference to *Plato's* Republic, III 398 E. The rule is extended to other Platonic characters borrowed from history, as τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην (*the* Aristophanes of the Symposium), Pol. II 4, 1262 *b* 11, and ὁ Τίμαιος (Plato's Timæus, not the real personage), de Anima A 3, 406 *b* 26.

προϋπηργμένων· εὐδαιμονικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλὸν τὸ προσεπικτᾶσθαι τιμήν. καὶ εἰ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κάλλιον, οἷον εἰ εὐτυχῶν μὲν μέτριος ἀτυχῶν δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, ἢ μείζων γιγνόμενος βελτίων καὶ καταλλακτικώτερος. τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ τοῦ Ἰφικράτους, ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ὀλυμπιονίκου

πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφ' ὤμοισιν ἔχων τραχεῖαν,

καὶ τὸ τοῦ Σιμωνίδου

ἣ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ' οὖσα τυράννων.

32 *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος, ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ*

προϋπηργμένων] 'res antea virtute alicuius studioque possessas, laudes quas sibi quispiam labore suo comparaverit.' Victorius. 'his own previous acquisitions or possessions'; such as a stock of previous good, noble, great deeds, with which his new achievement, now the object of the encomium, is in accordance; as it ought to be. It is praiseworthy because it is the addition of a new honour, which, since honour itself is *καλόν*, must also have a tendency to happiness (*εὐδαιμονικόν*) and be right itself, and all that is right is praiseworthy.

But not only conformity with a man's antecedents may be adduced in praise of an action, but also the opposite, 'if he surpass them, namely, and improve upon' his own early condition and actions, or those of his ancestors, not acting *in accordance with* the past and what he was born to, but *contrary to* it, i.e. *beyond* it.

καταλλακτικώτερος] This does not necessarily contradict the topic of § 24; the irreconcilable temper there is only to be fostered against enemies, here it probably refers exclusively to friends: or if not, in Rhetoric either side may be taken as a subject of commendation, each suitable to a different kind or disposition of audience.

τὸ τοῦ Ἰφικράτους—τὸ τοῦ ὀλυμπιονίκου] Both of them already quoted, I 7. 32, q. v.

τὸ τοῦ Σιμωνίδου] The epigram is given at length by Thucydides VI 59. Bergk, *Fragm. Lyr. Gr.* Simon. Fr. 115, p. 781 [p. 906, 2nd ed.]. *Ἀνδρὸς ἀριστεύσαντος ἐν Ἑλλάδι τῶν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ | Ἱππίου Ἀρχεδίκην ἥδε κέκευθε κόνις. | Ἣ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ' οὖσα τυράννων | Παίδων τ' οὐκ ἤρθη νοῦν ἐς ἀτασθαλίην.*

§ 32. **ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος**] 'praise is derived from actions', i.e. it is only (moral) actions that can furnish topics of *ἔπαινος*, in its proper application. Praise and blame, moral approbation and disapprobation (Butler), are the tests of virtue and vice. *ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς*, Eth. N. I 12, 1101 *b* 32.

See on this subject, and upon what follows, the distinction of *ἔπαινος*, *ἐγκώμιον*, and *εὐδαιμονισμός* and *μακαρισμός*, Introd. App. B to c. 9 §§ 33, 34, p. 212 seq.

σπουδαίου τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πειρατέον δεικνύναι πράττοντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν. χρήσιμον δὲ τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα. διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώ-

ἴδιον τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσιν] On προαίρεσις, see note, c. 6. 26. The προαίρεσις, the deliberate moral purpose, is the distinctive characteristic of moral action. 'Acting in accordance' with this is consequently said to be 'peculiar to', the *proprium*, characteristic of 'the man of worth', or good man. In 'praising' any one, therefore, praise being, strictly speaking, confined to moral action, 'we must endeavour to shew that his actions are directed by a deliberate moral purpose'.

φαίνεσθαι] 'that he should *be shewn* to have'... 'that it should be made clear that he has'... Note on I 7. 31, p. 141.

διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώματα κ.τ.λ.] To establish a character for virtue in the object of your praise it is desirable to shew that his virtuous acts have been often repeated; and *therefore*, for the same purpose, to make an apparent addition to this number, we should assume as acts done with a moral purpose, ὡς ἐν προαιρέσει, any 'accidental coincidences' and 'pieces of luck' (which may have happened to him); 'for if a number of them can be brought forward 'resembling' the virtue or excellence that you wish to praise in him, they will be taken for 'a sign' of it and of the moral purpose or intention' (which constitutes virtue). The mere repetition of the actions, τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα, is serviceable in producing this impression, because it seems to shew an inclination or fondness for them, and thence a certain direction of the προαίρεσις or choice, and a certain ἕξις or moral state, which are indications of a virtuous habit. σύμπτωμα is a 'concurrence' or 'accidental coincidence' of one thing or act with another, between which there is no *necessary connexion*, and, like τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, *purely accidental*. 'σύμπτωμα est, cum quopiam aliquid agente, et quod nihil ad rem quae intervenit faciat, extrinsecus quippiam excitatum contingit; e.g. deambulante illo solem deficere: ἀπὸ τύχης vero, cum quopiam aliquid agente alicuius rei gratia, aliquid ex eo actu praeter propositum evenerit; ut scrobem facientem, ut arborem serat, thesaurum defossum invenire.' Victorius. On τύχη as an agent or supposed cause, see Introd. p. 218—224, Append. C to Bk. I. Both of Victorius's instances came from Aristotle [de div. per somn. *infra*, and Met. Δ 30, 1025 *a* 16. S.]

On σύμπτωμα (rare in ordinary Greek) Phrynichus, χρὴ οὖν συντυχίαν λέγειν, ἢ λύσαντας οὕτω, συνέπεσεν αὐτῷ τόδε γενέσθαι. Δημοσθένης μέντοι ἐν τῷ κατὰ Διονυσοδώρου (p. 1295, 21) ἅπαξ εἴρηκε τοὔνομα. The only other example of it, referred to by Lobeck, note ad loc. p. 248, in any writer earlier than Aristotle, is Thuc. IV 36, where it stands, like συμφορά, for an 'unfortunate accident'. In Dem. it is equivalent to τὸ συμβάν, which occurs in the same sentence. It occurs also in the Platonic Axiochus, 364 C, in the sense of 'a disease' (*morbus*, Ast), apparently as a special kind of 'calamity'. In Aristotle I have noted the following instances: Pol. VIII (V) 4, 1304 *a* 1 (where it means 'an accident', as in Dem. and Phryn.) [ib. 6, 1306 *b* 6; II 12, 1274 *a* 12]; Top. Δ 5, 126 *b* 36, 39, de div. per somn. c. 1, 462 *b* 27, 31, σύμπτωμα δὲ τὸ βαδίζοντος ἐκλείπειν τὸν

ματα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης ὡς ἐν προαιρέσει ληπτέον· ἂν γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ ὅμοια προφέρηται, σημεῖον ἀρετῆς
33 εἶναι δόξει καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἔστι δ' ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς. δεῖ οὖν τὰς πράξεις ἐπιδεικνύναι ὡς τοιαῦται. τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ κύκλῳ εἰς πίστιν, οἷον εὐγένεια καὶ

ήλιον (an accidental coincidence), 463 *a* 2, τῶν συμπτωμάτων οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἀεὶ γίνεται οὔθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πόλυ (it is a mere occasional, unaccountable accident), de respir. 5, 472 *b* 26; de Gen. Anim. IV 4 § 10, 770 *b* 6 [and 777 *b* 8]; Hist. An. VII 6. 4, 585 *b* 25, σύμπτωσιν (accident), IX 37. 6, 620 *b* 35, 40. 41, 626 *a* 29. Categ. 8, 9 *b* 15; p. 199 *a* 1; p. 1093 *b* 17. The medical sense of the word 'symptom' seems to be derived immediately from the Aristotelian 'accidental coincidence'. It is an attendant sign of the disease, though a mere external indication, and not of *the essence* of it; like a συμβεβηκός or 'accident'.

§§ 33, 34. See the Introd. p. 212 seq. Eth. Eud. II 1. 12, ἔτι δ' οἱ ἔπαινοι τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων...ἔτι διὰ τί ἡ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐπαινεῖται; ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τἆλλα, ἢ τῷ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφέρεσθαι (Eth. N. I 12) ἢ τῷ μόρια εἶναι αὐτῆς. διὸ ἕτερον εὐδαιμονισμὸς καὶ ἔπαινος καὶ ἐγκώμιον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργου, ὁ δ' ἔπαινος τοιοῦτον εἶναι καθόλου, ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλος.

τὰ δὲ κύκλῳ εἰς πίστιν] 'The encomium or panegyric is directed to deeds done' (ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας, after they are done, the *results* of actions; ἔπαινος being of the actions themselves) 'and the surrounding circumstances (such as noble birth[1] and cultivation) serve for confirmation'. These 'surrounding circumstances' are a sort of setting of the gem, a frame for the picture, of which the real subject is the 'deeds' of the hero of the panegyric; what he has done *himself;—nam genus et proavos et quae non fecimus ipsi, vix ea nostra voco*. The 'confirmation' consists in this,—'for it is natural and probable that the offspring of the good should be good, and that one reared in such and such a way should turn out of such and such a character (*fortes creantur fortibus et bonis:* ὡς ἀληθὲς ἦν ἄρα ἐσθλῶν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν ἐσθλὰ γίγνεσθαι τέκνα, κακῶν δ' ὅμοια τῇ φύσει τῇ τοῦ πατρός, Eur. Alcm. Fragm. VII Dind.). But still the real object of our praise is the ἕξις, the confirmed *habit* of virtue, the character and not the mere act; 'because we should praise a man even if he had not done the (praiseworthy) act, if we supposed that his character was such as to incline him to do it'.

τὰ κύκλῳ occurs in the same sense, of 'surrounding' (or accompanying) 'circumstances', Eth. Nic. III 12, 1117 *b* 2, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, where τὰ κύκλῳ are τὸ λυπηρὸν καὶ πόνοι, 'the pains and dangers by which courage is sur-

[1] The topic of genealogy is put first of all and treated at length by the author of the Rhet. ad Alex., c. 35 (36). 4, seq. in his chapter on the encomiastic and vituperative kind of Rhetoric. This stands in marked contrast to the secondary and subordinate place here assigned to it by Aristotle, who seems rather to have agreed with Ovid l. c. as to its comparative value.

παιδεία· εἰκὸς γὰρ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸν οὕτω p. 33.
τραφέντα τοιοῦτον εἶναι. διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πρά-
ξαντας. τὰ δ' ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἕξεως ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ
ἐπαινοῖμεν ἂν καὶ μὴ πεπραχότα, εἰ πιστεύοιμεν εἶναι
34 τοιοῦτον. μακαρισμὸς δὲ καὶ εὐδαιμονισμὸς αὐτοῖς
μὲν ταὐτά, τούτοις δ' οὐ ταὐτά, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἡ εὐδαι-
μονία τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ὁ εὐδαιμονισμὸς περιέχει ταῦτα.
35 ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἔπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί·
ἃ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλεύειν ὑπόθοιο ἄν, ταῦτα μετατε- P. 1368.
36 θέντα τῇ λέξει ἐγκώμια γίγνεται. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔχομεν

rounded, while it looks through them to the pleasant end'; again, Rhet. III 14. 10, οἱ δοῦλοι οὐ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ κύκλῳ.

§ 34. μακαρισμὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονισμὸς αὐτοῖς μὲν ταὐτά] It is quite true that the two terms are sometimes identified, (as in Eth. N. I 12, 1191 *b* 24, τούς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους μακαρίζομεν); but they are also distinguished, and then μάκαρ and μακαρία represent 'blessedness, bliss', a higher degree of happiness than εὐδαίμων and εὐδαιμονία, which is the *human* form of happiness, while μακαρία is the *divine*. μάκαρες is specially applied to θεοί by Homer and Hesiod; as well as to the denizens of the μακάρων νῆσοι, the abode of the blessed after death.—αὐτοῖς is for ἀλλήλοις.

τούτοις δ' οὐ ταὐτά] 'but not the same with the other two', viz. ἔπαινος and ἐγκώμιον: these are included in εὐδαιμονισμός as virtue is in happiness.

§ 35. ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος κ.τ.λ.] 'There is a community of *kind*' (the two may be referred to one species, *one* of the three kinds (εἴδη) of Rhetoric, c. 3. 1, either the συμβουλευτικόν or the ἐπιδεικτικόν, as the occasion requires) 'between praise and counsel or advice; for anything that you would suggest in advising may, by a mere change in the language, be converted into panegyric'. Quintilian has borrowed this, Inst. Or. III 7.28, *totum autem habet* (laudativum genus) *aliquid simile suasoriis; quia plerumque eadem illic suaderi hic laudari solent.*

§ 36. 'And so, when we know what we ought to *do* in any given case, or to *be* in respect of character, we must then use the acquired knowledge (of the right course of action, and the right character) as suggestions, by changing and converting the language' (twisting so as to adapt it to our purpose; lit. *turning them* by the language). The example, and probably the topic itself, is taken from Isocrates, who in Panath. § 32 employs it as a suggestion or piece of advice, and in Evag. § 45 converts it into a topic of laudation—'Now when thus expressed, it amounts to (has the value of, may serve for,) a suggestion, but when thus, it becomes laudation, "Proud, not of the accidents of fortune, but of the distinctions due to himself alone"'.—The example in the laudatory form from the Evagoras runs thus in the original, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῖς δι'

ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ποῖόν τινα εἶναι, δεῖ ταῦτα ὡς ὑποθήκας λέγοντας τῇ λέξει μετατιθέναι καὶ στρέφειν, οἷον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι' αὑτόν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν λεχθὲν ὑποθήκην δύναται, ὡδὶ δ' ἔπαινον "μέγα φρονῶν οὐ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι' αὑτόν." ὥστε ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν βούλῃ, ὅρα τί ἂν ὑπόθοιο, καὶ ὅταν ὑποθέσθαι,
37 ὅρα τί ἂν ἐπαινέσειας. ἡ δὲ λέξις ἔσται ἀντικειμένη ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ὅταν τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὸ δὲ μὴ κωλῦον μετατεθῇ.
38 χρηστέον δὲ καὶ τῶν αὐξητικῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον εἰ

αὑτὸν γιγνομένοις. Aristotle was probably quoting from memory, as seems to have been his common practice.

With the passages of Isocrates comp. Ovid. Met. XIII 140, *Nam genus et proavos et quae non fecimus ipsi, vix ea nostra voco.*

δύναται] Rhet. II 5. 1. δύνασθαι is often used in the sense of 'having the value of, amounting to, equivalent to', and is construed with the accusative. Herod. III 89, τὸ δὲ Βαβυλώνιον τάλαντον δύναται Εὐβοΐδας ἑβδομήκοντα μνέας. Xen. Anab. I 5. 6, ὁ σίγλος δύναται ἑπτὰ ὀβόλους, Thuc. VI 40, λόγοι ἔργα δυνάμενοι, Eur. Med. 128, τὰ δ' ὑπερβάλλοντ' οὐδένα καιρὸν δύναται θνατοῖς (where Elmsley and Pflugk understand καιρόν as used adverbially); also of the power, force, import, 'meaning', of a word, Ar. Met. Γ 6, 1011 *a* 7, δύνανται δ' αἱ ἀπορίαι αἱ τοιαῦται πᾶσαι τὸ αὐτό. Thuc. I 141, τὴν αὐτὴν δύναται (is equivalent to) δούλωσιν. Id. VI 36, τοῦτο δύνανται (mean) αἱ ἀγγελίαι, VII 58, δύναται δὲ τὸ Νεοδαμῶδες ἐλεύθερον ἤδη εἶναι. Ast's *Lex. Plat.* s. vv. δύναμαι, δύναμις. The *power* or *force* which is contained in the primary sense of δύνασθαι is expressed in the secondary sense in which it appears in the above passages as a particular kind of force, the value of anything, and hence the amount, (of which equality or equivalence is a species), or the import, or meaning (which again is a kind of equivalence) of it. And the accusative is nothing but a cognate accusative. That *power* or *force* is the original notion from which the secondary meanings are derived, is proved, if proof were needed, by the parallel use of ἰσχύειν to express precisely the same notion; Eth. Nic. II 3, 1105 *b* 2, τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται. As we say δύνασθαί τι for τινὰ δύναμιν, this construction is merely extended to the new kind of power which constitutes the secondary sense of the verb.

§ 37. ἡ δὲ λέξις κ.τ.λ.] 'The expression must be contradictory' (the opposition of ἀντίφασις, κατάφασις and ἀπόφασις, positive and negative, Categ. c. 10, p. 11 *b* 19, the fourth kind of 'opposites' τὰ ἀντικείμενα), i.e. it must be positive in one, and negative in the other, 'when the prohibitive and the non-prohibitive are interchanged'. This is the case in the two examples; the one forbids pride, the other recommends or praises it—in a sense, provided it be directed to proper objects: by 'not forbidding' it contradicts the other.

§ 38. τῶν αὐξητικῶν] *quae valent ad amplificandum.* These are the

μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετ' ὀλίγων ἢ καὶ[1] μάλιστα πεποίηκεν· ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα καλά. καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν· ταῦτα δὲ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον. καὶ εἰ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατώρθωκεν· μέγα γάρ, καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν ἂν δόξειεν. καὶ εἰ τὰ

[1] + ὃ *infra, cum libris.* '*Recte Wolfius apud Vaterum* p. 209 ὃ *delet.*' Spengel.

various modes of αὔξησις, which with the opposite, μείωσις, constitutes the fourth of the κοινοὶ τόποι. See Introd. p. 129, and (on II 26) p. 276.

Some of the special topics which follow as instances of αὐξητικά have been already mentioned in § 25, and appear again as giving a special importance or prominence to crimes in c. 14. 4, with the omission of the last. They, and others of the like kind, are included in the Rhet. ad Alex. 35 (36), 12, 13, under the general head of 'Comparison' with others for the purpose of laudation, to which they are all reducible. Comp. Cic. de Orat. II 85. 347—8, and Quint. Inst. Or. III 7. 16. With καὶ ὃ μάλιστα πεποίηκεν, εἰ πεποίηκεν must be supplied for the sense after καί.

τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν] 'circumstances of time and opportunity' give a praiseworthy character to particular actions at special times and seasons. This topic, equally applicable to comparative goods, has already occurred, c. 7. 32: and with παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον, comp. c. 9. 31. If, for instance, a man performs an act of liberality, at a time of great pecuniary pressure, or in a case of emergency, or at a crisis of especial difficulty, he is then doing something παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον, beyond what could naturally be expected from him, or any one else, and is entitled to especial credit for it. Similarly Victorius.

καὶ εἰ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατώρθωκεν] This topic is not to be confounded with τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα of § 32. *That* is a 'repetition of the act', *this* denotes the 'repeated success' in any attempt, the constant success is an indication—not infallible, or certain *as a proof*—of special skill: as if a man were to throw sixes several times running, even if it were by mere accident, the inference would be that he had a special knack or skill in throwing dice. 'The *constancy* of the success gives it importance, and it will seem *not* accidental but due to the agent himself'.

καὶ εἰ τὰ προτρέποντα κ.τ.λ.] 'And any one' (on whose account, in consequence of his actions and distinctions) 'to commemorate whom incentives, stimulants, to virtue ('encouragements' to do the like), or marks of respect for it, have been invented or were ever 'instituted', must be a praiseworthy character'. This is the general case of the invention or establishment of any public mark of honour in commemoration of the great deeds or distinctions of any signal public benefactor, and as an incentive or encouragement to others to follow his example.

The next clause, εἰς ὃν πρῶτον, is a particular example of the former of the two preceding cases, the 'invention', the first appropriation, of something in a person's honour. Victorius thinks that κατεσκευάσθη is especially applied to the *permanent* establishment of an enduring monument, as a temple.

This topic again is afterwards applied to crimes, in c. 14. 4.

προτρέποντα καὶ τιμῶντα διὰ τοῦτον εὕρηται καὶ κατεσκευάσθη. καὶ εἰς ὃν πρῶτον ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη,

εὕρηται...κατεσκευάσθη] We may note here the juxtaposition of the perf. and aor., apparently with no distinction of time intended. I have elsewhere noticed (Pref. to *Transl. of Gorgias*, pp. xv. xvi.) the difference of idiom between the Greek and English languages which *obliges* us sometimes to translate the Greek aorist by the English perfect. Other examples of the same inadvertence, confusion of tenses, or whatever else it is to be called, occur, I 3. 8, where *πραχθῆναι* in the same sense and in the same opposition is repeated in the form *πεπρᾶχθαι*, Top. IX sub fin. p. 184 *a* 8, *βεβοήθηκε μὲν...τέχνην δ' οὐ παρέδωκεν*. Many instances are found in Sophocles, which in a writer so subtle in the distinctions of language might lead one to think that *he* at any rate distinguishes them with a meaning. I leave the reader to judge. Philoct. 664, 666, (Herm. 676), *λόγῳ μὲν ἐξήκουσ' ὄπωπα δ' οὐ μάλα*, 927—8, *οἷά μ' εἰργάσω, οἷ' ἠπάτηκας*. 1172, *τί μ' ὤλεσας; τί μ' εἴργασαι;* Antig. 406 (Dind.), present and aorist, *καὶ πῶς ὁρᾶται κἀπίληπτος ᾑρέθη;* 1228—9, Aj. 31, Trach. 364, 5, Arist. Ran. 1010—11 (Dind.), *πεποίηκας...ἀπέδειξας*, Plat. Phaedr. 231 A, *ἅ τε καὶ διέθεντο, καὶ ἃ πεποιήκασιν εὖ*. Dem. de F. L. § 228, *οὔτ' ἠνώχλησα οὔτε...βεβίασμαι*.

εἰς ὃν πρῶτον...] The *novelty* of the distinction, invented expressly for the occasion, marks a still higher sense entertained of the value of the service or the virtue of the act which it is intended to commemorate.

ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη] *ποιεῖν* is here loosely used, by the so-called figure *zeugma* (on c. 4. 6, note 1), in connexion with *ἐγκώμιον* and the statue of Harmodius and Aristogeiton in two different senses—as to Hippolochus, until we know who he was, and in what way commemorated, the application must remain uncertain—of *writing* the panegyric, and 'setting up the statue in the market-place'.

Of Hippolochus nothing is known. It seems that Aristotle intended the *ἐγκώμιον* to refer to him. We should therefore insert a semicolon, or at least a comma after *Ἱππόλοχον*, in order to connect the panegyric and the statue with those that they severally concern: *εἰς* is to be repeated after *καί*. 'And one (is especially praiseworthy) in whose honour a panegyric was first composed, as it was for Hippolochus; (and as the setting up of their statue *in the market* was 'done' first, *ἐποιήθη*, i.e.), and as the privilege of having their statue erected in the market was granted for the first time to Harmodius and Aristogeiton'. Thucydides in his episodical account of the assassination and the circumstances that led to it, VI 54—59, makes no mention of the statue; nor Aristotle Pol. VIII (V) 10, where the attack on Hipparchus is spoken of. Pausanias, I 8. 5, says, *οὐ πόῤῥω δὲ ἑστᾶσιν Ἁρμόδιος καὶ Ἀριστογείτων οἱ κτείναντες Ἵππαρχον· αἰτία δὲ ἥτις ἐγένετο κ.τ.λ.* He is describing the *ἀγορά*, though he does not expressly name it. (See Smith's *Dict. of Geogr.* Art. Athena, p. 293 *b*.)

ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων] 'in the opposite cases', of men to whom any reproach or stigma, mark of disapprobation (the test of vice) was first attached. 'cum nempe quempiam aut solum aut primum aut cum paucis flagitium admisisse ostendemus, turpitudinem ipsius valde augebimus.' Victorius. On the topics of vituperation, Quintilian, Inst. Or. III 7. 19—22.

οἷον εἰς Ἱππόλοχον, καὶ δι' Ἁρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα τὸ ἐν ἀγορᾷ σταθῆναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. κἂν μὴ καθ' αὐτὸν εὐπορῇς, πρὸς ἄλλους ἀντιπαραβάλλειν· ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ἐποίει διὰ τὴν

κἂν μὴ καθ' αὐτὸν εὐπορῇς κ.τ.λ.] 'and if you have not enough to say about your hero himself, and in his own person, then institute a comparison between him and others... only the comparison must be with men of distinction, (reputation); because the amplifying power of the comparison and the impression of nobility which it creates, arise from the superiority which is attributed to him over those who are themselves worthy and good'. The same topic is recommended in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4). 6.

ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης—δικολογεῖν] 'which was Isocrates' custom, owing to his want of practice in forensic pleading'. Read ἀσυνήθειαν [with A^c] for two reasons. *First*, what is meant is that Isocrates cultivated the habit of comparing his hero with others in consequence of his want of *actual* practice in the law-courts. There the pleading is always direct, and the arguments pointed at an adversary; comparisons with others are altogether out of place, or only occasionally serviceable. If Isocrates had had this practice, he would not have fallen into the habit of comparing, into which he had been led by confining himself to the epideictic branch of Rhetoric where they tell and are in point. *Secondly*, this is what Isocrates himself tells us of his own habits and pursuits, Antid. §§ 2, 3, ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰδὼς ἐνίους τῶν σοφιστῶν βλασφημοῦντας περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς διατριβῆς καὶ λέγοντας ὡς ἔστι περὶ δικογραφίαν... αὐτὸς δὲ πᾶσι τοῦτο πεποιηκέναι φανερὸν ὅτι προῄρημαι καὶ λέγειν καὶ γράφειν οὐ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τηλικούτων κ.τ.λ. Panath. § 11, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τοῦ πολιτεύεσθαι διήμαρτον ἐπὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν (i.e. literary labour, speech writing) καὶ πονεῖν καὶ γράφειν, οὐ περὶ μικρῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν ποιούμενος οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων οὐδὲ περὶ ὧν ἄλλοι τινὲς ληροῦσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν κ.τ.λ. Ib. § 39 seq. ἡγοῦμαι δὲ χρῆναι τοὺς βουλομένους ἐγκωμιάσαι τινὰ τῶν πόλεων ἀκριβῶς καὶ δικαίως μὴ μόνον περὶ αὐτῆς ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους ἧς προῃρημένοι τυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ (here follows a simile) οὕτω καὶ ταῖς πόλεσι παριστάναι μὴ τὰς μικρὰς ταῖς μεγάλαις, κ.τ.λ. [Cf. note on Paneg. § 11. S.]

Here we find, *first*, that he failed in public life; *secondly*, that he withdrew from the law-courts and their ἴδια συμβόλαια, the cases arising out of the 'private dealings' of the citizens with one anothei in their ordinary business, in order to devote himself to philosophy and the study of public affairs; and *thirdly*, that his ordinary practice in his Panegyrics was, just as Aristotle describes it, to compare, παριστάναι, the object of his laudation with others, whether men or cities, as great and distinguished as themselves, πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν. The two first of these statements seem to put the reading ἀσυνήθειαν beyond question, συνήθειαν being contrary alike to the known facts and the probabilities of the case. It is nevertheless supported by Max Schmidt, in his tract on the date of the Rhetoric, pp. 17, 18. With this reading, δικολογία must be confined to speech writing for the use of parties in a legal process.

This is one of the passages of the Rhetoric on which Victorius founds

ἀσυνήθειαν τοῦ δικολογεῖν. δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν· αὐξητικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλόν, εἰ σπουδαίων
39 βελτίων. πίπτει δ' εὐλόγως ἡ αὔξησις εἰς τοὺς ἐπαίνους. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν. διὸ κἂν μὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐνδόξους, ἀλλὰ πρὸς p. 34
τοὺς ἄλλους δεῖ παραβάλλειν, ἐπείπερ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ
40 δοκεῖ μηνύειν ἀρετήν. ὅλως δὲ τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν

his charge against Aristotle of jealousy and illwill towards Isocrates, whom he supposes the other to have lost no opportunity of assailing with open or covert censure and ridicule in his Rhetoric. See his commentary, pp. 154, 507, 586, 605, and elsewhere. Here at least, (with the reading *ἀσυνήθειαν*), there is neither one nor the other. I have already entered into this question in the Introd. p. 40—1, where I have given the opinions of later writers on the subject.

συγκρίνειν] Pol. VI (IV) 11, sub init. 12, 1296 *b* 24, Metaph. A 4, 985 *a* 24, 26, Top. A 5, 102 *b* 15, H 3, 154 *a* 5, 9, Θ 5, 159 *b* 25. '*σύγκρισις, ἀδόκιμος φωνή. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ συγκρίνειν τόνδε τῷδε καὶ συνέκρινεν ἡμάρτηται· χρὴ οὖν ἀντεξετάζειν καὶ παραβάλλειν λέγειν.*' Phrynichus. See Lobeck's note ad loc. p. 278. In all the passages quoted, except the two of the Metaph., *συγκρίνειν* and *σύγκρισις* denote comparison: in the other two it is a term of the early Physical Philosophy, meaning a composition of elements, opposed to *διάκρισις*.

Victorius quotes in illustration of *πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν*, Catullus, Carmen 64, 344, *non illi quisquam bello se conferet heros*, seq. Cic. de Or. II 85, 348, *est etiam cum ceteris praestantibus viris comparatio in laude praeclara.*

§ 39. The *κοινὸς τόπος* of *αὔξησις* or amplification naturally falls under the general head or class of laudatory speeches, is especially applicable to all forms of 'praise': because its object is to establish a certain 'superiority' of the person panegyrized over others, and this 'superiority' is an honourable end to aim at. And therefore if we do not compare our hero with the distinguished, it is at all events better to do it with the rest of the world (the average of mankind) because superiority in general, in itself, is thought to be an indication of 'virtue'. Eth. Nic. IV 8, sub init. *οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ οἱ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον.*

§ 40. It follows from this that of the three universal kinds of persuasion *αὔξησις*, or *amplificatio*, is most appropriate to the epideictic branch of Rhetoric (and the opposite *μείωσις*, *vituperatio*, to the censorious critical extenuatory kind of it[1]): for in this the actions are taken for granted (as admitted), and therefore all that remains to be done is to invest them with magnitude (importance) and honour (dignity, glory). To the deliberative orator examples are most serviceable; because people

[1] *ἐχομένων γὰρ τούτων* (when these are held fast by us, when we have mastered these) *τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις φανερά· ὁ γὰρ ψόγος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν*, § 41 *infra*.

ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις ἡ μὲν αὔξησις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς· τὰς γὰρ πράξεις ὁμολογουμένας λαμβάνουσιν, ὥστε λοιπὸν μέγεθος περιθεῖναι καὶ κάλλος· τὰ δὲ παραδείγματα τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα καταμαντευόμενοι κρίνομεν· τὰ δ' ἐνθυμήματα τοῖς δικανικοῖς· αἰτίαν γὰρ καὶ ἀπόδειξιν μάλιστα δέχεται τὸ γεγονὸς διὰ τὸ ἀσαφές.

41 ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν οἱ ἔπαινοι καὶ οἱ ψόγοι λέγονται σχεδὸν πάντες, καὶ πρὸς ποῖα δεῖ βλέποντας ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ ἐγκώμια γίγνεται καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη, ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ἐχομένων γὰρ τούτων τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις φανερά· ὁ γὰρ ψόγος ἐκ τῶν ἐναν-
1 τίων ἐστίν. περὶ δὲ κατηγορίας καὶ ἀπολογίας, ἐκ CHAP. X. P. 1368 *b*.

are apt to draw inferences, to form a judgment or decision upon the future from the past by a sort of presentiment or anticipation. The enthymeme, direct logical argument, is most to the purpose in judicial oratory: in *that* there is most room for the application of direct proof, the tracing of cause and effect, and demonstration by deductive process, in clearing up the obscurity of 'past facts', which are the objects of forensic oratory, c. 3. 2. The substance of this is repeated in III 17. 3—5.

τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν] This seems to be a division, for the nonce, of rhetorical πίστεις as a γένος, into three εἴδη or species, each specially adapted to one of the three branches of Rhetoric. The division has no pretension to a regular scientific character: αὔξησις is not a logical kind of argument at all, and the three members of the division are not coordinate.

καταμαντευόμενοι] μαντεύεσθαι and ἀπομαντεύεσθαι, both of them not unusual in Plato and Aristotle, are the usual terms by which this kind of 'divination', the foreboding presentiment, dark undefined anticipation of the future is expressed. It occurs again (in the simple form) I 13. 2, III 17. 10, Eth. N. I 3, 1095 *b* 26, of a suspicion, or hypothesis, Ib. VI 13, 1144 *b* 25. Examples are to be found in Stallbaum's note on Rep. I 349 A, and many more in Ast's *Lex.* sub vv.—καταμαντεύεσθαι, besides this place [the only passage where it is used by Aristotle], is found in pseudo-Dem. ἐπιτάφ. p. 1400. 2, Polyb. II 22. 7, in Longinus and Athenaeus.

CHAP. X.

We now pass on to the treatment of the dicastic or forensic branch of Rhetoric, which occupies the remainder of the book; the ἄτεχνοι πίστεις, being peculiar to this branch, (ἴδιαι τῶν δικανικῶν), 15. 1, are added as an appendix in the fifteenth chapter. For the general connexion of the contents of these chapters, and the illustration of some special subjects which seemed to require a more detailed explanation, I refer to the ana-

πόσων καὶ ποίων ποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τοὺς συλλογισμούς,
2 ἐχόμενον ἂν εἴη λέγειν. δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τρία, ἓν μὲν
τίνων καὶ πόσων ἕνεκα ἀδικοῦσι, δεύτερον δὲ πῶς
αὐτοὶ διακείμενοι, τρίτον δὲ τοὺς ποίους καὶ πῶς
3 ἔχοντας. διορισάμενοι οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖν λέγωμεν ἑξῆς.

ἔστω δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον. νόμος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν ἴδιος ὁ δὲ κοινός· λέγω δὲ ἴδιον μὲν καθ' ὃν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται,

lysis of the Introduction, pp. 185—207, and the Appendixes to Bk. I, C. D. E.

§ 1. The first subject of inquiry in this branch is the number and nature (quantity and quality) of the materials or propositions (the premisses) of which our 'syllogisms' are to be constructed, in accusation and defence, the two functions of the dicastic branch of Rhetoric.

Schrader draws attention to the term 'syllogisms' as marking the especially logical character of the arguments which are employed in this branch as compared with the other two. On syllogism for enthymeme, see note on I 1. 11, p. 19.

§ 2. There are three subjects to be considered and analysed in order to furnish topics for the pleader's use; first, the number and nature of the motives and causes of injustice; secondly, the dispositions of the wrongdoers themselves; and thirdly, what characters and dispositions render men most liable to wrong and injustice.

§ 3. The first thing is to define justice, then to proceed with the rest in order.—*ἔστω*, of a *popular* or merely *provisional* definition; comp. 5. 3; 6. 2; 7. 2.

'Wrong' or 'injustice' is defined 'a voluntary injury contrary to law'. The two leading characteristics of a crime or punishable offence which are here brought into view are, that it is an act in violation of the law of the land—this is the *political* view of injustice—and that to be a *crime* the act must be intentional, done with malice prepense, and with full knowledge of the circumstances of the case and the probable effect of the action. It is thus distinguished from a merely *accidental* injury or harm done, which can hardly be considered voluntary at all, and again from a mere *mistake* or error of judgment arising from ignorance, not of *universals*, or general moral principles, but of the *particular* circumstances of the case (as of the absence of the button of the foil) where there is no evil or malicious purpose, no bad *προαίρεσις*, which constitutes the immorality of the act. See Eth. N. III 2, V 10. Rhet. I 13. 16.

νόμος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν ἴδιος ὁ δὲ κοινός] Comp. 13. 2, 11, 12, and Introd. p. 239, Append. E. to Bk. I.

λέγω δὲ ἴδιον κ.τ.λ.] 'by special[1] law I mean the written law under

[1] This application of the term *ἴδιος* to *νόμος* is to be distinguished from the ordinary meaning of it in this combination, as, for instance, Dem. de Cor. § 211,

κοινὸν δὲ ὅσα ἄγραφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ. ἑκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα εἰδότες καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἑκόντες, οὐ πάντα προαιρούμενοι, ὅσα δὲ προαιρούμενοι, εἰδότες ἅπαντα· οὐδεὶς
4 γὰρ ὃ προαιρεῖται ἀγνοεῖ. δι' ἃ δὲ προαιροῦνται

which the government is conducted and the citizens live', the laws and institutions—which direct the policy of the government and the conduct of the citizens—the positive, written, law of the particular state: this is human, as opposed to divine and natural, law: 'by common (universal) law (I mean) all the unwritten principles that are supposed to be universally admitted'. This is the usual distinction taken between the two: these *κοινά, ἄγραφα*, are described, Introd. p. 239 seq.; for the further subdivision adopted in c. 13. 2, see Ib. p. 242.

ἑκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα κ.τ.λ.] 'a *voluntary* act is characterised by knowledge, and the absence of all external force and compulsion'. Eth. N. III 3, init. *ὄντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα* (i.e. with *special* knowledge of the *particular* circumstances) *ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν.* I 13. 6, *τὰ ἑκούσια, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὅσα εἰδότες.*

ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἑκόντες κ.τ.λ.] 'now all voluntary actions are not done with (do not imply) deliberate moral purpose, but all acts done with such a purpose imply knowledge, because no one can be ignorant of what he purposes'. Eth. N. III 4, 1111 *b* 7, *ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἑκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ' οὔ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἑκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὔ.* Actions, for example, done under the impulse of violent excitement or passion, *διὰ θυμόν*, or of appetite, *δι' ἐπιθυμίαν*, are voluntary, but not *κατὰ προαίρεσιν*.

§ 4. *δι' ἃ δὲ προαιροῦνται κ.τ.λ.*] 'The impelling motive, cause, of this purpose to do mischievous and vicious acts in violation of the law, is vice and want of self-control. This general vicious habit takes various forms in particular cases, and shews itself in different special vices according to the circumstances which call it forth at the time, and give it its special direction. Thus vice and wrong (*μοχθηρία καὶ ἀδικία*) may take the form of illiberality in money matters, licentiousness in pleasure, effeminacy in respect of ease and comfort (*ῥᾳθυμία*), cowardice in danger (when, for instance, the coward leaves his comrades in the lurch, and runs away out of mere terror); similarly the vice of ambition is shewn in the undue pursuit of honour, the passionate irascible temper in the over indulgence of angry feeling; victory is the motive to wrong in one that is over eager for victory, revenge with the vindictive; folly (the want of *φρόνησις*, practical wisdom, the special *moral* faculty) shews itself in the inability to distinguish (the liability to be deceived in distinctions of) right and wrong,

where it stands simply for *ius privatum*, relating to private (as opposed to public) affairs.

βλάπτειν καὶ φαῦλα ποιεῖν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, κακία
ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκρασία· ἐὰν γάρ τινες ἔχωσι μοχθηρίαν ἢ
μίαν ἢ πλείους, περὶ τοῦτο ὃ μοχθηροὶ τυγχάνουσιν
ὄντες, καὶ ἄδικοί εἰσιν, οἷον ὁ μὲν ἀνελεύθερος περὶ
χρήματα, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος
ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ μαλακὸς περὶ τὰ ῥάθυμα[1], ὁ δὲ δειλὸς
περὶ τοὺς κινδύνους (τοὺς γὰρ συγκινδυνεύοντας ἐγκα-
ταλιμπάνουσι διὰ τὸν φόβον), ὁ δὲ φιλότιμος διὰ
τιμήν, ὁ δ' ὀξύθυμος δι' ὀργήν, ὁ δὲ φιλόνικος διὰ p. 35.
νίκην, ὁ δὲ πικρὸς διὰ τιμωρίαν, ὁ δ' ἄφρων διὰ τὸ

[1] ῥᾴθυμα *infra*.

the vice of the shameless man appears in his reckless disregard of the opinion of others'.—ὀξύθυμος 'quick-tempered', 'hasty'.

περὶ δὲ τοῦτο] Wolf, and with him Brandis, in Schneidewin's *Philologus*, IV i, p. 42, object to δέ, which *is* omitted by Brandis' '*anonymus*' and one MS. See the note on δῆλον δέ, I 1. 11, p. 20.

τὰ ῥᾴθυμα] are things and circumstances which tend to promote and encourage an easy, careless state of mind, 'things comfortable', which incline us to self-indulgence and inactivity. So ῥᾳστώνη in Plat. Gorg. 569 C, οὔκουν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη γίγνεται; 'isn't it a great comfort...?' Crit. 45 C, τὰ ῥᾳθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι, of 'careless, easy-going, indifference'.

ἐγκαταλιμπάνειν, 'to leave behind in the lurch', desert a comrade in danger [Cf. II 4. 26, 5. 7; III 16. 5.]. ἐν sc. τῷ κινδύνῳ. Eupolis Δῆμοι Fragm. VI (*Meineke*, *Fragm. Comic. Gr.* II 458), of Pericles' eloquence, μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις, 'to leave the sting behind in the wound', (ἐν τῷ ἕλκει). Plat. Phaedo, 91 C, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι.

πικρός] 'Translato a tristi sapore nomine, πικροὺς Graeci appellant qui accepta iniuria non facile placantur sed diu simultatem gerunt, de quibus accuratius egit noster, Eth. Nic. IV (11, 1126 *a* 20), οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ· ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα.' [Vict.] τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπείθει αὐτοὺς οὐδείς, ἐν αὑτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖν εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. The Latin *amarus*, as Victorius points out, is used in much the same sense. The distinguishing characteristic of the Aristotelian πικρότης, in which the particular 'bitterness' of this form of ὀργή is shewn, is its lasting and enduring quality—the wrath is nursed 'to keep it warm' (πέψαι τὴν ὀργήν)—and this gives it a malignant, spiteful, *implacable* character, exactly opposite to that of Horace, the irascible temper, ὀργιλότης, *irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem.*

ἀπατᾶσθαι] Ignorance of moral distinctions, and consequent wrong action, may be regarded as a kind of 'deception' or 'delusion'; when a man is too foolish (unwise) to be able to distinguish right from wrong,

ἀπατᾶσθαι περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, ὁ δ' ἀναίσχυντος δι' ὀλιγωρίαν δόξης. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

5 *ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων δῆλον, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰρημένων, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη ῥηθησομένων· λοιπὸν δ' εἰπεῖν τίνος ἕνεκα καὶ πῶς*

6 *ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι, καὶ τίνας. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν διελώ-*

when he does not know and cannot perceive the difference between them (has no φρόνησις). Victorius quotes Top. Z (9, 148 *a* 6), τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔχον ἐπιστήμην οὐ δοκεῖ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ διηπατημένον. Ignorance is not a mere στέρησις, the privation or absence of knowledge; which is shewn by our not applying the term 'ignorant' to inanimate objects and young children; it is something positive, and consists in a deception, mistaking one thing for another.

περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων] τὰ ὑποκείμενα, *res subiectae, subiecta materies;* things that fall under the same head or general notion, and so are members or species of the same genus: Eth. N. II 2, 1105 *a* 1, πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν, 'all that fall under the choice', as its objects, or matter to operate upon. These are the six things previously mentioned, καλόν, συμφέρον, ἡδύ, and their opposites.

And so for the rest, the same rule holds in the case of every vice, 'each in the things which are specially subjected to it', which come under that particular head, as money is the 'subject-matter' of illiberality, dangers of cowardice, anger of quick, irascible temper, and so on. Victorius understands it as the 'object' of the aim or desire of each.

§ 5. ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰρημένων] sc. in c. 9; ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη ῥηθησομένων sc. in II cc. 2—11. 'It remains now to describe the motives and dispositions or characters of wrong doers, and the dispositions and characters of their objects or victims'. In Polit. VI (IV) 11, 1295 *b* 9, there is a division of crimes based upon their respective magnitude or degree, into great and little, crimes on a great scale, acts of oppression, outrage, insolence, and crimes on a small scale, mean and paltry, which appear in fraud, cheating, and any paltry knavery or trickery. γίγνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρισταὶ καὶ μεγαλοπόνηροι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικροπόνηροι λίαν· τῶν δ' ἀδικημάτων τὰ μὲν γίγνεται δι' ὕβριν, τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν.

§ 6. First we have to distinguish or analyse the various motives and incentives, whether in the way of pursuit or avoidance which lead men to attempt (to undertake, take in hand, ἐγχειρεῖν) wrong doing: for it is plainly the accuser's business to inquire (how many and which kinds,) the number and the kinds of these universal incentives to wrong doing to which the adversary, whom he charges with a crime, is liable: and of the defendant, how many and what sorts of them are *not* applicable to his case. 'Hunc locum copiose persecutus est Cicero pro Milone et in criminando Clodio et in Milone purgando: cuncta enim in Clodio fuisse ostendit quae persuadere ipsi potuerint ut insidias faceret Miloni; eademque a persona Milonis afuisse.' Victorius.

μεθα τίνων ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ ποῖα φεύγοντες ἐρχειροῦσιν
ἀδικεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς τῷ μὲν κατηγοροῦντι πόσα
καὶ ποῖα τούτων ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ σκεπτέον,
[ὧν ἐφιέμενοι πάντες τοὺς πλησίον ἀδικοῦσι,] τῷ δ'
ἀπολογουμένῳ ποῖα καὶ πόσα τούτων οὐχ ὑπάρχει.
7 πάντες δὴ πράττουσι πάντα τὰ μὲν οὐ δι' αὑτοὺς τὰ
δὲ δι' αὑτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν μὴ δι' αὑτοὺς τὰ μὲν διὰ
τύχην πράττουσι τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τῶν δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης
τὰ μὲν βίᾳ τὰ δὲ φύσει· ὥστε πάντα ὅσα μὴ δι'
αὑτοὺς πράττουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ
δὲ βίᾳ. ὅσα δὲ δι' αὑτούς, καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ P. 1369.
μὲν δι' ἔθος τὰ δὲ δι' ὄρεξιν, τῶν δὲ δι' ὄρεξιν τὰ μὲν
8 διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλογον· ἔστι δ' ἡ

§ 7. This inquiry naturally leads to a classification of the sources or causes of human action, which are found to fall under seven heads; some of these have their origin in ourselves and are under our own control, others are external to us and independent of us, and exercise upon us and our actions the force of necessity and compulsion. To the causes whose origin is *without* us belong (1) chance or accident, (2) nature, and (3) external force or compulsion; over these we have no control: the causes which spring from *within* us, and are therefore more or less in our power to master and overrule, are (4) habit, (5) reasoning or calculation, (6) passion, (7) appetite or desire. These seven incentives to action have been carefully examined, and compared with other doctrines and opinions elsewhere expressed by Aristotle on the same subjects, in Append. C to Bk. I, Introd. p. 218 seq., to which I refer for further illustration of them.

This same classification of the causes or sources of actions is indicated or alluded to elsewhere, but nowhere else so completely made out. See, for instance, Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 *a* 32, *αἴτια γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου*, and VI 4, in the definition of art, 1140 *a* 14, *οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὑτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν.* And in I 10, 1099 *b* 20 seq. the same division is hinted at.

§ 8. *ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις κ.τ.λ.*] Comp. Eth. N. III 4, 1111 *b* 26, *ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν μὲν βουλόμεθα καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἁρμόζει· ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι.* This is a qualification of the too unlimited statement of the unscientific Rhetoric. 'In English, unfortunately, we have no term capable of adequately expressing what is common both to will and desire; that is, the *nisus* or *conatus*—the tendency towards the realisation of their end. By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire

μὲν βούλησις, ⟨βούλησις δ'⟩ ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις (οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ' ἢ ὅταν οἰηθῇ εἶναι ἀγαθόν), ἄλογοι δ' ὀρέξεις ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν ἀνάγκη πράττειν δι' αἰτίας ἑπτά, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βίαν, δι' ἔθος, διὰ λογισμόν, διὰ θυμόν,
9 δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι καθ' ἡλικίας ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα τὰ πραττόμενα περίεργον· εἰ γὰρ συμβέβηκε τοῖς νέοις ὀργίλοις εἶναι ἢ ἐπιθυμητικοῖς, οὐ διὰ τὴν νεότητα πράττουσι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀλλὰ δι' ὀργὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. οὐδὲ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβέβηκε τοῖς μὲν πένησι διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν ἐπιθυμεῖν χρημάτων, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν· ἀλλὰ πράξουσι

a blind and fatal, tendency to action'. Sir W. Hamilton, *Lect. on Metaph.* XI Vol. I. p. 184—5. On this, the Editor refers in a note to this passage. But βούλησις here means not 'will', but 'wish', as appears from the definition ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις—the 'will' is *not* always directed to good—and from the analysis of it in Eth. N. III 4. The term by which Sir W. H. proposes to designate the common quality of this family of faculties, and so separate them from the rest, is *Conative*. *Impulsive* means much the same thing, and has the advantage of being an English word.

οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται κ.τ.λ.] This question of the end and object of 'the wish' is discussed in Eth. Nic. III 6 (Bekk.), and the conclusion, 1113 *a* 23, is as follows: εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει (the two opposite views that it is τἀγαθόν and τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν), ἆρα φατέον ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν.

§ 9. τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.] What he says is superfluous (περίεργον) here, is actually done in the six ethical chapters, 12—17, of Bk. II, and this apparent contradiction has raised a suspicion that some error has crept into the text. There is however in reality no inconsistency between the theory here laid down and the actual practice in Book II. *There* the treatment of these ἤθη is appropriate, as supplementary to that of the πάθη: *here* it would be out of place, because the present subject of inquiry is about the *causes of human action;* and though these states and conditions, youth, age, wealth, poverty and the rest, are as a general rule attended and characterised by certain tendencies or πάθη, yet these latter can be by no means regarded as *effects of causes*, but are mere συμβεβηκότα, separable accidents, which do not invariably accompany the states that they characterise. Youth and age, wealth and poverty, are *not* the causes of any particular classes of actions; in so far as they *do* accompany them they are accidental, not essential.

ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν] These are thus defined by Plato, Rep. VIII 12, 558D,

καὶ οὗτοι οὐ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ ἄδικοι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ λεγόμενοι κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις πράττειν, διὰ p. 36.
ταῦτα πράξουσιν· ἢ γὰρ διὰ λογισμὸν ἢ διὰ πάθος· ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν δι᾽ ἤθη καὶ πάθη χρηστά, οἱ δὲ διὰ τἀναντία. συμβαίνει μέντοι ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἕξεσι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖν, ταῖς δὲ τοιαῖσδε τὰ τοιάδε· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἴσως τῷ μὲν σώφρονι διὰ τὸ σώφρονα εἶναι δόξαι τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι χρησταὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσι περὶ

οὐκοῦν ἅς τε οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ᾽ εἶμεν ἀποτρέψαι δικαίως ἂν ἀναγκαῖαι καλοῖντο, καὶ ὅσαι ἀποτελούμεναι ὠφελοῦσιν ἡμᾶς; τούτων γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίεσθαι ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη, comp. Phileb. 72 E. They are therefore pleasures that are *forced upon us* by nature, and therefore 'necessary' or 'indispensable' to us. Of these the 'bodily pleasures', the gratification of the appetites, are the most necessary, and sometimes the latter are confined to them; for in Eth. N. VII 14, 1154 *a* the pleasures which are first called *σωματικαί*, in lines 7 and 9, afterwards, in line 11, receive the name of *ἀναγκαῖαι*, which is repeated in line 17. The Scholiast and Paraphrast both explain *ἀναγκαῖαι* by *σωματικαί*. Plato more frequently speaks of the *ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιθυμίαι* in the same sense.

§ 10. Not however that I mean to deny—it *does* happen, *συμβαίνει*—that there is a connexion of certain particular results or qualities with particular moral states (but these classes and conditions of life are *not* 'states' in this sense): any virtue, I dare say, (*ἴσως*), as self-control, *does* generate a particular kind of opinions and desires about things pleasant, *good* ones namely; and the opposite vice of licentiousness the contrary in the same sphere.

This is a parenthetical note to avoid misunderstanding.

εὐθὺς...ἐπακολουθοῦσι] 'there is at once, from the very first, an immediate and close connexion (or consequence) between the *σώφρων* in virtue of his self-control, and certain *good* opinions and desires in respect of pleasure'. *εὐθύς* in the sense of 'at once', 'straight off', and corresponding sometimes to the Latin *statim* and *ultro*, passes into a variety of significations which take their colour from the context. Eth. N. V 14, 1137 *b* 19, *suapte natura*, *εὐθὺς τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν*; see Bonitz on Metaph. Γ 3, 1004 *a* 5, who cites Categ. 12, 14 *a* 32, Anal. Pr. I 16, 36 *a* 6, Eth. N. VI 5, 1140 *b* 18, *εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται*, *omnino non apparet*. Polit. III 4, 1277 *a* 15, *τὴν παιδείαν εὐθὺς* (from the very first) *ἑτέραν*. Ib. VI (IV) 11, 1295 *b* 16, *καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εὐθὺς οἴκοθεν ὑπάρχει παισὶν οὖσιν* (from their very earliest home associations). Ib. VIII (V) 10, 1310 *b* 8, *εὐθὺς ἐξ ἐναντίων* (at once, from direct opposites). Ib. c. 10, ult. *μὴ βουλομένων γὰρ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἔσται βασιλεύς* (he won't be king at all, *omnino*). Eth. Eudem. II 5, 1222 *a* 37, *διότι ἡ φύσις εὐθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἅπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφέστηκε τοῦ μέσου*. See Fritzsche, note ad loc. Phys. VII 4. 2, *bis*, 248 *a* 21, *ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη*, and 23. Hist. Anim. II 13. 2, 17. 7, *κεῖται ὑπὸ τὸ διάζωμα εὐθύς*, *statim*, at once, immediately under. V 17. 5,

τῶν ἡδέων, τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ αἱ ἐναντίαι περὶ τῶν
11 *αὐτῶν τούτων. διὸ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας διαιρέσεις ἐατέον, σκεπτέον δὲ ποῖα ποίοις εἴωθεν ἕπεσθαι· εἰ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸς ἢ μέλας ἢ μέγας ἢ μικρός, οὐδὲν τέτακται τῶν τοιούτων ἀκολουθεῖν, εἰ δὲ νέος ἢ πρεσβύτης ἢ δίκαιος ἢ ἄδικος, ἤδη διαφέρει. καὶ ὅλως ὅσα τῶν συμβαινόντων ποιεῖ διαφέρειν τὰ ἤθη τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἷον πλουτεῖν δοκῶν ἑαυτῷ ἢ πένεσθαι διοίσει τι, καὶ εὐτυχεῖν ἢ ἀτυχεῖν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν εἴπωμεν πρῶτον.*

12 *ἔστι δ' ἀπὸ τύχης μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα γιγνόμενα,*

de Gen. et Corr. II 11. 2, de part. Anim. IV 5. 1. Like *ἤδη* its connotation is transferred from time, its natural and proper signification, to place.

§ 11. 'And therefore', (because they are inappropriate as not assigning causes of human action,) 'such distinctions as these may be dismissed for the present; but still we are bound to inquire into the connexion which subsists between particular qualities and particular persons or classes'; (the general subject deserves investigation;) 'for though in respect of the qualities black and white or tall and short there is no fixed succession or accompaniment' (between them and any particular persons or classes), 'yet when we come to the connexion of young or old men with justice or injustice, *then* (by this time) there *is* a difference'. That is to say, that although in certain connexions of particular qualities with particular classes the establishment of such would be worthless or impossible, yet there are other cases, as in that of moral qualities, where it *would* be worth while to establish such a connexion, if it were possible. 'And in general, any accidental circumstance that makes a real difference in the characters of men; as the opinion a man has of his own wealth or poverty, or good or bad fortune, will make such a difference'. So after all it seems that it is possible to trace some such connexions between qualities and classes; but as this is not the proper place for such an inquiry—the reason being already given—'we will postpone it for the present', and wait till we come to the *πάθη*, where it will be in its proper place: 'And now let us proceed to what remains' of the subject on which we are at present engaged.

πλουτεῖν δοκῶν ἑαυτῷ is a reading of some MSS, followed by the old Latin Translation, and adopted by the recent Edd. The vulgate has *πλουτεῖν δοκεῖ*, which Buhle retains. *δοκεῖ τῳ*, a conjecture of Victorius, is also found in some MSS.

§ 12. On *τύχη* see Appendix C to Bk. I. Introd.; on *αἰτία ἀόριστος* see ib. p. 221 seq. 'Illos eventus qui a causa quam nemo facile definiat oriuntur ad fortunam referimus. Arist. Phys. II 4, 196 *b* 6, *εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἷς δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰτία μὲν ἡ τύχη, ἄδηλος δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ ὡς θεῖόν τι οὖσα καὶ δαιμονιώτερον.*' Schrader. (Schrader quotes this as Aristotle's own definition.)

ὅσων ἥ τε αἰτία ἀόριστος καὶ μὴ ἕνεκά του γίγνεται
καὶ μήτε ἀεὶ μήτε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μήτε τεταγμένως·
δῆλον δ' ἐκ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ τῆς τύχης περὶ τούτων.
13 φύσει δέ, ὅσων ἥ τ' αἰτία ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τεταγμένη· P. 1369 b.
ἢ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὡσαύτως ἀποβαίνει. τὰ
γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, πότερα
κατὰ φύσιν τινὰ ἢ ἄλλην αἰτίαν γίγνεται· δόξειε δ'
14 ἂν καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων. βίᾳ δέ,
ὅσα παρ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ τοὺς λογισμοὺς γίγνεται δι'
15 αὐτῶν τῶν πραττόντων. ἔθει δέ, ὅσα διὰ τὸ πολ-
16 λάκις πεποιηκέναι ποιοῦσιν. διὰ λογισμὸν δὲ τὰ δο-
κοῦντα συμφέρειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ὡς
τέλος ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅταν διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν
πράττηται· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκόλαστοι συμφέροντα
πράττουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν ἀλλὰ δι' ἡδονήν.
17 διὰ θυμὸν δὲ καὶ ὀργὴν τὰ τιμωρητικά. διαφέρει δὲ

καὶ (ὅσα) μὴ ἕνεκά του...μήτε τεταγμένως] 'in any fixed, regular, prescribed order'.

§ 13. φύσει] Introd. p. 224.—ἢ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, 'either constantly, or as a general rule': the latter alternative allows for the possible objection of τὰ παρὰ φύσιν to the *perfect* regularity of the operations of Nature.

καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία] The καί admits that chance *as well as* Nature may be the cause of these unaccountable *monstra*, these deviations from the ordinary laws of nature; but leaves the question unsettled.

§ 14. βίᾳ] Introd. p. 225, anything that is done by our own instrumentality, but in opposition to our desires and calculations, may be said to be done βίᾳ, by compulsion.

§ 15. ἔθει] Ib. p. 226—228.

§ 16. λογισμόν] Ib. p. 229. Reasoning or calculation is a cause of action, when any of the goods already mentioned (c. 6) are presented to us as objects of our interest, as expedient and useful to us, (this is good under the aspect of *utility*; the other two forms of good are τὸ καλόν the moral end, 'the right', and τὸ ἡδύ: see Eth. Nic. II 2, 1104 *b* 30, τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις...καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος,) in the form of an end, or of means to that end; when, that is, *good* is the object of the action, (I add this qualification) because even the licentious (those who have lost all self-control, and therefore cannot act with a deliberate purpose to an end) do things that are expedient or for their interest, only not for that reason, but for mere pleasure.

§ 17. θυμός and ὀργή. Ib. p. 231.—τὰ τιμωρητικά, 'acts and feelings of

τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσ-
χοντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἵνα
18 ἀποπληρωθῇ. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ὀργή, δῆλον ἔσται p. 37.
ἐν τοῖς περὶ παθῶν, δι' ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ πράττεται ὅσα

revenge, are prompted by passion and anger'. I have translated θυμὸς 'passion' and ὀργὴ 'anger' to express the distinction that the one is a more general, the other a more precise and definite, term. Besides this, θυμὸς being the older and Homeric term to represent anger might by that very fact have conveyed to the ears of the more modern Greek a difference of meaning which had no real existence. ὀργή, if Damm's *Lexicon* is to be trusted, never occurs in Homer; [the word is not to be found in Mr G. L. Prendergast's (unpublished) *Concordance to the Iliad.* S.] Both of the terms as applied to emotions are in fact modifications and limitations of more general notions—θυμὸς the life or soul (Hom.) is limited to the most prominent and impressive outward manifestation of it, the expression of passion: ὀργὴ 'anger' is one, the most striking, of a class of animal impulses, ὀργαί. In Aristotle's psychology, the θυμὸς is one of the impulsive faculties (ὀρέξεις), together with the appetites and the (deliberate) wish, de Anima B 3, 414 *b* 2, and in the Platonic scheme the θυμὸς or θυμοειδὲς represents a whole class of impulses of which no doubt ὀργὴ is one—it is in fact the impulsive element of the human soul.

On the difference of τιμωρία and κόλασις, see Introd. p. 232. Compare I 14. 2. Of this theory of punishment as a preventive, a very good account is given by Protagoras, Plat. Protag. 324 B. Comp. also Eth. N. II 2, 1104 *b* 16, αἱ κολάσεις...ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.

§ 18. For further particulars about ὀργὴ we are referred to the treatment of the πάθη in Bk. II: the chapter on anger is the second.

ἐπιθυμία. The last of the seven causes or stimulants of action is desire (Introd. p. 233), which excites all actions of which the object is pleasure. This pleasure may be either real or apparent, and therefore to include the latter we have ὅσα φαίνεται and not ἐστίν.

In the next two sentences the four incentives to action which originate in ourselves are shewn to be all referable in some sense to pleasure, real or apparent good, real or apparent as a motive cause. Of ἐπιθυμία it has been already stated that pleasure is the direct motive. Habit, again, is a kind of pleasure, for experience teaches that habituation and familiarity make actions not naturally agreeable pleasant to us—habit becomes a second nature. Of anger, revenge is the object, and revenge is proverbially sweet. And reasoning or calculation has always of course some good, real or supposed, for its object.

I have no doubt that Victorius is right in the distinction that he draws between σύνηθες and ἐθιστόν. The former represents a *natural* familiarity derived from familiar associations, with which, as I have pointed out on I 1. 2, the derivation, σὺν ἦθος, 'the haunting, herding together', the gregarious habit of some animals, is in exact accordance; so συνήθεις, of a man's 'familiar associates, habitual companions' I 11. 16;

-φαίνεται ἡδέα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνηθες καὶ τὸ ἐθιστὸν ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει μὴ ἡδέων, ὅταν ἐθισθῶσιν, ἡδέως ποιοῦσιν. ὥστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν, ὅσα δι' αὑτοὺς πράττουσιν, ἅπαντ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα. ἐπεὶ δ' ὅσα δι' αὑτούς, ἑκόντες πράττουσιν, οὐχ ἑκόντες δὲ ὅσα μὴ δι' αὑτούς, πάντ' ἂν εἴη, ὅσα

the other is an *acquired* habit, a practice to which you *habituate yourself* by study and attention; of which virtue the settled ἕξις formed by ἔθος is the best example. 'In priore vero,' says Victorius, 'nulla industria aut cura, sed potius una cum aetate crevisse, eo verbo intelligitur; ut cum a puero quispiam in illis vixerit, inde factum sit ut ea ipsi iucunda videantur.'

ἐθισθῶσιν] Spengel has adopted συνεθισθῶσιν from συνεθίσωσιν, the reading of MS A°. ['ἐθισθῶσιν *ceteri ut p.* 1370, 13' (c. II. 4). '*Restitui passivum.*' Spengel.]

πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] 'Perelegans est locus Agatharcidae p. 61 fragm. ed. H. Steph. οὕτως ἔχει τι φίλτρον μέγα πᾶσα συνήθεια· καὶ νικᾷ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος δυσχέρειαν ὁ χρόνος (it isn't the time, it is the association) ὁ τὴν πρώτην δεξάμενος εἰς τὸν βίον ἡλικίαν.' Gaisford.

ὥστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν] The dative is explained by supplying an imaginary τινί, 'as for one summing up to say'. An analogous phrase is ὡς συνελόντι εἰπεῖν, Xen. Mem. III 8. 10, IV 3. 7. See note on I 7. 7, τὸ ποιητικῷ εἶναι, and Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 388. Add Eth. N. I 5, 1097 *b* 13, ἐπεκτείνοντι ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς...εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. In this and similar examples the dative may almost be regarded as an absolute case.

οὐχ ἑκόντες] Victorius here draws attention to Aristotle's well-known distinction, Eth. N. III 2, init., between οὐχ ἑκών and ἄκων. Acts due to ignorance, acts which would not have been done, had the doer been aware of all the circumstances of the case, cannot be called ἀκούσιοι, involuntary or unintentional, unless they bring after them regret or repentance; neither are they strictly speaking ἑκούσιαι, intentional, because no harm was intended; they lie between the two and must take the name of οὐχ ἑκούσιαι, 'not-intentional'; neither intentional nor 'unintentional'. I doubt if this distinction is applicable here; the only cases that it can be applied to are chance or accident, nature, and external compulsion, under which all actions are said to be involuntary, i.e. in which the will has no concern; and this is true. But in the Ethics, the actions there in question are not said to be involuntary—the doer meant to do what he did—but acting in ignorance, he acted unintentionally, in so far as he did not intend to do the mischief that followed. But this ignorance from which the unintentional character of the act is derived, essential in the Ethics, has no place here; ignorance is not included in an act done by chance, nature, or external compulsion.

Now as we act voluntarily in all these four cases in which the impulse is from within and action in our own power, it follows (from the preceding) that the object of all voluntary action is some form either of real or

ἑκόντες πράττουσιν, ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα· τίθημι γὰρ καὶ τὴν τῶν κακῶν ἢ φαινομένων κακῶν ἢ ἀπαλλαγὴν ἢ ἀντὶ μείζονος ἐλάττονος μετάληψιν ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (αἱρετὰ γάρ πως), καὶ τὴν τῶν λυπηρῶν ἢ φαινομένων ἢ ἀπαλλαγὴν ἢ μετάληψιν ἀντὶ μειζόνων ἐλαττόνων ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν ὡσαύτως. ληπτέον ἄρα τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα,
19 πόσα καὶ ποῖα. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος εἴπωμεν νῦν. δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ἱκανοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ὅρους, ἐὰν ὦσι περὶ ἑκάστου μήτε ἀσαφεῖς μήτε ἀκριβεῖς.

apparent good, or of real or apparent pleasure; including, in the good, real and apparent, the removal of evil and the substitution of a greater good for a less, because all these are *αἱρετά* (desirable), objects of choice; and in the case of pleasure, the entire removal of pain and the substitution of a less for a greater; both of which are like the others (*ὡσαύτως*) desirable in the sense of pleasurable.

§ 19. It is therefore (from the preceding considerations) the rhetorician's business to discover the number *and* kinds (so Aristotle, but the number *of* kinds will be sufficient,) of good in the form of utility or expediency, and of pleasure. And as the first has been already examined and analysed under the head of deliberative Rhetoric (cc. 6, 7, good, absolute, and comparative), it remains for us to bestow a similar treatment on pleasure. Meanwhile we are not to forget that definitions for *rhetorical* purposes are sufficient, provided they are neither obscure nor over-exact: in the one case they are not understood, in the other they are also apt to be unintelligible by the popular apprehension, but besides this they trespass upon an alien province and method of reasoning, the scientific, namely, or philosophical, 1 4. 4—6, &c. Accordingly,

CHAP. XI

gives the analysis of pleasure, so far as it is of service to the rhetorician.

The general plan of this chapter, and the connexion of its contents, are as follows. First we have a definition of pleasure and a general description of its nature in §§ 1, 2. From this we learn that all that is in accordance with our nature is pleasurable, all that runs counter to it painful, §§ 3, 4. Consequently all *natural* desires and appetites produce pleasure by their gratification: and these fall into two classes, bodily appetites and mental desires, the former irrational and connected with the pleasures of sense, the latter rational, in so far as they are of an intellectual character, suggested and acquired by some kind of intellectual process of the nature of persuasion, § 5, and conveyed by a faculty, *φαντασία*, intermediate between sense and intellect. The analysis

1 ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα CHAP. XI.
τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς
2 τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοὐναντίον. εἰ δ'
ἐστὶν ἡδονὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ P. 1370.
ποιητικὸν τῆς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως, τὸ δὲ φθαρτικὸν
ἢ τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως ποιητικὸν λυπηρόν.
3 ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰέναι

of these intellectual pleasures (which include the pleasures of imagination, memory and anticipation, of love and friendship, and its counterfeit, flattery) occupies §§ 6—20. In the remainder of the chapter other kinds of intellectual pleasures are distinguished, and referred to the principles implied in the definition.

§ 1. The first word of the chapter is a commentary upon the concluding observations of the last: *ὑποκείσθω*, 'let us assume', as a definition, 'take it for granted': there is no occasion to enter into details, or attempt *to prove* that it is what I am about to describe. Similarly *ἔστω*, 5. 3, 6. 2, 7. 2, 10. 3.

On the terms of this definition, and the comparison of it with other doctrines held by Aristotle himself and other critics on the same subject, see Introduction, Appendix D to Bk. I, p. 234 seq.

κατάστασιν...εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν] This characteristic of pleasure, 'the resettlement of the soul', i.e. the vital and sensitive system, 'into its normal state' after a disturbance of the balance or harmony, which is pain, reappears in one of the special *forms* of pleasure, § 21, *ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι.* So that learning, as a pleasure, like pleasure in general, is, according to this view, the filling up of a vacuum, the supply of a want, the satisfaction of a craving, the restoration of a balance of the system, the re-establishment of a broken harmony. This is the Platonic conception of *pleasure;* not, so far as I remember, of *learning* in particular. See Appendix, p. 234. Lucretius takes the same view of pleasure, de Rer. Nat. II 963 (there quoted).

§ 2. *καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ ποιητικόν*] by the ordinary rule, I 6. 2, and note: as all is good that is conducive to good; if the end, then the means; so all is pleasant that is productive of, or conducive to, pleasure. Comp. Eth. N. I 4, 1096 *b* 10, quoted on the above passage.

τῆς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως] pleasure is here properly called a *διάθεσις*, 'a temporary and passing disposition', as opposed to the 'confirmed, complete, and permanent state' which constitutes the *ἕξις*. On the distinction of the two, see Categ. c. 8, p. 8 *b* 27, *διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ πολυχρονιώτερον εἶναι καὶ μονιμώτερον. τοιαῦται δὲ αἵ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί...διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἃ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα, οἷον θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· διάκειται γὰρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γενόμενος κ.τ.λ.*

§ 3. If pleasure is what it has been described to be, a return from a temporary disturbance or unnatural state into a state of nature (*φύσις*

ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἀπειληφότα ᾖ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τὰ κατ' αὐτὴν γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὰ ἔθη· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται· ὅμοιον γάρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ φύσει· ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τῷ ἀεί, ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἀεί,
4 τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλάκις. καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον· παρὰ

being here understood in one of the ordinary Aristotelian significations, the *normal nature*, nature in its best and completest condition), then all 'passing into a natural state' must be pleasant, 'and especially whenever what takes place in accordance with it has reached its own proper nature', i.e. its acme or maximum, the highest attainable point of its development, for instance, drinking, quenching the thirst is a pleasure, learning is a pleasure, but the acme or highest point they reach is still more pleasant in both. Schrader, who suggests these examples, expresses the later of the two stages in each, by *sitim restinxisse, didicisse*, which not only does not give Aristotle's meaning correctly, but also, as I think, is not true as a matter of fact.

ἀπειληφότα ᾖ] has attained to, acquired as its *due*, the opp. of ἀποδιδόναι, see note on I 1. 7. Gaisford cites in exemplification of this application of ἀπολαμβάνειν, Plutarch, de tuenda sanitate, II 130 E, τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἡ φύσις ἀπείληφεν (Nature has recovered, regained her own).

καὶ τὰ ἔθη κ.τ.λ.] 'and all habits, for in fact that which has *become habitual now* (by this time, now that it has reached this point) takes the form (γίγνεται) of something just like what is natural: for habit is a thing (τί) closely resembling nature; because frequent repetition makes a near approach to the constant and uniform, and nature belongs to the constant and uniform, and habit is a case of frequent repetition'. With this statement about habit, comp. de Memoria 2. 16, p. 452 *a* 27, ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος, and line 30, τὸ δὲ πολλάκις φύσιν ποιεῖ. Gaisford refers to Plutarch, de tuenda sanit. 132 A, τὸ ἔθος τρόπον τινὰ φύσις τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν γέγονεν.

Consuetudo altera natura. Prov. ap. Erasm. (*Adagia*) p. 994. Eth. N. VII 11, 1152 *a* 30, ῥᾷον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνος λέγει, φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι φίλε, καὶ δὴ | ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

§ 4. καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον] 'and freedom from constraint, freedom of action' by the same rule; because all external force, compulsion or violence, is unnatural. 'And therefore all *necessity* (of every kind) is painful'. This marks the distinction of ἀναγκαῖον and βίαιον. Fate, for example, is ἀναγκαῖον, and Necessity ('Ανάγκη herself).

There is a chapter on τὸ ἀναγκαῖον which includes βίαιον as a species, in Metaph. Δ 5. There are four kinds of 'necessary' things'. The first is physical necessity, as breath and food are necessary to life: the second class consists of things necessary as means to an end, as taking medicine to get well, to take a voyage to Ægina to recover a sum of money: under this head comes βία (and τὸ βίαιον), an external force that controls us,

φύσιν γὰρ ἡ βία. διὸ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν, καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται

πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ.

τὰς δ' ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας p. 38. *λυπηράς· ἀναγκαῖα γὰρ καὶ βίαια ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐθισθῶσιν· οὕτω δὲ τὸ ἔθος ποιεῖ ἡδύ. τὰ δ' ἐναντία ἡδέα· διὸ αἱ ῥαθυμίαι καὶ αἱ ἀπονίαι καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι καὶ αἱ παιδιαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ ὁ ὕπνος τῶν*

something independent of ourselves and our own will, (here the external compulsion or violence is the necessary means to the attainment of its end, control). *βίαιον* is thus described, 1015 *a* 26, *τοῦτο δ' ἐστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐμποδίζον καὶ κωλυτικόν. τὸ γὰρ βίαιον ἀναγκαῖον λέγεται, διὸ καὶ λυπηρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνός φησι, 'πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ.' καὶ ἡ βία ἀνάγκη τις, ὥσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς λέγει 'ἀλλ' ἡ βία με ταῦτ' ἀναγκάζει ποιεῖν'* (this is incorrectly quoted; *memoriter*, as Bonitz thinks; the line runs, *ἀλλ' ἡ βία γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀναγκάζει με δρᾶν*, Electr. 256). The third species of *ἀναγκαῖον* includes *τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν*; and the fourth, which is somewhat unnecessarily distinguished from this, is the necessity of demonstration, *ἀπόδειξις*, of which the conclusion 'can only be in one way'—which shews that it ought to be included in the preceding. See also Waitz, ad Organ. 83 *b* 38, *Comm.* II p. 358.

καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται] 'Pentameter statim subsequens laudatur quoque ab Arist. in Met. IV 5, et in Ethic. ad Eud. II 7; necnon a Plutarcho in l. *quod non suaviter vivi possit secundum Epicurum*, 1102 C. Tribuitur utrobique Eveno Pario, poetae Elegiaco, Philisti historici praeceptori. Legitur tamen idem versus unica voce immutata ap. Theogn. 470 (472 Bergk, *Fragm. Lyr. Gr.* p. 382) *πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον χρῆμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ.*' Buhle.

'And all acts of attention or study, serious effort, vigorous exertion are painful' (supply *ἀνάγκη εἶναι λυπηράς*), 'for all these imply necessity and constraint, unless they become habitual; but *then* the habit makes them pleasant. The opposites are of course pleasant; all states of ease and comfort, and idleness and inattention, carelessness and indifference, and sports, and recreations, and sleep, belong to the family (or class) of things pleasant; for none of these is related to (or has a tendency to, *πρός*) necessity'.

τῶν ἡδέων (τι)] Comp. I 9. 25, *νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν*, I 11. 16 and 17. These are examples of a mode of expression, not unknown to earlier and contemporary writers, but more familiar to Aristotle. It is the substitution of a genitive case with *τί* omitted, for the direct predicate in apposition or agreement with the subject. In Aristotle *τί* or *ἕν τι* is sometimes expressed. I have not *noted* it in any writer earlier than Plato, but have no reason to suppose that he was the first to use it. Protag. 319 C, *τῶν γενναίων*. Theaet. 164 B, *τῶν ἀδυνάτων τι ξυμβαίνειν φαίνεται.* Phaed. 68 D, Rep. II 376 E (Stallbaum's note), Ib. IV 424 C, *θὲς τῶν πεπεισμένων*, 437 B, IX 577 B, *ἡμεῖς εἶναι τῶν δυνατῶν ἂν κρῖναι.* Æsch. c. Tim. § 143, *ἕν τι τοῦτο*

5 ἡδέων· οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην τούτων. καὶ οὗ ἂν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνῇ, ἅπαν ἡδύ. ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος

τῶν λυπηροτάτων. Demosth. c. Lept. sub init. *ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δωρεὰν τῶν ἀδίκων ἐστίν*, Olynth. I 16, *τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων ἂν εἴη*, Olynth. II p. 18. 13, *ὡς ἔστι τῶν αἰσχρῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν αἰσχίστων*, de Fals. Leg. § 345, *τῶν ἀπιστούντων*. Isocr. *κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν* § 2, *ἓν τοῦτο τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστι*. § 16, *οὐκ εἶναι τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν*. Ar. Eth. Nic. VI 7, 1141 *b* 3, *τῶν τιμιωτάτων*, VI 12, sub init. 1152 *b* 4, VIII 1 ult. *τῶν καλῶν ἕν τι*. Polit. I 2, 1253 *a* 2, *τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί*, Ib. 5, 1254 *a* 22, c. 9, 1257 *a* 36, VI (IV) 4, 1291 *a* 9, *ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων*, Ib. c. 8, 1294 *a* 1, VIII (V) 3, 1303 *a* 19, *τῶν ἀρχόντων γενομένου Ἡρακλεοδώρου*, Ib. 7, 1306 *b* 28, IV (VII) 6, 1327 *a* 27, Ib. c. 9, 1329 *a* 9, Ib. c. 14, 1332 *b* 32, *ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων*. de Anima A 1. 2, 402 *a* 10, c. 5, 411 *a* 15, *τῶν παραλογωτέρων* (*comparative*, very unusual). de Caelo, I 5. 1, sub init. II 12. 4, 292 *a* 12, *τῶν ἀναριθμήτων εἶναι*. Hist. An. III 11. 4, 518 *a* 2, *τῶν συνεχῶν δὲ τὸ δέρμα ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ζῴοις*. Topic. B 9, 114 *b* 18, 19, 21, Γ 6, 119 *b* 11, Z 3, 141 *a* 5, *τῶν ἀτόπων*, Θ 2, 157 *a* 25. Waitz ad Org. 121 *b* 36, Vol. II p. 473.

§ 5. *καὶ οὗ ἂν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνῇ*] Anything is pleasant of which the desire is innate in us, 'the object of any of our *natural* desires or appetites', the definition of desire being 'an impulse towards pleasure'. de Anima B 3. 2, 414 *b* 2, *ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις*, *b* 5, *τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη* (*ἡ ἐπιθυμία*). Ib. Γ 10. 4, 433 *a* 25, *ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξίς τις ἐστιν*; and compare the following sections on *ἐπιθυμία* and its congeners. Eth. N. III 15, 1119 *b* 6, *κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις*. Similarly Plato speaks of desire as naturally associated with pleasure, Phaedrus 237 D, *ἡ ἔμφυτος οὖσα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν*.

This leads to a distinction of desires into rational and irrational, corresponding severally to the two parts of our moral and intellectual nature, the *λόγον ἔχον* and the *ἄλογον*—the latter division is attributed to Plato by the author of Magna Moralia, I 1. 7, 1182 *a* 23.

The irrational appetites, the Platonic *ἐπιθυμητικόν* (Republic), are those which are not accompanied or guided by reason, which act naturally or by a physical necessity, *ὅσαι λέγονται φύσει*, (these are Plato's *ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιθυμίαι*; Rep. VIII 554 A, 558 D, 559 A, B, see the whole passage, IX 572 C, *τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίους, ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἕνεκα γιγνομένας*; and have corresponding *ἡδοναί*, Rep. VIII 558 D, Phileb. 72 E), and are not prompted by any 'supposition', *ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν τι*, any suggestion of ulterior advantage of any kind thereby accruing, but are forced upon us by the imperious demands of nature; such as bodily appetites (those which we have, which come to us, through the channel or *medium* of (*διά*) the body, sensual, *αἱ σωματικαί*, Eth. N. VI 6, sub init. *ἀναγκαῖα τὰ σωματικά*, compare the whole passage), for instance, that of food, thirst, and hunger, and the (special) desires of particular kinds of food (special tastes leading to particular kinds of pleasure); and those connected with taste in general, and with sex, and universally with touch (which includes *taste*, '*gustus*', with *feeling* in general, *τὸ δὲ γευστὸν ἁπτόν τι*, de Anima B 10 init.), and with smell (of fragrance), and hearing and sight. The rational, those which are accompanied with reason, are such as owe their origin to

ἐστὶν ὄρεξις. τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν ἄλογοί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. λέγω δὲ ἀλόγους μὲν ὅσας μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν τι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ τοιαῦται ὅσαι εἶναι λέγονται φύσει, ὥσπερ αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχουσαι, οἷον ἡ τροφῆς, δίψα καὶ πεῖνα, καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον [τροφῆς] εἶδος ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὅλως τὰ ἁπτά, καὶ περὶ ὀσμὴν [εὐωδίας] καὶ ἀκοὴν καὶ ὄψιν· μετὰ λόγου δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκού-
6 *σαντες καὶ πεισθέντες. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐν*

'persuasion' of some kind—these are artificial and acquired tastes, as opposed to the natural and inborn *τὰ ἐνόντα, φυσικά*—because the hearing (things praised and admired by others) and persuasion in general (the influence of fashion and association and instruction as well as direct persuasion) suggest to us a taste for, or desire of, seeing and possessing things.

The division accordingly resolves itself into (1) natural and necessary, (2) artificial and acquired, desires and tastes.

ὅσας ἐπιθυμοῦσιν] sc. *ἐπιθυμίας*, is a cognate accusative; *ἐπιθυμεῖν* is construed only with the genitive case and infinitive mood.

§ 6. The received text followed by Bekker and Spengel puts a full stop at *ἐλπίζει* [p. 206, line 3]. (The latter editor has also adopted the reading of MS A^c *ἀεὶ ἐν* for *κἂν*). With this punctuation, *κἂν τῷ μεμνημένῳ—ἐλπίζει* must be the apodosis, and the argument runs thus: 'If pleasure consists in sensation, and *φαντασία* is a kind of sensation, then (assuming that there *is* pleasure in memory and anticipation) memory and anticipation must be always accompanied by a mental impression of what is remembered or anticipated'—pleasure being the middle term, without which the supposed apodosis will not follow from the premisses. But this is not what Aristotle undertakes to shew; and also it assumes first what is proved in the next sentence, viz. that pleasure does accompany memory and anticipation. Surely Victorius and Vater are right in supposing the apodosis of the entire sentence, *ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.* to be *δῆλον ὅτι—καὶ αἴσθησις*, which is in fact what Aristotle here wishes to establish. Substitute a colon for the full stop: retain *κἂν* (for *καὶ ἐν*) instead of *ἀεὶ ἐν*; and understand the first three clauses *ἐπεὶ—ἐλπίζει*, as three distinct and independent propositions, the basis of the conclusion which follows; *εἰ δὲ τοῦτο* is a repetition in sum of the foregoing, 'if all this, I say, be so', (*δέ* is appropriate in a *resumption* of what has been just said, note on I 1.11); *if* pleasure is a mode of sensation, *if φαντασία* is a feeble kind of sensation, and *if* memory and hope *are* attended by a *φαντασία* or mental impression of that which is remembered or hoped (some phenomenon past or future, the former a fact, the latter an imagination), it follows that pleasure, which is sensation, accompanies the memory of the past and the anticipation of the future because *φαντασία*

τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν

does, which is a form of sensation, ἐπείπερ καὶ αἴσθησις[1]. In this case κἂν is to be retained in preference to ἀεὶ ἐν. The latter necessarily makes the clause that it introduces, the apodosis; καὶ ἐν merely couples this with the preceding premisses. The mood ἀκολουθοῖ ἄν, which might seem objectionable in the mere statement of a proposition, must be considered as a qualified statement of the fact, 'will be likely to attend'; only so much can be affirmed.

φαντασία] which is here called a 'sort of feeble sensation', is described otherwise in the psychology of the de Anima. It is defined Γ 3, 429 *a* 1, ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη (for γιγνομένης, Trendelenburg and Torstrik), not, therefore, a mode of sensation as here, but a motion generated by sensation in active exercise: and again 428 *a* 1, φαντασία καθ' ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι: 'the presentative faculty' (Sir W. Hamilton). It is a faculty intermediate between sensation and memory, and thus becomes connected with the intellect; the seat of memory is τὸ πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν, viz. the heart, where the results of sensation are all collected in a focus, and thence transmitted to the mind. The memory is defined, de memoria, c. 1, ult. 451 *a* 15, φαντάσματος, ὡς εἰκόνος οὗ φάντασμα, ἕξις; which represents it as a state (in the heart, or the appropriate organ) of the impression φάντασμα, transferred by the faculty of φαντασία from the sensation itself, which (the impression) is the representation (the εἰκών) of the real object of sense, that of which it is the φάντασμα. The office of the φαντασία is therefore to convey the impressions of the actual objects of sense delivered to it by sensation, and to impress or print them on the organ fitted for their reception; when thus impressed or 'represented' they become memory, and so are passed on to the intellect. To compare with what is said in the Rhetoric, of this φαντασία being a sort of feeble sensation, we have in the de Anima, Γ 3, 428 *b* 11, what almost (not quite) justifies it, ἐπειδὴ... ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ' αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἴσθησίς ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν...καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. Though thus closely allied with sensation, and dependent upon it, the φαντασία is not a faculty of mere sensation, but belongs equally to the intellect, φαντασία ἅπασα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική, de Anima Γ 10 ult. 433 *b* 29, (being apparently intermediate between them and partaking of the nature of both); of which (intellect), when we take the whole of it, the διάνοια as well as the νοῦς, into account, the φαντασία

[1] That pleasure is attendant upon every act of sensation is stated in Eth. Nic. x 4, 1174 *b* 21, κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή, and again, line 27, καθ' ἑκάστην δ' αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονὴ δῆλον. But this is not the same thing as the statement of the Rhetoric which *identifies* the two, just as Eudemus in the 7th book of the Nic. Eth. identifies pleasure with the ἐνέργειαι, of which in Aristotle's 10th book it is only the concomitant. And there is a precisely similar overstatement here of the nature of the φαντασία, as compared with the description of it in the de Anima, where it is said to *be* a kind of sensation, instead of closely connected with it. See the following note, on φαντασία.

αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, κἂν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει[1]. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνη-
7 μένοις καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπείπερ καὶ αἴσθησις. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι γεγενημένα ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν μέλλοντα· αἰσθάνονται μὲν γὰρ τὰ παρόντα, μέμνηνται δὲ τὰ γεγενημένα, ἐλπίζουσι δὲ τὰ μέλ-
8 λοντα. τὰ μὲν οὖν μνημονευτὰ ἡδέα ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον P. 1370 *b*.

[1] ἐλπίζει· (see note on p. 204).

actually forms a part; c. 3, 427 *b* 28, τούτου δὲ (τοῦ νοεῖν) τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις. 'Imaginatio inter sensuum perceptiones et mentis cogitationes media intericitur, ut imaginatio sensibus, mens imaginatione egeat.' Trendelenburg ad de Anima III 3, 4, p. 453. On the various relations of the φαντασία, see the notes of the same Comm. ad de Anima, pp. 166, 462, 538, also Bonitz on Metaph. A 1, 980 *b* 26, p. 38, Waitz ad Org. 100 *b* 27, Vol. II, p. 440. [*Ueber den Begriff des Wortes φαντασία bei Aristoteles. J. Freudenthal* (Göttingen) 1863, pp. 59. s.]

§ 7. Consequently all pleasures may be reduced to three classes, according as they are referred to things present, past, or future. The pleasures of the present are the immediate pleasures of direct sensation; those of the past are the 'pleasures of memory', the pleasures that accompany, or are revived by, association, in the way of recollection, of past facts; and those of the future are derived by a similar association from the anticipation of future pleasure. ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν πάροντος ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἡ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη· ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν [Eth. N. IX 7, 1168 *a* 13]. Of memory, Ov. Heroid. XVIII 55, (Hero to Leander) *Nox erat incipiens; namque est meminisse voluptas; cum foribus patriis egrediebar amans.*

§ 8. Therefore everything that can be remembered is capable of giving pleasure; not only things that were pleasant at the time they happened, but some that were not, provided the after consequence of them was something right or good (right, morally; good, as tending to profit or advantage)[1]; whence the saying, 'nay truly, pleasant it is to remember past troubles after deliverance (escape) from them'. Fragm. Eur. Andromed. XV (Dind. XXXVI), Wagner, *Fragm. Poet. Trag. Gr.* Vol. II p. 75,

[1] When there has been no compensation of this kind, the remembrance of past suffering is painful. Ovid, Metam. IX 290, *quin nunc quoque frigidus artus, dum loquor, horror habet; pars est meminisse doloris.* XIII 283, (Ulysses) *me miserum, quanto cogor meminisse dolore temporis illius, quo Graium murus Achilles procubuit.* Virg. Aen. II 10, *sed si tantus amor casus cognoscere nostros...quamquam animus meminisse horret luctuque refugit, incipiam.* Dante, *Inferno*, c. V 121, *Nessun maggior dolore, che ricordarsi del tempo felice nella miseria.* Shaksp. *Richard II.* Act. I Sc. 3. 300, *Oh no! the apprehension of the good gives but the greater feeling to the worse.*

ὅσα ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὅτε παρῆν, ἡδέα ἦν, ἀλλ' ἔνια καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ἂν ᾖ ὕστερον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ' εἴρηται,

ἀλλ' ἡδύ τοι σωθέντα μεμνῆσθαι πόνων,

καὶ

μετὰ γάρ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι τέρπεται ἀνὴρ
μνήμενος, ὅς τις πολλὰ πάθῃ καὶ πολλὰ ἐόργῃ.

9 τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν κακόν. τὰ

cited by Plut. Symp. II 1, p. 630 E, and translated by Cicero, de Fin. II 32. 105, *suavis laborum est praeteritorum memoria.* Cic. Ep. ad Fam. V 12. 2 *habet enim praeteriti doloris secura recordatio delectationem.* Wagner adds, 'ex hoc loco et altero Archippi Comici apud Stobaeum LIX 7, profecisse Epictetum ap. Schweig. T. III, p. 104, scribentem, *ὡς ἡδὺ τὴν θάλατταν ἀπὸ γῆς ὁρᾶν, οὕτως ἡδὺ τῷ σωθέντι μεμνῆσθαι πόνων*, monuit Meinek. ad Menandrum p. 86.' Stobaeus quotes a second verse of Archippus, *ὡς—ὁρᾶν, ὦ μῆτέρ ἐστι, μὴ πλέοντα μηδαμοῦ*, which supplies the link of association from which the pleasure is derived. It is from a contrast of past trouble with present immunity, and the feeling of security which it engenders; and it has for its foundation the same feeling as is suggested by the celebrated lines of the opening of the second book of Lucretius' poem, the famous *suave mari magno.* The same association, the sense of comfort and security derived from an uncomfortable contrast, is the foundation of the pleasure expressed in the exquisite lines of Sophocles, Fragm. Tymp. 563 (Dind.) apud Stobaeum LIX 12, *φεῦ φεῦ, τί τούτου χάρμα μεῖζον ἂν λάβοις τοῦ γῆς ἐπιψαύσαντα κᾆθ' ὑπὸ στέγῃ πυκνῆς ἀκοῦσαι ψεκάδος εὑδούσῃ φρενί*;—to make the land, and then, the fatigues and perils past, to sit safe and snug under shelter, listening in dreamy and drowsy mood to the fast-falling drops of rain overhead—sign of the storm still raging, reminiscence of the past, and contrast with the comfort within. Comp. Cic. ad Atticum II 7, *cupio istorum naufragia ex terra intueri; cupio, ut ait tuus amicus Sophocles, κἂν ὑπὸ στέγῃ* et cet.

Another illustration of this source of pleasure is taken from Homer Odys. ο' (XV) 399, which Aristotle, as usual, has misquoted. With this compare Virg. Aen. I 202, *revocate animos maestumque timorem mittite. Forsan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit.* Comp. again Cic. ad Fam. l. c. *Nihil est aptius ad delectationem lectoris quam temporum varietates fortunaeque vicissitudines: quae etsi nobis optabiles in experiendo non fuerunt, in legendo tamen erunt iucundae.*

τούτου δ' αἴτιον κ.τ.λ.] 'and the reason of this is that there is pleasure even in the absence of evil'; that is, in the way of contrast with our former condition, from which we are now relieved; all relief, the removal of oppression and constraint, is pleasurable.

§ 9. *τὰ δ' ἐν ἐλπίδι (ἡδέα ἐστίν) κ.τ.λ.*] 'everything is pleasant in anticipation which appears to confer great delight or profit when present; and to do this without any accompanying pain', 'and in general, all that

δ' ἐν ἐλπίδι, ὅσα παρόντα ἢ εὐφραίνειν ἢ ὠφελεῖν p. 39.
φαίνεται μεγάλα, καὶ ἄνευ λύπης ὠφελεῖν. ὅλως δ' ὅσα παρόντα εὐφραίνει, καὶ ἐλπίζοντας καὶ μεμνημένους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. διὸ καὶ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἡδύ, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησε περὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ

ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο·

οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὀργίζεται τῷ ἀδυνάτῳ φαινομένῳ τιμωρίας τυχεῖν, οὐδὲ τοῖς πολὺ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς τῇ δυνάμει, ⟨ἀλλ'⟩
10 ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται ἢ ἧττον. καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις

delights when present, delights for the most part in anticipation and recollection. Therefore even anger is pleasant'—the prospect of vengeance lends a solace and a charm even to anger; comp. II 2.2, *πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἕπεσθαί τινα ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι κ.τ.λ.* and the same line of Homer, Il. Σ 100, is quoted in illustration, 'for no one is angry with one who is plainly beyond the reach of his vengeance', (see the above passage of Book II,) 'or with those who are far above him in power; either not at all, or less'. *ἀδικούμενοί τε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται ἢ βιαζόμενοι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου δοκεῖ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος καταναγκάζεσθαι,* Thuc. I 77. 5. On *φαινόμενος* = *φανερός*, see note on II 2. 1.

§ 10. Most appetites and desires are accompanied by a certain pleasure: which is felt either in the recollection of the past, or in the anticipation of the future, enjoyment; for instance, those who are suffering under (*lit.* held, possessed by) fevers feel a pleasure in the thirst (that attends them), either from the remembrance of former draughts, or the expectation of future; and lovers in talking of their beloved (in his absence), or painting his portrait, or drawing his likeness, from memory, and composing verses in his honour' (so Victorius and Vater; else, *γράφοντες* 'writing of him', and *ποιοῦντές τι ἀεί* 'in anything that they ever do which has any connexion with him', *περὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου* 'so as to recall him to their recollection'); for in all such cases the recollection appears to their fancy (*οἴονται*) to be like the (present) perception (by any of the senses) of the beloved.

All these last are pleasures of memory, agreeable *reminiscences*. The pleasures of memory are further exemplified in this, that when the love which has already arisen from the delight found in the actual presence of the beloved is retained by the memory in his absence, this is a sure sign of the commencement of a genuine and lasting passion. Bekker, ed. 3, followed by Spengel, has put *ἐρῶσιν* in brackets: F. A. Wolf had previously objected to it. It may be retained and explained as I have translated it, but the text and the general meaning would not suffer by its omission. *ἐρῶσιν* if retained implies that the passion is *already* conceived. Gaisford, after Victorius, quotes Eth. Nic. IX 5, 1167 *a* 4, *ἔοικε δὴ (ἡ εὔνοια) ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ προησθεὶς τῇ ἰδέᾳ οὐθεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐθὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ.*

ἐπιθυμίαις ἀκολουθεῖ τις ἡδονή· ἢ γὰρ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔτυχον ἢ ἐλπίζοντες ὡς τεύξονται χαίρουσί τινα ἡδονήν, οἷον οἵ τ' ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς ἐχόμενοι ταῖς δίψαις καὶ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔπιον καὶ ἐλπίζοντες πιεῖσθαι
11 χαίρουσιν, καὶ οἱ ἐρῶντες καὶ διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες καὶ ποιοῦντές τι ἀεὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου χαίρουσιν· ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις μεμνημένοι οἷον αἰσθάνεσθαι οἴονται τοῦ ἐρωμένου. καὶ ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος αὕτη γίγνεται πᾶσιν, ὅταν μὴ μόνον παρόντος
12 χαίρωσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντος μεμνημένοι. διὸ καὶ ὅταν λυπηρὸς γένηται τῷ μὴ παρεῖναι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ἐγγίνεταί τις ἡδονή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡδονὴ δ' ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ ὁρᾶν πως ἐκεῖνον, καὶ ἃ ἔπραττε, καὶ οἷος ἦν. διὸ καὶ τοῦτ' εἰκότως εἴρηται,

ὣς φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ὑφ' ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο.

13 καὶ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι ἡδύ· οὗ γὰρ τὸ μὴ τυγχάνειν

ἐχόμενοι] Victorius inquires here whether ἐχόμενοι should be construed with ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς, as Plat. Phileb. 45 B, ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἐχόμενοι, or with ταῖς δίψαις: the case is doubtful, either will do.

ταῖς δίψαις] *their* thirst, that which naturally belongs to them: the possessive use of the definite article.

§ 12. 'And this again is the reason why, even when (the beloved) (becomes painful) causes pain (to his admirer) by his absence, there is still some pleasure that finds its way *into* (grows up, is engendered, in) his lamentations and wailings; for the pain that he feels is at the want of him, but *with* that, there is a pleasure in the recollection and, in a sense, sight of himself, and what he used to do, and how to look and behave, (οἷος what sort of person he was, in external appearance, and character, i. e. conduct)'. The very absence, and the pain that it causes, and the expression of grief, have a charm in them which affords some compensation by the recollection of all that he is and does. 'Hence the appropriateness of the saying',—meaning especially the use of the word ἵμερος, which implies eager desire, in relation to γόος—'thus spake he, and in them all aroused longing desire for wailing'. This is a familiar phrase in Homer, and occurs several times both in the Iliad and Odyssey. See in Damm's *Lexicon*, s. v. ἵμερος. Andromache looking back at Hector as she was taking leave of him, δακρυόεν γελάσασα, is a picture of the mixture of pleasure and pain (Il. Z 484).

§ 13. 'And revenge is sweet', by the logical theory of convertible

λυπηρόν, τὸ τυγχάνειν ἡδύ· οἱ δ' ὀργιζόμενοι λυποῦνται ἀνυπερβλήτως μὴ τιμωρούμενοι, ἐλπίζοντες
14 δὲ χαίρουσιν. καὶ τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλονίκοις ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν· φαντασία γὰρ ὑπεροχῆς γίγνεται, οὗ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ ἠρέμα ἢ μᾶλλον.
15 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς ἡδείας

opposites, 'for where failure is painful, success must be pleasant; and angry men, whilst they are vexed beyond all measure if they miss their revenge, are equally delighted in the anticipation of it'. *ἀνυπερβλήτως*, 'unsurpassably', a rare word, found as adj. in Isocr. Paneg. § 71, Xen. Cyrop. VIII 7. 15, Plat. Defin. 412 B, Dem. Olynth. II 23. 11, Epitaph. 1389. 7, Lycurg. c. Leocr. § 101, and more frequently in Polybius. Of the adverb I find only this one example. [Cf., however, Rhet. ad Alexandrum, 12, 1430 *b* 25, *ἀνυπερβλήτως τιμωροῦνται*, *Index Aristotelicus*. S.]

§ 14. And victory is a source of pleasure—not only to those who have a special and peculiar 'fondness' for it (*τοῖς φιλονίκοις*), but universally, to everybody; because it gives rise to (*γίγνεται*, there arises) an impression (fancy or notion) of superiority, of which all feel the desire either in a slight degree or more strongly. Comp. I 9. 39, *ἡ δ' ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν... ἐπείπερ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ δοκεῖ μηνύειν ἀρετήν*. Superiority is a noble or right aim, or end of action; and indicative of 'virtue'. This is one of the modes in which the 'love of power' manifests itself, to which, as a purely selfish instinct, Hobbes sought to trace all our feelings and springs of action. The Emotion of Power is, in Mr Bain's Classification of the Emotions as sources of action, one of the most important of a family of eleven which together compose our moral constitution. Bain, *Emotions and Will*, p. 59, and the admirable analysis, 145—162. See also Dugald Stewart on this subject, there quoted p. 145. 'The objects of the sense of power may be described as the effects or consequences of our own agency surveyed under such a comparison as to set forth some kind of *superiority*.' This is the *ὑπεροχή* in question.

§ 15. This love of victory, as an evidence of *superiority*, is the foundation of the amusement derived from all sports and games into which competition enters; all, namely, that involve a contest either of bodily strength and skill (as cricket, athletic exercises, and all encounters of a *combative* character, *μαχητικάς*, cock-fights, bear-baiting, pugilistic encounters, tournaments and sham-fights of all kinds), or 'wit-combats', intellectual and dialectical encounters (*ἐριστικάς*); games of knucklebones, of ball, of dice, and draughts.

Three MSS Q, Y[b], Z[b] here add *αὐλητικάς*, (*τὰς μαχητικὰς καὶ τὰς αὐλητικὰς καὶ ἐριστικάς*), to represent 'musical' contests, which spoils the antithesis, and introduces a vicious classification.

On the zeal and eagerness and love of victory manifested by children in their sports, comp. Cic. de Fin. V 22. 61. On *παιδιαὶ ἐριστικαί*, Probl. XVIII 2 (referred to by Gaisford). *Διὰ τί οἱ ἐριστικοὶ λόγοι γυμναστικοί εἰσιν; ἢ ὅτι ἔχουσι τὸ νικᾶν ἢ ἡττᾶσθαι πυκνόν; φιλονείκους οὖν εὐθὺς ποιοῦσιν· καὶ γὰρ νικῶντες διὰ τὸ χαίρειν προάγονται μᾶλλον ἐρίζειν καὶ ἡττώ-*

εἶναι τὰς μαχητικὰς καὶ τὰς ἐριστικάς (πολλάκις γὰρ P. 1371. ἐν ταύταις γίγνεται τὸ νικᾶν) καὶ ἀστραγαλίσεις καὶ σφαιρίσεις καὶ κυβείας καὶ πεττείας. καὶ περὶ τὰς

μενοι ὡς ἀναμαχούμενοι. καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγῶσι ταὐτό· διὸ καὶ μαχόμενοι καὶ ἥττους ὄντες πολλάκις οὐ βούλονται διαλύεσθαι.

ἐριστική here in the Rhetoric means nothing more than the practice of dialectics, arguing against an opponent, and for victory. It has, however, almost always in Plato, and not unfrequently in Aristotle, the additional connotation of captious reasoning, quibbling and sophistry. In Top. IV (de Soph. El.) 11, 171 *b* 24, the *ἐριστικοί* are defined as *οἱ πάντως νικᾶν προαιρούμενοι*, and again 25, *οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοι ἐριστικοὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.* Here there is already the imputation of an over-disputatious habit implied by the word, but by and by, in lines 30, 32, it is associated with sophistry and sophists; but with this distinction—they both argue unscrupulously, 'but the eristics do this to gain an *apparent* victory, the sophists to make a show of wisdom'; the definition of the sophist being, c. 1, 165 *a* 22, *χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας οὔσης δ' οὔ.* Again, c. 2, 165 *b* 7, they are distinguished from the genuine dialecticians, who deal with *τὰ ἔνδοξα real* probabilities, by this sophistical habit and mode of arguing, *ἐριστικοὶ δὲ οἱ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδόξων μὴ ὄντων δὲ συλλογιστικοὶ ἢ φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικοί. ψευδὴς λόγος καλεῖται τετραχῶς· ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ὅταν φαίνηται συμπεραίνεσθαι μὴ συμπεραινόμενος, ὃ καλεῖται ἐριστικὸς συλλογισμός.* Top. Θ 12, 162 *b* 3. In Rhet. II 24. 10, *τὰ ἐριστικά* stands for the sophistical practice of unfair reasoning, *γίγνεται φαινόμενος συλλογισμός* 'lead to an apparent, or fallacious, conclusion'.

ἀστραγαλίσεις] The game of *ἀστράγαλοι*, 'knucklebones', cut into rough dice with only four flat sides (*talus*), and so distinguished from the *κύβοι* (*tesserae*), which (as the name imports) had all six sides flat, is described in Rich, *Dict. of Gk. and Rom. Antiq.* p. 64, Smith, *Dict. Antiq.* s. v. *talus*, p. 1095 (ed. 2), Becker, *Gallus*, Exc. II, p. 499 (Engl. Tr.), *Charicles*, Exc. III, p. 354. And for an account of the other games mentioned see the same authorities (reff. in Index); [also K. F. Hermann's *Lehrbuch der Griechischen Privatalterthümer*, ed. 2, § 55. S.]

σφαιρίσεις] Theaet. 146 A, Athen. A 25, 26, p. 14 D—15 C, *πολὺ δὲ τὸ σύντονον καὶ καματηρὸν τῆς περὶ τὴν σφαιριστικὴν ἁμίλλης κ.τ.λ.*

κυβείας καὶ πεττείας] often go together, Plat. Phaedr. 274 D, Rep. II 374 C, (on the difficulty of these two games); Soph. Naupl. Fragm. 4, *πεσσοὺς κύβους τε.* Fragm. 380, 381 (Dindorf). Plut. (Cap. Descr.) Qu. Rom. p. 272 F, *Ζάκορός τις...ἀπολαύων σχολῆς ἔθος εἶχεν ἐν πεττοῖς καὶ κύβοις τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύειν.* The *πεττοί* in particular was an old and favourite game, which appears from the constant allusions to it in Greek literature. The earliest mention of it occurs in Homer, Od. *α'* 107. The corresponding Latin game, *latrunculi*, is described by Ovid, Ars Am. II 208, III 357.

The same is the case with 'serious' games (games that require study and attention, such as chess, and *πεττεία* and *κυβεία*, according to Plato, l. c.)—the only difference between serious games and games of mere amusement, in respect of the pleasures they afford, is that the pleasure in

ἐσπουδασμένας δὲ παιδιὰς ὁμοίως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεῖαι γίγνονται, ἄν τις ᾖ συνήθης, αἱ δ' εὐθὺς ἡδεῖαι, οἷον p. 40.
κυνηγία καὶ πᾶσα θηρευτική· ὅπου γὰρ ἅμιλλα, ἐνταῦθα καὶ νίκη ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ ἡ δικανικὴ καὶ ἡ
16 *ἐριστικὴ ἡδεῖα τοῖς εἰθισμένοις καὶ δυναμένοις. καὶ τιμὴ καὶ εὐδοξία τῶν ἡδίστων διὰ τὸ γίγνεσθαι φαν-*

the one case must be *acquired*, and arise from habit and cultivation, whereas others are *naturally* agreeable, lit. *at once* (*εὐθύς*, from the very first); to this latter class belong hunting with dogs, and every kind of chace.

Various 'kinds of chace' are enumerated in the Politics, I 8, in the description of the 'hunting stage', the second, according to Aristotle, in the development of human civilization. He takes occasion from this to distinguish the several kinds of hunting. *οἱ δ' ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι, καὶ θήρας ἕτεροι ἑτέρας, οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ λῃστείας, οἱ δ' ἀφ' ἁλιείας, ὅσοι λίμνας καὶ ἕλη καὶ ποταμοὺς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην* (i.e. of the same kind as the lakes, marshes and rivers, namely, fish-producing) *προσοικοῦσιν, οἱ δ' ἀπ' ὀρνίθων ἢ θηρίων ἀγρίων*, piracy, man-hunting, fishing, fowling, and hunting wild animals, hunting proper.

Wherever there is rivalry or competition, there is also victory, the opportunity of shewing one's superiority. And this is what makes practice at the bar and in the law courts (where there is a perpetual struggle and contest for the victory going on between the two rival pleaders), and that of dialectics (what is avowedly and technically a contest between two opposites), pleasant occupations.

§ 16. This quasi-sensation, the *φαντασία*, is again employed to explain the pleasure we derive from honour and fair fame, the favourable opinion of others. These are pleasant because every one who possesses them always acquires an impression or fancy that he must be such an one as is the good (such as *ὁ σπουδαῖος*, to whom alone such things are really *due*), and a *φαντασία*, being a form of sensation, always carries pleasure with it, § 6; and this pleasure is still greater (the *φαντασία* becomes still more vivid, and its effect greater) when he believes that those who say so (*ὅτι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷος ὁ σπουδαῖος*) are likely to be right in what they say. Such (*οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀληθεύειν*) are near neighbours who know a man better, and are therefore better judges, than those (friends) that live at a distance; intimates (familiar, habitual associates, *συνήθεις*, note on I 1. 2, 10. 18), and fellow-citizens rather than strangers afar off, (who only know him by report); contemporaries rather than posterity (to whom the same reason applies); wise men rather than fools; many rather than few. This is because (*γάρ*; i.e. the preference, expressed by the *μᾶλλον* in each case, is due to the fact that) those (first) mentioned are more likely to arrive at the truth than the opposite; for when a man has a great contempt for any one, as children and beasts, he cares not at all for their respect and good opinion, at least on account of the opinion itself, but, if at all, for something else.

τῶν ἡδίστων] Note on § 4, *supra*.

τασίαν ἑκάστῳ ὅτι τοιοῦτος οἷος ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅταν φῶσιν οὓς οἴεται ἀληθεύειν. τοιοῦτοι δ' οἱ ἐγγὺς μᾶλλον τῶν πόρρω, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις καὶ οἱ πολῖται τῶν ἄπωθεν, καὶ οἱ ὄντες τῶν μελλόντων,

τῶν ἄπωθεν] The *fact* that words (substantives, adjectives, adverbs, and pronouns, *Διόθεν οὐρανόθεν οἰκόθεν, ἀλλόθεν παντόθεν, ἔντοσθεν ἔξωθεν πρόσωθεν ἔσωθεν, ὅθεν σέθεν ἐμέθεν*) with the old genitive termination *-θεν*, are often substituted for the primitive forms, particularly with the definite article as *οἱ αὐτόθεν* (see many instances of this idiom in Index to Arnold's *Thucyd.* s. v.), *οἱ ἔξωθεν, οἱ ἄνωθεν, κάτωθεν, οἰκόθεν, ἐκεῖθεν*, and such like, in phrases where the termination *seems* to have entirely lost its force, has been long known and noticed: see examples in Wunder's note, *Antig.* 519, and Lobeck, *Phryn.* p. 128: but the explanation of this usage, so far as I know, is still wanting. It is to be found in an observation of Hermann, on Soph. Electr. 888, *ἐσχάτης δ' ὁρῶ πυρᾶς νεωρῆ βόστρυχον*, and 882, *ὁρῶ κολώνης ἐξ ἄκρας νεοῤῥύτους πηγὰς γάλακτος*, 'solent Graeci spatia non a vidente et audiente ad id quod ille videt et audit, sed ab isto ad hunc metiri': they reverse *our* order of proceeding; we measure from ourselves to the object, the Greeks from the object to themselves. The application of this simple fact to all the cases resembling those above given solves the whole mystery of the idiom, which, as Lobeck says, *olim vel barbatos magistros obstupefecit.* (Lobeck is speaking merely of the knowledge of the *fact;* he himself assigns no reason.) Rhet. I 15. 16, *οἱ δ' ἄπωθεν*, II 6. 23, *τοὺς ἄπωθεν*. In Eurip. Ion 585—6 (Dind.) both points of view are taken, *οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶδος φαίνεται τῶν πραγμάτων πρόσωθεν ὄντων ἐγγύθεν θ' ὁρωμένων*, unless, as is at least equally probable, the interpretation of *ἐγγύθεν ὁρωμένων* be, 'seen' not 'from a near point' where *we* are, but 'seen', the sight of them proceeding, from a near point, where *they* are. Arist. Pol. VII (VI) 4, 1319 *a* 8, gives an excellent illustration of this difference between the Greek and our point of view: Aristotle is speaking of some restrictions on the occupation of land: *ἢ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἐξεῖναι κεκτῆσθαι πλείω γῆν μέτρου τινὸς ἢ ἀπό τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ τὴν πόλιν*—or, as we say, 'within a certain distance *from* the city'. Plat. Theaet. 165 D, *ἐγγύθεν ἐπίστασθαι πόῤῥωθεν δὲ μή* (not, as in English, *at* a distance, but *from* a distance, *as seen* from a distance), Rep. VII 523 B, *τὰ πόῤῥωθεν φαινόμενα*, Ib. C, *εἴτ' ἐγγύθεν προσπίπτουσα εἴτε πόῤῥωθεν.* Ib. 514 B, *εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, φῶς πυρὸς ἄνωθεν καὶ πόῤῥωθεν καόμενον ὄπισθεν αὐτῶν.* Soph. Oed. Col. 505, *τοὐκεῖθεν ἄλσους*, Philoct. 27, *δοκῶ γὰρ οἷον εἶπας ἄντρον εἰσορᾶν.* *'Οδ. ἄνωθεν, ἢ κατωθεν; οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.* Eur. Iph. T. 41, *σφάγια δ' ἄλλοισιν ἄῤῥητ' ἔσωθεν τῶνδ' ἀνακτόρων θεᾶς.* Tyrtaeus, Fragm. 8. 38, 9. 12 (Bergk, *Fr. Lyr. Gr.*), *ἐγγύθεν ἱστάμενοι.* Examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

As regards *ἄπωθεν* and *ἀπύθεν*, the former is condemned as formed on a false analogy from an imaginary *ἄπω* by Göttling on Ar. Pol. II 1, p. 311.—See Lobeck on *Phryn.* p. 8—10, who shews that both forms are good. The MSS vary in the prose form, but *ἄπωθεν* is found *in verse* (Eurip. and Aristoph.), which guarantees its existence.

καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι ἀφρόνων, καὶ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων· μᾶλλον γὰρ εἰκὸς ἀληθεύειν τοὺς εἰρημένους τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐπεὶ ὧν τις πολὺ καταφρονεῖ, ὥσπερ παιδίων ἢ θηρίων, οὐδὲν μέλει τῆς τούτων τιμῆς ἢ τῆς δόξης αὐτῆς
17 *γε τῆς δόξης χάριν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, δι' ἄλλο τι. καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων· τό τε γὰρ φιλεῖν ἡδύ (οὐδεὶς γὰρ φίλοινος μὴ χαίρων οἴνῳ) καὶ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἡδύ· φαντασία γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὗ πάντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι· τὸ δὲ*
18 *φιλεῖσθαι ἀγαπᾶσθαί ἐστιν αὐτὸν δι' αὐτόν. καὶ τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι ἡδὺ δι' αὐτὸ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι. καὶ τὸ κολα-*

§ 17. *ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων*] § 16, *τῶν ἡδίστων*, note on § 4 *supra*.

τό τε γὰρ φιλεῖν ἡδύ...οἴνῳ] Friendship or a friend belongs to the class of pleasant things—the term *φίλος* or *φιλεῖν*, 'to be fond of' anything, implies pleasure; no one is said for instance to be fond of wine who does not *take pleasure* in it; and the converse, 'to be liked' is also pleasant—for here again comes in the 'impression' or fancy that the thing liked or loved (*φιλεῖν* has just the same double sense as the French *aimer*, the stronger 'love', and the feebler 'liking') must have some good in (belonging to) it, good in some form or other being the universal object of desire of all sentient beings; i.e. of all creatures that are capable of appetites and affections, which capacity depends on sensation, the power of feeling pleasure and pain, de Anima B 3, 414 *b* 1—5, line 4, *ᾧ δ' αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη*. This *φαντασία* &c. belongs to, and is meant to illustrate, the active liking, *τὸ φιλεῖν ἡδύ*. Every one who likes anything always has the impression that the object of his liking has something good about it, which is the reason for his liking it, since good is the universal desire. 'And being liked or loved is to be valued, esteemed, for one's own sake and for nothing else'. This is what may be called the 'passive' liking, said of the recipient of the action or liking; and is opposed to the active form of liking or love in this respect; that it is an end or ultimate object in itself, whereas the other looks to some further end beyond itself, namely, some good which it seems to see in the object of its affection. It is probable that little or no distinction is here intended to be made between *φιλεῖν* and *ἀγαπᾶν*, since it is the end and not the process that is here in question, and they seem to be used pretty nearly as synonyms. They represent two different aspects of love, as a natural affection or emotion, and as an acquired value, which we express by 'esteem'. See further, in Appendix A at the end of this Book.

§ 18. *καὶ τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι*] 'And admiration is a source of pleasure, due to the very honour or respect (that it carries with it or implies)'. *αὐτό* the honour itself, alone, and nothing else: notwithstanding that there is no more substantial benefit derived from it (Victorius). *τιμή* is pleasant, § 16.

κεύεσθαι καὶ ὁ κόλαξ ἡδύ· φαινόμενος γὰρ θαυμαστὴς
19 καὶ φαινόμενος φίλος ὁ κόλαξ ἐστίν. καὶ τὸ ταὐτὰ
20 πράττειν πολλάκις ἡδύ· τὸ γὰρ σύνηθες ἡδὺ ἦν. καὶ
τὸ μεταβάλλειν ἡδύ· εἰς φύσιν γὰρ γίγνεται μετα-

Flattery is pleasant, because it is accompanied by the *φαντασία* (which is always capable of conveying pleasure, § 6) the pleasant impression (not reality) of admiration and friendship in the flatterer.

§ 19. The frequent repetition of the same acts is pleasant, because they become habitual and familiar; as we were told (*ἦν*) in c. 10. 18. Probl. XIX 5, ult. *ἔτι καὶ τὸ σύνηθες ἡδὺ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀσυνήθους.*

§ 20. And change is pleasant; by the definition, because change is a relapse into the normal condition of our nature: 'the constant repetition of the same thing causing a (vicious) excess of the settled state'. It is this vicious excess which is represented in the proverbial *μηδὲν ἄγαν*, *ne quid nimis*, '*toujours perdrix*.' When we have reached a 'settled state', as a state of health finally established by a gradual course of medical treatment, the medical applications which were repeatedly employed during the cure should be at once discontinued or the state of body will be vitiated: and so in all cases when a state has reached its acme or normal condition anything that causes it to exceed this is injurious. Eating and drinking too much are other cases in point; when the system is settled or satisfied, the repetition of the acts of eating and drinking disturbs the harmonious balance and produces discomfort or disease. The same expression occurs in Eth. N. VII 13, 1153 *a* 4, *ἀναπληρουμένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας*, where from the contrast of the two participles the first plainly signifies the state of progress towards satisfaction, and the second the complete or satisfied state; and so the Paraphrast explains it, *πληρωθέντες ἡδόμεθα κ.τ.λ.*: and similarly *ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυίᾳ ἡλικίᾳ*, Thuc. II 36, means, a confirmed and settled, mature and vigorous time of life, when the age of growing is over.

And in general, *all* excess is vicious; as the Pythagoreans and Plato (Philebus) held, and Aristotle himself proves by induction in the establishment of the doctrine of the mean, in the Nicom. Ethics, II. The concluding words of the seventh book of the Nic. Eth. may serve as a commentary on this topic; *μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύτατον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά·* (i. e. imperfection: we are always wanting a change, because we never are in a 'complete state'). *ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῆ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής.* The 'poet', referred to here and in the Rhetoric, is Euripides, Orest. 234, *ἢ κἀπὶ γαίας ἁρμόσαι πόδας θέλεις χρόνιον ἴχνος θείς; μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ.* The 'changeableness' of the bad man in the illustration, is deduced, I presume, from the axiom that right is one, error and wrong infinite, *ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί*: see the whole passage from which this apothegm is taken, Eth. Nic. II 5, ult. 1106 *b* 29, *ἔτι τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς κ.τ.λ.*

It is this pleasure which is felt in change that makes men and things pleasant that present themselves to us or happen 'after an interval';

βάλλειν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὑπερβολὴν ποιεῖ τῆς καθεστώσης ἕξεως· ὅθεν εἴρηται

μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ.

διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ διὰ χρόνου ἡδέα ἐστί, καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ πράγματα· μεταβολὴ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος ἐστίν,
21 *ἅμα δὲ καὶ σπάνιον τὸ διὰ χρόνου. καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδὺ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· ἐν μὲν*

'because they bring a change from our present condition or circumstances, (this is a di-version or a-musement,) and at the same time that which can be used (or enjoyed) only at intervals is rare': but rarity makes things 'better', c. 7, 14, 29, 32, or gives them a preference over others in value and importance—not *necessarily* however in the amount of pleasure which may be derived from them; though in many cases, such as the possession of any rare object, print, coin, gem, in a collection, it certainly does.

§ 21. And learning and wondering are pleasant for the most part; wonder, because in it is contained, manifested, the desire of learning; and therefore the wonderful is an object of desire (every desire is directed to some pleasure, § 5) and consequently pleasant; and learning includes, implies, a settlement into our normal condition'. *φύσις* here stands for the true and highest nature, the normal perfect state, of anything, see Grant, on Eth. N. II 1. 3, Polit. I 2, 1252 *b* 32, *οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκαστοῦ, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας.* This highest condition of our nature is *θεωρία*, philosophy, the contemplation of truth, which is also the highest form or ideal of happiness, Eth. Nic. X 8 and 9. A state of knowledge, to which learning leads, may therefore be regarded as a settled or complete state, and to be the 'normal condition of the intellect', the noblest part of the entire *ψυχή*. A settlement into this condition must therefore by the definition, § 1, be a form of pleasure.

On wonder, or curiosity, as the origin of learning, of all speculative inquiry or philosophy, compare Plato, Theaet. 155 D, to whom the observation is due, *μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, κ.τ.λ.* From Plato it is borrowed by Aristotle, Metaph. A 2, 982 *b* 12, *διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν...ὁ δὲ ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν,* Poet. IV 4, *αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῶν,* and Coleridge again, *Aids to Reflection*, on spiritual religion, Aph. IX., has thus improved upon Plato and Aristotle, 'In wonder all philosophy began: in wonder it ends: and admiration fills up the interspace.' See also Sir W. Hamilton's *Lect. on Metaph.* Lect. IV. Vol. I. p. 77 seq. Ar. Met. init. *πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει, κ.τ.λ.* Here (in the Met.) as elsewhere, the pleasure of learning or knowledge is assumed. The reverse of this is the cynical Horatian *Nil admirari*, &c., followed by Pope, "'Not to admire is all the art I know, To make men happy and to

γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθεῖν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν εἰς τὸ
22 κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι. καὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν τῶν ἡδέων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὖ πάσχειν τυγχά- P. 1371 b.
νειν ἐστὶν ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχειν καὶ ὑπερέχειν, ὧν ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίενται. διὰ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ p. 41.
εἶναι τὸ εὐποιητικόν, καὶ τὸ ἐπανορθοῦν ἡδὺ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ τοὺς πλησίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐλλιπῆ ἐπι-
23 τελεῖν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι οἷον τό τε μιμού-

keep them so.' Plain truth, dear Murray, needs no flowers of speech, So take it in the very words of Creech." [Epist. I, 6. 1.]

§ 22. The pleasure of conferring and receiving benefits and favours is made to arise, in the case of the reception of good, or good treatment, from the gratification of our desires which this implies, any gratification of a desire being pleasant, § 5; and the other, the pleasure of *conferring* favours, is due to the gratification of our love of power (Hobbes again, cf. p. 210); the power, namely, evinced in our having (ἔχειν) the means of bestowing them, and of shewing our superiority (ὑπερέχειν) by doing so. Aristotle, neither here nor elsewhere, takes any account of the benevolent affections as elements of human nature.

Similarly τὸ ἄρχειν is said to be ἥδιστον, § 27.

From the pleasure of doing service in general is derived the particular pleasure of 'setting our neighbours right' (rectifying, restoring their *fallen* fortunes or character to its normal or *upright* state) either in their property, when their *affairs* have gone *wrong;* or in their judgment, when they have made a mistake; or in their conduct, when they have deviated (παρεκβαίνειν) from the *right* path: and also of supplying their deficiencies (as before, pecuniary, intellectual, and moral) and bringing them up to a complete or satisfactory condition. ἐπιτελεῖν is 'to put the end upon', (as ἐπιστέφειν, ἐπισφραγίζειν, ἐπιγράφειν, ἐπιχρωματίζειν Plat. Rep. X 601 A, ἐπιτιθέναι, et sim.), hence, to finish, complete, or 'fill up'.

§ 23. The pleasure derived from the 'imitative arts' is next traced to the same sources, the pleasures, namely, of learning and wonder. These being assumed, it follows that every work of imitation, as of painting, sculpture, poetry—especially dramatic poetry—(we must either read here with Vater γραφικῇ &c. in the dative, as had occurred to myself, or suppose that the 'art' in the three cases is carelessly substituted for the 'product' or result of the art); and especially any *exact* imitation, even when the object imitated is not pleasant in itself; the pleasure lies in the *mere imitation*, and arises from exercise of the intellect in drawing an inference or 'conclusion (συλλογισμός) from this to that'; which is a reasoning process, and a kind of learning.

The *inference* is from the copy to the original, which must have been

μενον, ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιη-

seen before, if any pleasure is to be derived from the imitation; and the learning arises from the observation of the two and the comparison of them whereby we acquire some knowledge of what the things really are. This explanation is found in Poet. c. 4. 5. I will quote the entire passage from the beginning of the chapter, as a complete commentary on the passage of the Rhetoric, which indeed seems to be directly taken from the other. In the Poetics, as here in the Rhetoric, the love of imitation is ultimately based upon the love of learning; § 4, *αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου κ.τ.λ. infra.* The faculty or power of imitation which attends us from our very birth, *σύμφυτον*, and the love of imitation which accompanies it, both natural, are the two causes of poetry, §§ 1 2, and also of the other mimetic arts. *Ἐοίκασι δὲ γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι δύο τινές, καὶ αὗται φυσικαί. τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστί, καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. σημεῖον δὲ τοῦτο τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων* (the lowest and most degraded) *καὶ νεκρῶν.* (§ 4) *αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος, ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ προεωρακὼς οὐ διὰ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν* (the execution, elaboration, finish, Plat. Rep. VI 504 D) *ἢ τὴν χροιὰν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν.* In the first three chapters of this treatise it is assumed that all the fine arts, painting, sculpture, music, and poetry in all its branches—architecture, except so far as the sculpture employed in decoration is concerned, does not appear in the list—are *imitative*, and derived from the love of imitation and the power of imitation characteristic of humanity; and it is upon the various modes of imitation that the division of the fine arts is founded.

In the same way the pleasure which we derive from metaphors consists in tracing the resemblance—a process of learning, *μάθησίς τις*—between the word 'transferred' and the thing it, sometimes remotely, resembles; so that here again the natural pleasure which attends all acquisition of knowledge, *τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥᾳδίως ἡδὺ φύσει πᾶσιν ἐστι*, is assumed as the foundation of the love of imitation. Rhet. III 10. 2. Comp. III 8. 2, *ἀηδὲς γὰρ καὶ ἄγνωστον τὸ ἄπειρον.* III 9. 2, 11. 9. And in Probl. XIX 5, the same principle is applied to music: *διὰ τί ἥδιον ἀκούουσιν ᾀδόντων ὅσα ἂν προεπιστάμενοι τυγχάνωσι τῶν μελῶν ἢ ὧν μὴ ἐπίστανται ;...... ἢ ὅτι ἡδὺ τὸ μανθάνειν; τούτου δὲ αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ μὲν λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τὸ δὲ χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίζειν ἐστίν.*

Twining in his note on Poet. IV 4 (note 22, p. 186 seq.) in describing and illustrating this doctrine of Aristotle, remarks that 'he does not see how any *information* can be said to be acquired by the spectator' (or listener) from the mere *identification* of two objects, the inference that 'this is that'. And this remark is true if this were all that Aristotle means by his doctrine. The mere identification of an object compared with one already known conveys no *new* knowledge, which is essential to

τική, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ᾖ, κἂν ᾖ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ
τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ
συλλογισμός ἐστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν
24 τι συμβαίνει. καὶ αἱ περιπέτειαι καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν
σώζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων· πάντα γὰρ θαυμαστὰ

the notion of *learning*. But what seems to be Aristotle's real meaning is (as I have expressed it above) that by the comparison of the representation with the original, whether it be a picture, or a trait of character in a tragedy, or a metaphor, you *learn* something *new* in this respect; that the representation, in proportion to its accuracy and finish (the number of *details* introduced), enables you to *discover* or *observe* by the comparison something new in the object which you had never observed before: and this is the 'inference' from the resemblance, which the *συλλογισμός*, here and in the Poetics, is intended to express. On the love of imitation, and the pleasure derived from the imitation of objects in themselves disagreeable, Schrader quotes de Part. Anim. I 5, *b* 45, *a* 5. [*καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἄτοπον εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν, οἷον τὴν γραφικὴν ἢ τὴν πλαστικήν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῷμεν τὴν θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοί γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν. διὸ δεῖ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παιδικῶς τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμοτέρων ζῴων ἐπίσκεψιν.*]

§ 24. From the love of wonder arises the pleasure that we derive from (tragic) 'catastrophes' and 'narrow escapes from danger', which are all objects of wonder. Poet. XI init. *ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή,...καὶ τοῦτο δὲ...κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ ἀναγκαῖον.* The term *περιπέτεια* therefore expresses merely the 'sudden change or revolution of fortune' of the actors in the drama; the later appellation *καταστροφή* (Polybius) conveys the same notion of 'revolution' (*στροφή*), with the additional annotation of a 'downward' tendency (*κατά*) or downfall, to degradation or ruin.

παρὰ μικρόν] The preposition, which in this and similar phrases, *παρὰ βραχύ, παρ' ὀλίγον, παρ' οὐδὲν* (*ἄγειν, τίθεσθαι, ἡγεῖσθαι*), is usually translated in English by 'within', 'within a little of', 'within an ace or an inch of', in reality implies comparison; two things when set 'side by side' being more easily compared together. (Rhet. II 23. 30, *παρ' ἄλληλα φανερὰ... μᾶλλον*, III 2. 9, *διὰ τὸ παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι*, Ib. 9. 8, 11. 9, 17. 3.) The comparison in these phrases is expressed in terms of quantity, 'about as much as, amounting to'; and so *παρὰ μικρόν* becomes 'nearly about, closely approaching to, or within a little of'. A few instances of a very common idiom are given in Jelf's *Gr. Gr.* § 637 on *παρά*, Vol. II, p. 301, [Kuhner's *Ausführliche Grammatik*, § 440, Vol. II, p. 445] and Matth. *Gr. Gr.* 588 *a*, who does not properly explain it. Victorius quotes from Phys. B 5, 8, 197 *a* 27, a sentence which conveys a sort of explanation of *παρὰ μικρόν*: *διὸ καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν μέγα λαβεῖν ἢ δυστυχεῖν ἢ εὐτυχεῖν ἐστίν, ὅτι ὡς ὑπάρχον λέγει ἡ διάνοια· τὸ γὰρ παρὰ μικρὸν ὥσπερ οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν δοκεῖ.*

25 ταῦτα. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδύ, τὰ συγγενῆ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, πάντα τὰ συγγενῆ καὶ ὅμοια ἡδέα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ καὶ νέος νέῳ. ὅθεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἴρηνται, ὡς ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει, καὶ ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον, καὶ ἔγνω δὲ θὴρ θῆρα, καὶ ἀεὶ κολοιὸς
26 παρὰ κολοιόν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ

§ 25. *καὶ...τὰ συγγενῆ δέ*] Note on I 1.11, p. 20. *συγγενῆ* are things that belong to the same *γένος* or family, congeners of all kinds, 'all things akin to and resembling one another': the *συγγενῆ*, besides the examples given directly, man, horse, youth, are also indirectly illustrated by the things mentioned in the proverbs: they are 'class fellows', any thing of the same *kind* with another. All that is natural is pleasurable—by the definition—things belonging to the same class have a natural connexion, ('*κατὰ φύσιν* inter se esse dicit quod eiusdem naturae participes sint,' Vict.) —therefore all *συγγενῆ* are *ἡδέα*; but only 'for the most part', not always: for sometimes 'a man's greatest foes are those of his own household', and 'two of a trade can never agree'; *κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων*, Hes. Op. et D. 25. The two sides are given, Eth. Nic. VIII 2 init.

ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει] *Crabbed age and youth cannot live together*. Hence *ἡλικιώτης* is 'a companion and ~~friend', as Arist. Nub. 1006.~~ The Schol. on Plat. Phaedrus 240 C, *ἥλικα γὰρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπειν τὸν ἥλικα*, gives the remainder of the line, *ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπε, γέρων δέ τε τέρπε γέροντα*. The proverb occurs again in Plato, Gorg. 510 B, Symp. 195 B, Lys. 214 A, and is alluded to Rep. I 329 A, *πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθά τινες εἰς ταὐτὸ παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες, διασῴζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν.* Eth. Nic. VIII 14, 1161 *b* 35, *μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν...τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἧλιξ γὰρ ἥλικα, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἑταῖροι.* Eth. Eudem. VII 2, 1238 *a* 34, where another of these proverbs of association is quoted from Eur. Belleroph. Fr. VIII (Dind.) *κακῷ κακός τε συντέτηκεν ἡδοναῖς.* Cic. de Senect. c. 3. Ast and Stallbaum's notes, *ad ll. cc.*

ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον] *ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον*, Hom. Od. ρ' (XVII) 218. Eth. N. VIII 2, init. IX 3, 1165 *b* 17, Eth. Eud. VII 1, 1235 *a* 7, Magn. Mor. II 11, 1208 *b* 10, Theophrastus *περὶ φιλοπονηρίας*, ult. *καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ τῆς παροιμίας, τὸ ὁμοῖον πρὸς τὸ ὁμοῖον πορεύεσθαι.*

ἔγνω δὲ θὴρ θῆρα] Eth. Eud. u. s., *ἔγνω δὲ φὼρ τε φῶρα καὶ λύκος λύκον.*

κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν] *Birds of a feather flock together.* Eth. Eud., u. s., *καὶ γὰρ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν.* Magn. Mor. II 11, 1208 *b* 9, *καὶ γὰρ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιὸν ἱζάνει* ('perch together'), Eth. N. VIII 2, u. s. Theocr. Id. IX 31, *τέττιξ μὲν τέττιγι φίλος, μύρμακι δὲ μύρμαξ, ἴρηκες δ' ἴρηξιν.* Epicharmus, apud Diog. Laert. III 1. 16 (quoted by Gaisford), *καὶ γὰρ ἁ κύων κυνὶ κάλλιστον εἶμεν φαίνεται, καὶ βοῦς βοΐ, ὄνος δ' ὄνῳ κάλλιστόν* (*ἐστιν* Gaisford; Mullach, *Fragm. Phil. Gr.* p. 142; *ὗς δὲ θὴν ὑΐ*, Cobet, Diog. L.), *ὗς δ' ὑΐ.* Three of these proverbs are illustrated by Erasmus, *Adagia*, pp. 1642—44.

§ 26. Next from the principle of the 'fondness of like for like' is

ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἡδὺ ἑαυτῷ ἅπαν, μάλιστα δ'

deduced the universality of 'self-love'. τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἡδὺ ἑαυτῷ stands for τὰ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ ἡδέα ἀλλήλοις ἅπαντα; 'since all things that are like and akin (closely related) are agreeable to one another, and a man stands in the highest degree in this relation to himself, (τοῦτο πέπονθεν, 'suffers this', has this affection, i. e. relation to...) all men must be more or less fond of self (self-lovers); because all such relations (ὁμοιότης and συγγένεια) belong to him (ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ), most of all to himself'; i. e. he stands in these relations more nearly to himself than to any thing or any body else. In the discussion of τὸ φίλαυτον, the subject of Eth. Nic. IX 8, two kinds of self-love are distinguished; the one low and vulgar, characteristic of the πολλοί, which consists in τὸ ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμειν τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς...τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται...οἱ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς—διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος, 1168 *b* 16, seq.; and it has therefore got a 'bad name': but τὸ φίλαυτον in its true sense, when this desire of superiority over others, and consequent preference of self—this grasping spirit, πλεονεξία, in a good sense—manifests itself in a desire to excel them in honour and virtue, *then* becomes praiseworthy and right. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι δεῖ καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὡς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή, 1169 *a* 35. Comp. Pol. II 5, 1263 *b* 2, τὸ δὲ φίλαυτον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ φιλεῖν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσί γε πάντες ὡς εἰπεῖν ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. So we say 'fond of money' or anything else, meaning 'over-fond' of it. The natural fondness is in all cases to be distinguished from the vicious over-fondness.

This love of self will naturally be extended to all that immediately belongs to, or is closely connected with, oneself, τὰ αὑτῶν, as our 'words' and 'works'. λόγοι all that we '*say*'—and, as we should now add in this our 'reading age', 'read and write'—all our talk, studies, habits of thought, theories, arguments and such like, everything in which *intellect* is expressed; and ἔργα, all that we *do*, or *produce*, all our actions and works; in which latter is included the propagation of children, αὑτῶν γὰρ ἔργα τὰ τέκνα. Comp. Plat. Rep. I 330 C, ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσι ταύτῃ τε δὲ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. This natural fondness for our own 'works' is assigned in Eth. Nic. IX 7 as the reason why benefactors usually feel more affection for those on whom they have conferred their favours than these are inclined to return. The compensation principle, the debtor and creditor account between the two parties, belongs to justice, and has nothing to do with this natural affection, φιλία. δόξειε δ' ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ οὐχ ὅμοιον τῷ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας, 1167 *b* 29: and then follows the true explanation, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου. μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα.

It is this love which men feel for what is specially their own in word

αὐτὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος τοῦτο πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη πάντας φιλαύτους εἶναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον· πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὑτὸν μάλιστα. ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλαυτοι πάντες, καὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι πᾶσιν, οἷον ἔργα καὶ λόγους. διὸ καὶ φιλοκόλακες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ φιλερασταὶ καὶ φιλότιμοι καὶ φιλότεκνοι· αὑτῶν γὰρ ἔργα τὰ τέκνα. καὶ τὰ ἐλλιπῆ ἐπιτελεῖν ἡδύ· αὑτῶν γὰρ ἔργον ἤδη γίγνεται.
27 καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἥδιστον, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν δοκεῖν εἶναι

or work that is the foundation of their liking for flattery, for the love of others, and for honour, the external tokens of respect—all of which are recognitions of their merit in word or deed in some shape or other, and evidence of respect, admiration, and regard; from the flatterer a mere pretence, with the others a reality. It is also the explanation of the parental affection, children being in a special and peculiar sense a man's own work.

And this accounts also for the pleasure which we find in supplying a defect, or bringing anything to a state of perfection (see on § 22), 'because *now* (by this time, not before, ἤδη) the work becomes our own': the *perfection* of it is due to ourselves, and we get the credit of the whole. Victorius remarks upon this, that the difference between this form of pleasure and that which is expressed in the same words in § 22, lies in the difference of the source of the pleasure and the motive of the action in either case. In the former the motive is benevolent, and the pleasure is that of doing good to others; here the motive is selfish, and the pleasure that of gratifying oneself.

§ 27. ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἥδιστον] 'ut res plana certaque ponitur'. Victorius. However, it may most readily be deduced from the innate love of power, already indicated in §§ 14, 22, *q. v.* To this natural impulse or emotion is traced the pleasure that is derived from 'wisdom', or the reputation of it—this is not the same as the pleasure of learning or acquiring knowledge, but that of possessing and exercising it, or the influence which the reputation of it carries with it—Now 'wisdom' may be understood in two senses; 'practical wisdom', φρόνησις, τὸ φρονεῖν, which is pleasant to possess and exercise because it implies power, in the shape of influence over the actions of others; and 'speculative wisdom', σοφία, which gratifies our love of wonder, § 21, because it brings with it the knowledge of all sorts of things that are interesting and curious (and therefore objects of wonder). One would have supposed that the love of taxing, censuring, or finding fault with our neighbours and friends, ἐπιτιμᾶν, is *directly* traceable to the pleasure of exercising power so frequently noticed before. Here however an intermediate step is introduced between the feeling and its real origin. This is the love of honour. Censuring and finding fault implies an advantageous contrast between ourselves and those whom we thus 'tax', a superiority in judgment or virtue, which gives us the right to

ἡδύ· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ τὸ φρονεῖν, ἔστι δ' ἡ σοφία πολλῶν καὶ θαυμαστῶν ἐπιστήμη. ἔτι ἐπεὶ φιλότιμοι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς πέλας ἡδὺ
28 εἶναι. καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ βέλτιστος δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ, ἐνταῦθα διατρίβειν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ

κἀπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,
νέμων ἑκάστης ἡμέρας πλεῖστον μέρος,
ἵν' αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὤν.

find fault; and the honour we all love is reflected upon ourselves by the contrast. But the pleasure lies ultimately not in the honour itself, but in the superiority that respect and the outward signs of it indicate.

MS A^c here adds καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν after ἡδὺ εἶναι, adopted by Spengel. It would mean of course the general exercise of authority, an extension of the special ἐπιτιμᾶν, and analogous to it, as manifested in various modes of punishment or correction by word and deed. And herein would lie the distinction. The private citizen can only find fault (viz. with his tongue); the ruler can inflict actual penalties, personal or pecuniary.

§ 28. There is pleasure again in 'dwelling upon', lingering in (passing one's time in, διατρίβειν) any pursuit or occupation in which one is 'at one's very best'. διατρίβειν is by a similar metaphor applied to dwelling on, brooding over, nursing, the prospect of vengeance, II 2. 2. This same topic is also applied to 'good', I 6. 29; the difference being in the 'ends' or motives severally proposed, which stimulate the action in each; in the one it is success, a form of good; in the other, pleasure; the skill or degree of excellence shewn in the exercise of any faculty, bodily or mental, is the same in both. To dwell on that in which our superiority is shewn is of course pleasant, by the preceding rule. Problem XVIII 6, quoted by Gaisford, raises the question suggested by this topic. The solution which corresponds to the explanation here given, is the second: ἢ ὅτι ἐν οἷς οἴεται ἕκαστος κρατιστεύειν ταῦτα προαιρεῖται, ὃ δὲ αἱρεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείξεται (here follows the quotation from Euripides; and it is added,) ὅτι δ' ἂν τινες ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἕλωνται, κἂν οἷς ἂν συνεθισθῶσιν, οὐδὲ κρίνειν δύνανται τὰ βελτίω· διέφθαρται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια διὰ φαύλας προαιρέσεις: that is, men in these cases choose a lower kind of pursuit instead of a higher, in consequence of a depravation of judgment arising from the familiarity created by constant exercise of those practices in which their special skill lies.

αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ βέλτιστος] Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 460. The superlative in these phrases seems to be substituted for the comparative, and to belong to the rather large family of misuses of the former, which are found in our own language no less than in the Greek.

This fragment of Euripides' Antiope (Fr. XX Dind., XXVII Wagner) is quoted also in Plato's Gorgias 484 E, &c., with one or two trifling variations. The second line there runs thus, νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος; which, with αὑτῷ instead of τούτῳ, is also the reading of the Problem. The third line is quoted in Alcib. II 146 A, with κράτιστος. In the Problem also, κράτιστος stands for βέλτιστος. In the two following

29 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πᾶσα p. 42.
ἄνεσις, καὶ ὁ γέλως τῶν ἡδέων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα
ἡδέα εἶναι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα· διώ- P. 1372.
ρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἡδέων εἰρήσθω ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις φανερά.

pages of the Gorgias a good deal more of the same passage has been incorporated in Callicles' speech as prose. Of the attempted restorations of this I have given an account in Note A, Appendix to *Translation of Gorgias*, p. 134. [On p. 64 the lines here quoted are translated as follows: 'Each shines in that, *to that end presses forward, Devotes to that the better part o' the day, Wherein he chances to surpass himself.*']

§ 29. τῶν ἡδέων] Note on I 11.4—ἄνεσις, 'relaxation', metaphor from unscrewing and thereby relaxing the strings of the lyre, and so lowering the tone; and ἐπίτασις the opposite: ἐπιτείνειν and ἀνιέναι are hence extended to denote 'intensification' and 'relaxation' in general. See note on I 4.12. The undue propensity of people in general to the enjoyment of 'the ridiculous' is noticed in Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 *a* 13 (on εὐτραπελία the mean in the use of the γελοῖον), ἐπιπολάζοντας δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. The discussion of τὸ γελοῖον here referred to as existing in the Poetics, and again in Rhet. III 18.7, where we are told that the 'kinds' of it are enumerated, cannot possibly mean the passage which we actually find there in c. 5.2, which is a mere definition. The subject was probably treated in the second book of the two of which the Poetics originally consisted[1]; and most likely formed part of the treatise on Comedy, which the author promises at the commencement of the sixth chapter of the extant work. Such are the opinions of Heitz, the latest writer on the question; *Verlorene Schriften Arist.* pp. 87—103.

On the 'ludicrous', see Cicero de Orat. II 58 seq. *de ridiculo;* Quint. Inst. Orat. VI 3. Demetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας in the chapter—περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι χαρίτων, ap. Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* III 298 seq. Bain, *On the Emotions and Will*, pp. 282—285; and Herbert Spencer, *Essays* &c., 2nd Series, Essay III, *The Physiology of Laughter*.

εἰρήσθω] This is the first instance in the Rhetoric of the use of this most familiar Aristotelian form of expression (a verb in the third person of the imperative passive), which in some of his works occurs sometimes at the end of nearly every chapter. It expresses the completeness and sufficiency of any action or process, that a thing has been completely gone through and finished, and that that is sufficient, and no more need be said or done about it. Thus εἰρήσθω, 'let so much *have been said* upon the subject', means, let it suffice to have said so much, let this be considered sufficient, and the subject closed; and let us now 'have done with it', and go on to something else. It is not peculiar to Aristotle, though very much more common in him than in other writers. It occurs

[1] The two lists of the Aristotelian writings differ. Diogenes V. 26 has Ποιητικά. α'; the *Anonymus*, ap. Buhle, Vol. I p. 63, τέχνης ποιητικῆς, β'.

1 ὧν μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα ἀδικοῦσι, ταῦτ' ἐστίν. πῶς δ' CHAP. XII.
ἔχοντες καὶ τίνας, λέγωμεν νῦν. αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν ὅταν

for instance in Xenophon, Mem. IV 2. 19, ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσθω μοι, 'be satisfied with my saying so much', let it suffice to have said so much: Plato, Phileb. 57 C, εἰρήσθω, 'let it be said once for all', and no more about it. Ib. 62 E, μεθείσθων, and Stallbaum's note on Phaedr. 278 B, πεπαίσθω, 'enough of this joking', Ib. 250 C, κεχαρίσθω, Theaet. 197 D, πεποιήσθω, Euthyd. 278 D, πεπαίσθω ὑμῖν, Rep. VIII 553 A, 562 A, IX 588 D, πεπλάσθω. Thucyd. I 71, ὡρίσθω, 'let this definition suffice'. Ar. Eth. Nic. I 1 ult. πεφροιμιάσθω, 'let so much suffice by way of preface'; Top. Α 8, 103 *b* 1, and 13, 105 *a* 21, διωρίσθω: *et passim.*

This notion of a completed, perfected, concluded, fixed and permanent, and sufficient action, belongs to the perfect tense in general, and appears, not only in the imperative of the passive, but also in the indicative, perfect and future (the *paulo post futurum*, on which see Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 498). Of the indicative, instances are, Soph. Trach. 586, μεμηχάνηται τοὔργον, Philoct. 1280, πέπαυμαι, Eur. Hippol. 1457, κεκαρτέρηται τἀμά, my powers of endurance are exhausted, the play is played out, all my endurance and sufferings are over, and this is the end: compare πεπόνθασι γάρ, Rhet. II 8. 2; Aesch. Eum. 680, and Aesch. S. c. T. 1050, διατετίμηται (Paley's notes on both passages). Fragm. Phryx (Fr. Aesch. 263), διαπεφρούρηται βίος. Eur. Orest. 1203, and Phoen. 1019, εἴρηται λόγος. Plat. Phileb. 62 D, μεθεῖνται. Ar. Rhet. I 14 ult. II 5 ult. καὶ περὶ μὲν φοβερῶν καὶ θαρραλέων εἴρηται, 'so much for', where the perf. ind. pass. in summing up at the end of the chapter, plainly differs only in form from the ordinary imperative. *Troia fuit. Fuit Ilium.*

Of the *paulo post futurum* a good instance occurs Theaet. 180 A, in the humorous description of the Heraclitean philosophers, 'and if you look for an explanation of the meaning of the meaning of this, ἑτέρῳ πεπλήξει καινῶς μετωνομασμένῳ, you will be instantly shot with (*lit.* another phraselet, ῥηματίῳ) another brand new word coined for the occasion', i.e. you will have been shot already, as it were; almost before you know where you are.

The observation on this use of the tense in Jelf's *Gr. Gr.* § 399, obs. 1, is quite inadequate, and not quite correct: Matthiae, *Gr. Gr.* § 500, p. 841, is somewhat more satisfactory.

CHAP. XII.

§ 1. Such are the motives and incentives that stimulate men to injustice and wrong, which have been found to be so many varieties of pleasure: we next proceed to examine and classify, for the use of the forensic practitioner, the dispositions and characters of wrong-doers and of their intended victims, those who are most likely to be exposed to wrong.

First of all, the 'possibility' of effecting it must always be taken into account by any one who contemplates the perpetration of a wrong: and not only the *general* possibility, as whether so and so is possible to a human being (physical or absolute possibility), but a *special* possibility to

οἴωνται δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα πραχθῆναι καὶ ἑαυτοῖς δυνατόν, εἴτε ἂν λαθεῖν πράξαντες, ἢ μὴ λαθόντες μὴ δοῦναι δίκην ἢ δοῦναι μὲν ἀλλ' ἐλάττω τὴν
2 *ζημίαν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους ἑαυτοῖς ἢ ὧν κήδονται. ποῖα μὲν οὖν δυνατὰ φαίνεται καὶ ποῖα ἀδύνατα, ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται (κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντων τῶν λόγων), αὐτοὶ δ' οἴονται δυνατοὶ εἶναι μάλιστα ἀζήμιοι ἀδικεῖν οἱ εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρακτικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἔμπειροι πολλῶν ἀγώνων, κἂν πολύφιλοι ὦσιν,*
3 *κἂν πλούσιοι. καὶ μάλιστα μέν, ἂν αὐτοὶ ὦσιν ἐν*

themselves, *καὶ ἑαυτοῖς δυνατόν*; in other words, the *moral* possibility, when the act is done in such a way or under such circumstances as shall render it worth their while; such that the prejudice or injury sustained by the action or its consequences shall not outweigh the prospective benefit; an act done in spite of these considerations may be regarded as morally 'impossible'.

εἴτε ἂν (*οἴωνται*) *λαθεῖν πράξαντες*] 'whether, that is, the intended wrongdoers think the crime will never be detected at all; or be detected, but remain unpunished; or if it be punished, that the loss or injury so sustained will be less than the gain resulting from it to themselves'.

§ 2. *ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον*] The subject of 'general probability and improbability' shall be considered hereafter, that is, in II 19, where the *δυνατόν* and *ἀδύνατον* (one of the four *κοινοὶ τόποι*) are analysed. This is expressed by the *κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντων τῶν λόγων* of the parenthesis: 'because they *are* common to all kinds of speeches', (viz. the three kinds of Rhetoric, which is here taken as the basis of their *κοινότης*, elsewhere it is their opposition to the *εἴδη*, see Introd. on *τόποι*, p. 128), '*therefore* they shall be considered hereafter', viz. with the rest in II 19. We now proceed to the subject of the special or moral probability, which affects would-be wrongdoers themselves (*αὐτοὶ δ' οἴονται δυνατοὶ εἶναι*...), and under the circumstances of any particular case.

The first class of persons that rely on this kind of possibility, in the sense of a possible exemption from punishment if they do wrong, are able speakers and men of action—the one capable of defending themselves against attack with their tongues by plausible argument, the other of carrying through the business or transaction in the best and completest way, so as to secure all possible advantage; and men already practised in many forensic contests—and so with acquired experience of the resources available for defence against an accuser in a court of justice; and men with many friends, having an extensive or influential connexion, or well befriended,—these will be well helped; and the wealthy—who can buy off an accuser or antagonist, and corrupt the judges.

§ 3. The possibility of doing wrong with impunity is greatest when the parties themselves answer to any of the foregoing descriptions; and

τοῖς εἰρημένοις, οἴονται δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὑπάρχωσιν αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτοι φίλοι ἢ ὑπηρέται ἢ κοινωνοί· διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα δύνανται καὶ πράττειν καὶ λανθάνειν
4 καὶ μὴ δοῦναι δίκην. καὶ ἐὰν φίλοι ὦσι τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις ἢ τοῖς κριταῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ φίλοι ἀφύλακτοί τε πρὸς τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ προσκαταλλάττονται πρὶν

if not, (in the next degree), when they have friends, or servants and followers, or associates of these kinds; for these circumstances and capacities make it possible for them (*διά*, the cause, the power is due to these) to *do* the things (this applies specially to the *πρακτικοί*), and to escape either detection or punishment.

§ 4. Again, the possibility is increased, the attempt becomes easier, if they are friends either of the objects of the wrong, those whom they propose to injure, or of the judges who would have to try the case if brought before them: for friends are off their guard (*lit.* unguarded), and thereby particularly exposed to injury and wrong, and moreover are inclined to come to terms or to be reconciled without 'prosecuting' the case, or bringing it before a court of justice; and judges are ready to oblige their friends, and either let them off altogether, or inflict a very slight penalty (so fair and upright were the Athenian dicasts).

οἱ...φίλοι ἀφύλακτοι κ.τ.λ.] This sounds very atrocious, and certainly has a highly immoral appearance on the face of it. But we are to recollect that the author told us in his apology for Rhetoric in the preface that such suggestions are to be regarded only as exemplifications of the *theory* of the art, which argues each side of every question indifferently without regard to moral considerations: but in *practice*, though the rhetorician as such *can* employ immoral arguments, no *honest* rhetorician would have recourse to them. Rhetoric does not profess to teach virtue; that must be learned *aliunde*. This is *Aristotle's* view of the matter: the Sophists, who, as we are expressly told, identified the study of Rhetoric with a general, political education, had no such excuse or justification for the immoralities of *their* Rhetoric, which they inculcated without alloy.

προσκαταλλάττονται] '*καὶ πρὸς, et praeterea.* pessime vulgo *προσκαταλλάττονται*'. Gaisford. Bekker and Spengel retain the vulgate, to which there is no possible objection. *καταλλάττεσθαι* alone, it is true, conveys all that is *necessary* to the sense, the reconciliation namely; but *πρός* is very often added to a verb, simple or compound, to express 'direction' to an object, as *προσεντείνειν πληγάς*, Dem. c. Mid. 528. 25; *προσευθύνειν*, Ar. Pol. VII (VI) 8, 1322 *b* 9; and particularly with verbs that imply conciliation or reconciliation, as *προσχωρεῖν* Thuc. I 103, IV 71, 'to come over to a side', *προσάγεσθαι*, 'to bring over to one, to conciliate'. Isocr. Nicocl. § 22, *θεραπείας προσαγάγεσθαι*. Thuc. III 43, *ἀπάτῃ προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος*, III 48, *μήτε οἴκτῳ μήτ' ἐπιεικείᾳ, οἷς οὐδὲ ἐγὼ ἐῶ προσάγεσθαι* (to be won over). *προσίεσθαι et similia.* So here the compound verb *καταλλάττεσθαι* denotes the mutual *settlement* of the disputed points, and the additional *πρός* the conciliation, being won over, which attends it.

ἐπεξελθεῖν, οἱ δὲ κριταὶ χαρίζονται οἷς ἂν φίλοι ὦσι, καὶ ἢ ὅλως ἀφιᾶσιν ἢ μικροῖς ζημιοῦσιν. λαθητικοὶ δ' εἰσὶν οἵ τ' ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἐγκλήμασιν, οἷον ἀσθενὴς περὶ αἰκίας καὶ ὁ πένης καὶ [1]αἰσχρὸς περὶ μοιχείας. καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς·

[1] ὁ *infra cum libris.* [ὁ] Spengel.

§ 5. Persons likely to escape detection are those whose personal and moral or mental character is opposite (this is the 'opposition' of 'contrariety', the extremes under the same genus, as black and white in colour, bitter and sweet in taste, hot and cold in touch or feeling, and such like) to that which the charge necessarily implies; as when a man of feeble bodily frame is charged with 'assault and battery', or a poor and ugly man with adultery.

The ἀσθενὴς charged with αἰκία was a stock example of the τόπος of τὸ εἰκός in the early rhetorical treatises. This τόπος was the staple of Corax's τέχνη, Rhet. II 24. 11; and the case of the 'weak man' is quoted by Aristotle as one of the examples there used. The application of the argument of 'probability' to the treatment of it, shewing how Rhetoric τἀναντία συλλογίζεται, is there illustrated. It appears again in Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37). 6, and Pl. Phaedrus 273 B, as an extract from Tisias' τέχνη, where the τόπος of τὸ εἰκός is represented as somewhat differently treated. Victorius cites Quint. V 10. 26, speaking of the same mode of inference; the probability namely of the conformity of a man's actions to his bodily condition and ordinary character. These are 'personal' topics of argument, *argumenta a persona*, § 23, inferences from personal conditions, qualities, habits, employed to determine the probability of a certain action, as proceeding from *him*: one of these is, *habitus corporis: ducitur enim frequenter in argumentum species libidinis, robur petulantiae; his contraria in diversum*—the two cases given by Aristotle.

ὁ πένης καὶ ὁ αἰσχρός, the definite article marking the genus, *the* member of a certain class. See note on I 7. 13 εἰ μὴ ἦν ὁ πράξων, p. 130. In this and the next topic there is a change from persons to things, which are resumed as the objects of analysis in § 32.

καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ] 'And things, i. e. acts, that are excessively conspicuous, open to observation and under people's eyes'. τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς, 'things in sight', *qui sautent aux yeux*. Polit. VII (VI) 4, 1319 *b* 18, ὀλίγον μὲν γὰρ πονηρὸν παροράται, πολὺ δὲ γινόμενον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς μᾶλλόν ἐστιν. Such glaring acts are not guarded against (ἀφύλακτα here occurs in a different sense to ἀφύλακτοι φίλοι in § 4: *that* is 'unguarded', from φυλάττεσθαι, the direct *passive*; this is 'not guarded *against*', the passive of (the middle) φυλάττεσθαί τι 'to guard oneself against anything', comp. §§ 6 and 21), no precautions are taken to prevent them, 'because no one would suppose that any one was likely to attempt them'. Supply to complete the sense τιν' ἂν ποιῆσαι αὐτά, or ἐπιχειρῆσαι αὐτοῖς. This is a return to the original topic of ἃ δύνανται πράττειν 'possible actions'. τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ are therefore *acts* which are likely 'to be carried into effect'—*not*, 'to escape detection', λαθητικά from the preceding clause, which is in some sort parenthetical.

6 ἀφύλακτα γὰρ διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἂν οἴεσθαι. καὶ τὰ τηλικαῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷα μηδ' ἂν εἷς· ἀφύλακτα γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα· πάντες γὰρ τὰ εἰωθότα ὥσπερ ἀρρωστήματα φυλάττονται καὶ τἀδικήματα, ὃ δὲ μηδείς
7 πω ἠρρώστηκεν, οὐδεὶς εὐλαβεῖται. καὶ οἷς μηδεὶς ἐχθρὸς ἢ πολλοί· οἳ μὲν γὰρ οἴονται λήσειν διὰ τὸ μὴ φυλάττεσθαι, οἳ δὲ λανθάνουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἂν ἐπιχειρῆσαι φυλαττομένοις, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀπολογίαν

§ 6. And acts again which are of such a magnitude (*τηλικαῦτα*) and of such a kind as no one (else) would ever think of doing (supply *ποιήσειε*); for these too (like the preceding) are not guarded against, (viz. novel and audacious attempts and enterprises which people are unprepared for, and which therefore take them by surprise): for it is only against customary offences, just like sicknesses, that people are on their guard; against diseases hitherto unknown, (which no one has ever yet had,) no one ever takes precautions. *ἀῤῥώστημα, ἀῤῥωστία, ἀῤῥωστεῖν* properly denote 'want of strength', bodily weakness, and hence any infirmity, such as sickness. Hence Thucydides applies it, III 15, to want of strength of will, or of inclination, *ἀῤῥωστία τοῦ στρατεύειν*; and VII 47, to weakness of mind; the mental prostration or despondency which prevailed amongst the Athenian troops before Syracuse: and again in VIII 83, to Tissaphernes' weakness of will or inclination, as shewn in his 'remissness' or 'disinclination' to supply pay to the crews of the Peloponnesian vessels; which Arnold well expresses by 'he was sick of it'. In Plat. Rep. II 359 B it represents nothing more than the defect or weakness of a faculty. In Xenophon the three words usually denote some form of disease or sickness: Demosth. Ol. II p. 24. 5, *ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἡμῶν, ἕως μὲν ἂν ἐῤῥωμένος ᾖ τις, οὐδὲν ἐπαισθάνεται τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα σαθρῶν, ἐπὰν δὲ ἀῤῥώστημά τι συμβῇ, πάντα κινεῖται, κἂν ῥῆγμα κἂν στρέμμα κἂν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπάρχοντων σαθρὸν ᾖ*, any disease or other imperfection and unsoundness of body, including fractures, sprains, &c.

§ 7. *καὶ οἷς μηδεὶς ἐχθρὸς ἢ πολλοί*] is a return to the original construction of § 3. Supply *οἴονται δύνασθαι πράττειν κ.τ.λ.* or simply *οἴονται δύνασθαι ἀδικεῖν*. And also those (are disposed to do wrong, or think they can do it undetected or with impunity) who have no enemy at all or a great many: the former think they will escape undetected because there is no one (no enemy) to take precautions against them (and their attempts); the latter pass undiscovered, because they are not likely (*ἂν*) to be suspected of assailing people when they are on their guard against them (as enemies), *διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἂν ἐπιχειρῆσαι* 'because they would not be thought (*lit.* seem) likely to assail', 'because no one would think them likely to assail'; and also, if they *are* suspected or detected (so Victorius), (and brought before a court of justice), they have a defence ready that they never would have made, were not at all *likely* to make, such an attempt; that is, that their guilt is *highly improbable;* Corax's topic of *τὸ εἰκός* again.

8 ἔχειν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐνεχείρησαν. καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει κρύψις p. 43.
ἢ τρόπος ἢ τόπος ἢ διάθεσις εὔπορος. καὶ ὅσοις μὴ
λαθοῦσιν ἔστι δίωσις δίκης ἢ ἀναβολὴ χρόνου ἢ
διαφθοραὶ κριτῶν. καὶ οἷς, ἐὰν γένηται ζημία, ἔστι
δίωσις τῆς ἐκτίσεως ἢ ἀναβολὴ χρόνιος. ἢ ⟨εἰ⟩ δι'
9 ἀπορίαν μηδὲν ἕξει ὅ τι ἀπολέσῃ. καὶ οἷς τὰ μὲν

§ 8. And those again who have any means of concealment (either of themselves, or of the goods they have stolen,) or any 'mode' (of changing it, so that it shall not be recognised, Victorius, or more generally, 'any contrivance or device') or any place (of refuge for themselves, or for stowing away the stolen property) or are of an inventive disposition, or habit of mind', (suggestive of τρόποι in the second sense, and μηχαναί).

Victorius confines the whole of this topic to the one crime of robbery, *de furibus ac latronibus;* and interprets κρύψις *qui possunt quae sustulerint nullo negotio occulere;* τρόπος *quibus modus viaque facilis est illa immutandi. Quod aut figuram aut colorem variare possint; aut artificio denique suo aliquo modo facere ne ipsa agnoscantur.* I should prefer giving it the wider sense of contrivances, devices of all kinds, tricks, artifices, any 'ways' or 'modes' of getting out of a scrape, and escaping the consequences of a criminal act. In Plat. Phileb. 16 A, it has a nearly similar sense, εἴ τις τρόπος ἔστιν καὶ μηχανή. Lastly, confining διάθεσις to the same subject, he translates it *vendere*, as we say to *dispose of* a thing; adding, *διάθεσιν enim hic alienationem valere arbitror*, and quoting, in support of the interpretation, Plut. Solon, p. 91 E, τῶν δὲ γενομένων διάθεσιν πρὸς ξένους ἐλαίου μόνον ἔδωκεν· ἄλλα δὲ ἐξάγειν ἐκώλυσεν. Demosth. Olynth. II, p. 22, οὐδ' ὅσ' ἂν πορίσωσιν οὕτως ὅπως ἂν δύνωνται ταῦτ' ἔχοντες διάθεσθαι. Isocr. Paneg. § 42, τὰ μὲν ὅπου χρὴ διάθεσθαι τὰ δ' ὁπόθεν εἰσαγάγεσθαι, (the word in this sense implies 'distribution', and so, 'disposing or setting out for sale.' Similarly ib. § 9, τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὖ διάθεσθαι 'to set out, or forth, in words'; and several of the best authors use it of 'disposing of' a variety of different things, property, one's own person, a daughter, goods for sale).

It seems to me preferable to extend the meaning, as in the other cases, beyond the mere 'disposal' of stolen goods, to *any* disposition or habit of mind, which is at all events the usual meaning of διάθεσις. And there is this further reason for rejecting Victorius' limitation of the topic, that if it is adopted no difference whatsoever is left between κρύψις and τόπος here and afterwards in §§ 33, 34.

καὶ οἷς, ἐὰν γένηται ζημία κ.τ.λ.] And those who, if they don't escape detection, have the means of getting rid of (*lit.* pushing off) the trial altogether, or postponing it, or of bribing the judges. And those who, if a penalty be actually imposed have the means of getting rid of the payment of it, or postponing it for a long time, or who from poverty have nothing to lose: (in the last clause the relative οἷς, which is convertible with εἴ τις, must be supposed to take that form when joined with ἕξει).

§ 9. Another class of cases in which men are disposed to do wrong,

κέρδη φανερὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ ἐγγύς, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι μικραὶ
ἢ ἀφανεῖς ἢ πόρρω. καὶ ὧν μή ἐστι τιμωρία ἴση τῇ P. 1372 b.
ὠφελείᾳ, οἷον δοκεῖ ἡ τυραννίς. καὶ ὅσοις τὰ μὲν
ἀδικήματα λήμματα, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι ὀνείδη μόνον. καὶ
οἷς τοὐναντίον τὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα εἰς ἔπαινόν τινα,
οἷον εἰ συνέβη ἅμα τιμωρήσασθαι ὑπὲρ πατρὸς ἢ
μητρός, ὥσπερ Ζήνωνι, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι εἰς χρήματα ἢ
φυγὴν ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι· δι' ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἀδικοῦσι καὶ

and think wrong deeds possible, is where the profit likely to accrue is evident, or certain (patent to all, free from all doubt or obscurity), or great, or immediate; and the penalties to which they are liable small, or obscure and uncertain (not such as to attract attention, and so deter from the intended wrong; *quae obscurae admodum et caecae sunt ut perspici nequeant:* Victorius), or remote.

Or again, where no possible punishment is equal to the prospective benefit; as is supposed (δοκεῖ) to be the case with absolute sovereignty or tyranny. On τυραννίς, and the distinction between it and μοναρχία, see note on I 8.4 and 5, p. 155.

§ 10. 'And cases in which the offence, and the profit or result of it, is a substantial, solid gain, and the penalty mere disgrace'.—λήμματα refers perhaps to pecuniary gain (*lucrum*).

'And the reverse; where the (legal) crime tends to any kind of praise (is directed to, as its meed or reward; i.e. where what is a crime in *one* point of view, is likely to meet with *praise* in another), as, for instance, if the crime was accompanied by vengeance for father or mother, as it was in Zeno's case; whilst the penalties are all directed against a man's purse or person, as fine, imprisonment, banishment, or anything else of the same kind (not affecting his character or reputation): for both circumstances and both dispositions may be motives to wrong acts, only not in the same persons and the same characters'.

Men of different characters are influenced by different motives in the commission of crime. Some care more for honour and glory and reputation than for their money and personal ease and comfort, and these, like Zeno, will be ready to commit what may be construed as a crime and render them liable to punishment, provided it be attended with something which leads to praise: the others, who value their personal well-being more than their good name, will be induced rather to do wrong acts which lead to substantial gain, and affect only their reputation. The one are virtuous, though they err; the others, sordid, mean, and vicious.

Of Zeno's case, here referred to, nothing is known, and we are reduced to conjecture. Of the two best known of this name, Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect, whose death is placed in B.C. 263 (Clint. *Fast. Hell.*), would, if alive, have been too young when Aristotle wrote the Rhetoric to have attracted public attention: it is just possible that the other, Zeno the logician, of Elea, Parmenides' follower, may be the person

ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντες, πλὴν οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀλλ' οἱ ἐναν-
11 τίοι τοῖς ἤθεσιν. καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἢ λεληθότες ἢ μὴ
ἐζημιωμένοι. καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἀποτετυχηκότες· εἰσὶ
γάρ τινες καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πο-
12 λεμικοῖς, οἷοι ἀναμάχεσθαι. καὶ οἷς ἂν παραχρῆμα
ᾖ τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὕστερον, ἢ τὸ κέρδος, ἡ δὲ

here meant. Of this Zeno we learn from Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, and Diodorus (see the reff. in Brandis' Art. in Smith's *Dict. Biogr.*) that he joined in an attempt to rid his native country of her tyrant: and if the attempt was successful (of which we are not informed) and the tyrant slain, Zeno may *possibly* have mixed personal considerations with his public and patriotic motives, just as Harmodius and Aristogeiton did, as Aristotle tells us in the Politics (VIII (V) 10), in their attack upon the Athenian tyrant. Only it seems unlikely that if this were the true explanation of the allusion that Aristotle would have spoken of tyrannicide as an ἀδίκημα, a 'wrong', either legal or moral: and besides this, the act itself, as well as the attendant circumstance, would have been regarded as praiseworthy.

πλήν] 'only', an exception or reservation; see note on I 1.14, p. 26.

§ 11. 'And those who have often in previous attempts escaped either detection or punishment. And, on the other hand, those who have often failed in their attempts' (the opposite to the last); 'because there is a class of people who in such matters as these, as well as in actual fighting, are inclined (have a disposition) to renew the fight'. οἷοι for οἷον is due to Victorius *in addendis*. Victorius quotes in illustration of this pugnacious character, Problem XVIII 2, *de Sophistis*, καὶ γὰρ νικῶντες διὰ τὸ χαίρειν προάγονται μᾶλλον ἐρίζειν· καὶ ἡττώμενοι ὡς ἀναμαχούμενοι.

§ 12. καὶ οἷς] is no doubt masc., as it is through the whole series of these topics, and in accordance with οἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς τοιοῦτοι that follows. Otherwise it would be more naturally and conveniently translated in this and the following section as neuter, 'in all cases where'....

'And all those who have the pleasure (consequent on their action) immediately, and the pain comes afterwards; or the profit at once and the penalty later: because this suits the character of the ἀκρατεῖς who are devoid of self-control, and this vice extends (beyond mere pleasure) to every object of man's aims and aspirations', to profit as well as pleasure. And therefore wherever there is immediate pleasure or profit, and only subsequent pain or loss, the ἀκρατεῖς whose character is to be tempted by present pleasure and profit, though at the expense of future pain and loss, are naturally in all such cases prone to wrong-doing. What is here said of ἀκρατής and ἀκρασία is confirmed by Eth. Nic. VII 2, ult. ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους, though, as the λέγονται shews, this is only a popular way of speaking (and therefore suited to Rhetoric): and in VII 6, 1147 *b* 31, seq. we are told that these are not ἁπλῶς ἀκρατεῖς, ἀκρασία proper being περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, limited to the same class of objects as ἀκολασία; and ὁ τῶν τε ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ

ζημία ὕστερον· οἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς τοιοῦτοι, ἔστι δ'
13 ἀκρασία περὶ πάντα ὅσων ὀρέγονται. καὶ οἷς ἂν τοὐναντίον τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν ἤδη ᾖ ἢ ἡ ζημία, τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ καὶ ὠφέλιμον ὕστερα καὶ χρονιώτερα· οἱ γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ φρονιμώτεροι τὰ τοιαῦτα διώκουσιν.
14 καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐνδέχηται διὰ τύχην δόξαι πρᾶξαι ἢ δι' ἀνάγκην ἢ διὰ φύσιν ἢ δι' ἔθος, καὶ ὅλως ἁμαρτεῖν
15 ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀδικεῖν. καὶ οἷς ἂν ᾖ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς τυχεῖν. καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐνδεεῖς ὦσιν. διχῶς δ' εἰσὶν ἐνδεεῖς· ἢ

τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ ἁφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν, παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται.

§ 13. 'And also the opposite characters to these are equally prone to wrong-doing in cases where the pain or loss is for the moment (ἤδη), and the pleasure and profit later and more lasting: for this is the character of the ἐγκρατεῖς, those that have acquired the habit of self-control, and of the wiser sort (men of more practical wisdom, φρόνησις), who pursue them in this order'.

§ 14. 'And those whose actions may possibly be thought to be due to chance, or to necessity, or to nature, or to habit, and who in general may be thought to have been guilty of error rather than of crime'. There is a variation here in the classification of these impelling causes of action from that laid down in c. 10. 7, 8, which is singular even in a rhetorical treatise, considering that they stand so near together. In the former there are three (of the seven) which are independent of ourselves and our own will, (1) τύχη, and ἀνάγκη subdivided into (2) βία and (3) φύσις. ἔθος in the other list is classed with the voluntary sources of action, where we are ourselves the causes of them. Here ἔθος is referred to the other class, doubtless because habit when confirmed becomes a 'second nature', and action from habit is so far involuntary. Rhet. I 11. 3, and de Memoria, c. 2, φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος.

ἁμαρτεῖν and ἀδικεῖν] refers to the well-known threefold gradation of wrong or criminality, (1) ἀτύχημα, accidental injury, (2) ἁμάρτημα, a mistake or error arising from ignorance of the circumstances of the case (Eth. N. III 2), and (3) ἀδικία, in which the προαίρεσις, the deliberate purpose, enters and constitutes an *intentional* wrong or crime, malice prepense. In Eth. Nic. V 10, a fourth degree is added, ἀδίκημα, distinguished from ἀδικία in this, that though the act is voluntary and intentional at the moment, the intention is not preconceived and deliberate, the malice is not prepense; it is without προαίρεσις, *deliberate* purpose; as an injury or death inflicted in a sudden fit of passion.

§ 15. 'And those that have the prospect of, anticipate, a merciful construction being put on their act by the judges'. On ἐπιείκεια, see I 13. 13, and Introd. on that passage, pp. 190—193. It is thus defined in Eth. Nic. V 14, 1137 *b* 12, δίκαιον μέν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου, a rectification, supply of the deficiencies, of the strict letter of the

γὰρ ὡς ἀναγκαίου, ὥσπερ οἱ πένητες, ἢ ὡς ὑπερ-
16 βολῆς, ὥσπερ οἱ πλούσιοι. καὶ οἱ σφόδρα εὐδοκι-
μοῦντες καὶ οἱ σφόδρα ἀδοξοῦντες, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐ
δόξοντες, οἱ δ' ὡς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον δόξοντες.
17 αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ἀδι-
κοῦσι δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ἔχοντας
ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐνδεεῖς ἢ εἰς τἀναγκαῖα ἢ εἰς ὑπεροχὴν ἢ εἰς
18 ἀπόλαυσιν, καὶ τοὺς πόρρω καὶ τοὺς ἐγγύς· τῶν μὲν
γὰρ ἡ λῆψις ταχεῖα, τῶν δ' ἡ τιμωρία βραδεῖα, οἷον p. 44.

law, legal justice, ᾗ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου, Ib. V 27, ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικός, 1138. 1. Soph. Oed. Col. 1127 (Oedipus), ἐπεὶ τό γ' εὐσεβεῖ μόνοις παρ' ὑμῖν εὗρον ἀνθρώπων ἐγὼ καὶ τοὐπιεικές, *milde gesinnung*, *humanität*, *gegenüber starrem recht*, Schneidewin ad loc. Soph. Fragm. Inc. 699 (709, Dind.) δαίμονα, ὃς οὔτε τἀπιεικὲς οὔτε τὴν χάριν οἶδεν, μόνην δ' ἔστερξε τὴν ἁπλῶς δίκην.

'Any deficiency which a man feels may incline him to commit wrong —for the purpose of supplying it. Such deficiency is of two kinds; either deficiency in what is necessary, as poverty, or in some excess, as wealth'. Rich men often feel a craving for something over and above their wealth, something superfluous, as power, honour, license. Thuc. III 45. 4 reads like a commentary on this topic, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκῃ τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἡ δ' ἐξουσία ὕβρει τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι 'great resources and the consequent license breed the grasping spirit (their natural progeny, τὴν) by insolence and pride'. Comp. also Pol. II 7, quoted in § 17.

§ 16. 'And those in excessively high and in excessively low repute, the one as altogether unlikely, the other as no more likely than before, to incur the imputation of crime'. The first rely upon their character, either for the success of their attempt, which will put their victims off their guard, or for impunity by escaping suspicion; the second, having no character to lose, are emboldened by this to make new attempts, by which they *may* gain and cannot lose, because they cannot be in a worse position in the eyes of the world than they are already.

§ 17. 'Such are the dispositions which lead men to attempt wrong'. We now turn to the characters and dispositions, qualities and circumstances which most expose men to wrong; these are as follows:

§ 18. 'First, people that have what we want, either in respect of necessity or excess (superfluity), or of sensual enjoyment, whether remote or near; for the acquisition of the one is speedy, the vengeance of the other tardy: as when we Greeks spoil the Carthaginians'. 'We Greeks' are *pirates*. Comp. Pol. II 7, 1267 *a* 2, οὐ μόνον δ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τἀναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν,...ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι (this is the craving after superfluities out of mere wantonness of appetite)...οὐ τοίνυν διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂν ἐπιθυμοῖεν ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἄνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; κ.τ.λ. The difference of the two last of these lies in this, that the one is the desire caused by the painful gap to supply the

19 οἱ συλῶντες τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. καὶ τοὺς μὴ εὐλαβεῖς μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς ἀλλὰ πιστευτικούς· ῥᾴδιον γὰρ πάντας λαθεῖν. καὶ τοὺς ῥαθύμους· ἐπιμελοῦς γὰρ τὸ ἐπεξελθεῖν. καὶ τοὺς αἰσχυντηλούς· οὐ γὰρ
20 μαχητικοὶ περὶ κέρδους. καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀδικηθέντας καὶ μὴ ἐπεξελθόντας ὡς ὄντας κατὰ τὴν

deficiency; the other is a desire of pleasures which have no such painful craving attendant upon them, such are the pleasures of taste, learning, knowledge, and, in general, intellectual pleasures. The cure recommended for this vicious desire is philosophy, which may be obtained from within and *δι' αὐτοῦ*, without any extraneous aid. It seems therefore that this division does not exactly coincide with that of the Rhetoric, though there is a strong resemblance between them.

§ 19. 'And those who are not inclined to caution or precaution, but are of a confiding temper; for they are all easy to take by surprise' (*λαθεῖν*, *lit.* it is easy for the wrong-doer to escape their notice in attacking them).

And the careless (indolent, easy-tempered); because the prosecution of an offence belongs to (the opposite character) the careful, anxious attentive.

So Leech, in *Punch*, Aug. 2, 1862. *Infuriate Captain.* 'You scoundrel, I'll have you up as sure as you are born'. *Cabman.* 'What, summons me! Oh no, you won't, my Lord. You'll never take the trouble'. (*Exit* Cabman with 3*s.* 6*d.* over his fare.)

And the sensitive, timid, retiring, shamefaced; because they are not 'combative', inclined to contest the point, to stand out, in the matter of gain. *αἰσχυντηλός*, II 6. 27, 12. 10, it is characteristic of young men: whereas Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1128 *b* 20, *πρεσβύτερον οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός.* Plat. Charm. 158 C, Legg. II 665 E, *αἰσχυντηλῶς ᾄδοντες.* Vict. cites Aristoph. Equit. 264, *καὶ σκοπεῖς γε τῶν πολιτῶν ὅστις ἐστὶν ἀμνοκῶν, πλούσιος καὶ μὴ πονηρὸς καὶ τρέμων τὰ πράγματα.*

§ 20. 'And those who have been wronged by many and yet never prosecuted, or taken vengeance on, the aggressors, these being what the proverb calls *Mysians' spoil*', that is, an easy prey. Μυσῶν λεία *dicitur de possessione quae defensore caret et obnoxia est direptori cuivis*, Dissen ad Dem. de Corona, § 72; of anything that may be plundered with impunity, Liddell and Scott, *Lex.*; *von allem durchaus preisgegebenen*, Rost u. Palm, *L.* Harpocration and Suidas, s. vv., both explain the origin of the proverb to be the defenceless state of Mysia during the absence of their king Telephus, the famous beggar-hero of Euripides, and Horace's type of a pauper. See also Stallbaum's note on Gorgias 521 B, who quotes Olympiodorus (on the passage of Plato), *ἡ παροιμία αὕτη ἐκ τοῦ Τηλέφου ἐστὶν Εὐριπίδου, ἐκεῖ γάρ κ.τ.λ.* Whatever may be the origin of this proverb, it certainly was not *derived* from Euripides' play: for Harpocration expressly says that it is to be found in Strattis (the Comic poet) and Simonides *ἐν ἰάμβοις.* This last is probably Simonides of Amorgos, a

21 παροιμίαν τούτους Μυσῶν λείαν. καὶ οὓς μηδεπώποτε καὶ οὓς πολλάκις· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἀφύλακτοι,
22 οἳ μὲν ὡς οὐδέποτε, οἳ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι. καὶ τοὺς

very early writer; but if it be the other Simonides, of Ceos, it is equally impossible that he could have *derived* it from Euripides, since he died when Euripides was a child.

The above explanations seem to be founded upon the *helpless condition* of the Mysian people under some special circumstances which deprived them of their ordinary means of self-defence. I should rather suppose that the proverb implies an imputation upon their *national character*, because *another* proverbial expression, at least as common as this, represents the Mysians, as sharing with the Carians, the reputation of being the vilest and most contemptible of mankind; the property of such mean and cowardly wretches would naturally be *an easy prey* to any one who chose to take it. This imputation of cowardice or weakness is directly conveyed by Aristotle in the passage before us. This brings the two proverbs together as the expression of the same features of national character. This will furnish a sufficient explanation of Gorg. 521 B, εἰ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, and we need not have recourse with Stallbaum and Heindorf (ad loc. § 162) to the Μυσῶν λείαν to interpret it. This proverbial contempt for the Mysian character appears in Rhes. 251, Pl. Theaet. 209 (Schol. in Heindorf and Stallbaum), Magnes, (Com.) Fr. Poastriae (in Meineke's *Fragm. Comic. Gr.* II 11), Philemon, Sicel. fr. 3 (Meineke u. s. IV 25), Menand. Androg. VII (Schol. Gorg. u. s., and Mein. IV 86), and Menand. Fr. Inc. 481 (Mein. IV 327), all in the words Μυσῶν ὁ ἔσχατος, 'the last and lowest—even of the Mysians', worthlessness can go no further. Cic. pro Flacco, 27. 65, *quid in Graeco sermone tam tritum et celebratum est, quam si quis despicatui ducitur, ut 'Mysorum ultimus' esse dicatur.* Ib. 2. 3; 40. 100; Orat. VIII 27, *quonam igitur modo audiretur Mysus aut Phryx Athenis, quum etiam Demosthenes, &c.* ad Quint. Fratr. I 1. 6 *hominis ne Graeci quidem, at Mysii aut Phrygii potius.* (Erasm. Adag. *Mysorum postremus*, p. 354.) The other form of the proverb occurs in Dem. de Cor. p. 248, § 72, τὴν Μυσῶν λείαν καλουμένην, in Strattis, Medea, (fr. Harpocr.) Mein. II 776. (Erasm. Adag. *Mysorum praeda*, p. 1774.)

§ 21. καὶ οὓς μηδεπώποτε καὶ οὓς πολλάκις] sc. ἠδικήκασι. Both those who have never yet been injured and those who have been often injured (by the proposed wrong-doer) are proper objects of wrong: both of them are likely to be unprepared or taken off their guard (see on ἀφύλακτα, § 5, *supra*), the one because they feel secure and are careless from ignorance of all injurious treatment, and the others because they have already had so much of it that they think they must now be exempt from it for the future; that fortune or the Gods must be tired of persecuting them.

οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐδέποτε, οἱ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι] sc. ἀδικούμενοι. The participle will suit both constructions. Soph. Oed. Col. 965, τάχ' ἄν τι μηνίουσιν εἰς γένος πάλαι expressing 'likelihood', and convertible with οἳ τάχ' ἄν τι μηνίοιεν. (Hermann ad loc. 969.) Matth., *Gr. Gr.* § 599 C, quotes this passage as an illustration of ἂν with a participle signifying 'mere possibility

διαβεβλημένους ἢ εὐδιαβόλους· οἱ τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οὔτε προαιροῦνται, φοβούμενοι τοὺς κριτάς, οὔτε δύνανται
23 πείθειν· ὧν οἱ μισούμενοι καὶ φθονούμενοι εἰσίν. καὶ
πρὸς οὓς ἔχουσι πρόφασιν ἢ προγόνων ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ P. 1373.
φίλων ἢ ποιησάντων κακῶς ἢ μελλησάντων ἢ αὐτοὺς

or probability, a conjecture or a modest indefiniteness', distinguishing this from the general case which is exemplified in § 598 *b*. There is no ground for this distinction; the particle in both alike has its usual conditional signification; and the likelihood or probability and the rest is only one of the conditions under which the act is conceived. Here it expresses the opinion or expectation (ὡς) that they would be no longer likely to be exposed, or under such conditions or circumstances as would expose them, to wrong.

§ 22. And those that have already been the subjects of hostile charges, suspicion, calumny (all included in διαβάλλειν, 'to set one man at variance with, or against, another'), and such as are especially exposed or liable to it (easily calumniated, &c.); for such as these have neither the will (to prosecute) from fear of the judges (who are prejudiced against them), nor are they able to persuade (the judges, for the same reason, if they brought this case before a court of law): and to this class belong all that are hated and envied.

φθονούμενοι] On the *irregular passive*, see Appendix B (at the end of this Book).

§ 23. καὶ (ἀδικοῦσι τούτους) πρὸς οὓς ἔχουσι πρόφασιν] 'and those again are liable to injury against whom there is (*lit.* others have) any available pretext' (real or supposed for attacking, or doing them wrong) 'of injury received or threatened by their ancestors or themselves or their friends against *themselves* or *their* forefathers, or those whom they care for, (are interested in); because, as the proverb has it, villany only wants a pretext'.

For μελλησάντων Brandis' *Anonymus* (ap. Schneidewin's *Philologus*, IV, 1, p. 44) read μελετησάντων; no great improvement.

μέλλειν, to be about to do, hence of something *impending* or *threatening*. Plat. Theaet. 148 E, of the intention; see Stallbaum's note; of a *threatening* attitude or posture, μέλλησις. Thuc. I 69, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, and IV 126, Brasidas (of the *threatening* demonstrations of the barbarians before the battle), οὗτοι δὲ τὴν μέλλησιν μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἀπείροις φοβεράν.

The proverb 'any pretext will serve a knave' is thus expressed by Menander, Thettale, Fr. 1. (Meineke IV 133), μικρά γε πρόφασίς ἐστι τοῦ πρᾶξαι κακῶς, ap. Stob. Flor. IV 40. To the same effect, Eurip. Iph. Aul. 1180, ἐπεὶ βραχείας προφάσεως ἐνδεῖ μόνον, ἐφ' ᾗ σ' ἐγὼ καὶ παῖδες αἱ λελειμμέναι δεξόμεθα δέξιν ἥν σε δέξασθαι χρεών.

Victorius refers to a story of Agathocles tyrant of Sicily, in Plutarch, as an illustration of this topic. It is told (in the *de sera numinis vindicta* 557 B) of the Corcyreans, Ἀγαθοκλῆς δὲ ὁ Συρακοσίων τύραννος καὶ σὺν γέλωτι χλευάζων Κερκυραίους ἐρωτῶντας, διὰ τί πορθοίη τὴν νῆσον αὐτῶν,

ἢ προγόνους ἢ ὧν κήδονται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ παροιμία, 24 προφάσεως δεῖται μόνον ἡ πονηρία. καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ τοὺς φίλους· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ῥᾴδιον, τοὺς δ' ἡδύ. καὶ τοὺς ἀφίλους. καὶ τοὺς μὴ δεινοὺς εἰπεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι· ἢ γαρ οὐκ ἐγχειροῦσιν ἐπεξιέναι, ἢ καταλλάτ-
25 τονται, ἢ οὐδὲν περαίνουσιν. καὶ οἷς μὴ λυσιτελεῖ

ὅτι, νὴ Δία, εἶπεν, οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν ὑπεδέξαντο τὸν Ὀδυσσέα' and then of the people of Ithaca, καὶ τῶν Ἰθακησίων ὁμοίως ἐγκαλούντων ὅτι πρόβατα λαμβάνουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ στρατιῶται, ὁ δὲ ὑμέτερος, ἔφη, βασιλεὺς ἐλθὼν πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸν ποιμένα προσεξετύφλωσεν. And the last is repeated, Apophth. 176 F.

§ 24. 'And friends as well as enemies; the former from the ease, the latter from the pleasure, of the undertaking and its success'. Theognis 1219, ἐχθρὸν μὲν χαλεπὸν καὶ δυσμενεῖ ἐξαπατῆσαι, Κύρνε· φίλον δὲ φίλῳ ῥᾴδιον ἐξαπατᾶν. Lysias, κατ' Ἀνδοκίδου § 7, p. 103 ult. (of Andocides), ὃς τέχνην ταύτην ἔχει, τοὺς μὲν ἐχθροὺς μηδὲν ποιεῖν κακόν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους ὅτι ἂν δύνηται κακόν. Victorius.

'And the friendless. And those who have *no* skill and practice in speaking or action (business)'; (the opposite of them, οἱ εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρακτικοί, are opposite also in disposition; they are of those that are inclined to do wrong, § 2); 'for these either make no attempt at all to prosecute, or if they *do* make the attempt, soon come to an agreement, or if they *do* carry on the prosecution, produce no effect (bring it to no conclusion, make nothing of it)'. These are the ἀπράγμονες, the ordinary victims of the Cleons, and public informers, the συκοφάνται, and all other troublesome and mischievous people, who, like fever-fits or nightmares, τοὺς πατέρας τ' ἦγχον νύκτωρ καὶ τοὺς πάππους ἀπέπνιγον, κατακλινόμενοί τ' ἐπὶ ταῖς κοίταις ἐπὶ τοῖσιν ἀπράγμοσιν ὑμῶν ἀντωμοσίας καὶ προσκλήσεις καὶ μαρτυρίας συνεκόλλων (Arist. Vesp. 1039), and, κἄν τιν' αὐτῶν γνῷς (Cleon) ἀπράγμον' ὄντα καὶ κεχηνότα καταγαγὼν ἐκ Χεῤῥονήσου διαλαβὼν ἠγκύρισας... καὶ σκοπεῖς γε τῶν πολιτῶν ὅστις ἐστὶν ἀμνοκῶν, πλούσιος καὶ μὴ πονηρὸς καὶ τρέμων τὰ πράγματα, Equit. 261. On the impossibility of leading a quiet life at Athens, see Criton's case in Xen. Mem. II 9. 1, οἶδα δέ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ Κρίτωνος ἀκούσαντα ὡς χαλεπὸν ὁ βίος Ἀθήνησιν εἴη ἀνδρὶ βουλομένῳ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. νῦν γάρ, ἔφη, ἐμέ τινες εἰς δίκας ἄγουσιν, οὐχ ὅτι ἀδικοῦνται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅτι νομίζουσιν ἥδιον ἄν με ἀργύριον τελέσαι ἢ πράγματα ἔχειν. It ends by Criton's taking one of these 'sycophants' into his own service, like a dog, as he describes him, to keep off these wolves from his flocks.

§ 25. And those to whom it is unprofitable to waste their time in waiting for the trial or payment of the fine or penalty, such as strangers and farmers (who live in the *country*, and are so completely occupied in the cultivation of their land, that they cannot afford to waste time in attending the law-courts in the city); such as these are inclined to settle their differences on easy terms (διαλύεσθαι, to dissolve, break off, put an end to, and so make up, a quarrel), and readily leave off (drop) the prose-

διατρίβειν ἐπιτηροῦσιν ἢ δίκην ἢ ἔκτισιν, οἷον οἱ ξένοι καὶ αὐτουργοί· ἐπὶ μικρῷ τε γὰρ διαλύονται καὶ
26 ῥαδίως καταπαύονται. καὶ τοὺς πολλὰ ἠδικηκότας, ἢ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἀδικοῦνται· ἐγγὺς γάρ τι δοκεῖ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἶναι, ὅταν τι τοιοῦτον ἀδικηθῇ τις οἷον εἰώθει καὶ αὐτὸς ἀδικεῖν· λέγω δ' οἷον εἴ τις τὸν

cution. 'Strangers', who are merely passing through Athens, and incessantly occupied either with business or sight-seeing, have of course no time to spare in dancing attendance at the law-courts; and 'farmers', '*cultivators* of their *own land*', just as little, for the reason already mentioned. These *αὐτουργοί*, 'independent cultivators', constitute the *δῆμος γεωργικός*, and are the best sort of democratical population, Pol. VII (VI) 4, init. *βέλτιστος δῆμος ὁ γεωργικός ἐστιν*, a statement often repeated. One of the reasons for this is, 1318 *a* 12, *διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἄσχολος, ὥστε μὴ πολλάκις ἐκκλησιάζειν*, and the same would prevent them from waiting at the courts of law. This is confirmed by Eurip. Orest. 919, *ὀλιγάκις ἄστυ κἀγορᾶς χραίνων κύκλον, αὐτουργός, οἵπερ καὶ μόνοι σῴζουσι γῆν.* To the same effect, Pol. VI (IV) 6, sub init., the *γεωργοί, ἔχουσιν ἐργαζόμενοι ζῆν, οὐ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν.* Comp. Eur. Suppl. 420, *γαπόνος δ' ἀνὴρ πένης ...ἔργων ὕπο οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο πρὸς τὰ κοίν' ἀποβλέπειν.* The praises of agriculture and agriculturists are sung by Xenophon, Oecon. VI §§ 8, 9, 10, XV 9, and elsewhere. In Rhet. II 4. 9, the *αὐτουργοί* are distinguished from the *γεωργικοί*, the latter being confined to farmers and agricultural labourers, *αὐτουργοί* being extended to all that work with their own hands. See Thuc. I 141. 3, and Arnold's note. Thucydides does not observe Aristotle's distinction, the *αὐτουργοί* here are *γεωργοί* in the next chapter.

§ 26. And those who have committed either many wrongs themselves, or wrongs of the same kind as they are now suffering: for it seems almost no injustice at all, when a man has the same wrong inflicted on him as he himself was in the habit of inflicting (upon others); an assault, for instance, committed on a man who is habitually guilty of wanton insolence or outrage.

αἰκία and *ὕβρις* are thus legally distinguished. *αἰκία* is *personal* violence, a blow, or an assault, *εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰκίζεσθαι πληγαῖς*, Pol. VIII (V) 10, 1311 *b* 24, and is the subject of a *δίκη* or private action between citizen and citizen. ' *ὕβρις* is threefold, (1) *δι' αἰσχρουργίας*, (2) *διὰ πληγῶν* (this is further defined *μετὰ προπηλακισμοῦ*, which distinguishes it from *αἰκία*), *διὰ λόγων*; that is, a violation of the feeling of personal dignity and sense of honour, humiliating, degrading, scornful, wanton, language or acts; the *mental* injury constituting a great part of the offence. This appears in Aristotle's definition of it, Rhet. II 2. 5, *τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνη ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ* (not for any profit to himself) *ἀλλ' ὅπως ἡσθῇ* (out of mere wantonness and pleasure in the insult itself). So that *ὕβρις* is a mixture of intentional insult and wantonness or 'wanton insult'. To the same effect is the observation in I 13. 10, that it *προσσημαίνει τὴν προαίρεσιν*, 'implies deliberate intention'. This then is the

27 εἰωθότα ὑβρίζειν αἰκίσαιτο. καὶ τοὺς ἢ πεποιηκότας κακῶς ἢ βουληθέντας ἢ βουλομένους ἢ ποιήσοντας· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ
28 ἀδικεῖν φαίνεται. καὶ οἷς χαριοῦνται ἢ φίλοις ἢ θαυμαζομένοις ἢ ἐρωμένοις ἢ κυρίοις ἢ ὅλως πρὸς οὓς ζῶσιν αὐτοί. καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἔστιν ἐπιεικείας τυχεῖν.

ground of the distinction between αἰκία and ὕβρις, and the reason for the latter being made the object of a γραφή, or public prosecution, the honour of the state being considered as compromised in the insult to one of its members. See further on this subject, Meier und Schömann *Der Attische Process*, p. 319 seq.

Hippodamus, the legislator of Miletus, who drew the plans and laid out the Piraeus, and was the architect of Thurii on its foundation, and of Rhodes, divided crimes into three kinds, as we learn from Pol. II 8, 1267 *b* 38, περὶ ὧν γὰρ αἱ δίκαι γίνονται, τρία ταῦτ' εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὕβριν, βλάβην, θάνατον, i.e. (1) crimes by which the feelings are wounded and the sense of personal dignity wantonly outraged, (2) those which involve loss or damage to person or property, and (3) murder and homicide.

§ 27. And (in the way of retaliation) those who have either already done, or have intended, or are intending, or will certainly do, us mischief: because this retaliation or compensation carries with it (ἔχει) not only pleasure (sensual or intellectual, chiefly the latter in this case) but also (a sense of) right (the *moral* object of conduct), and so it seems bordering upon almost no wrong at all. 'Retaliation' or 'compensation' is *right* upon principles of justice, τὸ δίκαιον; of which the 'reciprocal' or 'retaliatory' is one of the three kinds, Eth. Nic. V c. 5, arising from the subdivision of the original two, διανεμητική, 'distributive', and διορθωτική, 'corrective'; the latter having two divisions, (1) rectification of, or compensation for, *frauds* and *crimes*, διορθωτική proper, and (2) τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός (c. 8) the justice that regulates exchanges and commercial transactions.

The difference between this topic and that of § 23, καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἔχουσι —κήδονται is, according to Victorius, that the motive or occasion of the wrong in either case is not the same. In the one the wrong-doer seeks a pretence or pretext for injuring his neighbour, in the other the occasion comes unsought; the wrong would not have been done had it not been provoked by previous injury.

§ 28. καὶ οἷς χαριοῦνται] and those by whom, i.e. by whose injury, they will oblige either their friends, or those whom they admire and respect, or love, or their masters (any one who has power over them) or those by whose opinions or authority they direct their life and conduct.

πρὸς οὓς ζῶσιν] in reference to whom they live, who are their guides and authorities in life and action: or, on whom they depend, to whom they look for support or subsistence; as a 'dependant' does. To which is opposed in I 9. 27, ἐλευθέρου τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν, 'independence', αὐτάρκεια, where you *don't* look to any one else but yourself. See the note there, p. 173.

29 καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐγκεκληκότες ὦσι καὶ προδιακεχωρηκότες, οἷον Κάλλιππος ἐποίει τὰ περὶ Δίωνα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ

καὶ πρὸς οὓς] 'those, in reference to whom', that is in our relations (or dealings) with whom, it is possible (we may expect) to meet with indulgence or merciful consideration. On *ἐπιείκεια*, see Introd. p. 190—93.

Victorius, followed by Vater, would connect this clause immediately with the preceding, *πρὸς οὓς ζῶσιν αὐτοί, καὶ πρὸς οὓς κ.τ.λ.* in order to avoid a supposed repetition of a former topic, § 14, *καὶ οἷς ἂν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς τυχεῖν*. Vater, who supplies this explanation, forgets that the two topics are differently applied; in § 14 the *expectation* of indulgent consideration is assigned as a motive of action in the agent; in this section it is a *disposition* in the *patient* which subjects him to wrong: though it is true that the feeling or tendency itself resides in both cases in the same person. Besides this, the union of these two seems to be an improper conjunction of two heterogeneous dispositions, a sort of moral *ζεῦγμα*; taking a man for the guide of your life or depending upon him, and relying upon his merciful consideration, are not closely enough connected to warrant their being classed together. I have therefore retained Bekker's punctuation, which makes them separate topics.

§ 29. And if we have had cause of complaint against any one, or a previous difference with him, (we do to him) as Callippus did in the affair of Dion; for things of that kind (a wrong deed done under such circumstances) *appear to us* (personally and at that time, not always or in general,) to border upon, bear a close resemblance to, acts altogether innocent.

προδιακεχωρηκότες] *διαχωρεῖν* is used here as the neuter of *διαχωρίζειν*, to separate. In this sense it is almost a *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον*. No authority for this use of the word is given by Stephens or any other Lexicon earlier than Arrian. It represents morally and metaphorically a 'split', or 'separation', 'parting asunder' of intercourse and interests between two friends.

ἐποίει] The *imperfect* here seems unmeaning, as the act is only one. Spengel, in his Edition, 1867, has adopted without remark *ἐποίησε* from MSS Q, Y[b], Z[b].

Κάλλιππος...τὰ περὶ Δίωνα] Plutarch. Vit. Dion. I 982, de Sera Numinis Vindicta c. 16. The story is thus told by Victorius. Callippus was an Athenian, friend and companion of Dion during his stay at Athens, and the partner of his expedition to Sicily for the liberation of his native country. By his conduct and services he had ingratiated himself with Dion's mercenaries, whom he incited to murder their general, and thereby made himself master of Syracuse. Before this, he had spread calumnious reports about Dion and excited the citizens against him. Dion being informed of this took no precautions for his own safety; partly in scorn of the attempt, and partly because he was unwilling to preserve his own power and life at the expense of the destruction of his friends: the scheme accordingly took effect, and Dion was shortly after put to death. Aristotle says upon this that Callippus justified the act by arguing that as Dion had now knowledge of his designs, and his own life

30 τοιαῦτα ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαίνεται. καὶ τοὺς ὑπ' ἄλλων μέλλοντας, ἂν μὴ αὐτοί, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐνδεχόμενον βουλεύσασθαι, ὥσπερ λέγεται Αἰνεσίδημος

was in danger, this anticipation of the other, was a mere measure of precaution or retaliation, and no crime at all. This suspicion of Callippus is the ground of his *complaint* and the occasion of the *previous difference*, or sundering of their apparent friendship. [Arnold Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, III 2. p. 159, 160.]

§ 30. καὶ τοὺς ὑπ' ἄλλων μέλλοντας (ἀδικεῖσθαι), ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ (ἀδικῶσιν αὐτούς)] Another motive in the aggressor to commit a wrong, another circumstance which renders its intended object especially liable to it, arises, when the victim is in such a position that the wrong *will* be done by somebody else (ὑπ' ἄλλων) if we don't do it ourselves, or take the initiative—this seems to us a justification of the act of aggression which in other circumstances would be a gross wrong—and the necessity of immediate action allows no time for deliberation. That this is a sort of justification of such an act appears in the conduct attributed to Ænesidemus towards Gelo: the latter (tyrant of Syracuse) had anticipated him (the tyrant of Leontini) in reducing and enslaving some state that was neighbour of both: Aenesidemus sends a present to Gelo of eggs, cakes, and sweetmeats, the ordinary prize of the game of κότταβος, as a prize, in acknowledgment of his superior foresight, quickness and dexterity, shewn in his 'anticipation' of himself, ὅτι ἔφθασεν, admitting at the same time that he had had an eye to it himself. This shows that Aenesidemus thought it 'hardly a crime', ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, a justifiable act; and also illustrates the extreme liability to aggression and wrong involved in the position of this 'neighbouring state', which would have been wronged in any case by some one else, ὑπ' ἄλλων μέλλοντας, at any rate, even if Gelo (who here represents the αὐτοί, the man who takes the initiative) had not done it himself.

As Casaubon has observed, there is some object understood after ἀνδραποδισαμένῳ. The simple τινάς or τινὰ πόλιν, will answer the purpose. Nothing more is known about the circumstances of the case.

The person here called Αἰνεσίδημος, in Herod. Αἰνησίδημος, and in Pindar Αἰνησίδαμος, is mentioned twice in Herodotus, VII 154 as the son of one Patäicus, and a member of the body-guard of Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, and in c. 165, as the father of Thero, sovereign (μούναρχος) of Agrigentum, to whom Pindar's second Olympian Ode is dedicated. In Pindar his name occurs three times, but only as the father of Thero, Ol. II 46, III 9, and of him and Xenocrates, Isthm. II 41. To reconcile Herodotus' statement about him with that of Aristotle here, we may perhaps suppose that Aenesidemus had made himself master of Agrigentum, on the throne of which he was succeeded by his son Thero, before the period to which this story belongs. Aristotle's narrative certainly represents him as a sovereign prince, and not as a mere mercenary in another's service. Victorius, followed by Schrader, calls him 'tyrant of Leontini', but gives no authority.

Γέλωνι πέμψαι κοττάβια ἀνδραποδισαμένῳ, ὅτι p. 45.
31 ἔφθασεν, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς μέλλων. καὶ οὓς ἀδικήσαντες
δυνήσονται πολλὰ δίκαια πράττειν, ὡς ῥᾳδίως ἰασό-
μενοι, ὥσπερ ἔφη Ἰάσων ὁ Θετταλὸς δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἔνια,
32 ὅπως δύνηται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν. καὶ ἃ πάντες
ἢ πολλοὶ ἀδικεῖν εἰώθασιν· συγγνώμης γὰρ οἴονται

κοττάβια] On the game of κότταβος, the modes of playing it, and its varieties, see Becker, *Charicles, on the Greek Games*, Excursus III to Sc. VI, p. 349. Our information upon the subject is principally derived from Athen. XI 58, p. 479 C—E, and XV 1, 665 seq., and Pollux VI 109. We learn from Athenaeus, on the authority of Dicaearchus (479 D) that it was a Sicilian invention and most fashionable in that country, (cf. XV 666 B), ἡ τῶν κοττάβων εὕρεσις Σικελική ἐστι παιδιά, ταύτην πρώτων εὑρόντων Σικελῶν. Further we are told that the winner at the game received a prize, 667 D, ὅτι δὲ ἆθλον προὔκειτο τῷ εὖ προεμένῳ τὸν κότταβον προείρηκε μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἀντιφάνης· ᾠὰ γάρ ἐστι καὶ πεμμάτια καὶ τραγήματα. Similarly from Hegesander, 479 D, τοσαύτη δὲ ἐγένετο σπουδὴ περὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα ὥστε εἰς τὰ συμπόσια παρεισφέρειν ἆθλα κοττάβια καλούμενα. From Gaisford's observation that the form κοττάβεια occurs in at least three *verses*, in Ath. XV 666 E, 667 F, it seems that both this and κοττάβιον were in use. Gaisford unnecessarily infers from it that there was only one, and that κοττάβειον.

§ 31. And those to whom the wrong can be readily compensated, or more than compensated by just acts, because such wrongs admit of an easy cure;—an instance of this is the saying of Jason of Pherae, that we are bound to commit some wrongs in order that we may have the opportunity of doing justice on a larger scale. The saying itself is to be found in somewhat different words in Plutarch, πολ. παραγγέλμ. 817 F (Buhle), it was always applied, ἐφ' οἷς ἐβιάζετο καὶ παρηνώχλει τινὰς ἀεὶ λεγομένην, to his various acts of oppression and annoyance, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀδικεῖν τὰ μικρὰ τοὺς βουλομένους τὰ μεγάλα δικαιοπραγεῖν. This is in fact Robin Hood's plea, that he robbed the rich to give to the poor. This topic may be further illustrated by Bassanio's appeal to the judge, *Merchant of Venice*, Act IV. Sc. 1, line 209, *And I beseech you, Wrest once the law to your authority: To do a great right do a little wrong, And curb this cruel devil of his will.*

§ 32. Victorius observes that we here enter upon a new division of the chapter. The analysis has been hitherto confined to *persons* prone to wrong and liable to wrong: it is now applied to certain classes of *things* or circumstances which increase the liability to wrong. These are kinds of ἀδικήματα. It is in fact a transition to the subject of the next chapter. Such are offences of very common occurrence; men are tempted to commit such because they think they shall meet with indulgence: people have become so familiar with the offence by constant association (συνηθείᾳ) that it has lost its repulsive character; and also they may argue that if 'all or many' are guilty of it, it must be a human infirmity, and being a *natural* defect is hardly to be called a vice.

33 τεύξεσθαι. καὶ τὰ ῥᾴδια κρύψαι· τοιαῦτα δ' ὅσα
ταχὺ ἀναλίσκεται, οἷον τὰ ἐδώδιμα. ἢ τὰ εὐμετά-
34 βλητα σχήμασιν ἢ χρώμασιν ἢ κράσεσιν, ἢ ἃ πολλα-
χοῦ ἀφανίσαι εὔπορον· τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ εὐβάστακτα
35 καὶ ἐν μικροῖς τόποις ἀφανιζόμενα. καὶ οἷς ἀδιάφορα
καὶ ὅμοια πολλὰ προϋπῆρχε τῷ ἀδικοῦντι. καὶ ὅσα
αἰσχύνονται οἱ ἀδικηθέντες λέγειν, οἷον γυναικῶν
οἰκείων ὕβρεις ἢ εἰς αὑτοὺς ἢ εἰς υἱεῖς. καὶ ὅσα φιλο-

§ 33. Crimes and the products of them that are easy to conceal, especially in the case of stealing, which is here most prominent in the author's thoughts. Such are things that are soon consumed, as eatables, or things that can be easily changed (in their appearance, without losing their value; so that they shall not be recognized, and the theft escape detection), in respect of their shape (as plate and coin by melting), or colour (cloth or silk by dyeing), or mixture (as liquids of all kinds). Victorius refers to Cic. de Fin. v 25. 74, of the Stoics, *Atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum quas ceperunt signa commutant, sic illi ut sententiis nostris* (sc. Academicorum) *pro suis uterentur nomina tanquam rerum notas mutaverunt.* There is about the same amount of resemblance in this topic to that of § 8, as we found in § 28 (*q. v.*) to that of § 14; the circumstance is nearly the same, the application different.

§ 34. Or things that are easy to make away with, put out of sight (*effacer*, cause to disappear) in many different ways; such are things portable, which can be hid away in holes and corners (*lit.* small places).

§ 35. And things (stolen goods), *like* others, of which the thief has already a good many in his possession, either exactly like (with no difference at all between them) or nearly like (bearing a general resemblance, and so not easy to distinguish). The first is the case of coins or medals, and in general, things that are made in sets, one exactly like another.

ἀδιάφορος, which in the sense here assigned to it seems to be a *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον*, is not to be confounded either with the logical signification of it—Anal. Post. II 13, 97 *b* 31, *ἐν τοῖς καθόλου ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις*, Top. A 7, *ἀδιάφορα τὸ εἶδος, ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος*; this is 'without *specific* difference', 'an individual'—or with the meaning it bears in the Stoic philosophy, things 'indifferent', without any *moral* differences, neither good nor bad; from which our sense of the word is derived.

'And things which the injured party is ashamed to reveal: as any outrage committed upon the women of one's own family, or one's self or one's children'. Victorius quotes Lysias, c. Simon. § 3, *μάλιστα δ' ἀγανακτῶ, ὦ βουλή, ὅτι περὶ τοιούτων πραγμάτων εἰπεῖν ἀναγκασθήσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐγὼ αἰσχυνόμενος, εἰ μέλλοιεν πολλοί μοι συνείσεσθαι, ἠνεσχόμην ἀδικούμενος.*

καὶ ὅσα φιλοδικεῖν] *ὅσα* cognate accusative for *ὅσας δίκας*; or perhaps the local accus., 'the cases in which (as the seat of them) the litigious spirit is shewn', Appendix B, note 1, at the end of this Book.

δικεῖν δόξειεν ἂν ὁ ἐπεξιών· τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε μικρὰ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς συγγνώμη.

1 ὡς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι, καὶ ποῖα καὶ ποίους CHAP. XIII. P. 1373 b.
καὶ διὰ τί, σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν· τὰ δ' ἀδικήματα πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διέλωμεν, ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἐντεῦθεν. ὥρισται δὴ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα
2 πρός τε νόμους [δύο] καὶ πρὸς οὕς ἐστι, διχῶς. λέγω δὲ νόμον τὸν μὲν ἴδιον τὸν δὲ κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν τὸν

'And all cases in which prosecution would seem to indicate a litigious spirit in the prosecutor': that is, where the offence is trifling, or, again, in the case of acts that deserve indulgence—some of which are mentioned in c. 13. 16, 17. Victorius refers to Lysias, *κατὰ Θεομνήστου* A § 2, *ἐγὼ δ', εἰ μὲν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ με ἀπεκτονέναι ᾐτιᾶτο, συγγνώμην ἂν εἶχον αὐτῷ τῶν εἰρημένων· οὐδ' εἴ τι ἄλλο τῶν ἀπορρήτων ἤκουσα, οὐκ ἂν ἐπεξῆλθον αὐτῷ, ἀνελεύθερον γὰρ καὶ λίαν φιλόδικον εἶναι νομίζω κακηγορίας δικάζεσθαι.*

The chapter concludes with a summary enumeration of its contents. 'So now of the characters and dispositions that incline men to crime, the several kinds of those crimes, the characters that invite crime, and the motives that incite to crime, we have given a tolerably complete (*σχεδόν*) account', or analysis.

CHAP. XIII.

A connected sketch of the contents of the following chapter, a particular account of *ἐπιείκεια* or equity, and of the relations of the different kinds of 'law', will be found in the Introduction, p. 187—193, and on p. 239 (Appendix E to chap. XIII).

It analyses and classifies actions right and wrong, first from the *strictly legal*, and secondly from the *equitable* or moral point of view. Equity is the principle of merciful consideration, that indulgent view of men's actions which makes allowance for human infirmities, looks rather to the intention than the act, and thus mitigates or corrects (*ἐπανορθοῖ*) the strict rigour of the 'written law'.

§ 1. 'In distinguishing or analysing wrong and right acts, let us commence with the following consideration' (or, let us take the following for our starting-point). On *δικαίωμα* here 'an [illegible]just act', the opposite of *ἀδίκημα*, and its various senses, see note on I 3. 9, p. 56. 'Accordingly the definition of justice and injustice has reference to two kinds of "law" (§ 2), and two kinds of persons (§ 3)'. The divisions of just and unjust depend upon their relation to two kinds of law, and two kinds of persons: *πάντα ὁρίζεται τῷ τέλει.*

§ 2. 'I distinguish therefore two kinds of law, the special and the universal; and by special, I mean that which is determined in each people or nation (separately or individually) by themselves, (*lit.* that which has for each class of people or nation its definition directed or referred to themselves,) by their own peculiar habits, customs, feelings, opinions, form of government, and this either unwritten or written' (see

ἑκάστοις ὡρισμένον πρὸς αὑτούς, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν μὲν ἄγραφον τὸν δὲ γεγραμμένον, κοινὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν. ἔστι γάρ, ὃ μαντεύονταί τι πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, κἂν μηδεμία κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾖ μηδὲ συνθήκη, οἷον καὶ ἡ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνη φαίνεται λέγουσα, ὅτι δίκαιον ἀπειρημένον θάψαι τὸν Πολυνείκη, ὡς φύσει ὂν τοῦτο δίκαιον·

οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε
ζῇ τοῦτο, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη.

καὶ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ

in explanation of this, Introd. Appendix E p. 242—244); 'and by universal law, the "law of Nature".' For there is, as all are instinctively convinced, a natural and universal notion of right and wrong, quite independent of any mutual communication (association, intercourse) or compact, such as Sophocles' Antigone evidently alludes to, when she says that it is just, (right), though forbidden, (by the *positive* law of Creon's enactment) to bury Polynices, implying (ὡς, on the supposition that) that this is naturally right.

Not of today nor yet of yesterday
Is this, but everlasting is its life,
And none doth know what time it came to light.

And, as Empedocles says about killing living animals; for this is not *right* for some and *not* right for others, 'but this same law for all (this universal law) spreads without break or flaw' (ἠνεκέως, usually διηνεκῶς, 'continuously') 'over the wide ruling sky and again over the boundless earth'.

Law universal of no human birth
Pervades the sovereign sky and boundless earth.

On the distinction of the κοινός and ἴδιος νόμος here taken, compare Eth. N. V 10 (Eth. Eud. IV 10) 1134 *b* 18 seq. quoted in Introduction, p. 241. The same distinction is found *supra* I 10. 3. On 'natural law' see Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, § 380 seq. Duke of Argyll, *Reign of Law*, Definitions of Law, c. 2.

μαντεύονται] of a presentiment or foreboding, or as here an instinctive conviction, a sort of divination; see note on I 9. 40, καταμαντεύεσθαι.

Ἀντιγόνη...λέγουσα] Soph. Antig. 456.

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει] Empedocles, Fragm. lines 404—5. Karsten ad loc. p. 281 says, 'Scaliger ad vocabulum αὐγῆς in margine annotavit lect. αὖ γῆς. Codices variant (the best including A^c appear to give αὐγῆς); hoc perperam recepit Bekkerus, quem plures sunt secuti, qui loci sensum parum habuerunt perspectum.' Spengel follows Bekker in reading αὖ γῆς. In illustration of the doctrine alluded to in the lines quoted, Karsten cites Diogenes Laertius, de Pythag. VIII 13, *qui dicit, eum vetare* ἅπτεσθαι τῶν ζῴων, κοινὸν δίκαιον ἡμῖν ἐχόντων τῆς ψυχῆς; and Sextus Empiricus adv. Math. IX 127, who says that the entire school of Pythagoras and

ἔμψυχον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τισὶ μὲν δίκαιον τισὶ δ' οὐ δίκαιον,

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διά τ' εὐρυμέδοντος
αἰθέρος ἠνεκέως τέταται διά τ' ἀπλέτου αὖ γῆς.

3 *καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ* Μεσσηνιακῷ *λέγει* Ἀλκιδάμας*...πρὸς οὓς δέ*[1], *δίχα ὥρισται· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς ἕνα* p. 46.

[1] + *διώρισται infra.*

Empedocles, and all the Italians, assert that we have intercourse not only with the Gods and one another, but that this extends also to irrational animals; *ἓν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου διῆκον ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ ἑνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα· διόπερ καὶ κτείνοντες αὐτὰ... ἀσεβοῦμεν.* On the interpretation of *αὐγῆς* Karsten has this note. 'Ergo *commune illud ius* pertinet *διά τ' αἰθέρος* i. e. *per aerem* (cf. annot. ad v. 105) quo omnes animantes vescuntur, *διά τ' αὐγῆς per lucidum caelum* (ut vs. 127) in quo Dii degunt'. The verse cited by Karsten in support of his interpretation of *αὐγῆς* seems insufficient for its purpose; the word there seems to have no other meaning than its ordinary one, 'sunbeam or sunlight'; I doubt if *αὐγή* could stand for 'heaven'; and perhaps it may be better to accept Bekker's reading.

On Alcidamas, see the article on the Sophistical Rhetoric, in the *Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, Vol. III. No. 9, p. 263 seq. and on the Μεσσηνιακὸς λόγος, ib. p. 257. It is quoted again, II 23. 1. Vater, and Spengel (*Artium Scriptores* p. 175), cite the anonymous Scholiast, who supplies the missing quotation thus; *ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας ὁ Θεός, οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν.* It seems to be totally inapplicable to the topic which it professes to illustrate, and if it comes from the speech at all is at all events quite out of place here. Spengel (*Praef. ad Rhet. Gr.* I vi) says of it, *fictum non verum:* but being as it is so utterly inappropriate, it can hardly have been 'manufactured' for an occasion to which it is not suitable..

Of the 'Messeniac declamation' the Schol. says that it was a *μελέτη ὑπὲρ Μεσσηνίων ἀποστησάντων Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ μὴ πειθομένων δουλεύειν.* Conf. Sauppe, ad Alcid. Fragm. 1, *Oratores Attici* III 154. [Vahlen, *der Rhetor Alkidamas*, (*Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Academie der Wissenschaften*, Vienna, 1863, pp. 491—528, esp. p. 505). S.]

§ 3. *πρὸς οὓς δὲ διώρισται, διχῶς διώρισται,* Vulg.—*δίχα ὥρισται* A[c], adopted by Bekker and Spengel [ed. 1867], omitting the first *διώρισται*: in *Rhetores Graeci* [1853] he reads [*διώρισται*] *διχῶς διώρισται,* in conformity with § 1. (I do not myself see why the first *διώρισται* need be omitted without manuscript authority.) 'In respect of the persons to whom it is referred, this division of law is twofold, for the right and wrong, justice and injustice, in acts, are referred to (severally determined by, divided in relation to) either the public, society in general, the whole community (against whom the offence is supposed to be directed), or an individual member of it. And therefore just and unjust acts are divided into two classes, according as they are directed against a single and definite individual, or the community at large. Adultery and assault are injuries or wrongs to the indi-

τῶν κοινωνούντων, ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν. διὸ καὶ τἀδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἔστιν ἀδικεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ὡρισμένον ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν· ὁ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινὰ τῶν ὡρισμένων, ὁ δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινόν.

4 *ἁπάντων δὴ τῶν ἀδικημάτων διῃρημένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ πρὸς ἄλλους, ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστι τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, λέγωμεν*

viduals, refusal to serve, or desertion, is a wrong to the entire community or nation'. This is the basis of the distinction in Attic jurisprudence between the *δίκη*, the private civil action or suit of man against man, and the *γραφή*, or public, criminal prosecution; since the latter is a state offence, common to the whole community, a public prosecution may be conducted by *ὁ βουλόμενος*, 'any one that pleases', provided, that is, he be a qualified Athenian citizen. See further on this subject, in Introd. I 13, p. 187, and Meier u. Schömann, *Der Attische Process*, Bk. III. § 2. Buttmann ad Dem. Med. § 9.

Accordingly *ὁ τύπτων* is liable to a *δίκη αἰκίας*; *ὁ μὴ στρατευόμενος*, one that either declines to serve altogether, and so fails in his duty to society and his country, or a deserter, to a *γραφὴ ἀστρατείας* or *λειποταξίου*. *μοιχεία* is here included with *αἰκία* in the class of wrongs that are the subject of a *δίκη* or *δίκη ἰδία*; under the ordinary classification it exposed the offender to a *γραφή*, a criminal prosecution, which, as it could be carried on by the husband or one of the near relations, might also properly be called *ἰδία*. Meier u. Schömann, u. s., p. 163—4, 327 seq. In this case the state, as well as the husband, considered itself aggrieved as the guardian of public morals. In illustration of this twofold aspect of a crime, Victorius quotes Cic. in Verrem, v (III) 69, 161, *quibus in rebus non solum filio, Verres, sed etiam reipublicae fecisti iniuriam: susceperas enim liberos non solum tibi sed etiam patriae.*

§ 4. 'After this division, or classification, of wrong acts, some of which are directed against the entire community, and the others against one or more *individuals*, let us first repeat our definition of *τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι*, that we may know what being treated unjustly, or suffering wrong, is, and then proceed to the rest'.

The introduction of *ἄλλους* here leads to a new distinction: a civil action between parties in their private capacity may be brought either against one or several, as when an action is brought against a club or commercial company or the partners in a firm: in either case the offence which is the subject of it is private and particular, and directed against individuals, and both of them are distinguished from state offences.

ἀναλαβόντες] to repeat or resume (take up again) seems to be a reference to I 10. 3, where *ἀδικεῖν*, the exact opposite of *ἀδικεῖσθαι*, was defined,

5 τὰ λοιπά. ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἑκόντος τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν· τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὥρισται πρότερον
6 ἑκούσιον εἶναι. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι, αἱ μὲν βλάβαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραί εἰσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ διῄρηται καθ' αὑτὰ πρότερον, καὶ
7 τὰ ἑκούσια, ὅτι ἔστιν ὅσα εἰδότες. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ

and the latter can readily be inferred from the former. This may be called a resumption, or, in a sense, a repetition of the preceding definition, or at all events of the same subject; and this seems to be confirmed by the reference, in the next sentence, to this very definition. On the entire question of the voluntary character of *ἀδίκημα* and *ἀδικία* see Eth. Nic. V 11 (Bekk.): and that of vice in general is discussed in the same work, III 7 (Bekk.). The conclusion in the two chapters of the Ethics is that which is here assumed to be the fact.

§ 5. 'To be wronged then is to be unjustly treated by a voluntary agent, for to do wrong has been previously defined to be voluntary', I 10. 3. And since 'doing' and 'suffering', action and passion, are opposites, and opposites fall under the same *γένος*, we may infer at once that if doing wrong is voluntary, suffering wrong is voluntary too—not in the patient of course, but in the agent. Comp. Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 *a* 15, *ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ ὅταν ἑκὼν τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ· ὅταν δ' ἄκων οὔτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ... ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὥρισται τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ...ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μέν, ἀδίκημα δ' οὔπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προσῇ.*

§ 6. 'Now injury, and injury against one's will, being both of them necessary to the notion of injustice or wrong, it will be clear from what has preceded, what the injuries are (*αἱ βλάβαι the* injuries of different kinds which are contained in the notion); for things good and bad *in themselves* (as opposed to the comparative goods of c. 7) have been previously analysed (in c. 6), and of things voluntary it has been stated (c. 10 § 3) that they are things done with the full knowledge' (of the special circumstances of the case. Eth. Nic. III 2). Spengel has adopted *εἴρηται* from MS A[c], for *διῄρηται* the Vulg., which Bekker retains.

§ 7. 'So that all charges (accusations, complaints of wrong) of every kind must be referred to two different distinctions, the first that of the persons offended, whether individuals and private persons, or the community at large; and the second (*ἢ καί*, 'or again'), in the nature of the act, whether it was done in ignorance or unintentionally (i.e. under compulsion, by a superior *external* force), or intentionally and with full knowledge; and of these last (*ἑκόντος καὶ εἰδότος*) either with *deliberate* purpose, malice prepense, or under the influence of passion or excited feeling'. Bekker and Spengel have omitted *καί* with MSS Q, Y[b], Z[b], *before*

ἴδιον εἶναι, καὶ ἢ ἀγνοοῦντος καὶ[1] ἄκοντος ἢ ἑκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ
8 πάθος. περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ῥηθήσεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποῖα δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες,
9 εἴρηται πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁμολογοῦντες πολλάκις πεπραχέναι ἢ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ περὶ

[1] ἢ καὶ ἀγνοοῦντος ἢ *infra*.

ἀγνοοῦντος, or rather changed the order of ἢ *καί* into *καὶ* ἤ, and substituted *καί* for ἢ *after* ἀγνοοῦντος. This is certainly unnecessary, though perhaps preferable. The sense is perfectly good as I have translated, following MS A^c, which appears to give the vulg. reading. The first *καί* is 'again', the *second* distinction: ἢ ἀγνοοῦντος of course corresponds to ἢ ἑκόντος: ἀγνοοῦντος ἢ ἄκοντος is quite defensible, the two don't always go together; τὸ ἀκούσιον includes other things besides ignorance, ὄντος τοῦ ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, Eth. N. III 3 init., the involuntary is due to external force or compulsion as well as to ignorance. This does not apply to ἑκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, because knowledge and voluntary action always do go together; voluntary action implies full knowledge of the circumstances of the case, τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. Eth. N., u. s., and see the preceding chapter on ignorance as the justification of an act. Of the two last classes of acts liable to ἐγκλήματα, τὰ προελομένου and τὰ διὰ πάθος, the former are acts done with προαίρεσις, the deliberate purpose or enlightened and deliberate intention which alone gives them their virtuous or vicious character, and stamps them as morally good or bad; the latter are acts due to the two impulses, here called πάθος, appetite and desire (ἐπιθυμία), and 'passion', any sudden and violent, especially angry, excitement (θυμός). Acts of this latter kind cannot properly be said to be involuntary, οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, Eth. N. III 3, 1111 *a* 24, because though they are done *in ignorance* (ἀγνοῶν πράττει), or in the temporary blindness of a fit of passion, they are not *due* to ignorance, δι' ἄγνοιαν, ignorance is in no sense the cause of them, and therefore no justification, Ib. III 2. These are in fact the four degrees of criminality of Eth. Nic. V 10, on which, and on this subject in general, see Introd. p. 181—9. They are afterwards reduced to the ordinary three in § 16, *infra*.

§ 8. Of θυμός we shall have to speak when we come to treat of the πάθη or emotions in II 2—11, where the second chapter gives the analysis of ὀργή, as it is there called. The motives and incentives to crimes and the intentions and dispositions of the criminals have been already dealt with (in cc. 10 and 12).

§ 9. On this and the two following sections, which refer to what were subsequently called στάσεις, *status*, the legal issues of cases, and by Aristotle ἀμφισβητήσεις, see Introd. p. 189, 190.

'But whereas it frequently happens that men when called to account for an imputed criminal act, admit the *fact*, but refuse to admit either the *title*, or name that has been applied to it' (by the prosecutor namely, who

ὃ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, οἷον λαβεῖν μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ κλέψαι, P. 1374.
καὶ πατάξαι πρότερον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ μοιχεῦσαι, ἢ κλέψαι ἀλλ' οὐχ ἱεροσυλῆσαι (οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ τι), ἢ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ

has had it registered under a certain name or title whereby it is referred to a certain class of crimes, and some particular tribunal, and has a special penalty attached to it: this is the στάσις ὁρική, *status finitivus, nomen*, or *finitio*, of the subsequent classifications), 'or that which is contained under the title' (that is, the description of the act which is *supposed* to correspond to the title, but may not actually do so): 'a man may say, for instance, that he 'took' the thing but did not 'steal' it, or that he struck the first blow but was not guilty of wanton outrage, or that there was intercourse but no adultery, or that he was guilty of theft but not of sacrilege (because the thing stolen belonged to no god), or that he had committed a trespass but not on public lands, the state domains, or had conversed (held communication) with the enemy but was guilty of no treachery—from the frequent occurrence of these and similar distinctions it becomes necessary that it should be determined what theft *is*, and what ὕβρις, and what adultery, and so on; in order that if we want to prove that the fact *is* so, or the reverse, we may be able to set in a clear light the real merits or rights (τὸ δίκαιον) of the case'.

The distinction of the ἐπίγραμμα and περὶ ὃ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα I have already indicated. The one is the στάσις ὁρική, the *name or title* by which the act should be designated, which determines the court that it shall be tried in, and is represented in all the examples given except the case of trespass: the other is the *description given of the act*, as may be seen in the instance that illustrates it, the *trespass* (the *name*) is acknowledged, but the detailed account described it as a trespass upon the *public* land, which is denied. This, if it corresponds to any of the στάσεις when they were regularly classified (on which see Introd. p. 397 seq. in Appendix E to Book III), must be the στάσις of quality, ποιότης, *quale*: but it seems certain that in Aristotle's time they had not yet been systematised and arranged under constant technical names. At all events, in this passage in the two last cases it seems that no very clear distinction is made out; or apparently intended, as appears from the mixing up together of the examples of both. Quint. III 6. 49, where Aristotle's division of στάσεις is noticed, must be referred, not to this passage, but to Rhet. III 16. 6, and 17. 1.

πατάξαι πρότερον] to be the aggressor in an affray. It is otherwise termed ἄρχειν χειρῶν ἀδίκων, II 24. 9, Rhet. ad Alex. 26 (37). 39.

ἐπεργάσασθαι] Donaldson, *New Cratylus* § 174, has introduced this passage amongst his examples of a large family of verbs compounded with ἐπί, in which the preposition corresponds to the Latin (and English) *inter* (in composition), implying *reciprocity*, or mutual right or association, as ἐπικοινωνία, *inter*-communion, ἐπιγαμία, the right of *inter*-marriage, Rhet. I 14. 5. It is quite true that ἐπεργασία and ἐπεργάζεσθαι (see the examples in Donaldson, p. 296, and the Lexicons) are both used in this sense

δημόσια, ἢ διειλέχθαι μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλ' οὐ προδοῦναι, διὰ ταῦτα δέοι ἂν καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι, τί κλοπή, τί ὕβρις, τί μοιχεία, ὅπως ἐάν τε ὑπάρχειν ἐάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα δεικνύναι, ἔχωμεν ἐμφανίζειν τὸ δίκαιον. ἔστι δὲ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τοῦ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ φαῦλον ἢ μὴ ἄδικον[1] ἡ ἀμ-

[1] + περὶ οὗ *libri deteriores.*

for the right of inter-cultivation of land, just like *ἐπινομία* the right of mutual pasturage, as on a border territory. But here *ἐπεργάσασθαι* must mean to encroach or trespass, otherwise it is no offence: and so the word is used by Aeschines, Ctesiph. § 113, of the Locrians of Amphissa who 'encroached upon' the sacred soil of Crissa, by cultivating, Thucyd. I 139, and elsewhere; as well as *ἐπινομία* and *ἐπινέμειν*, for a similar trespass on the pasturage of some one else. The primary sense must be no doubt that of reciprocal right or occupation, the interchange of cultivation. Perhaps the notion of going backwards and forwards over a border to cultivate land may have suggested the notion of trespassing, by extending the original signification to cases where there was no such right existing, or only in the trespasser's imagination.

I will add some instances of similar formations which are not given in the *New Cratylus.*

ἐπαλλάττειν, Eur. Heracl. 836, *ποῦς ἐπαλλαχθεὶς ποδί*, 'interchanged, interlaced': common in Aristotle, Pol. I 6 (quoted by Donaldson), c. 9, 1257 *b* 35, *ἐπαλλάττει ἡ χρῆσις κ.τ.λ.* Ib. VI (IV) 10, 1295 *a* 9, *διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν*, Ib. VII (VI) 1, 1317 *a* 1, *ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπαλλάττειν.* Parva Naturalia, de longitate et brevitate vitae, c. 1, 464 *b* 28, *ἐπηλλάττει τὰ νοσώδη τὴν φύσιν σώματα τοῖς βραχυβίοις*, de ortu anim. II 1, 732 *b* 15, *ἐπάλλαξις*, 733 *a* 27, *ἐπαλλάττουσιν ἀλλήλοις κ.τ.λ.* de insomniis II 18, 460 *b* 20, *καὶ τῇ ἐπαλλάξει τῶν δακτύλων τὸ ἓν δύο φαίνεται*, Theophr. Hist. Pl. I 3. 2.

ἐπιμίσγεσθαι, Thucyd. I 2 and 13, *ἐπιμιγνύντες, ἐπιμισγόντων*; Herod. I 68, *ἐπιμιξίη*; Thuc. V 78, Xen. Cyr. VII 4. 5, Ar. Pol. IV (VII) 6, 1327 *a* 39: *ἐπέρχεσθαι*, Thucyd. IV 120, *ἐπήρχοντο*, 'were going backwards and forwards paying one another visits': *ἐπικοινωνεῖν, ἐπικοινωνία*, Plat. Gorg. 464 C, Soph. 251 D, 252 D, *ἐπικοινοῦσθαι*, Protag. 313 B, Ar. Top. Δ 2, 123 *a* 6, *ἐπικοινωνοῦσι γὰρ οἱ τόποι*, Anal. Post. A 11, 77 *a* 26, *ἐπικ. πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἀλλήλαις*, Rhet. ad Alex. 5 (6). 5.

§ 10. 'In all such cases the issue (the dispute, question in dispute, disputed point) turns upon this, whether namely (the accused party) is criminal and vicious or not; for the vice and injustice (of the act) lies in the deliberate purpose or intention, and names of this kind, such as wanton outrage and theft, connote (signify in addition to their direct and literal meaning) the deliberate intention or purpose; for the act of striking is not in every case (co-extensive with) wanton outrage, but only if it was done with a particular object or purpose, of insulting the other for instance, or for his own gratification (the wanton pleasure in the insult itself and in the humiliation it inflicts, *ὅπως ἡσθῇ*, Rhet. II 2. 5). Nor is

φισβήτησις· ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν προαίρεσιν, οἷον ὕβρις καὶ κλοπή· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξε, πάντως ὕβρισεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἕνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκεῖνον ἢ αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι. οὐδὲ πάντως, p. 47.

surreptitious appropriation in every case theft, but only if the theft was for the injury of the other and for the thief's own private use and advantage. And so the same rule that applies to these cases holds in like manner of all the rest'.

περὶ οὗ. These words, suspected from Victorius downwards, omitted by A° and three other MSS, and finally rejected by Bekker and Spengel, were probably inserted by some transcriber or commentator who was doubtful about the construction. If they are omitted, the accusative, *πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα*, will be, as Victorius says, equivalent to *κατὰ πάντα*, '*in* all such cases'; which is thus grammatically to be explained. The accusative here follows the analogy of that class of accusatives which indicate the *local seat* of any 'affection' in its widest sense, and follow passive and neuter verbs and adjectives, (*τερφθεὶς τοῦτο*, Eur. Ion 541, *ὦτα κατεαγότες*, Plat. Gorg. 515 E, *τὰ ὦτα κατάγνυνται*, Protag. 342 B, *ἀλγεῖν τὴν κεφαλήν*, *νοσεῖν ὀφθαλμούς*, *βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος*, *πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς*) and are themselves probably nothing but extensions of the ordinary cognate accusative; which passes *first* from the direct expression of the *same notion* as that in the verb, *μαίνεσθαι μανίαν*, *τέρπεσθαι τέρψιν*, to the indirect and general and indefinite *neuter*, *μαίνεσθαι τάδε*, *τέρπεσθαι τοῦτο* or *ταῦτα* (see Wunder on Oed. R. 259), and *secondly* into the expression of any *equivalent* notion almost without limit, of which *the seat of the affection* is one form. This is the explanation of Kühner [§ 410 *anmerk.* 5 of 2nd ed.], Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* §§ 545, 6, and I think probably the true one. Here therefore *πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα* 'all such instances' are represented locally as the seats of the several *ἀμφισβητήσεις*, the points on which each case turns, or legal issues: *in them* the points in dispute or issue are said *to reside.*

ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει ἡ μοχθηρία] See note on I 1. 14, and the passage there cited. One of them is Top. Z 12, 149 *b* 29, *οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάθρα λαμβάνων ἀλλ' ὁ βουλόμενος λάθρα λαμβάνειν κλέπτης ἐστίν.* Add Eth. Nic. III 4, init. *περὶ προαιρέσεως...οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων.* Ib. 1112 *a* 2, *τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοί τινές ἐσμεν.* Ib. V 10, 1135 *b* 25, *οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη. ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός.* 1136 *a* 1, *ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ ἀδικεῖ.* Rhet. I 14. 1, 5 (implied).

προσσημαίνει] *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* c. 3, 16 *b* 5, *ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον.* Ib. lines 8, 9, 13, 18, 24; ubi Ammonius, *προσσημαίνειν δὲ τὸ πρὸς τῷ πρώτως δηλουμένῳ κατὰ δεύτερον λόγον καὶ ἄλλο τι συνεμφαίνειν.* Eth. Eudem. II 3, 1221 *b* 18 seq. (where much the same thing is said as in this passage of the Rhetoric in many more words).

ὕβρις] See note on I 12. 26.

εἰ λάθρᾳ ἔλαβεν, ἔκλεψεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ καὶ σφετερισμῷ ἑαυτοῦ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τούτων.

11 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἦν δύο εἴδη (τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμμένα τὰ δ' ἄγραφα), περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἀγράφων δύο

12 ἐστὶν εἴδη· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν

σφετερισμός is 'the making a thing one's own', appropriating it to one's self, and one's own use. Plato has σφετερίζεσθαι, and Arist. Pol. VIII (V) 11 sub fin. 1315 *b* 2, σφετεριστής. The meaning of the genitive ἑαυτοῦ, which *looks* as if it meant 'appropriation of oneself', must be interpreted by the opposite βλάβη ἄλλου, with which it is contrasted. As ἄλλου after βλάβη is the objective genitive, injury to another, so ἑαυτοῦ after σφετερισμός is the appropriation *to* yourself and your own benefit, appropriation for your own use and advantage.

§ 11. ἦν] 'there are, as we said', viz. in § 2. This however was *not* 'said' precisely as it is here; *there*, laws were divided into universal and special, and then the special subdivided into written (or positive law) and unwritten: and we now learn that the universal law is also unwritten, and that the special branch of the unwritten law, which must now be distinguished from the other, is to be found in that spirit of fairness and mercy and consideration, which consists in an inclination to relax the unnecessary rigour of the written code arising from its own imperfections, and at the same time to make due allowance for human errors and infirmities: all which is contained in the principles of equity, the unwritten law which prescribes such a course of conduct in matters of doubt. I have observed in the Introduction p. 244 that we are probably to extend this subordinate kind of ἄγραφοι νόμοι so as to include all the prevailing feelings and opinions as to propriety and right and wrong in general which prevail in each *special* state (and are therefore a kind of ἴδιος νόμος, distinguished from the universal): of which indeed the views and feelings represented by equity form a very considerable part.

§ 12. The two kinds of unwritten law are, *first* the universal law, the precepts of which suggest higher considerations and higher duties than mere legal obligations to pursue virtue and avoid vice, (this is what is meant by the 'excess, or higher degree, of virtue and vice' above the legal standard, expressed in καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, *quod eximiam virtutem aut vitium inde continet*, Victorius), obedience to which law is rewarded by praise and honour and gifts (the two kinds of rewards; the 'gifts' in this case being conferred of course not for their value as a pecuniary compensation, but in so far as they are signs of moral approbation) and the breach or violation of it punished by (not fine or imprisonment or any personal penalty, as the violation of a *legal* enactment, but by) censure, reproach, dishonour (not deprivation of civil rights, which is a *legal* penalty): of such precepts examples are, gratitude to benefactors, the return or repayment of obligations (differing from the *feeling* of gratitude),

ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, ἐφ' οἷς ὀνείδη καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαί, οἷον τὸ χάριν ἔχειν τῷ ποιήσαντι εὖ καὶ ἀντευποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαντα καὶ βοηθητικὸν εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου νόμου καὶ γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα.
13 τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ ἐπιεικὲς

the inclination and readiness to aid and defend one's friends, and such like. It is remarkable that amongst the precepts of the universal law which we are all bound to obey Aristotle should have here omitted the duty of interring and paying honour to the dead, so strikingly exemplified by the appeal of Antigone against Creon's tyrannous proclamation in the play to which he himself had just called our attention (comp. Eur. Suppl. 16—19, 526, 538), and still more so perhaps in the trial of the eight generals after Arginusae.

The *second* kind of unwritten law is that which belongs to law special, and is what is omitted by (i. e. intended to supply the deficiencies of) the written law.

Some of these universal principles of the popular morality are occasionally mentioned by the poets and other non-scientific writers: they are the most general rules of conduct which every one everywhere is supposed to recognise and obey. A short list of the most fundamental of them is given in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. I (2). 6, 7, which almost coincides with Aristotle's in the Rhetoric, *δίκαιον μὲν ουν ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν ἁπάντων ἢ τὸ τῶν πλείστων ἔθος ἄγραφον, διορίζον τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ γονέας τιμᾶν καὶ φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις χάριν ἀποδιδόναι· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια οὐ προστάττουσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οἱ γεγραμμένοι νόμοι ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἀγράφῳ καὶ κοινῷ νόμῳ νομίζεται.* Eurip. Antiope, Fragm. XXXVIII (Dind.), *τρεῖς εἰσιν ἀρεταὶ τὰς χρεών σ' ἀσκεῖν, τέκνον, θεούς τε τιμᾶν, τούς τε φύσαντας γονεῖς, νόμους τε κοινοὺς Ἑλλάδος.* Comp. Xen. Memor. IV 4. 19—24, where the same are mentioned with one or two additions. On the unwritten law in general, see Plato, Legg. VII 793 A, B, C; he says *inter alia*, *οὓς πατρίους νόμους ἐπονομάζουσιν, δεσμοὶ οὗτοι πάσης εἰσὶ πολιτείας μεταξὺ πάντων ὄντες τῶν ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντων τε καὶ κειμένων καὶ τῶν ἔτι τεθησομένων, ἀτεχνῶς οἷον πάτρια καὶ παντάπασιν ἀρχαῖα νόμιμα, ἃ καλῶς μὲν τεθέντα καὶ ἐθισθέντα πάσῃ σωτηρίᾳ περικαλύψαντα ἔχει πρὸς τοὺς γραφέντας νόμους*, and he finally classes with the unwritten law the *ἔθη καὶ ἐπιδεύματα*, Aristotle's second class of *ἄγραφοι νόμοι*, as I have mentioned in p. 243 of the Introduction.

§ 13. On what follows, see Introd. pp. 191—2, on equity; and the 14th chapter of the Nic. Eth. Book V. 'For equity appears to be just (or a kind of justice), and it is the supplement to the written law that is equity (equitable)'. Comp. Eth. Nic. V 14, 1137 *b* 8, *τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δικαίου τινὸς ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου.* Ib. line 12, *τὸ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μέν ἐστιν, οὐ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου.* Line 26, *καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ᾗ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου.*

τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἀκόντων τὰ δὲ ἑκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκόντων μὲν ὅταν λάθῃ, ἑκόντων δ' ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται διορίσαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ᾖ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, μὴ ᾖ δέ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. καὶ ὅσα μὴ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι δι' ἀπειρίαν, οἷον τὸ τρῶσαι σιδήρῳ πηλίκῳ καὶ ποίῳ τινί. ὑπολείποι γὰρ ἂν ὁ αἰὼν
14 διαριθμοῦντα. ἂν οὖν ᾖ ἀδιόριστον, δέῃ δὲ νομοθετῆσαι, ἀνάγκη ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ὥστε κἂν δακτύλιον

'This is done sometimes unintentionally, sometimes intentionally, on the part of the legislators, unintentionally when the omission escapes their notice, intentionally when they find it impossible to define or determine every thing (to provide by their definitions or determinations for all possible cases in detail), and are therefore obliged to lay down the rule as absolute (to pronounce universally), though it is not so in fact, but only true and fair for the most part'; and so fail to provide for exceptional cases. Eth. Nic. V 14, 1137 *b* 15, *ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὀρθῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν.* Pol. III 11, 1282 *b* 2, so in the administration of government, and in enforcing obedience to the laws of the state, the sovereign power assumes the office of equity in the administration of justice; *δεῖ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυρίους κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τὸν ἄρχοντα δέ, ἄν τε εἷς ἄν τε πλείους ὦσι, περὶ τούτων εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὅσων ἐξαδυνατοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι καθόλου δηλῶσαι περὶ πάντων.* In Magna Moralia, II 1, the author, in treating of *ἐπιείκεια*, says, *ἃ γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐξαδυνατεῖ καθ' ἕκαστα ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ἀλλὰ καθόλου λέγει, ὁ ἐν τούτοις παραχωρῶν, καὶ ταῦθ' αἱρούμενος ἃ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐβούλετο μὲν τῷ καθ' ἕκαστα διορίσαι, οὐκ ἠδυνήθη δέ, ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικής*, and concludes, *τῶν μὲν γὰρ φύσει καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντων δικαίων οὐκ ἐλαττοῦται, ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ νόμον, ἃ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐξαδυνατῶν ἀπέλιπεν.* On the defects of the written law, see also Rhet. I 1. 7.

And not only is the legislator unable to provide for all exceptional cases to general rules, but also the infinity of particular circumstances which distinguish human actions and crimes precludes the possibility of his enumerating in detail all those varieties which in justice should have different degrees of punishment apportioned to them; as for instance, in enacting the prohibition of 'wounding with an iron instrument', to define the size and the kind of instrument in every case; for life is too short, and would fail a man in the attempt to reckon them all up in detail (on this case, which is given also by Quintilian, VII 6. 8, see Introd. p. 191).

§ 14. If then it be thus impossible to determine all these particular and exceptional cases, and yet there is a necessity for legislation, the law *must* be expressed in general terms; so that if a man wearing an iron

ἔχων ἐπάρηται τὴν χεῖρα ἢ πατάξῃ, κατὰ μὲν τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἔνοχός ἐστι καὶ ἀδικεῖ, κατὰ δὲ P. 1374 b.
15 τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς τοῦτο ἐστίν. εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ ἐπιεικές, φανερὸν ποῖά ἐστι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ ποῖοι οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄν-
16 θρωποι· ἐφ' οἷς τε γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἐπιεικῆ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιοῦν, μηδὲ δὲ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀτυχή-

ring lift his hand (to threaten) or strike another, by the *written* law (the *letter* of the law) he is liable (to the penalty), and has committed a crime, but in truth and in fact he is not guilty of a crime, and herein (τοῦτο, in this fair interpretation of the act) lies equity'.

§ 15. 'If then equity be such as we have described it, it is plain what sort of things (i.e. charges, imputed crimes) are equitable (i.e. suitable for equitable treatment), and the reverse, and what sort of men are not equitable'. And hence to the end of the chapter we have an analysis of the popular objects of equitable treatment, and the characteristics of it, or of the absence of it, the negative which may be inferred from the positive, in these subjects.

§ 16. '(The first of these), the kinds of actions which are suitable objects of equity are such as these. Cases which ought to be treated with indulgence, and mistakes or *errors* (implying *ignorance in particulars*, Eth. Nic. III 2, on involuntary ignorance) and mere misfortunes, *accidental*, which should be carefully distinguished from actual crimes, and not visited with equal penalties: the latter of the two, accidental misfortunes, are such acts as are sudden and unexpected, or beyond calculation, and do not spring from a vicious habit or evil intention; errors are such as are not accidental, in the sense of unexpected and beyond calculation, and yet do not proceed from vice (in the same sense as before); but crimes are acts that are not without calculation (i.e. deliberate), and are prompted by a vicious habit or inclination, because all wrong acts that are due to desire, proceed from this depraved will and moral judgment'. This is the usual classification of the degrees of criminality in actions; for acts, of which the mischievous consequences are purely accidental, and therefore altogether beyond our own control, and for mischievous acts committed under some mistake as to the particular circumstances of the case (not of general moral principles, for which we *are* responsible), as when a man is killed with a gun that was not known to be loaded, we are *not* responsible: what makes us responsible for an act is not only the harm or injury that is its consequence, but the deliberate intention or purpose with which it was done (and in all cases where the wrong was prompted by desire, this is sure to be an evil one, τὰ γὰρ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας) and full knowledge of all the circumstances of the case. In the treatment of this subject in Eth. Nic. V 10, a fourth degree is introduced between the error and the crime.

ματα· ἔστι δ' ἀτυχήματα μὲν ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἁμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τ' ἐστίν· τὰ γὰρ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν
17 ἀπὸ πονηρίας. καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγινώσκειν ἐπιεικές. καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην σκοπεῖν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς p. 48.
τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν
18 ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ μέρος ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, μηδὲ ποῖός τις νῦν, ἀλλὰ ποῖός

This is the case of a wrong act, as a homicide, done in a fit of passion *ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ὁ ὀργίσας*: this being done by a spontaneous impulse, and not after deliberation with malice prepense (*οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας*), is only an *ἀδίκημα*, a wrong no doubt, and a thing which ought not to have been done, but not punishable like the deliberate act; a homicide not a murder. Compare the treatment of this topic in Rhet. ad Alex. 4 (5). 9—11. It seems to have been one of the stock topics of the rhetorical books. The degrees of criminality are there, as here, only three.

§ 17. *καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγινώσκειν*] 'the indulgent consideration of human accidents and infirmities', especially errors, in mitigation of the application of the strict letter of the law. On *τὰ ἀνθρώπινα*, see note on I 2. 7, p. 34. These *human* errors and infirmities in the culprit should be met by a corresponding *humanity* on the part of the judge, the opponent, and indeed *men* in general. Victorius quotes 'Ter. Adelph. III 4. 24, *persuasit nox amor vinum adolescentia: humanum est.*' *τὸ δ' ἐξαμαρτεῖν καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀτυχεῖν οὐ μόνον εἶναι αὐτῷ ἴδιον* (*φάθι*), *ἀλλὰ καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τῶν δικαζόντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων*, Rhet. ad Alex. u. s. § 10.

§§ 17—18. 'And to look (in interpreting the offence and the amount of the penalty), not to the law, but to the legislator, and not to the mere words (the letter) of the law, but to the mind (the intention) of the legislator'; (*ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει ᾗ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ ἥμαρτεν ἁπλῶς εἰπών ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ κἂν ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς οὕτως ἂν εἴποι ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ᾔδει ἐνομοθέτησεν ἄν.* Eth. Nic. V 14, 1137 *b* 20); 'and (to look) not to the act (of the accused) but to the deliberate purpose or intention, and not to the part but to the whole' (i. e. not to take a narrow view of the criminality of the act by confining yourself to the consideration of the bare naked fact, or of some particular part or circumstance of it, which gives it a specially vicious appearance; but to look at it *as a whole*, to take into account the general character of the doer and all the attendant or surrounding circumstances which will throw light upon the intention of it, the purpose with which it was done), 'and not merely to the *present* character of the offender but to the constant or usual character that he bore (to what sort of man he was, always or usually)'.

τις ἦν ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν μᾶλλον ὧν ἔπαθεν ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, καὶ ἀγαθῶν ὧν ἔπαθε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐποίησεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον λόγῳ ἐθέλειν κρίνεσθαι ἢ ἔργῳ.
19 καὶ τὸ εἰς δίαιταν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς δίκην βούλεσθαι ἰέναι· ὁ γὰρ διαιτητὴς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ὁρᾷ, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς τὸν νόμον· καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα διαιτητὴς εὑρέθη, ὅπως τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἰσχύῃ.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον

§ 18. 'And to remember rather the good than the ill treatment you may have received, and the benefits that you have received rather than those that you have conferred'.

μᾶλλον ἢ (*ὧν*, attracted, or *ἃ*) *ἐποίησεν*.—*τὸ δίκαιον*, strict justice, the letter of the law, requires an even balance of benefits on both sides, on the reciprocal (retaliatory, tit for tat, *par pari*) principle, *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός*, Eth. N. V 8.—*ἐπιείκεια*, merciful indulgent consideration, remembers only the benefits and forgets the injuries; remembers kindnesses received, forgets those that it has bestowed. *ἐγὼ νομίζω τὸν μὲν εὖ παθόντα δεῖν μεμνῆσθαι τὸν πάντα χρόνον τὸν δὲ ποιήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐπιλελῆσθαι, εἰ δεῖ τὸν μὲν χρηστοῦ τὸν δὲ μὴ μικροψύχου ποιεῖν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου. τὸ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας εὐεργεσίας ὑπομιμνήσκειν καὶ λέγειν μικροῦ δεῖν ὅμοιόν ἐστι τῷ ὀνειδίζειν*· Dem. de Cor. p. 316. Victorius.

καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον κ.τ.λ.] 'and to put up with injury or injustice', to endure it without retaliation, 'and, the disposition or inclination, to have a matter decided rather by word than deed'.

λόγῳ κρίνεσθαι] to decide a dispute by an amicable settlement, by *talking* the matter over with the opposite party, or reasoning with him, rather than proceed *ἔργῳ*, appeal, that is, to the *ultima ratio*, the *voie du fait*, and actually fight out the quarrel: or (in the case to which Victorius would confine it, that of a quarrel between two neighbouring states) an appeal to arms. '*Omnia prius consilio experiri quam armis sapientem decet.* Ter. Eun. IV 7. 19. Apoll. Rhod. III 185.' Victorius.

§ 19. 'Or again'—a particular case of the same kind of general disposition—'to be more inclined to refer a matter to arbitration than to a court of law: for the arbitrator always takes the equitable view of the case, whereas the judge looks to the law' (the letter, or literal interpretation of the law, which *he is bound by oath* strictly to carry out and interpret to the best of his judgment). 'In fact the very motive or intention of the invention of arbitration (the introduction of it into jurisprudence and social relations in general) was that equity should prevail'.

διωρίσθω] note on *εἰρήσθω*, I 11. 29 ult.

'And so let this manner' (this rough, hasty, popular sketch or outline) 'of describing (marking out the boundaries in detail, determining the boundaries of the whole and the several parts, defining, analysing,

1 τοῦτον, ἀδίκημα δὲ μεῖζον, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀπὸ μείζονος ᾖ ἀδικίας· διὸ καὶ τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα, οἷον ὁ Μελανώπου Καλλίστρατος κατηγόρει, ὅτι παρελογίσατο CHAP. XIV.

describing, διορίζεσθαι) equity suffice' for the occasion; for the use, that is, of the rhetorician, who requires no scientific treatment of the subject.

CHAP. XIV.

This chapter, a continuation of the preceding, contains the application of the 'common topic' of degree, 'greater and less', to the offences or crimes which formed the subject of the other.

§ 1. 'The magnitude of a *wrong* varies with the degree of the *injustice* that prompts it'. There is here the same distinction taken between *ἀδίκημα*, a wrong done—an abstract wrong, regarded independently of the motive or intention—and the confirmed habit (the bad *ἕξις*), depraved will and disposition implied in *ἀδικία*. The deliberate purpose, *προαίρεσις*, is the measure of moral worth, and distinguishes virtue from vice, Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 *b* 20, *ὅταν δὲ εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δὲ (πράττῃ τις), ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικά, συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μέν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη· ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός.*

'And therefore (sometimes) the smallest things are greatest', acts apparently most trifling are sometimes indicative of the worst intentions and dispositions, 'as is exemplified in Callistratus' charge against Melanopus, that he cheated the temple-builders of three consecrated half-obols'. Such a charge subjected the offender to a *γραφὴ ἱερῶν χρημάτων*, Dem. de Fals. Leg. § 335 [=p. 435 § 293]. The exact nature of the offence imputed to Melanopus cannot be ascertained: it was probably some fraud (possibly an error construed as a crime,) in the settlement of accounts between himself and the persons charged with the building or restoration of a temple, the *ναοποιοί*.

The word *ναοποιοί* appears to be an *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον*. Stephens, *Thesaurus* s. v., gives no other example. On the same analogy are formed *τειχοποιός, μηχανοποιός, ἀγαλματοποιός*. The office is *described* in Pol. VII (VI) 8, 1322 *b* 19, *οἷον ἱερεῖς καὶ ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τοῦ σώζεσθαί τε τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἀνορθοῦσθαι τὰ πίπτοντα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς*. The word *ἱεροποιοί*, which follows immediately, in line 24, is referred by Stahr (erroneously however) to this office of curator of sacred buildings, where he translates it '*tempel-baumeister*'.

The magnitude of the vice is argued in this case from the trifling amount of the profit; if a man would commit so great a sin as sacrilege for three halfpence, how great must be the depravity of his character and intentions. Melanopus and Callistratus, as Victorius notes, are mentioned together as ambassadors to Thebes by Xenoph., Hellen. VI 2 and 3; and by Plutarch, Vit. Demosth. (p. 851 F), represented as political rivals and opponents. On Callistratus, see note on I 7. 13.

παρελογίσατο] This verb has two different applications in conformity with the *double* sense of *λογίζεσθαι* and *λογισμός*; the two senses, though closely connected and often identified, are at all events distinguishable;

τρία ἡμιωβέλια ἱερὰ τοὺς ναοποιούς· ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνης δὲ τοὐναντίον. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ἐνυπάρχειν τῇ δυνάμει· ὁ γὰρ τρία ἡμιωβέλια ἱερὰ κλέψας κἂν ὁτιοῦν ἀδικήσειεν. ὁτὲ μὲν δὴ οὕτω τὸ μεῖζον, ὁτὲ δ' ἐκ

(1) 'reasoning' and (2) 'calculation'; the παρά, which conveys the imputation of *fraud* (παρά, amiss, awry, *wrong*), being common to both. Here (as in Dem. c. Aphob. α', p. 822. 25, where it stands for simple 'misreckoning', and Isocr. Panath. § 243, for 'cheating', '*fraudulent* miscalculation' in accounts) it has the latter sense. Elsewhere, and *usually*, (at all events in Aristotle, as Rhet. I 9. 29, II 23. 3, 25. 10 *bis*, III 12. 4, *et passim*,) it denotes 'wrong, fallacious, false, *reasoning*', a 'fallacy' in argument. Lastly ἱερά means 'consecrated to sacred uses; devoted to the service of *the gods* or *religion*'.

'In the case of justice, the opposite is true'. That is, the magnitude or strength of the just and virtuous disposition, inclination, resolution, is shewn, not now in the trifling character of the temptation or motive by which it is led astray, but in the greatness of the temptation which it withstands. 'Ut qui ingentem vim auri, apud se nullo teste depositam, cum infitiari impune possit, reddidit, iustior sit necesse est quam si idem in exigua pecunia fecit.' Victorius. Injustice varies inversely with the magnitude of the profit or advantage to be derived from it, the less the temptation the greater the sin; justice directly, the greater the profit and the consequent temptation to do wrong, the higher the virtue in foregoing it: as, the greater the deposit, the greater the justice in restoring it.

'The reason of this' (ταῦτα is τὸ τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα εἶναι) 'is, that (the greater crime) is virtually latent (in the less); for one who could steal (*lit.* stole) three half-obols consecrated to religious uses would be capable of any other iniquity whatsoever'. The δύναμις, the indefinite latent capacity of vice, is tacitly opposed to the ἐνέργεια, any possible enormity, to which it may, or may not, be developed. If a man will commit a crime which may be interpreted as sacrilege for such a trifle as three half-obols, he is plainly 'capable' of sacrilege in any degree of atrocity, where the profit and temptation are greater.

On the subject of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, physical, moral, and metaphysical, the fundamental and all-pervading antithesis of the Aristotelian Philosophy, a commentary on Rhetoric is not the place to enter. It is explained by Trendelenburg, *Comm. on de Anima*, II 1, *Elem. Log. Arist.* § 6, p. 61. δύναμις is treated in Metaph. Θ 1—5, and ἐνέργεια, ib. 6—9, on which consult Bonitz's *Commentary*. Grant, *Essays on Ethics*, Essay IV, pp. 181—201, 1st [or 2nd] ed., gives a full and clear account of the relation between them, and the doctrine in general, especially in its application to Moral Philosophy. Aristotle himself nowhere gives a complete and intelligible description of this antithesis and its bearings, but assumes the knowledge of it in all his writings.

'Now sometimes the degree of crime, the comparative criminality, may be determined in this way; in other cases it is decided, or estimated, by the (actual amount of the) harm or injury done'. ἐκ 'from', means

τοῦ βλάβους κρίνεται. καὶ οὗ μή ἐστιν ἴση τιμωρία,
2 ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἐλάττων. καὶ οὗ μή ἐστιν ἴασις· χαλεπὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀδύνατον[1]. καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστι δίκην λαβεῖν τὸν παθόντα· ἀνίατον γάρ· ἡ γὰρ δίκη καὶ κόλασις
3 ἴασις. καὶ εἰ ὁ παθὼν καὶ ἀδικηθεὶς αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μεγάλως ἐκόλασεν· ἔτι γὰρ μείζονι ὁ ποιήσας δίκαιος κολασθῆναι, οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ὑπὲρ Εὐκτήμονος συνηγο-

[1] *Coniecit F. Portus.* χαλεπὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀδύνατον *infra cum libris.*

that the decision or estimate of the amount of criminality *proceeds* or *is derived from* the comparison of the injury or consequences resulting from the two acts.

§ 2. 'And when there is no punishment (in use) equal or adequate (to the offence), but any one (that exists or can be devised) is too slight for it'; supply ἀδίκημα μεῖζόν ἐστι.

'And where the mischief done is incurable: for it is hard (or grievous), or indeed impossible'. To fill up the sense either repeat ἰᾶσθαι, 'to find any adequate remedy or compensation'; or, from οὗ μὴ ἴση τιμωρία, 'to devise any adequate punishment'. Otherwise it may be supposed (though it is unnecessary) that Aristotle wrote ἀδύνατον, having ἀμήχανον or some similar adjective in his mind, meaning 'a helpless, hopeless, irremediable' case.

'And again crimes for which no legal redress is to be obtained by the injured party: for such a wrong is incurable: because 'justice' (trial and sentence) and punishment are so many *remedies*'. On this doctrine of punishment, and the difference between κόλασις and τιμωρία, see above I 10. 17, and Introd. p. 232. Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. II 2, 1104 *b* 16, μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων· ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.

'And if (in consequence of the wrong done) the sufferer and the victim of the wrong inflicted some heavy punishment on himself; for the perpetrator of the act deserves a still severer punishment (than that which he thus unintentionally brought upon his victim): as Sophocles, in pleading the cause of Euctemon—after he had killed himself in consequence of the outrage he had sustained—said that he would not lay the penalty at a less amount than the sufferer had estimated it at for himself', i. e. Euctemon by his suicide had virtually fixed the penalty of the offence at death.

§ 3. δίκαιος κολασθῆναι] On this idiomatic usage of δίκαιος, and similar constructions—in which the adjective, instead of being expressed impersonally in the neuter, as δίκαιόν ἐστι, is attracted as it were to the subject of the sentence—especially with δῆλος and its compounds, φανερός, γελοῖος, and such like, see Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 297, comp. 549. 5. It is to be observed that the case of δίκαιος is peculiar; this takes the infinitive, whereas all the rest are construed with the participle. To Matthiae's examples add ἄξιος, similarly constructed in Thuc. I 70, sub init. ἄξιοι νομίζομεν εἶναι τοῖς πέλας ψόγον ἐπενεγκεῖν; some Platonic examples in

ρῶν, ἐπεὶ ἀπέσφαξεν ἑαυτὸν ὑβρισθείς, οὐ τιμήσειν P. 1375.
4 ἔφη ἐλάττονος ἢ οὗ ὁ παθὼν ἑαυτῷ ἐτίμησεν. καὶ ὃ

Stallbaum's note on Gorg. 448 D; Soph. Aj. 634, κρείσσων γὰρ Ἅιδᾳ κεύθων, and Lobeck's note; the proverb μὴ κίνει Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητος γὰρ ἀμείνων: Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 641, ἥδιους ἔσεσθε ἀκούσαντες; Arist. Nub. 1241, Ζεὺς γελοῖος ὀμνύμενος: Ar. Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 *b* 34, γελοῖος φαίνοιτο ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὤν: Pl. Phaedrus 236 D, γελοῖος ἔσομαι... ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων.

Σοφοκλῆς] Not the poet, but a statesman and orator advanced in life at the close of the Peloponnesian war. He was one of the ten πρόβουλοι, Rhet. III 18. 6, appointed by the Athenians, after the Sicilian disaster in 413 B.C., to devise measures for the public safety, Thuc. VIII 1, Grote's *Hist. Gr.* Pt. II, ch. 61, Vol. VII, p. 499, and note: and afterwards one of the thirty tyrants, Xen. Hellen. II 3. 2. This Sophocles is doubtless the same who is again mentioned, Rhet. III 15. 3. He is there described as an old man, which agrees with the statement of Thucydides, u. s., that the πρόβουλοι were an ἀρχὴ πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν; and the 'charge' brought against him (Rhet. l. c.) was probably connected with his conduct as a member of 'the thirty'.

τιμήσειν, ἐτίμησεν] In all causes civil as well as criminal which could be brought before an Athenian law-court, one point to be considered in the judgment was the τίμημα or estimate, assessment, either of the kind or amount of the penalty in criminal prosecutions, or of the damages in civil actions. This gives rise to the division of all legal processes into ἀγῶνες ἀτίμητοι and τιμητοί. In the former of these the penalty and damages are already fixed by law or by previous private arrangement (C. R. Kennedy), and are therefore 'unassessable' by the judges; in the τιμητοὶ ἀγῶνες of all kinds, the amount of the damages or penalty to be awarded is at the discretion of the judges, who τιμῶσιν, estimate, assess, or fix the amount. This is the explanation of Harpocration, and Ulpian, followed by Meier & Schömann, *Attischer Process*, p. 171 note, Böckh *Publ. Econ.* Bk. III, c. 11 (p. 371 Engl. Transl.), and Hermann *Pol. Antiq.* § 143. 7—12. Suidas, and other ancient writers, invert this distinction, and make τιμητοὶ ἀγῶνες the cases in which the penalty is already fixed, and ἀτίμητοι those in which it is open to adjudication. See Meier & Schömann, u. s., p. 171 note.

On the whole subject see Meier & Schömann u. s. et seq. and Mr C. R. Kennedy's article in Smith's *Dict. Antiq.* p. 970 (1st ed.) [p. 1131, 2nd ed. and cf. note on Dem. *Select Private Orations*, Part II, Or. 55 § 18. S.]

The accuser in a criminal process, where the penalty was not already fixed by law, himself in the first instance assessed its amount, which the judges confirmed or not as they thought proper. The first was called τιμᾶσθαι, the second τιμᾶν, in accordance with the usual distinction of the active and middle voice, as marking by their contrasted significations the functions of the judge and the parties in the case, δικάζειν and δικάζεσθαι, κρίνειν and κρίνεσθαι, &c.; the one administering justice and deciding the question, whilst the others 'get this done for them' by the intervention of another. Aristotle has here neglected this ordinary distinction, for reasons best known to himself. As far as the phrase ὁ παθὼν ἐτίμησεν

μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετ' ὀλίγων πεποίηκεν. καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ ἁμαρτάνειν μέγα. καὶ δι' ὃ ἂν ζητηθῇ καὶ εὑρεθῇ τὰ κωλύοντα καὶ ζημιοῦντα, οἷον ἐν Ἄργει ζημιοῦται δι' ὃν ἂν νόμος τεθῇ καὶ δι' οὓς τὸ

is concerned, the reason might be, that the accuser is supposed to represent the estimate by the deceased of his own wrongs as of equal authority with a judicial decision: but this will not apply to *τιμήσειν*, Sophocles' own estimate. At the same time as *τιμᾶν* and *τίμημα* may denote an 'estimate' in general, the use of the verb here must be regarded rather as a departure from ordinary usage, than as a solecism, or violation of the laws of the language.

On the *συνήγοροι*, see Schneider's note on Pol. VI 5. 10, vol. II, p. 391, and *addenda*, pp. 502—4. *συνηγορῶν* here is not technical: there is no reason to suppose that it denotes one of the public *συνήγοροι*, appointed by the state.

Lastly, the entire topic, *καὶ εἰ ὁ παθὼν—ἐτίμησεν*, is thus illustrated by Schrader: 'Sexti Tarquinii flagitium ideo maius est, quod illius foeditate inducta Lucretia sibi ipsi vim intulit. (This is suggested by Victorius.) Et Appii Claudii decemviri sceleratum de L. Virginii filia iudicium eo sceleratius est, quoniam pater illo commotus filiam interfecit (Liv. III 48).'

§ 4. 'And any crime that is unique, or the first of its class (that has been committed), or has been seldom paralleled'. These three cases of especial prominence have been already applied to acts as topics of praise, I 9. 38. See in illustration the references there given.

'And the frequent commission of the same offence magnifies it': because this shews the depraved *habit*, or confirmed state, the *ἕξις* which constitutes vice. 'Nec enim is casu aut affectu, sed habitu et pravitate animi, delinquit.' Schrader.

'And any crime for which any checks and preventives or penalties have been sought and found (invented or discovered), as, for instance, at Argos a penalty is incurred by any one on whose account a law has been enacted (i.e. one of the *κωλυτικοί*, or (if I may coin a word for the occasion) *ζημιωτικοί, νόμοι*), or on whose account the prison was built': supply *ἐζημιώθησαν*. This same topic has been already employed in the opposite sense, to heighten the praise due to an action, c. 9 § 38. Schrader quotes in illustration Lysias, Or. XXII § 16 (*κατὰ τῶν σιτοπωλῶν*), *οὕτω δὲ πάλαι περὶ τῆς τούτων πανουργίας καὶ κακονοίας ἡ πόλις ἔγνωκεν, ὥστ' ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὠνίοις ἅπασι τοὺς ἀγορανόμους φύλακας κατεστήσατε, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτῃ μόνῃ τῇ τέχνῃ χωρὶς σιτοφύλακας ἀποκληροῦτε*; the appointment of a special board of officers for the control of the corn-market signalizes the special rascality of the dealers.

§ 5. 'And the more brutal the crime is, the worse'; that is, the nearer approach it makes to the conduct and instincts of a mere animal or brute, who is incapable of virtue and self-control; and the more cruel, savage, 'inhuman' it is, more degraded below the level of humanity.

There are three degrees in the scale of natures, moral and intellectual, (1) the beast, (2) the man, and (3) the god. Thus, Pol. I 2, 1253 *a* 27, it is

δεσμωτήριον ᾠκοδομήθη. καὶ τὸ θηριωδέστερον ἀδί-

said of a man that is incapable of society, or is in want of nothing, being all-sufficient to himself, that he is ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός: in respect of this complete independence he is either below or above all the various wants, instincts, affections, desires, aims, and aspirations that characterize humanity. Precisely the same view appears in the little disquisition on θηριότης at the opening of Book VII of the Nicom. Ethics, except that here the distinction between the three natures is made to rest solely upon intellectual and moral virtue: this is human, whereas the beast and the god are alike incapable of it, the beast, from the defects already stated, being below the human standard, the gods above it.

On this superiority of the gods to the practice of moral or human virtue and their entire independence of it, see Eth. Nic. X 8. A fine fragment of Cicero's lost dialogue *de Philosophia sive Hortensius*, quoted by Augustine, *de Trinitate* XIV c. 9, is manifestly borrowed, not translated, from this passage of Aristotle. It is printed in Nobbe's edition of Cicero, p. 1171, fragm. 35.

Here therefore 'brutality' consists in the absence of all capacity for virtue, moral and intellectual, and is consequently opposed to τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἡρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν. This brutal nature, like the divine, is extremely rare amongst mankind. (This statement is qualified in Pol. III 11, 1281 *b* 19, καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν ἔνιοι τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν; ἀλλὰ περί τι πλῆθος οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς κωλύει τὸ λεχθέν). It is found chiefly in 'barbarians'. 'Barbarous' and 'barbarity' in fact express pretty nearly the same notion of character.) Again, the absence of all moderation in the indulgence of our desires and emotions and general want of self-control is characteristic of the 'brutal' nature; Ib. c. 6, 1148 *b* 34, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἔξω τῶν ὅρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης. And again, 1149 *a* 4, πᾶσα ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις εἰσιν. And these are then illustrated, ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, κἂν ψοφήσῃ μῦς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός·...καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις. (αἴσθησις is the characteristic of 'animal life' in general; that which distinguishes *animals* from *plants*. de Anima.) Brutal 'tastes' or instincts are illustrated a little earlier in the same chapter, 1048 *b* 20 seq. Brutal (or animal) pleasures are those which we have in common with the lower animals, the pleasures of feeling and taste; in the over-indulgence of which, this form of bestiality lies, III 13, 1118 *a* 23—*b* 4. Gaisford refers to Magna Moralia II 5 init., ἔστι δὲ ἡ θηριότης ὑπερβάλλουσά τις κακία· ὅταν γάρ τινα παντελῶς ἴδωμεν φαῦλον οὐδ' ἄνθρωπόν φαμεν εἶναι ἀλλὰ θηρίον, ὡς οὖσάν τινα κακίαν θηριότητα. ἡ δ' ἀντικειμένη ἀρετὴ ταύτῃ ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμος, ἔστι δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον οὖσα, οἷον ἡρωική τις καὶ θεία: expressions directly taken from the passages of Eth. N. VII just quoted. Finally, the instinctive ὀρέξεις (θυμός and ἐπιθυμία) belong to this animal part of our nature, and are therefore not always under our control; Pol. III 16, 1267 *a* 28; where the divine part of our nature, the controlling, regulating, intelligent νοῦς, is contrasted with the lower instincts of the brute elements of our nature, the emotional and appetitive.

κημα μεῖζον. καὶ ὃ ἐκ προνοίας μᾶλλον. καὶ ὃ οἱ ἀκούοντες φοβοῦνται μᾶλλον ἢ ἐλεοῦσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ῥητορικά ἐστι τοιαῦτα, ὅτι πολλὰ ἀνήρηκε δίκαια ἢ p. 49.
ὑπερβέβηκεν, οἷον ὅρκους δεξιὰς πίστεις ἐπιγαμίας·

'And when it arises from or is due to malice aforethought'. *προνοία* is the 'forethought', the *deliberate* vicious *purpose* which constitutes 'malice prepense', aggravates a wrong act in proportion to its intensity and the length of time during which the evil intent has been nursed; and converts an act otherwise innocent into a crime. The *προνοία* is that which distinguishes murder from homicide. It is in fact the moral *προαίρεσις*, distinctive of vice and virtue, of which an account has been already given in the first note on this chapter. See the passage of Eth. Nic. V 10, there quoted. Comp. Rhet. I 13. 10. There *ἐκ προνοίας* is identified with the (in Ethics) more ordinary *ἐκ προαιρέσεως. ὅταν δὲ ἐκ προαιρέσεως (ἡ βλάβη) ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ* (actions which are done in a state of violent excitement, under the impulse of overpowering passion, are considered as involuntary, and exempted from the penalty of crimes) *οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται.* The case quoted by Schrader from Magna Moralia I 17, of a woman who had caused the death of her lover by a love-potion which she had sent him only with the view of inflaming his passion, and was consequently acquitted by the court of Areopagus on the charge of murder, because the act was done without deliberate malevolent intent, is a case of *ἁμάρτημα* (one of those in which the wrong done does not amount to a crime), in which the mischief is done without due knowledge of the circumstances of the case. In Demosth. c. Aristocr. p. 634, there is a similar distinction between two kinds of *ἀνδροφονία*: in one sense the name is applied *ἐπ' ἀκουσίῳ φόνῳ*, and to acts of this kind 'a wise and humane law', *νόμος ἀνθρωπίνως καὶ καλῶς κείμενος*, does not apply the name of murder; from this are immediately afterwards distinguished *οἱ ἐκ προνοίας (φονεύσαντες)*. Aeschines c. Ctesiph. § 212, *εἴληφε τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας γραφὰς γραφόμενος.* Dinarch. c. Demosth. § 6, *τῶν ἐκ προνοίας φόνων.* Compare Cic. de Off. I 8, sub fin. *Sed in omni iniustitia permultum interest utrum perturbatione aliqua animi, quae plerumque brevis est et ad tempus, an consulto et cogitata fiat iniuria. Leviora enim sunt quae repentino aliquo motu accidunt quam ea quae meditata ac praeparata inferuntur.*

'And any act, or wrong done, which inspires the hearers rather with terror than compassion'. An act which tends to consequences which inspire terror, the stronger emotion, in those who may be exposed to the like treatment, must plainly be more striking in its character and important in its social effects, more noxious and prejudicial, and worse in general, than one which excites mere pity or sympathy with the sufferer, without raising alarm on account of what may follow to oneself. That which excites terror must be terrible; formidable and dangerous to the individual or society. An atrocious crime makes men tremble, and fear expels pity; the stronger emotion overpowers the weaker. Comp. Rhet. II 8. 5 and 12, 'Amasis shed no tears when he saw his son led away to

6 πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων ὑπεροχή. καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα οὗ κολάζονται οἱ ἀδικοῦντες, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ ψευδο-

death, but wept when his friends asked an alms': *τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐλεεινόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ δεινόν· τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν ἕτερον τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ καὶ ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἐλέου καὶ πολλάκις τῷ ἐναντίῳ χρήσιμον.* Victorius quotes Cic. Tusc. Qu. III 27, *Constabat eos qui concidentem vulneribus Gn. Pompeium vidissent, quum in illo ipso acerbissimo miserrimoque spectaculo sibi timerent quod se classe hostium circumfusos viderent, nihil tum aliud egisse nisi ut remiges hortarentur, et ut salutem adipiscerentur fuga: posteaquam Tyrum venissent tum afflictari lamentarique coepisse.*

'And the rhetorical artifices or exaggerations' (such as *αὐξήσεις, δεινώσεις*, rhetorical tricks for giving extra importance and interest to a subject; or for magnifying, exaggerating, intensifying the atrocity, enormity, of a crime), 'for instance, that the accused (whose crime you desire to magnify) has subverted many principles (or obligations) of justice at once, or transgressed them; for instance, oaths, the right hand (pledge of faith, *καὶ δεξιαὶ ᾗς ἐπέπιθμεν*, Il. B 341), 'all confidence or good faith, all the laws of intermarriage, and the rest; for this is an excess of many crimes over the one which has really been committed'; or 'a multiplication of one crime into many'.

The exaggeration of this rhetorical fallacy lies in the enumeration, and apparent accumulation, of offences by division of the single offence into its parts, or the repetition—as in the instance—of the same offence under different names, which seems thus to swell its bulk and magnify its enormity. This is the reverse application of the same rhetorical artifice of exaggeration as has been already referred to in I 7. 31 (see note), the methods of *διαίρεσις εἰς τὰ μέρη, συντιθέναι*, and *ἐποικοδομεῖν* applied to the 'amplification' of good things; the object and use of them being stated in nearly the same words, *πλειόνων γὰρ ὑπερέχειν φαίνεται.*

ἀναιρεῖν, 'to take up, so as to remove, annul, or destroy'; here *tollere, subvertere.* The simple verb, as well as the phrase *ἀναιρεῖν ἐκ μέσου*—comp. Lat. *de medio, e medio tollere* (Cic., Liv.) is common in Demosth., Aesch. and the Orators, and occurs occasionally in other writers, as Plato and Xenophon, with words like *νόμους, τὸ δίκαιον, διαθήκην, ὑποθέσεις* (Plato), or *πόλιν, πολιτείαν, ὀλιγαρχίας* (Xenoph.).

Gaisford illustrates the various forms of pledges or guarantees here mentioned by a corresponding passage in Arist. Acharn. 306, *πῶς δ' ἂν ἂν καλῶς λέγοις ἄν, εἴπερ ἐσπείσω γ' ἅπαξ οἷσιν οὔτε βωμὸς οὔτε πίστις οὔθ' ὅρκος μένει.*

ἐπιγαμία, ius connubii, the right of intermarriage between different states, together with the rules and obligations which it entails, which are here in question. On the 'reciprocal' *ἐπι*, '*inter*', see note on *ἐπεργάσασθαι* I 13. 9, p. 251.

§ 6. *καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα (ἀδικεῖν) οὗ κ.τ.λ.*] 'and to commit a crime in the very place where offenders are punished' is an aggravation of the criminality; 'which is the case with perjurers or false witnesses: for where would a man *not* commit a crime if he is ready to do it even in the very court of justice?' This is the *argumentum a fortiori;* the rule, *omne*

μαρτυροῦντες· ποῦ γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἀδικήσειεν, εἴ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ; καὶ ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνη μάλιστα. καὶ εἰ τοῦτον ὑφ' οὗ εὖ πέπονθεν· πλείω γὰρ ἀδικεῖ, ὅτι
7 τε κακῶς ποιεῖ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ εὖ. καὶ ὃ παρὰ τὰ ἄγραφα δίκαια· ἀμείνονος γὰρ μὴ δι' ἀνάγκην δίκαιον εἶναι·

maius continet in se minus. 'Hinc P. Clodii culpam amplificavit Cicero, cum insidiis Gn. Magnum per servum tollere eum voluisse pro Milone dicens criminatus est: *Insidiator erat in foro collocatus, atque in vestibulo ipso senatus*' [pro Milone § 19], Victorius. (Victorius has forgotten the still more striking *Etiam in senatum venit*, &c. of the first speech against Catiline, § 2.) The sanctity of the place converts theft into sacrilege. The atrocity of the murder of 'Zacharias the son of Barachias' was heightened by the circumstance of its occurrence 'between the temple and the altar' (Matth. xxiii. 35).

'Another aggravation of an offence is, where it is attended by disgrace (to the victim); and this in proportion to its amount (μάλιστα)'. This, together with the wantonness, the unprovoked character of the aggression, is what converts a mere assault, αἰκία, into an act of ὕβρις, a wanton outrage. See Rhet. II 2. 5, definition of ὕβρις, and I 13. 10; also note on I 12. 26, p. 239. The wound inflicted on a man's pride and sense of dignity, the injury to his feelings and honour, constitute a great aggravation of the offence. ὕβρις is, τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνη ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι κ.τ.λ. In II 6. 2, αἰσχύνη is defined, λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων η μελλόντων...ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν κακῶν ὅσα αἰσχρὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ὧν φροντίζει.

καὶ εἰ τοῦτον (ἠδίκηκέ τις)] 'and another is, when the victim of his wrong has been his benefactor; for his offence is thereby multiplied; in that he not only *does* what is wrong (positive wrong, a sin of commission), but also fails, omits, to do what is right (negative wrong, a sin of omission). The last explanatory clause is thus illustrated by Victorius from Cicero's criticism of the third Stoic Paradox, § 25 ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα. *Illud tamen interest quod in servo necando, si adsit iniuria, semel peccatur; in patris vita violanda multa peccantur; violatur is qui procreavit; is qui aluit: is qui erudivit; is qui in sede ac domo atque in republica collocavit: multitudine peccatorum praestat* (ὑπερέχει), *eoque poena maiore dignus est.*

§ 7. 'And an offence against the unwritten laws of right' (is worse than the violation of a written or positive law): 'because it is indicative of a better character and disposition, of a higher degree of virtue, to do right without compulsion'. (Any external force destroys the voluntary character of an act, and therefore its virtue. And if this voluntary obedience to the unwritten law implies a more virtuous disposition than that which is enforced by the positive enactments which have power to compel it, then the *opposite* is true, an act of disobedience to the unwritten law is a worse offence, and a sign of a more vicious disposition,

τὰ μὲν οὖν γεγραμμένα ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ δ' ἄγραφα οὔ. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον, εἰ παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα· ὁ γὰρ τὰ φοβερὰ ἀδικῶν καὶ τὰ ἐπιζήμια καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐπιζήμια ἀδικήσειεν ἄν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀδικήματος μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος
1 εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων CHAP. XV.

than the violation of the other.) 'Now the written laws are compulsory, the unwritten are not'.

'From another point of view', (in another way of arguing or looking at the case; Rhetoric *συλλογίζεται τἀναντία*, 1 § 12) the crime is worse 'if it be a breach of the written law: for (it may be argued) if a man does wrong when it is dangerous (fearful) and liable to penalty, (*a fortiori*) he would do it when it is not'. This again is by the rule *omne maius continet in se minus;* the greater and more powerful inclination to wrong necessarily involves the less.

φοβερά] acts fearful, alarming, formidable, from the probable consequences. Supply the cogn. accus. *ἀδικήματα*.

ἐπιζήμια] Note on 1 4. 9, *ἐπίδοξον*, p. 66.

εἴρηται] 'so much for', 'enough of', 'no more of': note on *εἰρήσθω*, 1 11. 29.

CHAP. XV.

The general sense and connexion of the contents of this chapter upon the *ἄτεχνοι πίστεις* of the practice of Rhetoric, those adjuncts of proof and external supports of the case, which consist in the various kinds of evidence which can be adduced by the pleader in confirmation of his statements and arguments, have been already given in the Introduction to this Commentary, pp. 193—207, to which I now refer and which I need not here repeat. They are called 'unartistic' or 'inartificial' because they are not due to the artist's inventive skill, but are supplied to him from the outside, as it were, of his art; and all that he has to do is to use them to the best advantage. Rhet. 1 2. 2. It is this distinction of two kinds of proof or modes of persuasion which explains the application of the term *inventio* by the Latin rhetoricians to that part of the art to which Aristotle first gave the name of *ἔντεχνοι πίστεις*, and the title of one of Cicero's rhetorical treatises, the *de Inventione*. The author himself, l. c., applies the term *εὑρεῖν* to the *ἔντεχνοι πίστεις*.

In commenting therefore upon this chapter we shall have to occupy ourselves principally with the details of language, argument, and allusion, and so fill up the outline which has been sketched out in the Introduction.

§ 1. 'Next to the subjects already discussed' (the *ἔντεχνοι πίστεις*, the logical or dialectical proofs of Rhetoric and their topics in cc. 4—14), 'we have to run over (give a hasty sketch, or summary of) what are called the unartistic proofs, or modes of persuasion, *because*' (*γάρ*, this is the appropriate place for them, *because* we have just been engaged upon the

ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπιδραμεῖν· ἴδιαι γὰρ
2 αὗται τῶν δικανικῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν,
3 νόμοι μάρτυρες συνθῆκαι βάσανοι ὅρκος. πρῶτον μὲν
οὖν περὶ νόμων εἴπωμεν, πῶς χρηστέον καὶ προτρέ-
ποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπο-
4 λογούμενον. φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μὲν ἐναντίος ᾖ
ὁ γεγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ κοινῷ νόμῳ χρη-
5 στέον καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ὡς δικαιοτέροις. καὶ ὅτι

forensic branch of Rhetoric, and 'these are peculiar to law proceedings (or forensic practice)'. On the treatment of these ἄτεχνοι πίστεις by other writers on the subject see Introd. 205—207.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων...ἐπιδραμεῖν] See note on I 9. 14; on the redundant use of περί, ὑπέρ, &c.

ἐχόμενόν] with genit. *partitive*, 'holding, hanging, on by (lit. to *a part* of,)', 'clinging to', 'connected with', 'in succession to', 'following'. Very frequent in Herodotus.

ἐπιδραμεῖν] 'to run over', commonly in its literal signification takes the accusative, sometimes the dative. Here we may suppose that περὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων is substituted for the accusative: as it is also in pseudo-Demosth. περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν, 217. 7, μικρὰ ἐπιδραμοῦμαι περὶ αὐτῶν πολλῶν ὄντων. This passage and Xen. Oecon. XV 1 are the only two instances that are given by the Lexicons of the *metaphorical* sense in which it occurs here. [Cf., however, Pol. III 15, 1286 *a* 7, θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας, *Index Aristotelicus*. S.] Compare a similar use of ἐπελθεῖν of 'pursuing an inquiry' or 'going over, reviewing, a subject'. Pol. I 13, 1260 *b* 12, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπελθεῖν. Ib. VI (IV) 2, ult. πειρατέον ἐπελθεῖν τίνες φθοραὶ κ.τ.λ. *et passim*.

§ 3. χρηστέον προτρέποντα] i.e. πῶς δεῖ τινα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς προτρέποντα. The verbal adjective can be resolved into δεῖ with an indefinite object, with which the participle is made to 'agree'. Demosth. Olynth. β. 21, 24, πολλὴν δὴ τὴν μετάστασιν καὶ μεγάλην δεικτέον τὴν μεταβολὴν εἰσφέροντας ἐξιόντας. Other examples in Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 447. 4.

It appears from the addition of προτρέποντα and ἀποτρέποντα that the first of the ἄτεχνοι πίστεις, the laws, are not confined to *forensic* practice, but can also be used by the *deliberative* orator in addressing a public assembly: and this is true also of some kinds of witnesses, viz. the 'authorities' appealed to in support of a statement, which may be as serviceable in enforcing considerations of public policy, the συμφέρον ἢ ἀσύμφορον, as the δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον of a legal process in a court of justice; see § 16. The original statement therefore of § 1, ἴδιαι γὰρ αὗται τῶν δικανικῶν, requires modification.

§ 4. ἐναντίος τῷ πράγματι] 'opposed to the facts on our side, to our view of the case'. Comp. infr. § 12.

§ 5. With ὅτι here, and in the following topics, λεκτέον or something similar must be supplied from χρηστέον, §§ 3—4.

τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ τοῦτ' ἐστί, τὸ μὴ παντελῶς 6 χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιεικὲς ἀεὶ μένει καὶ οὐδέποτε μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ὁ κοινός (κατὰ φύσιν γάρ ἐστιν), οἱ δὲ γεγραμμένοι πολλάκις· ὅθεν εἴρηται τὰ ἐν τῇ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνῃ· ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι ἔθαψε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος νόμον, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ τὸν ἄγραφον·

οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε. P. 1375 *b*.
ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνδρὸς οὐδενός.

7 καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀληθές τι καὶ συμφέρον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν· ὥστ' οὐ νόμος ὁ γεγραμμένος· οὐ γὰρ

τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ] Supply *κρίνειν* or *δικάζειν*; the former is expressed in Rhet. II 25. 10, *τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ κρίνειν*. This was the dicasts' oath, taken when they entered the court. The usual form was *γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ*. Dem. c. Aristocr. 652 sub fin. *γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ δικάσειν ὀμωμόκασιν (οἱ δικασταί), ἡ δὲ τῆς γνώμης δόξα ἀφ' ὧν ἂν ἀκούσωσι παρίσταται... πᾶς γὰρ ὁ μήτε δι' ἔχθραν μήτε δι' εὔνοιαν μήτε δι' ἄλλην ἄδικον πρόφασιν μηδεμίαν, παρ' ἃ γιγνώσκει, θέμενος τὴν ψῆφον εὐσεβεῖ...ἀλλ' εἴ τις εἰδὼς ἐκείνους προδέδωκεν ἢ ἐξαπατᾷ, οὗτος ἐστ' ἔνοχος τῇ ἀρᾷ·* c. Boeot. de Nom. 1006. 27, *ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γ' ἂν μὴ ὦσι νόμοι γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ δικάσειν ὀμωμόκατε.* adv. Lept. 493. 1. Ar. Pol. III 16, 1287 *a* 25, *ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος ἂν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπιτηδὲς παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας*, which explains the meaning and object of the oath.

The form of the oath is found in Pollux VIII 10 [*ὁ δ' ὅρκος ἦν τῶν δικαστῶν περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι εἰσί, ψηφιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, περὶ δὲ ὧν μὴ εἰσί, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ*]; see Meier & Schömann, *Attischer Process*, p. 128; comp. p. 135.

τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις] The meaning of the oath is, 'that the judges are not to employ, i.e. to enforce, to its full extent, in its strict and literal interpretation, the rigour of the written statute'.

§ 6. 'And that equity and the universal law are constant and unchangeable, like the laws of nature whose operation is uniform; to which the appeal is made in Sophocles' Antigone (line 450 seq.); for her defence is, that the burial (of her brother) was indeed against Creon's law, but not against that which is unwritten'. *οὐδ' ὁ κοινὸς (μεταβάλλει)*.

§ 7. *ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν*] *δίκαιον ἀληθές ἐστι κ.τ.λ.* 'and that justice is something real, genuine, and salutary, but this sham, apparent justice (the rigorous interpretation) is not. And therefore the written law, the letter of the statute, is not; because it sometimes—and this is one of the cases—does not do the proper work of the law', which is to do substantial, not merely apparent and fallacious justice, that which *seems* to be,

ποιεῖ τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ ὅτι ὥσπερ ἀργυ-
ρογνώμων ὁ κριτής ἐστιν, ὅπως διακρίνῃ τὸ κίβδηλον
8 δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. καὶ ὅτι βελτίονος ἀνδρὸς τὸ
τοῖς ἀγράφοις ἢ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις χρῆσθαι καὶ ἐμ-
9 μένειν. καὶ εἴ που ἐναντίος νόμῳ εὐδοκιμοῦντι ἢ καὶ
αὐτὸς αὑτῷ· οἷον ἐνίοτε ὁ μὲν κελεύει κύρια εἶναι ἅττ' p. 50.
ἂν συνθῶνται, ὁ δ' ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συντίθεσθαι παρὰ

but is not justice. On the superiority of natural justice to positive enactments, see Cicero, de Legg. I 15, referred to in Introd. p. 194.

'And we may further argue that the judge is like an assayer of coin and appointed for the purpose of distinguishing *base* justice from *genuine*'.

ἀργυρογνώμων] Moeris, Lex. Attic. (p. 50, ed. Koch) *ἀργυραμοιβοί, Ἀττικῶς· κολλυβισταί* (money-changers, who change large coin for small, *κόλλυβος*), *Ἑλληνικῶς. ἀργυρογνώμονες, Ἀττικῶς· δοκιμασταί, Ἑλληνικῶς*, and Pierson's note, who refers to the pseudo-Platonic dialogue *περὶ ἀρετῆς*, 378 D (Zurich ed. p. 867), *ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τὸ χρύσιον καὶ τὸ ἀργύριον εἰσὶν ἡμῖν δοκιμασταί, οἵτινες ὁρῶντες κρίνουσι τό τε βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον; Εἰσίν. Τίνας οὖν τούτους καλεῖς; Ἀργυρογνώμονας.* Pollux, VII § 170. To the same family of words belong *προβατογνώμων* Agam. 768 (see Blomfield's Glossary) a 'discerner of the flock', one that can distinguish the several sheep of a flock; hence 'a judge of character'; *ἱππογνώμων* in the same metaphorical sense, Aesch. Fragm. Tox. 224 Dind. Cf. *φυσιογνώμων*, Ar. de Gen. Anim. IV 3. 32, and on *φυσιογνωμονεῖν*, as an art (the study of character from the indications of the features and other external peculiarities), see Anal. Pr. II 27, 70 *b* 7—38; and the treatise *φυσιογνωμονικά*, printed with Aristotle's works, Bekk. Vol. II. p. 805. Compare Cic. de Fato, 5. 10 (quoted in Blomfield's note, as 'De Nat. Deor. I 8'), *Quid? Socratem nonne legimus, quemadmodum notarit Zopyrus, physiognomon, qui se profitebatur hominum mores naturasque ex corpore oculis vultu fronte pernoscere?* Compare, lastly, the simple *γνώμων*, Xen. Memor. I 4. 5 (ap. Blomfield), of the tongue as distinguishing between sweet and bitter, and Agam. 1099, *θεσφάτων γνώμων ἄκρος*.

§ 8. See Introd. p. 194. Correct there the second line of the quotation, Hor. I Ep. 16, 52, which should be, *tu nihil admittes in te formidine poenae: 'tu'* is addressed to men in general, and therefore the second line speaks as generally as the first. Schrader appears to refer this topic to c. 7 § 12, *καὶ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μείζονος μεῖζον*, for its authority; the topic of § 16, *καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ ἀρετῆς...τὸ μὲν γὰρ τέλος, τὸ δ' οὐ τέλος*, is equally applicable.

§ 9. 'Or if the (written) law (which is against us) chance (*που*) to be contradictory, either to any other law of repute, or to itself; as, for example, in some cases one law enacts the validity of all contracts whatsoever, whilst the other (of the two opposite laws) forbids the contracting of any engagement contrary to the law (except those that the law allows)'. On this Victorius, 'Exemplum hoc est legis legi repugnantis; *ἀντινομία*

10 τὸν νόμον. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ὥστε στρέφειν καὶ ὁρᾶν ἐφ' ὁποτέραν τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφαρ-
11 μόσει ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, εἶτα τούτῳ χρῆσθαι. καὶ εἰ τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐφ' οἷς ἐτέθη ὁ νόμος μηκέτι μένει, ὁ δὲ νόμος, πειρατέον τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ μάχεσθαι ταύτῃ
12 πρὸς τὸν νόμον. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἢ πρὸς τὸ

autem id vocatur. Alterius vero exemplum, cum lex aliqua secum ipsa discordat, omisit, ut rei sua vi satis notae'.

§ 10. This very elliptical sentence must apparently be thus filled up. *καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος* (*ὁ νόμος, χρηστέον αὐτῷ* from §§ 3, 4, or *λεκτέον*), *ὥστε* (so as to, in such a way as to...) *στρέφειν* (*αὐτόν*) *καὶ ὁρᾶν κ.τ.λ.* 'and if the law (which we have to interpret) be ambiguous, (we must deal with it, treat it, or interpret it) in such a way as to wrest (twist) it (in either direction according as it suits our purpose) and to see to which of the two constructions either strict justice (the *letter* of the law) or expediency, i. e. equity, (whichever of the two we are arguing for) will adapt itself, and then employ *that*'. *τὸ συμφέρον* here stands for 'equity', because by accommodating itself to the varying circumstances of particular cases it is more 'generally serviceable' than the stiff unbending letter of the law. *ἀγωγή* (*τοῦ νόμου*) 'leading', 'guiding' of the law. This 'leading of the law' represents the law itself as leading those who have to use it by the 'interpretation' or 'construction' that may be put upon it in one or another direction, and corresponds exactly to *ductus* in the phrase *ductus litterarum*. The following passage of the Politics, VI (IV) 5, 1292 *b* 12, throws light upon this use of *ἀγωγή*, and as they mutually illustrate one another I will quote it entire. *οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ συμβέβηκεν ὥστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μὴ δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγὴν πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν παρ' ἄλλοις τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι πολιτείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ δ' ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι μᾶλλον.* Here again the *ἀγωγή* is *τοῦ νόμου*, the leading, direction given to, or interpretation put upon the law in the actual practice of the society. The difference which sometimes arises between *the theory of the constitution* as laid down in the laws, and *the actual administration* and conduct of the government, is accounted for, first, by the character and habits of the people, either natural to them or as cultivated and formed by education; and secondly, by the 'direction' they give to, or the 'interpretation' they put upon, the actually existing laws, in accordance with the character which *they* wish to give to the practical administration of the government. Compare *καθ' αὐτοὺς ἄγουσι τὴν πολιτείαν*, c. 11, 1296 *a* 26, and Thuc. II 65, of Pericles' direction of the state policy, *καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ* (*τοῦ πλήθους*) *ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε.*

ἀμφίβολος] III 5. 4, *ἀμφίβολα*, 'ambiguous phrases'. Rhet. ad Alex. 25 (26). 1, *διαφεύγων τὸ ἀμφίβολον*, opposed to *οἰκεῖα ὀνόματα.* Ib. 36 (37). 22, 29. Comp. note on III 5. 4.

§ 12. The highly condensed contents of this section, which gives the other side of the foregoing arguments for the treatment of laws, shewing

πρᾶγμα, τό τε γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ λεκτέον ὅτι οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἕνεκα δικάζειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἵνα, ἐὰν ἀγνοήσῃ τί λέγει ὁ νόμος, μὴ ἐπιορκῇ. καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αἱρεῖται οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὑτῷ. καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι. καὶ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐ λυσιτελεῖ παρασοφίζεσθαι τὸν ἰατρόν· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἡ ἁμαρτία τοῦ ἰατροῦ ὅσον τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἄρχοντι. καὶ ὅτι τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητεῖν εἶναι, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις νόμοις ἀπαγορεύεται.

13 καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτω διωρίσθω· περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρές εἰσι διττοί, οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ οἱ δὲ πρόσφατοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου οἱ δ' ἐκτός. λέγω δὲ παλαιοὺς μὲν τούς τε

how to argue when the written law is in our favour, have been developed *in extenso* in the Introd. p. 195—6, and we may now proceed to the details.

πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα] 'in favour of our case' as *τῷ πράγματι* § 4.

τὸ ἁπλῶς, τὸ αὑτῷ] I 7. 35, *καὶ τὸ αὑτῷ καὶ ἁπλῶς*, and note there.

παρασοφίζεσθαι] 'to attempt to outdo (to go beyond, *παρά*) the physician (note the *generic τόν*; one of the two uses of the definite article, to mark the *member of a class*) in skill and subtlety, ingenuity and cleverness'. The proverb, 'to be wiser than your physician', is applied to *ἰδιῶται* who pretend to rival the professors, *τεχνῖται* or *σοφοί*, men of special knowledge, skill, and experience in any art or science. In Athen. p. 137 F, quoted by Victorius, the verb stands for 'over refining' in the art of cookery, *τὸν δὲ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ κρέας ταριχηρὸν εἰς τάριχος διασκευάσαντα μαστιγωθῆναι, ὡς παρασοφιζόμενον πονηρῶς.*

τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητεῖν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Cleon ap. Thuc. III 37, *οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι...καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις*: and a little before, *πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ...μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι χείροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις, ἀμαθία τε μετὰ σωφροσύνης ὠφελιμώτερον ἢ δεξιότης μετ' ἀκολασίας, κ.τ.λ.* Bacon, *de Augmentis*, Lib. VIII. Aphor. 58 (Vol. I. p. 816, ed. Ellis and Spedding), quotes this maxim as proverbial, '*licet enim non male dictum sit, neminem oportere legibus esse sapientiorem;*' on which Ellis has this note, 'Bacon refers perhaps to D'Argentré's maxim, *Stulta videtur sapientia quae lege vult sapientior videri.* In the passage from which these words are taken he is condemning the presumption of judges *who depart from the text on the pretence of equity*—which is precisely what the advocate is supposed to be doing here.'

§ 13. **διωρίσθω**] See on I 11. 29, p. 224.

ποιητὰς καὶ ὅσων ἄλλων γνωρίμων εἰσὶ κρίσεις φανεραί, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι Ὁμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος καὶ Τενέδιοι ἔναγχος Περιάνδρῳ τῷ Κορινθίῳ πρὸς Σιγειεῖς. καὶ Κλεοφῶν κατὰ Κριτίου

κρίσεις φανεραί] 'decisions, judgments, published, or notorious'. Quint. V 11. 36, *Adhibetur extrinsecus in causam et* auctoritas. *Haec secuti Graecos, a quibus* κρίσεις *dicuntur,* iudicia *aut iudicationes vocant ...si quid ita visum gentibus, populis, sapientibus viris, claris civibus, illustribus poetis* (all γνώριμοι,) *referri potest.*

οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι Ὁμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος] Quint. u. s. § 40 (as an instance of the appeals to 'authorities' mentioned in § 36), *Neque est ignobile exemplum, Megareos ab Atheniensibus, quum de Salamine contenderent victos Homeri versu, qui tamen ipse non in omni editione reperitur, significans Aiacem naves suas Atheniensibus iunxisse.* The '*versus*' or rather two verses here in question are, Il. B 557—8, [Αἴας δ' ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νῆας, στῆσε δ' ἄγων, ἵν' Ἀθηναίων ἵσταντο φάλαγγες] which were quoted by Solon (and said to have been interpolated by him in the text of Homer for that purpose, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. Sol. § 48) as an 'authority' in favour of the Athenian claim to the possession of Salamis. See Heyne, Paley, and Trollope's notes on the passage of Homer, Plut. Vit. Sol. c. 10, Strabo, Attica, IX 1. Plutarch says that the current opinion in his time attributed the interpolation of the line (the second of the two) to Solon, though the Athenians denied it: in Strabo's time it was condemned by the critics: he enters at length into the question, and gives the reasons for rejecting the verse. Another well-known instance of the authority of a γνώριμος, or distinguished man, is the proverbial αὐτὸς ἔφα, *ipse dixit*, of the disciples of Pythagoras.

καὶ Τενέδιοι ἔναγχος κ.τ.λ.] Of this event, 'recent' at the time of Aristotle's writing, nothing more is known than we learn from this passage. 'Ex verbis his colligo', says Victorius, 'Tenedi insulae incolas cum Sigeensibus disceptantes usos et ipsos prisco teste Periandro: qui, quamvis multis antea saeculis mortuus esset, poema reliquerat quo praecepta quaedam ad beate vivendum, ὑποθῆκαι vocatae a Graecis, continebantur. Laertius qui vitam ipsius scripsit hoc narrat: in eo autem, ut suspicari licet, aliquid fuit quod causam Tenediorum adiuvaret.'

Κλεοφῶν] a mischievous profligate demagogue, who took a leading part in public affairs at Athens during the latter years of the Peloponnesian War. He was tried and condemned by the Council during the siege of Athens in 405 B.C. One of the results of the political rivalry between him and Critias, one of the leaders of the opposite party, was this charge which he brought against him, at some time not ascertained. The various references to him in Aristophanes, Xenophon, and the Orators, will be found in the article on him in Smith's *Dict. of Biography*, and other particulars respecting his habits and character in Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Graec.* I p. 171 seq, in the account of the play bearing his name, which Plato the Comic poet wrote to assail him.

Κριτίου] The person accused by Cleophon was the well-known oli-

τοῖς Σόλωνος ἐλεγείοις ἐχρήσατο, λέγων ὅτι πάλαι
ἀσελγὴς ἡ οἰκία· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε ἐποίησε Σόλων
εἰπεῖν μοι Κριτίᾳ πυρρότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν.

garchical leader, one of the thirty tyrants, maternal uncle of Plato the philosopher, and great-grand-nephew of Solon, Plat. Charm. 155 A. He was son of Callaeschrus, ibid. 153 C, who was the son of another Critias, son of Dropides, brother of Solon. Comp. Tim. 20 E.

Cleophon, in his accusation, took occasion to quote 'as from an authority' some elegiac verses of Solon from whose family he was descended, to shew that reckless licentiousness was hereditary in the race.

ἀσελγής] Hesychius ἀκόλαστος, ἀκάθαρτος. Gram. ap. Bekk. *Anecd.* I 451, ἀσελγές, πᾶν τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ βίαιον. καὶ ἀσέλγεια ἡ μετ' ἐπηρεασμοῦ καὶ θρασύτητος βία. καὶ ἀσελγὴς ὁ ἀνάγωγος (intractable, unmanageable, like 'unbroken' horses and dogs, Xenophon, from ἄγειν, 'to train or educate'). Δημοσθένης (c. Mid. 521. 2), καὶ ὁ κωμικός. Ὥσπερ ἀνέμου ἐξαίφνης ἀσελγοῦς γενομένου (Eupolis, Fr. Inc. XXV. Meineke, Vol. II. p. 558). οἴων αὐτέπνιγος (or τὸ πνῖγος) ὡς ἀσελγής (Pherecr. Fragm. Inc. XXIX. Meineke, II 348). ἀσελγὲς σκῶμμα, Eupolis, *bis*. Hence it appears that the primary sense of the word is 'untamed or untameable', from α and θέλγειν (on the analogy of ἀμιγής 'unmixed', one who cannot be soothed, charmed, tamed; hence violent, extravagant, excessive—Arist. Plut. 559, παρὰ τῷ μὲν (πλούτῳ) γὰρ ποδαγρῶντες καὶ γαστρώδεις καὶ παχύκνημοι καὶ πίονές εἰσιν ἀσελγῶς, 'extravagantly fat'—and specially in the indulgence of the appetites and passions, reckless in character and conduct; licentious, profligate to excess. Arist. Pol. VIII (V) 5, sub init. διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν, 'license' in conduct; ib. c. 6, 1305 *b* 40, γίγνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς, 'by a life of reckless extravagance'. Plat. Rep. IV 424 E (the word is rare in Plato). Demosth. Olynth. II 23. 19, Phil. IV. 131. 11, c. Mid. 521. 2 u. s., ap. eundem ἀσελγῶς ζῆν, διακεῖσθαι, διάγειν τὸν βίον, χρῆσθαί τινι.

εἰπεῖν μοι] This, and the following line of Solon's elegy, is quoted, with two variations from Aristotle's version, by Proclus ad Tim. 20 E,

εἰπέμεναι Κριτίῃ ξανθότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν·
οὐ γὰρ ἁμαρτινόῳ πείσεται ἡγεμόνι,

the father of Critias being Solon's brother, Dropides. These verses, which were probably intended by the author as a compliment to the father, are misconstrued by the malicious Cleophon into a reflection on the son, whose recklessness and licentiousness had brought upon him his father's displeasure: the authority of Solon is appealed to to shew that the grandson inherited his grandfather's vices. Whether πυρρότριχι is another malicious perversion of Cleophon, on the hypothesis that red hair implies a licentious disposition, or depravity in general—as seems to have been the opinion of the Normans, who had the proverb, *entre poil roux et félonie s'entreportent grant compagnie*, (Wace, *Roman de Rou*, quoted by Sir F. Palgrave, *Hist. of Norm.* II 721)—or Aristotle, quoting from memory, has *mis*quoted, *more suo*, cannot now be ascertained. At all events it is unlikely that *Solon* intended any such imputation on Critias' character, whatever may have been the case with Cleophon; for

14 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν γενομένων οἱ τοιοῦτοι μάρτυρες, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ οἱ χρησμολόγοι, οἷον Θεμιστοκλῆς, ὅτι ναυμαχητέον, τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος λέγων. ἔτι καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, μαρ- P. 1376.

Critias is evidently considered as a boy or very young man from the tone of the address or message, and Victorius shews from Theocr. Id. VIII. 3, ἄμφω τώγ' ἤτην πυῤῥοτρίχω, ἄμφω ἀνάβω, that red hair in a boy in the eyes of the Greeks was a beauty and not a deformity. It seems to me that Solon wrote ξανθότριχι, as Proclus gives it, and that the other reading is due either to Cleophon's malice if we interpret it *in deterius*, or to Aristotle's want of memory, if we take it as synonymous with ξανθότριχι. The evidence of Critias' ἀσέλγεια derived from the verses is plainly a false inference of Cleophon and not really contained in the original: the statement in Plat. Charm. 157 E, that Solon wrote Elegies in praise of 'the house of Critias', and spoke of its members as 'distinguished by personal beauty and virtue and all other so-called happiness', is altogether against any such supposition. Victorius, who regards the inference drawn by Cleophon as justified by the language of the verses, endeavours to reconcile this with the eulogistic character of the elegy, by the remark that Critias may have been an exception to the general good character of his family. Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* p. 331, follows Proclus' version. The other variation, εἰπεῖν μοι, and εἰπέμεναι, may be either another slip of Aristotle's memory, or εἰπεῖν μοι a mere false reading of εἰπέμεναι, the one being very easily mistaken for the other.

Lastly, μοί, if it were retained, would be a good example of the *dativus ethicus* corresponding in Greek to the familiar use of 'me' in the earlier English writers: as Shakespeare, Rob me the treasury; He smiled me in the face (Dame Quickly of Falstaff); See how this river comes me cranking in (Hotspur). [Abbott's *Shaksp. Gr.* § 220. S.]

§ 14. χρησμολόγοι] amongst whom Themistocles is included as the interpreter of an oracle which referred to future events, περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων, here denotes not merely professional soothsayers, but amateurs also who followed the diviner's craft. Herod., VII 141, gives the oracle here quoted: the verses run thus, τεῖχος Τριτογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς μοῦνον ἀπόρθητον τελέθειν, τό σε τέκνα τ' ὀνήσει. c. 143 gives Themistocles' interpretation. The professional interpreters of the oracles are called χρησμολόγοι by Herodotus.

αἱ παροιμίαι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται] These words will not bear the ordinary interpretation of ὥσπερ εἴρηται, 'as has been already said', because this is not true. Therefore Victorius and Vater propose to render ὥσπερ as if it were οἷάπερ, *huiuscemodi*, 'proverbs are also used as evidence, such as has been mentioned', viz. evidence of the future: and Muretus proposed καὶ τὸ ὥσπερ εἴρηται, "and the 'as has been said'," any general remark that has been habitually made, whether proverbial or not. We may follow Victorius in his explanation, without however supposing that ὥσπερ is used in any but its literal and proper meaning 'proverbs are evidence, in the way that has been stated', evidence (that is) of the future.

τυρια ἐστίν· οἷον εἴ τις συμβουλεύει μὴ ποιεῖσθαι φίλον γέροντα, τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ ἡ παροιμία,

μήποτ' εὖ ἔρδειν γέροντα. p. 51.

καὶ τὸ τοὺς υἱοὺς ἀναιρεῖν ὧν καὶ τοὺς πατέρας,

νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει.

15 πρόσφατοι δ' ὅσοι γνώριμοί τι κεκρίκασιν· χρήσιμοι γὰρ αἱ τούτων κρίσεις τοῖς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν· οἷον Εὔβουλος ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἐχρήσατο

μήποτ' εὖ ἔρδειν γέροντα] Suidas, s. vv. *ἄχρηστα* et *μήποτ' εὖ ἔρδειν*, quotes the proverb at length, in two different forms, both of them corrupt. The proverb conveys the maxim *εἰς ἄχρηστα μὴ ἀναλίσκειν*. Gaisford from the materials supplied by Suidas has put together the following lines, *μήποτ' εὖ ἔρδειν γέροντα, μηδὲ παῖδα βάσκανον· μὴ λαλητικὴν γυναῖκα, μηδὲ γείτονος κύνα· μὴ κυβερνήτην φίλυπνον, μὴ λάλον κωπηλάτην.*

νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει] The verse is taken from Stasinus' *Cypria:* quoted by Clemens, Strom. VI 747. Düntzer, *Fragm. Epic. Gr.* p. 16. It is repeated II 21. 11. Herod. I 155, Cyrus to Croesus, on hearing of the revolt of the Lydians, *ὁμοίως γάρ μοι νῦν γε φαίνομαι πεποιηκέναι, ὡς εἴ τις πατέρα ἀποκτείνας τῶν παίδων αὐτοῦ φείσαιτο.* Liv. XL 3, of Philip king of Macedon, father of Perseus, *Postremo negare propalam coepit satis tutum sibi quicquam esse nisi liberos eorum, quos interfecisset, comprehensos in custodia haberet, et tempore alium alio tolleret* (Victorius). Eur. Androm. 518, *καὶ γὰρ ἀνοία μεγάλη λείπειν ἐχθροὺς ἐχθρῶν, ἐξὸν κτείνειν καὶ φόβον οἴκων ἀφελέσθαι.* Comp. Toup. *Emend. in Suid.* II 185 (G.). Comp. Heracl. 1005, where it is put in the mouth of Eurystheus; and Herc. Fur. 168, in that of Lycus. Plutarch has the proverb, *νεκρὸς οὐ δάκνει.*

§ 15. **Εὔβουλος**] **'Αναφλύστιος** (*ψήφισμα* ap. Dem. de Cor. § 29), a demagogue (so Harpocration and the Schol.), orator and political opponent of Demosthenes, who mentions him very frequently in de Cor., de F. Leg., and elsewhere. This Eubulus is omitted in Smith's *Dict. of Biogr.;* but Baiter and Sauppe, in their excellent *Index Nominum* (*Orat. Att.* III. Ind. Nom. pp. 48, 9), have furnished a complete list of all the references to him from the Greek Orators, Scholiasts, and Lexicographers, which in some degree supplies the place of a biography. See also Ruhnken, *Hist. Crit. Or. Gr.* p. 146 [and especially Arnold Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, I 173—191. S.]. He is attacked and apostrophized by Demosthenes, de F. Leg. §§ 290—293, and a passage of one of his speeches is referred to in § 292. 'Eubulus in the law-court (at the trial) employed against Chares the saying of Plato (the Comic poet) against Archibius, that "the avowal of knavery (rascality) has grown in the city".' Meineke, in his *Fragm. Comm. Gr.* (Plat. Fragm. Inc. XLI.) Vol. II 692, merely quotes this passage without attempting to restore the verse or explain the allusion. In his *Hist. Crit.* (*Fr. Com. Gr.* I 161, note) he had proposed to substitute *'Αγυῤῥίου* for *'Αρχιβίου* in the text of

κατὰ Χάρητος ᾧ Πλάτων εἶπε πρὸς Ἀρχίβιον, ὅτι ἐπιδέδωκεν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸ ὁμολογεῖν πονηροὺς εἶναι.
16 καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου, ἂν δόξωσι ψεύδεσθαι. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτοι τῶν τοιούτων μόνον μάρτυρές εἰσιν, εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μή, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποῖον οὐ μάρτυρες, οἷον εἰ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, εἰ συμ-
17 φέρον ἢ ἀσύμφορον· οἱ δ' ἄπωθεν καὶ περὶ τούτων πιστότατοι. πιστότατοι δ' οἱ παλαιοί· ἀδιάφθοροι γάρ. πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυριῶν μάρτυρας μὲν μὴ ἔχοντι, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων δεῖ κρίνειν καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατῆσαι τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἁλίσκεται

Aristotle, an opinion which is afterwards retracted in the other place referred to.

§ 16. *καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες...ψεύδεσθαι*] 'Those who share the danger' (with the person for whom they give evidence, i. e. are liable to the penalties of *ψευδομαρτυρία*, as the other is to those of the offence with which he is charged) 'if they be suspected of falsehood', sc. *πρόσφατοί εἰσι*, are reckoned amongst 'recent' or contemporary witnesses. That they are so is shewn by their actual presence in court, and the risk they consequently run. See Introd. p. 196, for the explanation of the remainder of the section. *δόξωσιν.* 'quia si *credantur* etiam mendaces falsique, non tantum si fuerint, plectuntur.' Victorius.

With *εἰ συμφέρον ἢ ἀσύμφορον*, which recognises this kind of *ἄτεχνος πίστις* as available also in deliberative speaking, comp. § 3, and the note.

§ 17. *οἱ ἄπωθεν*] i.e., according to the Greek usage, those who give their evidence, not *at* a distance (as we say) but *from* a distance, measuring the distance *from* the object *to* the subject. See note on I 11. 16, p. 213.

πιστότατοι οἱ παλαιοί] Living witnesses may be corrupted, bribed to give false evidence: the ancient witnesses or authorities, appealed to in confirmation of statements or opinions, are inaccessible to corruption, and therefore most to be relied on.

πίστωμα, which seems to occur only in Aeschylus (Pers. 171 *γηράλεα πιστώματα*, *abstr. pro concr.*, for *πιστοὶ γέροντες*, and Choeph. 977, Eumen. 214, in the sense of 'pledge, guarantee, assurance') and in Empedocles and Clearchus and one or two late authors, is here no doubt connected with the rhetorical *πίστεις*, and means the assurances that are produced in the minds of the audience by the rhetorical proofs alleged. It can hardly be identifiable with the *πίστεις* themselves, though 'proofs' of some kind is the meaning required.

ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατῆσαι—ψευδομαρτυριῶν] Compare Hermogenes, *περὶ στάσεων* (Speng. *Rhet. Gr.* II p. 144), *ὁ δὲ κατηγορῶν ἀποφανεῖ τὸν διὰ*

τὰ εἰκότα ψευδομαρτυριῶν· ἔχοντι δὲ πρὸς μὴ ἔχοντα, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει
18 μαρτυριῶν, εἰ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἱκανὸν ἦν θεωρῆσαι. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μαρτυρίαι αἳ μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ αἳ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, καὶ αἳ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αἳ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους, ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέποτ' ἔστιν ἀπορῆσαι μαρτυρίας χρησίμης· εἰ μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ πράγματος ἢ αὐτῷ ὁμολογουμένης ἢ τῷ ἀμφισβητοῦντι ἐναντίας, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἢ αὐτοῦ εἰς
19 ἐπιείκειαν ἢ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος εἰς φαυλότητα. τὰ

τῶν πραγμάτων ἔλεγχον ἀξιοπιστότερον τοῦ διὰ τῶν μαρτύρων· οὔτε γὰρ πεπεισμένα τὰ πράγματα οὔτε χαριζόμενά τῳ λέξει ὥσπερ οἱ μάρτυρες πολλάκις, ἀλλ' οἷά ἐστι φύσει, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐξεταζόμενα φαίνεται. Cic. pro Caelio, c. 9 (quoted by Victorius), *Equidem vos abducam a testibus: neque huius iudicii veritatem, quae mutari nullo modo potest, in voluntate testium collocari sinam; quae facillime effingi, nullo negotio flecti ac detorqueri potest. Argumentis agemus; signis omni luce clarioribus crimina refellemus; res cum re, causa cum causa, ratio cum ratione pugnabit.* 'Probabilities can't be bribed to cheat (the judges), as witnesses can'.

οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα] 'probabilities are not responsible (liable to trial and penalty) like witnesses, and therefore less to be trusted'. ὑπόδικος, formed upon the analogy of ὑπεύθυνος, ὑπαίτιος, ὑπόσκιος, ὑπόσπονδος, ὕποσμος (Ar. de Anima, II 9. 5), ὑπαίθριος, ὑπόστεγος, ὑπόφορος; and following that of ἐπαίτιος, ἐπιζήμιος, ἐπικαίρος or -καίριος, ἐπίνοσος, κ.τ.λ. (liable or exposed to so and so); from ὑπό *sub*, 'under', 'subject to', either literally as ὑπόσκιος, or metaphorically as ὑπεύθυνος, ὑπόδικος. It occurs in the Orators, frequently in Plat. Leges, Aesch. Eumen. 250, ὑπόδικος θέλει γενέσθαι χερῶν, and Rhet. ad Alex. 4 (5). 6.

§ 18. αἳ μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ αἳ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος] 'Evidence (may be brought) either *for* ourselves or *against* the opposite party'; the indeterminate περί, 'about', 'concerning', takes its specific meaning from the words with which it is immediately joined; like the chameleon its colour from the objects round it. περὶ τοῦ πράγματος...περὶ τοῦ ἤθους, 'either to facts or character'; to support our own, and to invalidate and depreciate those of the opposite party.

εἰ μὴ γάρ] (εὐπορεῖ τις, or ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν, μαρτυρίας, with which ὁμολογουμένης is supposed to agree). ἀλλά (at any rate, at least) *subaudi* εὐπορεῖ γε... 'For if we have no evidence as to the fact, either in agreement with our own side of the case, or opposed to that of the adverse party, at all events (we shall be sure to find plenty) as to character, (εἰς, tending to, bearing on,) to establish, that is, either our own respectability or the opponent's worthlessness'. ὁμολογουμένης, 'in agreement with', comp. II 22. 15, ὁμολογούμενα and (the opposite) ἀνομολογούμενα. In § 21 of this chapter, the sense is different, 'admitted', as in Plato and Arist. Rhet. I 13. 9 *bis*.

δ' ἄλλα περὶ μάρτυρος ἢ φίλου ἢ ἐχθροῦ ἢ μεταξύ, ἢ
εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἢ ἀδοξοῦντος ἢ μεταξύ, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι
τοιαῦται διαφοραί, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων λεκτέον ἐξ
οἵων περ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγομεν.
20 περὶ δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν τοσαύτη τοῦ λόγου χρῆσίς P. 1376 b.
ἐστιν ὅσον αὔξειν ἢ καθαιρεῖν ἢ πιστὰς ποιεῖν ἢ ἀ-
πίστους, ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχωσι, πιστὰς καὶ κυρίας,
21 ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος τοὐναντίον. πρὸς μὲν
οὖν τὸ πιστὰς ἢ ἀπίστους κατασκευάζειν οὐδὲν δια- p. 52.
φέρει τῆς περὶ τοὺς μάρτυρας πραγματείας· ὁποῖοι
γὰρ ἄν τινες ὦσιν οἱ ἐπιγεγραμμένοι ἢ φυλάττοντες,

§ 19. ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων...λέγομεν] '(the arguments on these subjects) must be drawn from the same topics (i.e. the εἴδη) as those from which we derive our enthymemes also'. See Introd. p. 198.

§ 20. περὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν] On συνθῆκαι see note on I 1. 9, περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα. They are contracts, bonds, engagements, agreements of any kind between two or more parties. They are probably intended to include documentary evidence of all kinds, which is expressed by the Latin *tabulae* of Cicero and Quintilian. See on this head Quint. V 5.

αὐτῷ] 'for oneself'. Add this to the instances of αὑτοῦ, &c. for αὐτοῦ and the rest, in notes on I 1. 12; I 7. 35; and see the references there given.

'On the subject of contracts, arguments may be so far employed as to magnify or reduce (pull down, met. extenuate, depreciate, disparage (their value and importance), or (in other words) confirm or destroy their credit (or trustworthiness); if we have them (to produce) (χρῆσίς ἐστι ποιεῖν) we must argue for their credit and validity (κυρίας, their *authoritative* character); in the case of (if they *apply to*, are on the side of) the opposite party, the reverse'.

§ 21. κατασκευάζειν] is a technical term of dialectics, denoting the constructive process and object of argumentation or syllogism, viz. to establish some *positive* conclusion, to maintain or confirm a thesis; and opposed to ἀνασκευάζειν, which represents the 'subversive', 'destructive' (ἀνασκευάζειν 'to undo', comp. λύειν 'to break up, or dissolve a thing into its elements'), 'refutative' syllogism or reasoning which proves a negative. On these terms see further in Introd. p. 268, and note (on p. 267) on the same page.

'Now in regard of establishing their credit or discrediting them, the treatment of this in no respect differs from that of the witnesses; for according to the character of those whose names are attached to, subscribed to, (inscribed *upon*, as ἐπίγραμμα, the *title* of a crime or a legal prosecution, I 13. 9,) the document, or contract, or who have it in their keeping, the measure (degree) of credit or trustworthiness of the contract is determined (*lit.* by them are the contracts made trustworthy)'.

τούτοις αἱ συνθῆκαι πισταί εἰσιν. ὁμολογουμένης δ' εἶναι τῆς συνθήκης, οἰκείας μὲν οὔσης αὐξητέον· ἡ γὰρ συνθήκη νόμος ἐστὶν ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος, καὶ αἱ μὲν συνθῆκαι οὐ ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον κύριον, οἱ δὲ νόμοι τὰς κατὰ τὸν νόμον συνθήκας. καὶ ὅλως αὐτὸς ὁ νόμος συνθήκη τις ἐστίν, ὥστε ὅς τις ἀπιστεῖ ἢ ἀναι-
22 *ρεῖ συνθήκην, τοὺς νόμους ἀναιρεῖ. ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια κατὰ*

τούτοις πισταί] is a somewhat irregular expression, meaning *τοσούτῳ πιστότεραι εἰσὶν αἱ συνθῆκαι* or *τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ συνθῆκαι τῷ πισταὶ εἶναι.*

The degree of integrity of those who have the document in their custody is a measure of the probability of its having been tampered with or not.

'The existence of the contract being admitted, if the document be our own (§ 26), we must *magnify* it (cry it up; *increase*, exaggerate, its value and importance); for the contract (we may say) is a law, special and partial; and it is not the contracts that give authority, or validity, to the law, but the laws to the contracts which are made in conformity with them (legally)'. Either of these arguments may be urged to shew that a covenant has the sanction of law, and shares its authority. 'And, speaking generally, the law itself is a kind of contract, and therefore any one who violates (disobeys) the provisions (understand *συνθήκῃ* after *ἀπιστεῖ*) of a contract or makes away with it, is in fact subverting, doing away with, the laws'. This doctrine has already been stated in other words, c. 13. 2, *νόμον...ἴδιον μὲν τὸν ἑκάστοις ὡρισμένον πρὸς αὑτούς.* This is therefore the positive, written, local or national law, varying in different societies, and enacted by each of them severally for mutual convenience, under an implied contract to observe and maintain them.

Analogous to this view of law as a contract is the theory, in Politics, of the *Social Contract*, which has been maintained by Locke, Rousseau, and many others. This view of the origin of the social organization and of government, is founded upon the natural freedom and equality of men; and assumes a common agreement amongst the members of a state to live and act together for purposes of self-defence and mutual advantage in obedience to laws and an executive authority which the theory supposes to have emanated originally from themselves, and to be invalid without their consent. Similar to this are the 'laws of war', which give the conqueror certain rights over the conquered, amongst them that of enslaving, and result from a sort of international compact, or universal agreement. Polit. I 6, sub init. *ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τίς ἐστιν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασίν.* Compare also Pol. III 9, 1280 *b* 10 seq. *καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη, καὶ καθάπερ ἔφη Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷος ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας.*

§ 22. *ἔτι δὲ πράττεται κ.τ.λ.*] Transl. in Introd. p. 199. *πράττεται* 'are transacted'. On *συναλλάγματα*, 'the ordinary dealings' of men with

συνθήκας, ὥστε ἀκύρων γιγνομένων ἀναιρεῖται ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρεία τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καὶ τἆλλα δὲ ὅσα
23 ἁρμόττει, ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν ἔστιν. ἂν δ' ἐναντία ᾖ καὶ

one another, especially in trade and exchange of commodities, see note on I 1. 9.

καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια] 'all voluntary transactions', in general, is added because *συναλλάγματα* may include *τὰ ἀκούσια*, frauds, crimes, offences, which may arise in men's dealings with one another: Eth. Nic. V 5 sub fin., 1131 *a* 2, *τῶν μὲν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσιά ἐστι τὰ δ' ἀκούσια· ἑκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πρᾶσις, ὠνή, δανεισμός, ἐγγύη, χρῆσις, παρακαταθήκη, μίσθωσις· ἑκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἑκούσιος, τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπή, μοιχεία, φαρμακεία, προαγωγεία, δουλαπατία, ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία, δεσμός, θάνατος, ἁρπαγή, πήρωσις, κακηγορία, προπηλακισμός.*

χρεία] '*usus*' as *χρῆσθαι* '*uti*', 'intercourse', the *use* that men make of one another.

ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν ἔστιν] This phrase occurs again, Rhet. II 16. 1, and Hist. Anim. IX 38. 2, *ἡ μὲν οὖν μυρμήκων ἐργασία πᾶσίν ἐστιν ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν*. In Rhet. II 23. 30, *τὸ ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι* expresses 'superficiality'. It seems to be said of things that 'lie on the surface, things prominent and conspicuous, so as to be seen by every one', *ὥστε τινὰ* or *πάντας ἰδεῖν αὐτά*. This explanation is confirmed by the substitution of *εὐθεώρητα*, to express the same notion, in § 25 *infra* (so Victorius). If this be so, the verb should be written *ἐστιν*, and not *ἔστιν* (for *ἔξεστιν*) as in Bekker's text.

ἐπιπολῆς] is the genitive of a substantive *ἐπιπολή* 'a surface', only used by later and non-Attic writers; 'veteribus illis...*ἐπιπολῆς* adverbii vicem fuit, Herod. I 187, Arist. Plut. 1207, Eccles. 1108, Thucyd. VI 96, et compluries Xenophon. Neque eius substantivi alius tum casus in usu fuit'. Lobeck ad Phryn. p. 126—7. It is an adverb of *place* or *position*, after the analogy of *Ἀθηνῶν* 'at Athens', *λαιᾶς χειρὸς* (Aesch. P. V. 720) 'on the left hand', &c.; see Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 377: (this seems to be omitted in Jelf's *Grammar*, though there are articles on the 'genitive of position'; §§ 524—528, which however is illustrated only by the genitive of relative position, not that which expresses place itself. The genitive, it is to be presumed, is in both cases *partitive*, denoting a point in space;) it is also after the analogy of the local adverbs, *οὗ, ὅπου, ὁμοῦ, οὐδαμοῦ, ποῦ* and *πού, ἀγχοῦ, τηλοῦ, πανταχοῦ*. *ἐπιπολή* itself not being in use, the substantive 'surface, superficies' is formed by the addition of the definite article, as Plat. Phileb. 46 D, (*ὁπόταν*) *τὸ...ἐπιπολῆς μόνον διαχέῃ*. Ar. *περὶ ἐνυπνίων* 2. 8, *τὸ ἐπιπολῆς τοῦ ἐνόπτρου*, 'the surface of the mirror'. Its derivatives *ἐπιπολαῖος* and *ἐπιπολάζειν* (to be on the surface), have three different senses all arising from the properties attributable to things on the surface; either (1) 'popular', 'prevalent', 'fashionable', 'current', like things that come to the top, come uppermost, and so 'prevail' over the rest, as *δόξαι μάλιστα ἐπιπολάζουσαι*, Arist. Eth. N. I 2, 1096 *a* 30, *ἐπιπολάζοντος τοῦ γελοίου*, ib. IV. 14, 1128 *a* 13, Hist. Anim. IV 1. 26, *τὸ μάλιστα ἐπιπόλαζον* 'the most abundant kind', VI 37. 2, de Gen. Anim. I 20. 11, *οὐ μὴν ἐπιπολάζουσί γε αἱ καθάρσεις ὥσπερ ἀνθρώποις*: or (2) (if indeed there be any difference between this

μετὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, πρῶτον μέν, ἅπερ ἄν τις πρὸς νόμον ἐναντίον μαχέσαιτο, ταῦθ' ἁρμόττει· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τοῖς μὲν νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὦσιν ἀλλ' ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῖν πεί-
24 *θεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ἀναγκαῖον. εἶθ' ὅτι τοῦ δικαίου ἐστὶ βραβευτὴς ὁ δικαστής· οὔκουν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἀλλ' ὡς δικαιότερον. καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον οὐκ ἔστι μεταστρέψαι οὔτ' ἀπάτῃ οὔτ' ἀνάγκῃ (πε-*

and the preceding) 'conspicuous', 'prominent', compared with such as are deep down, or buried, out of sight; Rhet. *bis*, Hist. Anim. quoted above on *ἐπιπολῆς*: and (3) 'superficial', opposed to *βαθύς*; either literally, de Insomn. (*περὶ ἐνυπνίων*) 2. 12, *οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσδύεται ἡ κηλὶς ἀλλ' ἐπιπολαιότερον*, or metaph., as Rhet. III 11. 10, *ἀληθὲς καὶ μὴ ἐπιπόλαιον*. II 23. 30, above referred to. III 10. 4, *τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων*, followed by the explanation, *ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα, καὶ ἃ μηδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσαι*, is doubtful; for an enthymeme may be too easy to follow and therefore unacceptable, either because it is intellectually 'superficial' (this I think is the more probable meaning, because more applicable to an intellectual process) or because it is 'prominent and conspicuous', *saute aux yeux*, and *therefore* is *δῆλον πᾶσιν*, Top. A 1, 100 *b* 27. Similarly in Pol. III 3, 1276 *a* 19, *ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιοτάτη τῆς ἀπορίας ζήτησις* (the most obvious and apparent, the clearest and plainest) *περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν*, and again, ib. c. 12, 1282 *b* 30, *ἢ τοῦτο ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεῦδος*; (evident on the surface). In these two last instances the literal sense of the word is uppermost.

§ 23. 'But if the contract or document be opposed to us, and (on the side) of the adverse party, first of all, the same arguments are suitable as may be used in *contending* against an adverse *law*'. *ἅπερ* is a cognate accusative extended by analogy from the direct cogn. acc. *ἥνπερ μάχην μαχέσαιτο*, for which the neuter plural, expressing the details of the contention, or the arguments employed in it, is substituted. 'For it is absurd to suppose that we are not bound to obey the laws, if their constitution is defective and the framers of them have been led into error, and yet that (in like cases) contracts are necessarily binding (that it is necessary to obey or observe them)'. [For *κείμενοι...τιθέμενοι* compare note on I 1. 7, p. 10. S.]

§ 24. *εἶθ' ὅτι*] The gist of the topic is to be found in Introd. p. 200.

βραβευτής] the umpire in the games, who *awards the prize* to the successful candidate, i. e. to the most deserving, is here used as an image of the judge who dispenses justice to the competitors in a court of law. It is he that is to be appealed to, not a mere contract, which has no regard for the general principles of justice. Justice (*ὡς δικαιότερον*) must prevail over contracts when they are in conflict. Dem., Cl. III 36. 7, has the verb in the same sense, *τὰ τῶν ἄλλων δίκαια βραβεύειν*. *βραβευτής* is the prose form; *βραβεύς* belongs to the Poets.

τοῦτο] is 'what we are talking about', 'that which is before us', *δεικτικῶς*; the contract, namely, and its contents.

25 φυκός γάρ ἐστιν), συνθῆκαι δὲ γίγνονται καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντων καὶ ἀναγκασθέντων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκοπεῖν εἰ ἐναντία ἐστί τινι ἢ τῶν γεγραμμένων νόμων ἢ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἢ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἢ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἔπειτα εἰ ἄλλαις συνθήκαις ὑστέραις ἢ προτέραις· ἢ γὰρ εἰ ὕστεραι κύριαι, ἄκυροι δ' αἱ πρότεραι, ἢ αἱ πρότεραι ὀρθαί, αἱ δ' ὕστεραι ἠπατήκασιν, ὁποτέρως ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον. ἔτι δὲ τὸ συμφέρον ὁρᾶν, εἴ πῃ ἐναντιοῦται τοῖς κριταῖς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα εὐθεώρητα ὁμοίως.

26 αἱ δὲ βάσανοι μαρτυρίαι τινές εἰσιν, ἔχειν δὲ δοκοῦσι τὸ πιστόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τις πρόσεστιν. οὔκουν χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, ἐξ ὧν ἐάν τε ὑπάρχωσιν οἰκεῖαι αὔξειν ἔστιν, ὅτι ἀληθεῖς μόναι τῶν μαρτυριῶν εἰσὶν αὗται· ἐάν τε P. 1377.
ὑπεναντίαι ὦσι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, δια- p. 53.
λύοι ἄν τις τἀληθῆ λέγων καθ' ὅλου τοῦ γένους τῶν

§ 25. 'And again, justice cannot be perverted (have its nature altered) by fraud or compulsion like a contract, because it is natural (constancy and uniformity are characteristic of *nature*); whereas contracts are undertaken, entered into, under the influence of deceit (under false pretences) and compulsion.' The two genitives in construction follow συνθῆκαι, 'contracts of men deceived are made'.

οἰκείοις ἢ ἀλλοτρίοις] 'domestic or foreign'.

τὸ συμφέρον] In arguing against the validity of a contract, you may take into account the consequences of carrying its provisions into effect, so far as they affect the judges, whose 'interest' or 'advantage' (or the reverse) may be involved in them: when these results happen to be adverse to the judges' interest, arguments from this source may be employed to invalidate the contract; 'and all other topics of the same kind, (may be used) (which need not be enumerated) because they are equally easy to observe (with the preceding)', too clear to need enumeration.

§ 26. οἰκεῖαι] 'of one's own', 'on our side', supr. § 21.

διαλύοι ἄν τις] or λύειν and διαλύειν, see Introd. p. 267 note.

τἀληθῆ λέγων] These words have been variously interpreted. Muretus omitted τἀληθῆ, as contrary to Aristotle's opinion on the subject of torture—which however must be gathered from the words of the text, and not assumed *a priori*, and the text altered in conformity with the hypothesis—evidently supposing that if retained it must be construed with διαλύοι and not with λέγων. There can be no doubt that the latter is right, and that the words *do* express Aristotle's opinion upon the use of

βασάνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὰ ψευδῆ λέγουσιν ἢ τἀληθῆ, καὶ διακαρτεροῦντες μὴ λέγειν τἀληθῆ, καὶ ῥᾳδίως καταψευδόμενοι ὡς παυσόμενοι θᾶττον. δεῖ δ' ἔχειν ἐπαναφέρειν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα γεγενημένα παραδείγματα ἃ ἴσασιν οἱ κρίνοντες.[1]

27 *περὶ δ' ὅρκων τετραχῶς ἔστι διελεῖν· ἢ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ λαμβάνει, ἢ οὐδέτερον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τὸ δ' οὔ,*

[[1] + *δεῖ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς αἱ βάσανοι· πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ παχύφρονες οἱ καὶ λιθοδέρμοι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντες δυνατοὶ γενναίως ἐγκαρτεροῦσι ταῖς ἀνάγκαις, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ εὐλαβεῖς πρὸ τοῦ τὰς ἀνάγκας ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν καταθαρροῦσιν ὥστε οὐδέν ἐστι πιστὸν ἐν βασάνοις.* A[c]].

torture, by asserting the truth and right of the arguments directed *against* the use of it. [On 'torture' see C. R. Kennedy's *Demosthenes*, Vol. IV., pp. 382—391, appendix. S.]

διακαρτεροῦντες] (thoroughly, *διά*,) obstinately, resolutely, persisting, (holding out).

καὶ ῥᾳδίως καταψευδόμενοι] 'and ready to make false accusations (*κατά* 'against others') in the expectation of a speedier release'.

On the passage which in MS A[c] concludes this section, and is printed in the note of the Oxford reprint of Bekker's 1st ed., see in Introd. p. 201, and the note. It is omitted by Bekker. Spengel, *On the Rhetoric*, in *Bav. Trans.* 1851, p. 51, thinks that it is an extract from some other treatise on Rhetoric, introduced by the transcribers. The last sentence at all events must be corrupt, being as it stands devoid of meaning and connexion with the preceding. Brandis in his tract in Schneidewin's *Philologus*, IV i. p. 43, informs us that his Anonymous Annotator found the passage in the MSS that he used, though he thinks that Victorius was right in rejecting it as an interpolation. Victorius, a man whose judgment is to be relied on, writes thus. 'Delevi autem quia adulterinos putavi; aut enim ex alio scriptore artis haec pars sumta est (*so Spengel*), aut Scholion olim fuit quod importune post in contextum verborum Aristotelis translatum sit;...Qui accurate quae supra a philosopho iam tradita erant perpendit ipsius haec non esse manifesto intelligit; cuncta enim ille quae ad quaestiones pertinentia dicere voluerat iam explicaverat; sententia vero quae his viribus exponitur superioribus continetur; vox etiam iuncta illic est quae sermonem Aristotelis non redolet, viz. *λιθόδερμος* (*this applies still more strongly to καταθαρρεῖν*); et omnis denique haec locutio, e. c. *ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντες δυνατοί*, locutionis Aristotelicae dissimilis videtur'.

§ 27. *περὶ ὅρκων...διελεῖν*] On *περί*, and other prepositions, redundant in the later Greek writers, see note on I 9. 14, 'oaths admit of a fourfold division'.

On oaths, see the corresponding chapter of Quintilian, V 6. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 17 (18). A full explanation of the connexion and general meaning of this and the following sections to the end of the Chapter will be found in the Introd. pp. 202—205, to which the reader is referred; so

καὶ τούτων ἢ δίδωσι μὲν οὐ λαμβάνει δέ, ἢ λαμβάνει
μὲν δίδωσι δ' οὔ. ἔτι ἄλλως παρὰ ταῦτα, εἰ ὀμώ-
28 μοσται οὗτος ἢ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ ὑπ' ἐκείνου. οὐ δίδωσι
μὲν οὖν, ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἐπιορκοῦσιν, καὶ διότι ὁ μὲν ὀμό-
σας οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὀμόσαντος οἴεται κα-
ταδικάσειν. καὶ ὡς οὗτος ὁ κίνδυνος κρείττων ὁ ἐν
29 τοῖς δικασταῖς· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πιστεύει τῷ δ' οὔ. οὐ
λαμβάνει δ', ὅτι ἀντὶ χρημάτων ὅρκος. καὶ ὅτι εἰ ἦν
φαῦλος, κατωμόσατο ἄν· κρεῖττον γὰρ ἕνεκά του

that we may confine ourselves here as before to the *details* that require notice. One puzzling circumstance which pervades this Chapter, tending to confusion, and adding to the difficulties arising from the extreme brevity of the expression (*'brevis esse laborat obscurus fit'*, is especially true of Aristotle here, as indeed in most of his writings,) it may be worth while to draw attention to; and that is, that throughout it both plaintiff and defendant are made to argue in the *third* person; to avoid this, *you* may may be substituted for Aristotle's *he* to designate the person who is in immediate possession of the argument, whichever side of the case he may be at the time maintaining.

On the technical expressions belonging to ὅρκοι, see *note* in Introd. p. 202, διδόναι ὅρκον, in Aristotle and the Orators, is to *offer* or *tender* an oath, λαμβάνειν (or δέχεσθαι, in the Orators), to accept, or *take* it.

εἰ ὀμώμοσται οὗτος] 'when *this* (the oath above mentioned) has been already taken by one or other of the two parties'. ὀμώμοσται here is represented by γεγενημένος in § 32.

§ 28. οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι] Supply τὰ χρήματα (the deposit, or something else which the opponent is unjustly withholding), which is added in three MSS, apparently from a marginal gloss.

The case is: you refuse to tender the oath to the adverse party because it is of no use; he is so little embarrassed by scruples of conscience that he will take the oath and keep the money, so that you gain nothing by your motion. τοὺς δε 'but the judges, *you* think, if he do *not* swear, will decide against him'.

Another reason, or topic, for refusing to tender the oath is, that 'this form of risk', the risk that one runs by leaving the matter to, by throwing oneself upon, the judges (ὁ κίνδυνος οὗτος ὁ ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς), is to be preferred (κρείττων), viz. to the risk incurred of losing your suit by tendering oath to the adversary, who will probably perjure himself: you therefore refer your case to the decision of the judges, because you can trust them, but not the other.

§ 29. ἀντὶ χρημάτων] is, setting a pecuniary value upon the oath (estimating it *against* money, at so much money value), which is degrading to the dignity and sanctity of the oath, and *therefore* it is that you refuse to take it, and not from any baser motive.

κατωμόσατο] κατομνύναι (ὅρκον) occurs in Arist. Ran. 305, 306, appa-

φαῦλον εἶναι ἢ μηδενός· ὀμόσας μὲν οὖν ἕξει, μὴ ὀμόσας δ' οὔ.[1] οὕτω δὲ δι' ἀρετὴν ἂν εἴη, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' ἐπιορκίαν τὸ μή·[2] καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους ἁρμόττει, ὅτι οὐκ ἴση πρόκλησις αὕτη ἀσεβεῖ πρὸς εὐσεβῆ, ἀλλ' ὁμοία καὶ εἰ ἰσχυρὸς ἀσθενῆ πατάξαι ἢ πληγῆναι

[1] οὔ· infra. [2] μή. infra.

rently as a mere synonym of the simple verb, Δ. καῦθις κατόμοσον. Ξ. νὴ Δί'; Δ. ὄμοσον. Ξ. νὴ Δία. With ὅρκον and a second accus. of the thing sworn by, Eur. Hel. 835, ἀλλ' ἁγνὸν ὅρκον σὸν κάρα κατώμοσα. The middle voice is found again in Herod. VI 65, but in a different sense 'to swear against', with a genitive following. Here, and in the two other cases quoted above, the κατά seems to have an intensive force, expressing the 'binding force' of an oath. This sense of κατά comes from the original, physical, notion of 'keeping *down*'.

For the interpretation of this obscure topic, see Introd. p. 203. The obscurity is a little heightened by Bekker's punctuation, and may be very slightly cleared up by reading μὴ ὀμόσας δ' οὔ· (with colon instead of full stop) and at the end of the next clause τὸ μή. (with full stop instead of colon). There is a considerably closer connexion between the two clauses which he separates by a full stop, than there is between the two which are divided only by a colon.

The intention of the topic is to shew the purity and disinterestedness of the speaker's motives in refusing to take the oath.

καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους] Xenophanes of Colophon, the founder of the Eleatic school of Philosophy (Plat. Soph. 242 D, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους...ἀρξάμενον)—of which Parmenides his follower was the most distinguished representative, who converted the theological conception of universal being, represented by Xenophanes as God, into the metaphysical conception of the Universe as One, ἓν τὸ ὄν—appears to have conveyed his philosophical doctrines in hexameter verse, an example subsequently followed by Parmenides and Empedocles. He also wrote elegies and iambics, the latter directed against Homer and Hesiod, whose manner of speaking about the Gods he disapproved, Diog. Laert. IX 2. 18. The verse quoted *here* is a trochaic tetrameter; on which Mullach remarks, *Fragm. Phil. Gr.* Xenoph. Fr. 25, p. 106, note, 'cuius versiculi hiatus in voce αὕτη caesurae excusationem habet, prima autem syllaba in ἀσεβεῖ producitur ad aliorum nominum velut ἀθάνατος similitudinem'. So Karsten, *Xenophanes*, p. 79. The work which contained this verse is unknown. Mullach and Karsten agree in the opinion that this verse is all that belongs to Xenophanes in Aristotle's reference; the succeeding illustration is his own. All that is repeated in the converse of Xenophanes' maxim, § 30, is what is contained in the verse itself. I have no doubt they are right. On Xenophanes and his philosophy, besides the two works already referred to, which contain collections of the surviving fragments, see the histories of Greek Philosophy, by Brandis, Zeller, Ritter, Butler, with Dr Thompson's notes and the rest; also Grote's Plato, Vol. I. pp. 16—19.

30 προκαλέσαιτο. εἰ δὲ λαμβάνει, ὅτι πιστεύει αὑτῷ, ἐκείνῳ δ' οὔ. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους μεταστρέψαντα φατέον οὕτως ἴσον εἶναι ἂν ὁ μὲν ἀσεβὴς διδῷ, ὁ δ' εὐσεβὴς ὀμνύῃ· δεινόν τε τὸ μὴ θέλειν αὐτόν, ὑπὲρ ὧν
31 ἐκείνους ἀξιοῖ ὀμόσαντας δικάζειν. εἰ δὲ δίδωσιν, ὅτι εὐσεβὲς τὸ θέλειν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιτρέπειν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὸν ἄλλων κριτῶν δεῖσθαι· αὐτῷ γὰρ δίδωσι
32 κρίνειν. καὶ ὅτι ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ θέλειν ὀμνύναι περὶ ὧν

ἀλλ' ὁμοία καὶ εἰ] In this illustration of Xenophanes' dictum, the parallel case proposed by Aristotle, the strong man is the unscrupulous or godless man, who is ready to swear anything, true or false; he has the same advantage over the scrupulous, godfearing man, in a challenge to swear, as the strong man would have over the weak in a challenge to fight.

πατάξαι ἢ πληγῆναι] These forms are in general use in Attic Prose as the aorist active and passive of τύπτω. Eth. N. V 5. 4, p. 1132 *b* 28, εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν οὐ πληγῆναι μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. Ib. V 4. 4, p. 1132 *a* 8, ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ. de Anima, B, 8, p. 419 *b* 15, τὸ τύπτον καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον followed by ἂν πληγῇ, ib. p. 420 *a* 24, τυπτόμενον καὶ τύπτον followed by ἐὰν πατάξῃ. For further illustrations see Dem. Select Private Orations, II. pp. 207—211, *Excursus on the defective verb τύπτω.* S.]

§ 30. ὅτι πιστεύει αὑτῷ, ἐκείνῳ δ' οὔ] 'that he can trust *himself* (not to swear to what he knows to be false), but not the other'. (In this case, if you *accept* the oath, or consent to swear) 'Xenophanes' dictum may be inverted (turned round to the other side), and you may say, that this is the fair way of proceeding, for the godless man to tender the oath, and the godfearing to take it'; (because the latter won't perjure himself, the other will). μεταστρέψαι, in § 25, was used in a somewhat different sense 'to pervert' justice; 'and (you may add) it is monstrous for you to refuse to take it *yourself*, in a matter in which (ὑπὲρ ὧν) you[1] require *those* gentlemen (the judges, namely,) to take an oath before they decide'. The judges were sworn upon entering the court to decide 'according to the best of their judgment', § 5, *supra*.

§ 31. 'If you tender the oath, (you argue) that to entrust the case to the decision of heaven is an act of piety; and that (your opponent) ought to require no other judges than himself; and therefore (*lit.* you say this *because*, γάρ) you offer him the decision of the matter'. Comp. Quint. V 6. 4, *At is qui defert alioqui agere modeste videtur quum litis adversarium iudicem faciat, et eum cuius cognitio est onere liberat, qui profecto alieno iureiurando stari quam suo mavult.* Victorius thinks that this is borrowed from Aristotle.

[1] I have translated this 'the adversary' in the Introd. p. 203, but I now think that it should rather be referred to the same person as αὐτόν.

ἄλλους ἀξιοῖ ὀμνύναι. ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον δῆλον πῶς λεκτέον, καὶ συνδυαζόμενον πῶς λεκτέον δῆλον, οἷον εἰ αὐτὸς μὲν θέλει λαμβάνειν διδόναι δὲ μή, καὶ εἰ δίδωσι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ θέλει, καὶ εἰ λαμβάνειν καὶ διδόναι θέλει εἴτε μηδέτερον· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνάγκη συγκεῖσθαι, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀνάγκη συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. ἐὰν δὲ ᾖ γεγενημένος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐναντίος, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιορκία· ἑκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ δ' ἐπιορκεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἐστί,
33 τὰ δὲ βίᾳ καὶ ἀπάτῃ ἀκούσια. ἐνταῦθα οὖν συνακτέον καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ στόματι. ἐὰν δὲ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ ᾖ ὀμωμοσμένος, ὅτι

§ 32. ὑπ' αὐτοῦ] 'by yourself', *supra*, § 20, note on I 1. 12, I 7. 35.

ἑκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν] On the 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' as affecting the character of actions, see Eth. Nic. III cc. 1, 2, 3, where the subject is thoroughly discussed; and on the degrees of criminality, and the distinction of wrong actions done with malice prepense, ἐκ προνοίας, or with deliberate purpose, προαιρέσει, and those which are due to accident, mistake, ἀπατή, or the momentary blindness of passion, see Eth. N. V 10, both of which passages have already been more than once referred to. On βία as a supposed source of action, I 10. 14, and the Appendix '*On the seven sources of action*', Introd. p. 225.

The term 'injustice' or 'criminality' can only be applied to actions voluntary in the proper sense of the word: the pleader who has executed two contracts, one conflicting with the other, and thus violated his engagements, argues that this was done in one or the other instance, either by force or fraud, compulsion or mistake, and that this exempts him from responsibility.

§ 33. συνακτέον] συνάγειν like συλλογίζεσθαι, συλλαμβάνειν, συλλέγειν, συνορᾶν, συνιδεῖν, συνιέναι, &c., and similarly *comprehendere*, *colligere*, all convey the notion of 'gathering' facts together, for the purpose of comparison, and so drawing a conclusion of *some kind*. συνάγειν and συλλογίζεσθαι are to 'draw logical inferences', from facts or premisses which you put together, and so by comparison are led to infer some general conclusion respecting them.

τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ στόματι] This is the famous ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ' ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος, Eur. Hippol. 612. The success of Aristophanes, and the vulgar misapprehension arising chiefly therefrom, have brought on Euripides a most baseless charge of immorality, so far at least as it is grounded upon this line. Cicero, de Off. III 29, has seen and exposed the fallacy. All the moralists without exception admit that the essence of a lie resides not in the words, but in the intention and moral purpose; and the verse when properly interpreted asserts no more than this.

πάντα ἀναιρεῖ ὁ μὴ ἐμμένων οἷς ὤμοσεν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ὀμόσαντες. καὶ "ὑμᾶς μὲν ἀξιοῦμεν ἐμμένειν οἷς ὀμόσαντες δικάζετε, αὐτοὶ δ' οὐκ ἐμμενοῦμεν." καὶ ὅσα ἂν ἄλλα αὔξων τις εἴπειεν.

[περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀτέχνων πίστεων εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.]

See Paley's note. It seems to me that the Hippolytus in its second and altered form, as we now have it, is, with the exception of the one fatal blot of Phaedra's false charge which brings about the death of the hero, one of the most moral and high-toned, as it certainly is one of the very best, of the extant tragedies of Euripides.

ἀναιρεῖ] *supra* § 21, *ἀναιρεῖν συνθήκην, τοὺς νόμους.*

καὶ τοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ὀμόσαντες] 'the laws also (as well as other things) are not enforced till an oath has been taken', 'the laws in particular are only enforced after an oath has been taken'.

καὶ ὑμᾶς μέν] On the explanation of this topic, and of the var. lect. *ἐμμενοῦμεν* and *ἐμμένουσιν*, see Introd. pp. 204—5. MS A^c has *ἐμμένουσιν*; the rest *ἐμμενοῦμεν*, which Bekker retains.

εἰρήσθω] See on I 11. 29.

APPENDIX (A)

ON

A II § 17.

στοργή, ἔρως, φιλεῖν, ἀγαπᾶν.

[The following Appendix has already appeared as an article in the *Journal of Philology*, Vol. I No. I (1868), pp. 88—93. S.]

THERE are four terms in Greek which represent different states or degrees of affection, fondness, liking, love, in its most general acceptation. Of these στοργή and ἔρως are co-ordinate terms, in this respect, that they both designate what Aristotle calls πάθη, instinctive affections, implanted in sentient beings by nature.

στοργή is the natural and instinctive affection that subsists between parent and child; irrational, but moral; an ἄλογον πάθος, but ἠθικόν. ἡδύ γε πατὴρ τέκνοισιν εἰ στοργὴν ἔχοι, Philem. ap. Stob. Meineke, *Fr. Comm. Gr.* IV 63. Fr. Inc. 108. στέργειν, Oed. R. 1023, ἔστερξεν of *parental* affection, Oed. Col. 1529. Plat. Legg. VI 754 B, καθάπερ παῖς...στέργει τέ καὶ στέργεται ὑπὸ τῶν γεννησάντων. Ar. Eth. N. IX 7, 1168 *a* 2, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα: ib. line 7, στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν, which describes an *instinctive* feeling, though not here the specially parental; comp. VIII 14, 1161 *b* 18, οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα...τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς: and line 25, οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, for which immediately afterwards φιλεῖν is twice substituted, lines 27, 28. But the verb is by no means confined to this special sense, and passes readily into the more general signification of 'liking' in the modified form of 'acquiescence' and 'toleration' (to acquiesce in, put up with, as αἰνεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν); and is even applied to the sexual affection, as Xen. Symp. VIII 14 and 21; and in Ar. Eth. N. VIII 5, 1157 *a* 29, it is used to express the instinctive liking or love which children feel for one another, δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες: ἔρως, again, the other form of instinctive or animal affection, is sometimes substituted for στοργή, as Eur. Fragm. Erecth. 19 (Dind.), ap. Stob. 77, p. 454, ἐρᾶτε μητρὸς παῖδες· ὡς οὐκ ἔστ' ἔρως τοιοῦτος ἄλλος, οἷος ἡδίων ἐρᾶν.

ἔρως differs from the preceding only in respect of its special direction and the absence of *moral character:* otherwise it is an ἄλογος ὄρεξις, a natural, animal impulse; the sexual form of ἐπιθυμία, or natural appetite. ὅτι ἐπιθυμία τις ὁ ἔρως παντὶ δῆλον, Plat. Phaedrus 237 D. ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ μεμιγμένον (the characteristic of ἐπιθυμία) ἔρωτα, Tim. 42 A; and though it is doubtless applied metaphorically, in the sense of a 'passionate desire' *similar* to the animal appetite, to represent intellectual and moral desires, as when Plato says ἐρᾶν μαθήσεως, φρονήσεως, τῶν καλῶν, yet I believe that when directly and literally applied to its object, it seldom or never means anything else. Arist. Eth. N. IX 10, 1171 *a* 12, ἐρᾶν...ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα, is an exception; here ἐρᾶν is said to be a kind of φιλία: the individual passion opposed to 'affection' or 'love' in general. The reverse of this—the ordinary distinction of the two words—appears in Pl. Phaedrus, 231 C, τούτους μάλιστά φασι φιλεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐρῶσι, that is, they feel the highest (moral) affections for those who have inspired them with the sensual passion. Comp. 255 E, καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ οἴεται οὐκ ἔρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαν εἶναι. Symp. 179 C, ὑπερεβάλετο τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα, where ἔρως represents the στοργή, or natural affection. Ib. 182 C, φιλίας, ὃ δὴ μάλιστα φιλεῖ ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖν. Ar. Polit. II 4, 1262 *b* 12, ὡς τῶν ἐρώντων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμούντων συμφῦναι, Eth. N. IX 5, 1167 *a* 3, ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν, ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή. The distinction of ἔρως and φιλία appears very clearly in Eth. Nic. IX 1, sub init., 1164 *a* 3 seq., ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ κ.τ.λ. The application of the word to a higher and purer love, in such passages as Eur. Fragm. Dict. VIII (Dind., Wagner), ἀλλ' ἔστι δή τις ἄλλος ἐν βροτοῖς ἔρως, ψυχῆς δικαίας σώφρονός τε κἀγαθῆς, καὶ χρῆν δὲ...τῶν εὐσεβούντων οἵτινές γε σώφρονες ἐρᾶν: and Fragm. Oedip. III (Dind.), VII (Wagn.), ἑνὸς δ' ἔρωτος ὄντος οὐ μί' ἡδονή· οἱ μὲν κακῶν ἐρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ τῶν καλῶν· ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ σῶφρον ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ἄγων ἔρως ζηλωτὸς ἀνθρώποισιν. This is no exception, for here it is still the animal impulse which is represented as sublimed and purified, and transformed (by a metaphor) into a moral appetite, just as the ἔρως in Plato's Phaedrus and Symposium is converted by the same process into a passion of philosophical enthusiasm.

φιλεῖν and φιλία are designations of 'love' in its widest and most comprehensive sense. The verb may even stand as a synonym of ἐρᾶν, as Topic. A 15, 106 *b* 2, τῷ μὲν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν φιλεῖν τὸ μισεῖν ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν οὐδέν, where the τὸ φιλεῖν κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειν is of course equivalent to ἐρᾶν. It also includes the whole family of likings and fondnesses, natural and acquired, which are attached to special and particular classes of objects, expressed by compound adjectives; as φιλοτοιοῦτος, 'one

who is fond of so and so', φίλοινος, φίλιππος, φιλότιμος, φιλόνικος, φιλέταιρος, φίλαυτος, &c. In the eighth and ninth books of the Nic. Eth. φιλία embraces every kind of moral and intellectual affection, instinctive or acquired, and is identified both with στέργειν (VIII 14, 1161 *a* 27, 28) and ἀγαπᾶν—see for example VIII 3, where all three are employed as equivalent terms (1156 *a* 14, 16), ἐρᾶν, the sensual appetite being expressly distinguished from them by its own name, *b* 2, 4. In Plato, Phaedrus 241 C, D, it comprehends even ἔρως, τὴν ἐραστοῦ φιλίαν, followed by ὡς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί: and in the same verse ἀγαπᾶν is used in the same sense (ὡς λύκοι ἄρν' ἀγαπῶσ', ὡς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί). In the Ethics therefore it expresses every shade and variety and gradation of the feeling of love in its moral and intellectual aspects from the instinctive affection of the parent, to the highest and ideal form of love; which according to the Greek notion was not that which subsists between the two opposite sexes, but that between two members of the superior sex; and again within that the *friendship* of two *good* men. The definition of φιλία in the Rhetoric, II 4. 2, is 'the wishing any one what you think good, for his sake and not for your own' (this is repeated from the Ethics), 'and the inclination or tendency to do such things to the best of your power'. This is disinterested affection, love in its moral aspect, and also in some degree intellectual, in so far as it implies choice: and in this respect corresponds with the Latin *diligere*, or *deligere*, to choose the object of your affection, which implies a *judgment* of his value. The analysis as well as the definition of the πάθος in the Rhetoric excludes all consideration of ἔρως, and in fact it is treated rather as *friendship* than as *love*.

We next come to the distinction between φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν. Döderlein, *Lat. Syn.* p. 103, and Rost and Palm in their *Lexicon*, connect ἀγαπᾶν with the root of ἄγαμαι and its congeners: this would make the distinctive character of ἀγαπᾶν an intellectual form of love derived from 'admiration' or a high *estimate* of the merits of the person loved. Whether this be the true derivation of the word or not, this notion of selection or affection, conceived, on the ground of admiration, respect, and esteem, certainly enters into its meaning. Xen. Mem. II 7. 9 is decisive on this point. Speaking of the relations of a master to his female servants, Socrates says, ἐὰν δὲ προστατήσῃς ὅπως ἐνεργοὶ ὦσι, σὺ μὲν ἐκείνας φιλήσεις ὁρῶν ὠφελίμους σεαυτῷ οὔσας· ἐκεῖναι δέ σε ἀγαπήσουσι αἰσθόμεναι χαίροντά σε αὐταῖς. The same conception of value (*estimation*) and hence *esteem*, as the foundation of love—complete φιλία—appears in a passage of Plato's Lysis, 215 A, B, τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἂν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαπηθείη μηδεμίαν

ἐπικουρίαν ἀλλήλοις ἔχοντα (the service rendered or benefit conferred is the ground of the esteem and affection); ὁ δὲ μή του δεόμενος οὐδέ τι ἀγαπῴη ἄν. ὃ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπῴη οὐδ' ἂν φιλοῖ.

I have looked over, with the help of an index, the instances of the word which occur in the Nicomachean Ethics, and find that in every case it may, and in many must, have this sense of an acquired affection, founded upon the judgment or intellectual faculty, which is indicated by the term 'esteem', and thereby distinguished from the irrational appetite ἔρως, and the purely emotional, and usually moral affection, φιλία. In I 3, init. 1095 *b* 17, the *esteem* which the vulgar have for a life of sensual enjoyment is represented as the result of a *judgment* about pleasure: and the same is the case with δι' αὐτὰ ἀγαπᾶται at the end of the Chapter, 'they are valued, prized, esteemed, in and for themselves'. In III 13, 1118 *b* 4, it is distinguished from χαίρειν, the instinctive affection, in the sense of to 'estimate or prize'; and at the end of c. 14 there is a very marked and decisive exemplification of this sense of the word, ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας, where the ἀξία, 'their value', shews clearly what determines the particular character of the affection. In further illustration of this I will merely refer to other places of the Ethics. In IX 7, from 1167 *b* 32 onwards, four examples of the word in this signification occur nearly together: in one of them it is actually contrasted with φιλεῖν: and X 7, 1177 *b* 2, and 9, 1179 *a* 28, where it is placed in juxtaposition with τιμῶντας, another word which conveys the notion of 'value', are two clear instances. ἀγαπᾶν therefore as contrasted with ἐρᾶν and φιλεῖν represents the Latin *diligere* as opposed to *amare*[1].

It may be questioned whether this is the primary and original sense of ἀγαπᾶν, since the meaning that appears most prominently and conspicuously in the Homeric use of it and ἀγαπάζειν is that of the external manifestations and signs of affection shewn in 'welcoming'[2] a friend or stranger, or in fondling and caressing as a father his child, Odys. π' 17: and the word is the precise counterpart of ἀσπάζεσθαι. See the examples in Damm's *Lexicon*, which all have this character; except Odys. φ' 289, where it bears the sense, common in the later language, and shared with αἰνεῖν and στέργειν, of acquiescing in, putting up with, contentment. But as it seems easier and simpler to derive the notion of the external indications of

[1] Ernesti, Clav. Cic. s. v. *diligere magis ad iudicium, amare vero ad intimum animi sensum pertinet.* See Döderlein, *Lat. Syn.* p. 97 seq., and Trench, *New Test. Syn.* p. 43 seq.

[2] Dr Lightfoot in *Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, No. 7, Vol. III (1857) p. 92, regards this usage of Homer as determining the primary and original sense of the word.

welcome from an internal sense or judgment, previously acquired, of the worth or value of one whom you receive so kindly, than the reverse process, the derivation of the feeling, whether it be esteem or affection, from the external manifestations of it, I prefer regarding the intellectual judgment as the basis of the distinction between it and the other forms of affection, and 'esteem' as its primary and original signification. If Döderlein's derivation from ἄγαμαι, and words of that family, could be depended upon, no doubt would be left upon this question.

In common usage, however, it is, like φιλεῖν, by no means confined to a single sense. In Plato's Sympos. 180 B, it takes the place of ἐρᾷν in the representation of the lowest and most sensual form of the passion or appetite of love, ὅταν ὁ ἐρώμενος τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ ἢ ὅταν ὁ ἐραστὴς τὰ παιδικά. In Lucian, Ver. Hist. II 25, we find similarly, ἐπιμανῶς ἀγαπῶσα τὸν νεανίσκον.

We therefore arrive at the conclusion in respect of these terms, expressive of different kinds of love or affection, that, although they are all of them more or less interchangeable in the ordinary language, yet in the strict and proper application of them they may be thus distinguished:—

στοργή and ἔρως are alike in that they are natural, spontaneous, and instinctive; but ἔρως is properly a *sensual appetite*, and στοργή a *moral affection*.

φιλία, the most comprehensive (in its ordinary use) of the four, belongs to the *emotional* part of our nature, includes all grades of the natural instinctive affection from a liking for wine to the perfect friendship (the highest form of love) between good man and good man; and in this its highest and normal sense acquires a *moral* aspect.

ἀγαπᾷν (ἀγάπη does not appear in any writers earlier than those of [the Septuagint and] N. T.) gives the *intellectual* aspect of love, in the shape of esteem; no longer a mere *emotion*; but an affection acquired and conceived after an exercise of judgment, consisting in a valuation or estimate formed of the *worth* of the object of preference.

APPENDIX (B)

ON

A 12 § 22.

On an irregular formation of the Greek passive verb.

[The following Appendix has, like the last, already been allowed to appear in the *Journal of Philology*, Vol. 1 No. 1 (1868), pp. 93—97. The additions in square brackets are taken from the margin of Mr Cope's own copy of the Journal, now in Mr Sandys' possession. S.]

φθονεῖσθαι, φθονούμενοι, is an example of the irregular formation of the passive, which is not seldom found in other Greek authors, but is so much more frequent in Aristotle's writings that it may perhaps be regarded as one of the characteristics of his style. In the Greek Grammars that I have consulted, with the exception of that of Dr. Donaldson, who only bestows on it a passing observation[1], it is left unnoticed, and I will therefore illustrate it by some examples that I have collected.

The best account of it that I have found is given in Madvig's *Latin Grammar*, Ch. III. on the dative case, § 244 b, and Obs. 3, 4, Engl. Transl.; his explanation of the Latin usage will apply equally well to the Greek.

The transitive verb, which expresses a *direct* action of subject on object—the relation of the two being inverted in the passive, in which agent becomes patient and patient agent, I strike A, A is struck by me—is the only kind that according to strict grammatical rule admits of the passive formation: verbs neuter, in which the action ends in itself, to walk, to run, and verbs which transmit the action, but *indirectly*—these are verbs which in Greek and Latin 'govern' other cases than the *accusative* (the case which expresses the direct action)—cannot, properly speaking, be converted into passives.

[1] *Greek Gram.* § 431. Obs. h h, i i.

Speaking of the dative case, 'the object of reference', in Latin, Madvig says, § 244 b, "this cannot, like the proper object, become the subject with the passive, and such verbs (like those that are intransitive) can only be used impersonally in the passive, *invidetur*, *nemini nocetur*." (I am not sure that there is any exact analogy to this in Greek, ἁμαρτάνεται is a doubtful case.) Obs. 4 gives a few exceptions. "To make such a dative the subject, and to use the verb of it personally in the passive, is a rare irregularity; *invideor*, Horace, A. P. 56, *credor*, Ov. Trist. III 10. 25, *medendis corporibus*, Liv. VIII 36," add *regnari*, Tac. Hist. I 16, *virginibus bacchata Lacaenis Taygeta*, Virg. Georg. II 487, *regnata*, Hor. Od. II 6. 11, III 29. 27, Ovid. Heroid. x 69. 2, *imperor*, Hor. Ep. I 5. 21. Heusinger ad Cic. de Off. II 4 gives a list of neuter verbs which become passives, but does not make the necessary distinctions: most of those which he quotes are used as *impersonals*. [On Latin participles of this formation, see Munro, on Lucr. II 156, 363.]

Obs. 2, "Some few verbs are used both with the accusative and the dative (in applying this to the Greek, for *dative*, must be substituted, 'some other case with or without a preposition',) without any perceptible difference in their signification, *adulor*, *aemulor*, *despero*, *praestolor*." In Greek θορυβεῖσθαι (ἡμᾶς θορυβεῖτε, Plat. Phaedr. 245 B), ἀμελεῖσθαι (ἀμελεῖν with accus. Herod. VII 163) are analogous.

In English a similar license is admitted, particularly in verbs which are constructed with prepositions, 'do as you would be done by', or 'done unto', Locke; *Essay*, Bk. I ch. 3, §§ 4 and 7, 'to be sent for', 'gone for', 'looked for', 'to be relied upon' (hence the vulgar reliable, unaccountable, and similar irregularities). See an observation on this subject in Marsh's *Lect. on the Engl. Language*, Lect. XVIII § 14. "The rejection of inflexions, and especially the want of a passive voice, have compelled the use of some very complex and awkward expressions...such a thing *has been gone through with*, *to be taken notice of*, *to be lost sight of*, are really compound, or rather agglutinate, passives, &c." [See Thring, *Exercises in Grammar*, p. 3, 'I am told'.]

I subjoin some instances of this irregular passive from various Greek authors. Euripides, Ion 87, Παρνησιάδες δ' ἄβατοι κορυφαὶ καταλαμπόμεναι, ib. 475, χορευομένῳ τρίποδι, Iph. Taur. 367, αὐλεῖται δὲ πᾶν μέλαθρον.

Thuc. I 126, ἐπιτετραμμένοι τὴν φυλακήν, ("even the dative or genitive of the person, which had formed the object of the active verb, may become the subject of the passive. Thuc. I 126. Xen. Anab. II 6. 1, ἀποτμηθέντες τὰς κεφαλάς[1], &c." Donaldson, *Gr. Gr.* u. s.).

[1] I rather think that this is not the right explanation of the construction in these two cases; at all events it may be otherwise explained. The verbs ἐπιτρέ-

The deponents *αἱρεῖσθαι* and *ὠνεῖσθαι* are converted into passives in Xen. Memor. III 2. 3, Ar. Pol. VI (IV) 45, 1299 *a* 19, *αἱροῦνται δὲ καὶ πρεσβευταί* (this may possibly be justified by the transitive use of *αἱρεῖν*, *but in a different sense*, the *middle* being necessary to the notion of 'choosing', or '*taking for oneself*'). Plat. Phaedr. 69 B (in Ast's note several other examples of *ὠνεῖσθαι* pass. from Xenoph. and Plat.) sim. *ἀπαρνεῖσθαι*, passive, Ar. Anal. Pr. I 32, 47 *b* 2, 3, 4. *ἀναβαθείς*, Xen. de re equestr. III 4, of a horse that is mounted (the regular constr. is *ἀναβαίνειν ἐφ' ἵππον*, or *ἐφ' ἵππου*). *ἀναβαίνειν* in Hom. with the accus. has a diff. sense, 'to go up *to*'.) *ἀπειλεῖσθαι*, Conv. IV 31. *χαλεπαίνεισθαι*, to be regarded, or treated, with angry feeling, Plat. Rep. I 337 A. *σπουδάζεσθαι*, to be eagerly pursued, (several other examples in Ast's Lexicon s. v. *ἐσπουδασμένους*, Isocr. Panath. § 1 44) ib. VI 485 E, *ἀμελεῖσθαι* (see above) VIII 551 A, *καταφρονεῖσθαι*, ib. 556 D, *καταγελασθῆναι*, Euthyphro. 3 C, *πλημμελεῖσθαι*, Phaedr. 275 E, Dem. de Cor. § 155, (in a law). *σπουδάζεσθαι*, *καταφρονεῖσθαι*, Ar. Rhet. II [2. 16], 3. 7, *ὑπερέχεσθαι*, Rhet. I 7. 2, 3, and Eth. N. IV 8, 1124 *b* 10, (*ὑπερέχειν τι* or *τινά* do occur, but rarely). *θορυβεῖσθαι*, I 2. 10, II 23. 30, Topic. A 12, 105 *a* 16, Isocr. Panath. *ἐπηνημένος καὶ τεθορυβημένος* (on *θορυβεῖσθαι* see above). *βοηθεῖσθαι*, Rhet. II 6. 6, *ἐπικεχείρηται*, III 1. 3. *ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι*, Pol. VIII (V) 10, 1311 *b* 35, *φθονεῖσθαι*, ib. 11, 1313 *a* 23, *πιστεύεσθαι*, ib. 10, 1310 *b* 16. Xen. Symp. IV 29, Isocr. c. Demon. § 30, *πιστευθέντες*, *π. εἰρήν.* § 76, Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 622, § 4. *μετέχεσθαι*, 'to be participated in', Arist. Metaph. A 9, 990 *b* 30, Top. Δ 121 *a* 12, *τοῦ μετεχομένου λόγου*, 126 *a* 18 and 21, Eth. Eud. I 8. 2. *προστάττεσθαι*, Top. E 129 *a* 14, *ἐπιτάττεσθαι*, Metaph. A 2, 982 *a* 18. *ἐνυπάρχεσθαι* (an unusually strange form), Anal. Post. I 4, 73 *b* 18. (Waitz ad loc.) *κατηγορεῖσθαι* passim ap. Arist. (Waitz ad Anal. Pr. 47 *b* 1.) [*βοηθεῖσθαι*, Rhet. II 6. 6; *παρημελημένος*, Eth. N. X 4, 1175 *a* 10; Plato, Crat. 404; *ἐντεθυμημένος* (Heindorf) Phaedrus, 246 C (with Thompson's note); *ἀνάσσεται*, Soph. Phil. 140; Homer, Od. IV 177; *παραλογίζεται*, de Soph. Elench. 165 *a* 169. *κεχαρίσθω* in Plato, Phaedrus, 250 C, *τὸ αἰσθανόμενον*, Rep. II. 375 A.]

τειν and *ἀποτέμνειν* are both transitive, and therefore the *passive form* is regular. The accusative is the *local* accusative, which expresses the *seat* of any affection or quality, and follows adjectives and verbs neuter and passive; Jelf (Kühner), *Gr. Gr.* § 545. 6, supposes with great probability that this is a mere extension of the ordinary cognate accusative and its varieties, *ἀγαθὸς τὴν ψυχήν*, *τὰ πολιτικά*, *ἀρετήν*, &c. (Plat.), *καλὸς τὸ πρόσωπον*, *ἀλγεῖν τὴν κεφαλήν*, *τὰ ὄμματα*, *δέρεσθαι τὸ νῶτον*, *τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων*; Gorg. 515 E. *βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος*, *πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς*, and so on. By the same rule, *τὴν φυλακήν* after *ἐπιτετραμμένοι* expresses the seat of, the place as it were in which it is deposited or lodged; the trust (viz. the watch) committed to them. [Similarly *πιστεύεσθαί τι*, to be entrusted with something, the thing being the *local seat* of the trust, that in which the trust resides.]

ἁμαρτάνεσθαι certainly occurs as a pass., frequently in Sophocles and Plato, Eurip. Troad. 1028, Ar. Eth. Nic. IV 9, 1125 *a* 19, in the form ἡμαρτημένος; and in some other forms which are undoubtedly passive; Xen. Mem. I 2. 9, ἁμαρτανόμενα, *bis*, Arist. Eth. Nic. III 3, 1111 *a* 35, ἁμαρτηθέντα, (also ἁμαρτάνεται, as II 5, 1106 *b* 26, and elsewhere, which in this place from the opposition to κατορθοῦται, line 30, seems more likely to be passive than middle): but in those cases where the choice between passive and middle is open, and the form does not determine it, as ἁμαρτάνεται ἁμαρτανόμενος, it is often difficult to decide between the two. Homer certainly employs the middle, Od. IX 512, ἁμαρτήσεσθαι; and there seems no positive objection to the interpretation of some of the forms employed by Plato and Aristotle as middle. (Ast in his Lexicon ranks all of them in Plato amongst the passives.) If the forms in question, ἁμαρτάνεσθαι &c., are regarded as passive, the accusative, which *in this case* becomes the nomin. to the passive verb, is the *cognate*, and not the *direct*, accusative. The *object* of the erroneous proceeding is the *mistake* that is made, ἁμαρτάνειν ἁμάρτημα; which becomes the subject to the passive.

APPENDIX (C)

ON

A 15 § 23.

On εἰ οὐ.

Hermann on Viger, p. 833, n. 309, followed by Matthiae on Eur. Med. 87, defends this combination of εἰ with the direct negative instead of μή against Elmsley, who holds it to be inadmissible, on the ground that, when it occurs, the negative does not belong to the hypothetical conjunction, but is attached closely to the word which it negatives, so as to combine with it one negative notion; as in Soph. Aj. 1131, εἰ τοὺς θανόντας οὐκ ἐᾷς θάπτειν παρών; where οὐκ ἐᾷς is equivalent to κωλύεις: in which cases the direct and not the hypothetical form of the negative is properly used to express an *abstract negation*.

But this explanation, though it is well adapted to the passage of the Ajax[1] quoted in support of it, is not universally applicable, and requires therefore to be supplemented by another and a different solution. For example, in Plat. Phaedo 62 A, we have in two consecutive sentences, first εἰ οὐδέποτε, and secondly εἰ μὴ ὅσιόν ἐστι, and both after the *same word* θαυμαστόν. Now according to Hermann's rule this μὴ ὅσιον should be οὐχ ὅσιον, because the negative here is just as much an abstract negation of ὅσιον as οὐκ ἐᾶν is of ἐᾶν in the Ajax, the one 'unhallowed' as the other 'to forbid': the same rule ought to be equally applicable to both; but it is not, and therefore this explanation of the distinction in this case breaks down.

The explanation, that I would add, as more generally applicable, is this. It is universally acknowledged that εἰ does not always pre-

[1] Eur. Ion, 388,

ὡς εἰ μὲν οὐκέτ' ἔστιν, ὀγκωθῇ τάφῳ,
εἰ δ' ἔστιν, ἔλθῃ μητρὸς εἰς ὄψιν ποτέ,

can doubtless be explained on this principle. And the same may be said of εἰ δ' οὐκ ἦν, quoted by Herm. on Med. 348 (on Elms.) from Antiphan. ap. Athen. III 99 A.

serve its hypothetical force, but may be put in the place of ὅτι or ὡς to express a simple fact; or of ἐπεί, 'since', as a hypothetical consequence, where however no *doubt* is implied; or of πότερον 'whether', as an alternative, after ἐρωτᾷν and similar verbs of questioning. See Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 617. 2; Viger, p. 504, c. VIII § 6. 3, and the passages quoted by Hoogeveen and Zeune in the note; Jelf (Kühner), *Gr. Gr.* § 804. 9; Buttm. *Ind. to Mid.* εἰ *pro* ὅτι *post* εἰδέναι, αἰσχύνεσθαι (Buttm. does not mean that the usage is confined to these two verbs, but merely that these happened to be the only two instances of it in this speech of Dem.); Id. in *Ind. ad Plat. dial.* IV 'εἰ in re certa, et *citra hypothesin*, valet *siquidem* (da) Men. c. 3. d (p. 72 A) εἰ ἀνεύρηκα.' Now it seems to me that whenever εἰ is used in this non-hypothetical sense, it naturally and properly is construed with the direct negative, just as ὅτι and ὡς, or ἐπεί or πότερον, would be, and in the same sense. And I appeal again to the passage of the Phaedo, where, as I think, in default of this explanation, there is no reasonable way of accounting for the variation of οὐ and μή in the two cases after the *same word*, θαυμαστόν. In the first sentence the hypothesis is altogether discarded, and the translation is, 'perhaps it will be surprising to you *that* this alone...and that it never happens, &c.': in the second, the hypothetical *form* is retained, though the sense is lost, and εἰ is still 'if'; 'it seems perhaps surprising *if* (as is the fact nevertheless, of which however there is no doubt) it is not allowed to these same men to do themselves a service'. Now there is a special class of words, like αἰσχρόν, δεινόν, ἄτοπον, θαυμαστόν, θαυμάζειν, which are habitually followed (especially in the Orators) by εἰ in the sense of ὅτι, and are sometimes accompanied by its attendant οὐ: still, although exact accuracy seems to require the direct negative in these cases, the ordinary fondness for indefinite and hypothetical expressions, which has been noticed as characteristic of Greek habits of thought and speech (the use of the indefinite μή, with relatives for instance, ἃ μὴ ποιεῖ, ὅτε δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ποιοῦσιν, Dem. c. Lept. 464, et sim.), prevails so far that in the great majority of cases the μή is retained. In Medea 87 (one of the lines on which Herm. writes his note) εἰ τούσδε γ' εὐνῆς οὕνεκ' οὐ στέργει πατήρ; εἰ is certainly equivalent to ἐπεί, and οὐ technically correct (though Hermann's rule might also apply; as is εἴπερ in the verse quoted Rhet. II. 23. 1, εἴπερ γὰρ οὐδέ κ.τ.λ. This is so clear, that Elmsley, who condemns εἰ οὐ altogether, proposes to read here ἐπεί for εἴπερ. (Note ad Med. 87.) Hermann's example from Thucyd. I 121, δεινὸν ἂν εἴη, εἰ οἱ μὲν...οὐκ ἀπεροῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ...οὐκ ἄρα δαπανήθομεν, which, according to him, are equivalent to καρτερήσουσιν and φεισόμεθα, is much more reasonably and naturally explained on the other principle; of the two verbs, the first being in fact no part of the hypothesis at all, and with the second οὐ being justified by the meaning of εἰ, which is

equivalent to ὅτι. Herm. adds, however (note on Elms. Med. 87), "Obiter adicimus, etiam ubi εἰ *an* significat ('whether or no', a common signification of the particle; where again no hypothesis is implied, not merely an alternative) recte sequi οὐ, ut apud Plat. Protag. 341 B, si nulla est negationis ad affirmationem oppositio." εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι. On Elms. Med. 348, he quotes, as exemplifying his rule, Hom. Od. β' 274, εἰ δ' οὐ κείνου γ' ἐσσὶ γονὸς καὶ Πηνελοπείης. This seems to me no instance of it at all; and as it is equally unexplained on my principle, it must be regarded as an exceptional case, and remain without explanation. All the rest of the examples quoted by Herm. l. c. from Herodotus and the Orators, in illustration of his theory, (with one exception) are instances of εἰ 'that' after δεινόν. The exception is Andoc. περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων § 33, εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν ἡμάρτημαι ἐγὼ κ.τ.λ. How this can be brought under Hermann's rule I am quite at a loss to perceive; but on the other principle the explanation is most clear and satisfactory. Andocides is defending himself, and offers an alternative; εἰ μέν τι ἠσέβηκα ἢ...ἀποκτείνατέ με. εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν ἡμάρτηταί μοι κ.τ.λ. Who can doubt that in the latter member of the alternative the speaker means to represent this as no admissible hypothesis—in fact he says so himself, καὶ τοῦτο ὑμῖν ἀποδείκνυμι σαφῶς—and therefore no hypothesis at all? It is therefore to be rendered, 'but the fact being that I have committed no offence', and is a signal example of the inapplicability of Hermann's rule.

In Dem. c. Mid. 581. 1, we have εἰ δὲ καταγνοὺς ἀδικεῖν τότε διὰ ταῦτ' οὐχ ὑπήκουσε κ.τ.λ., where οὐχ ὑπήκουσε forms no part of the supposition, but is stated as a fact of past time, and *contrasted* with what he may *possibly* do at present. The same applies to Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 250, ἢ οὐ δεινὸν δοκεῖ ὑμῖν...οὐ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων...ταῦτά τινες οὐκ ἐξαρνοῦνται κ.τ.λ. Arist. Pol. II 11, 1273 *b* 3, ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ πένης μὲν ὢν...φαυλότερος δ' ὢν οὐ βουλήσεται δαπανήσας.

I will conclude this note with two examples of a parallel case in which ἂν with the optative is found following εἰ, contrary to the ordinary rule of Greek grammar. One occurs in Dem. c. Lept. p. 475, εἰ μέλλοντες μὲν εὖ πάσχειν συκοφάντην ἂν τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα ἡγοῖσθε, ἐπὶ τῷ δ' ἀφελέσθαι κ.τ.λ., where the contrasted μέν and δέ (on which Buttm. *Gr. Gr.* and *Index to Mid.*) shew that the first of the two members is independent of the supposition: the other in Aesch. c. Timarch. § 85, ἄτοπον ἂν εἴη, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ μηδὲν μέν...καὶ μὴ γενομένης μὲν κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἥλω ἂν κ.τ.λ.

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